IMPLICATIONS OF THE ITALIAN SOCIALIST PARTY CONGRESS, 25-29 OCTOBER

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00429A001200050005-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 16, 2004
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: November 5, 1963
• Content Type: IM

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OCI No. 2392/63
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Office of Current Intelligence
5 November 1963
SUBJECT: Implications of the Italian Socialist
Party Congress,.25-29 October
1. The most noteworthy accomplishment of the
recent Socialist congress was the party's endorse-
ment of a new effort to form a center-left govern-
ment. To that extent it was a victory for Pietro
Nennits moderate faction. However, much hard bar-
gaining with the Christian Democrats is in prospect
during the days and probably weeks ahead. Moreover,
there is no guarantee at this early date that these
negotiations will succeed in fashioning a new regime.
2. Aldo Moro, the secretary of the Christian
Democratic party, who is the prospective premier of
a new center-left government, thinks the chances are
better than even that such a regime can eventually
be pulled together. He is, however,. unenthusiastic
about the overall tone of the final resolution that
came out of the congress. He has also pointed to
several rickety planks in the resolution which will
cause trouble.
3. Among these is an ambiguous one dealing
with the MLF. Although it approves Italy's partici-
pation in the project, Moro finds it unacceptable
because he feels it implies that the Socialists are
against MLF ships using Italian ports. He also ob-
jects strongly to another plank which seems to demand
legislation setting up regional administrations (a
pet Socialist project) prior to a commitment by the
Socialists not to ally themselves with Communists in
the administration of those regions.
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4. Another major obstacle to smooth negotia-
tions is bound to be the pushing and hauling over
the assignment,of cabinet portfolios. Since so
much revolves around personalities, it is impossi-
ble to predict just how this aspect of the bargain-
ing will go.
5. Some idea of what is in store is the wide
divergency in opinion as to who should be foreign
minister, Most Christian Democrats favor Guiseppe
Saragat, leader of'the Social Democratic party which
is also slated to be in the coalition. He is, how-
ever, opposed by the Socialists who favor former
Premier Amintore.Fanfani for the post. Fanfani, in
turn, is anathema to the right wing Of his own party.
Another potential problem is the possibility that
right-wing Christian Democrats, who do not have much
stomach for a center-left government anyway, will
throw up roadblocks by insisting on giving important
posts to such extreme conservatives as Guiseppe Pella
and Giulio Andreotti.
6. A third factor that could suddenly throw
delicate negotiations out of kilter is Ricardo Lom-
bardi, the Socialist leader who was chiefly responsi-
ble for sabotaging the talks for a center-left gov-
ernment last June. Lombardi seems to be amenable to
going along with the majority at present, but he is,
at best, an uncertain quantity. He is, moreover, a
virtual arbiter of party policy by virtue,of the
fact that he controls at least nine of Nenni's 59
representatives in the party's new 101-man central
committee.
7. In the overall, there seems to be nothing
in the Socialist platform that is insurmountable to
the achievement of a new "opening to the left." It
makes the usual Socialist pitches for social and
economic reforms; calls for a general overhaul of
the judiciary, education, and social security sys-
tems; and demands better local government and city
planning in addition to the establishment of re-
gional administrations. There is nothing in these
that the Christian Democrats cannot live with as ex-
pressions of Socialist objectives.
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8, More positively, one provision in the So.
cialists' program appears to accommodate Christian
Democratic insistence that a left-center government
repudiate, in advance, Communist parliamentary sup
port, In addition, this somewhat ambiguous provi-
sion is undergirded by a Socialist move to abrogate
a long standing rule requiring the party to join
hands with the Communists in administering those
cities and provinces where the two parties consti-
tute a majority of the electorate.
9, A further straw in the wind suggesting the
Socialists are prepared to push ahead for a new co-
alition government is an economic report they issued
about a fortnight ago. In this, they asserted they
were still as adamantly opposed as ever to any wage
freeze, but otherwise would not insist on a doctrin-
aire approach in the formation of the government's
economic policy. Thus the Socialists have been pass-
ing the word that this report was intended "to dissi-
pate preconceived fears in the business community lest
a center-left government be, by nature, prodigal and
spend thrift, 1
10. Also giving impetus to the effort to form
a center-left government is the recent statement by
the Italian episcopate issued by the Vatican. This
document, which apparently was deliberately withheld
until the Socialist congress wound up its proceedings,
reiterates the Church's condemnation of communism, but
avoids using the word "Marxism" which has character-
ized previous statements of this kind. The implica-
tion of this pronouncement is that the Church will in-
terpose no objection to the establishment of a coa-
lition government in which Christian Democrats and
Socialists would be partners,
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