ALTERNATIVES IN THE EVENT OF THE DEMISE OF PRESIDENT DIEM
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Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP79T00429A001300030025-6
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RIPPUB
Original Classification:
S
Document Page Count:
5
Document Creation Date:
December 12, 2016
Document Release Date:
January 2, 2002
Sequence Number:
25
Case Number:
Publication Date:
May 21, 1963
Content Type:
MF
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OCI No. 1838/63
21 May 63
MEMORANDUM FOR* The Special Group (CI)
SUBJECT a Alternatives in the Event of the
Demise of President Diem
A. The Constitutional Successors
The constitutional line of succession to
President Diem is Vice President Tho followed by
National Assembly President Le. Neither man nor
position holds real political power. As constitu-
tional successors, they nevertheless offer an im-
mediate rallying point as front men for a more
vigorous group behind them.
B. The Ngo Brothers
Diem?s four brothers, Nhu, Can, Luyen, and
Archbishop Thuc, exercise real political power stem-
ming from their covert mechanisms of control and
their associations with the President. Although
Diem?s death would be a setback to them, their en-
trenched position gives them a significant early
advantage in a bid for succession with other power
factors. Of the four brothers, only Nhu is prob-
ably a serious contender. In the past year he has
moved increasingly onto the public stage from his
role as a power behind the scenes.
The Army
The army probably holds the key to power
in the country. No leader could remain in power
without at least its passive support. Lack of unity
in the army, however, could render it incapable of
effective, independent action in the early stages
unless provided sufficient sound political guidance.
This weakness was clearly evident in the November
1960 coup attempt. The lesson of the November 1960
experience demonstrated this quite clearly. None-
theless, three or four generals show considerable
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strength of character or popularity and might emerge
to lead a military takeover, particularly if the
situation began to disintegrate to such an extent
that the security of the country was threatened.
D. The Administration
Among a number of prominent, popular or
efficient ministers in the present administration,
none appears to have enough power or influence to
succeed Diem in his own right. Some, however,
might provide important support to one of the other
contenders.
E. The Oppositionists
Although there are a number of capable
and influential opposition figures both within and
without the country, they are out of touch with
the real instruments of power. It is doubtful that
any of them has the ability to influence the selec-
tion of a successor regime, although some, including
persons now in exile, might be called upon to ad-
vise or serve a government dominated by a ruling
military junta. Within the country, the most impor-
tant nongovernmental grouping is the Dai Viet,
headed by Phan Huy Quat and Dang Van Sung. This
group may have a fairly substantial, if quiescent,
membership, including some adherents now occupy-
ing governmental positions, particularly in the
Ministry of Civic Action. The best-known opposi-
tionists in South Vietnam, Dr. Phan Quang Dan and
Pham Khac Suuo, have been under detention since the
November 1960 coup and have little potential for
active influence.
F. Labor
Labor in South Vietnam is not well enough
organized to take the lead in determining a suces-
sor regime. The support of key labor leaders, such
as Tran Quoc Buu, would be an asset to a serious
contender and Buu's organization might influence
the outcome of a contest in the Saigon-Cholon area.
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The Communists can be counted on to make
a bid for power in the event of President Diem's
death, using their front organization, the National
Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam. Although
the Front lacks the means to seize power directly,
it could emerge as an increasingly important alter-
native in the event that a struggle for power by
the major contenders remained unresolved for a con-
siderable period of time.
II. THE MOST LIKELY DEVELOPMENTS
A. The most probable initial development
following the death of President Diem would appear
to be an effort to conform to the constitution,
with Vice President Tho succeeding Diem. It is
questionable, however, if Tho could actually in-
herit real power. He has not been regarded as a
strong leader, but is considered an administrator
of some talent and in time might emerge as a quali-
fied leader. Unlike the Ngo family, from central
Vietnam, Tho is of southern Vietnamese origin, in
a country where regional loyalties are of consider-
able weight. It appears, however, that Tho would
be dependent upon strong support from key army of-
ficers and that he would remain no more than a
titular president.
B. It seems likely that Nhu, with or without
support from Can, would make an early bid for suc-
cession to Diem. If he were able to assume power
quickly, he might succeed, at least initially in
averting a serious, decisive challenge. Nhu and
his wife, however, have long been the focal point
of widespread criticism and opposition to the re-
gime. During the past year, he has been endeavor-
ing to redress this image and to strengthen his
position among the military, the administration and
the public through a more open role, particularly
in the promotion of the Strategic Hamlet Program.
It remains questionable, however, whether he would
be tolerated by the military.
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C. If, however, Diem remains in power for
the next few years and if success of the Strategic
Hamlet Program substantially strengthens Nhu's
political base and popular image, the latter's
chances of succeeding his brother will be good.
Otherwise, the most likely ultimate outcome would
appear to be some form of rule by a military junta,
either ruling directly or through a civilian front
man or group.
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