INSURGENCY IN LAOS AND SOUTH VIETNAM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00429A001200050007-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 16, 2004
• Sequence Number: 7
• Publication Date: November 5, 1963
• Content Type: IM

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J L C 13
OCI No. 3209/63
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Office of Current Intelligence
5 November 1963
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
SUBJECT: Insurgency in Laos and South Vietnam
1. Laos
a. Pathet Lao pressure appears to have been
stepped up somewhat in the Nhommarath region 'and the
Plaine des Jarres'ar all-scale clashes have
occurred. Pathet Lao preparations
for further activity north of the Plaine. No signifi-
cant change in the general pattern of Communist har-
assment is evident, however.
b. Premier Souvanna?s conversations in Mos-
cow apparently resulted in no significant change in
the noncommittal Soviet attitude toward the Lao prob-
lem. While. Souvanna said that the Soviets again in-
dicated their willingness to supply some equipment
to neutralist military forces, it seems unlikely that
Moscow is.prepared to supply more than a symbolic
amount of. military assistance.
2. South Vietnam
a. The overthrow of the Diem government
appears to be widely popular, but it is too early
to discern what effect the formation of a provisional
government will have in uniting the country. The
greater latitude of the military in prosecuting the
war against the Viet Cong will be a favorable factor.
b. Moscow, Peiping, and Hanoi have all ac-
cused the United States of masterminding the coup
and have labeled the new leaders American puppets,
Hanoi's appeal to the South Vietnamese forces and
ordinary citizens to rise against the "American
imperialists and their stooges" was ignored, and
there has been no significant Viet Cong military
reaction to the coup. Communist military activity
preceding the coup was at a normal level.
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co The Viet Cong continue to capture more
and better weapons than they lose, particularly the
highly prized automatic weapons and mortars.
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