IMPLICATIONS OF THE SINO-SOVIET RUPTURE FOR THE US

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00429A001300040006-6
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 8, 2004
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: July 18, 1963
• Content Type: IM

SECRET
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
IMPLICATIONS OF THE SINO-SOVIET RUPTURE
FOR THE US
18 July 1963
D I R E C T O R A T E O F I N T E L L I G E N C E
ECRET
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THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECT-
ING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES
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TITLE 18, USC, SECTIONS 793 AND 794, THE TRANSMIS-
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OCI No. 1585/63
18 July 1963
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
MEMORANDUM: x i
SUMMARY
Whether or not a complete Sino-Soviet break occurs, re-
lations between the USSR and Communist China will almost
certainly remain seriously ruptured for the foreseeable
future. The most important implication of this rupture
is its potential for complicating and perhaps significantly
changing world politics over the long term. Meanwhile it
will also create or intensify a number of difficulties for
Moscow and Peiping--and for the US as well. At the same
time, however, the Sino-Soviet rupture will offer the US a
number of new opportunities.
These opportunities may arise principally from a cer-
tain coincidence of US and Soviet interests, especially with
respect to concern over a nuclear-armed China. Such com-
mon interests might permit the US to undertake some new
tactical initiatives and to take a tougher stance with respect
to China, should the need arise, with somewhat less con-
cern for adverse Soviet reactions than may have been the
case previously.
The chances of a genuine Soviet approach to the US at
China's expense are not great, but they do seem sufficient
at least to justify US planning now for meeting the new
hazards and opportunities such a future contingency might
entail.
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Implications of the Sino-Soviet Rupture
For e
1. For most practical purposes, there now is
an open split in Sino-Soviet relations. The viru-
lence of the present confrontation, the directness
of the most recent insults and. accusations at Mos-
cow, and the theological certainty of both disput-
ants reflect new dimensions of antagonism too ex-
tensive to be bridged.. Similarly, present Chinese
Communist pretensions, and the increasing use of
the Sino-Soviet dispute by European Communist par-
ties and factions as a lever for promoting their
grievances against Moscow, constitute new challenges
which must almost certainly be impelling Khrushchev
and the Soviet leadership to question whether the
forbearance they have shown in the past under Chi-
nese provocations might bring unacceptable harm to
the interests of the CPSU and the Soviet state. Ac-
cordingly, whatever the immediate results of cur-
rent Sino-Soviet confrontation, the USSR and China
will almost certainly not be able to restore mutual
confidence or to achieve any genuine or lasting rec-
onciliation. Although efforts may be made from
time to time to restore a more cordial relationship,
especially by new Soviet and Chinese leaders, we be-
lieve that Sino-Soviet relations will almost cer-
tainly remain seriously ruptured. for the foresee-
able future, whatever the case with respect to a
complete break.
2. Probably the most important implication of
the Sino-Soviet rupture is its potential for chang-
ing the strategic setting of international politics.
It will contribute to the displacing of two distinct
and hostile power groups by a more pluralistic world.
The force of ideology will probably decline. The
major states will probably re-examine some of their
attitudes and re-evaluate their various interests
in the light of the slowly changing strategic situa-
tion, with consequent effect upon their policies
toward the USSR, Communist China, the US, and the
Western Alliance. Of greatest import to the US,.how-
ever, will probably be the conclusions the USSR itself
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draws from the changing situation. The Soviets will
probably have to decide whether to incline toward
competing with China in hostility to the US, or as
we consider somewhat more likely, toward pursuing
the logic of their "peaceful coexistence" line and
searching for new ways to demonstrate its validity.
The US will in any event encounter a much more com-
plicated world of new opportunities and problems
It is to these opportunities and problems implicit
in the Sino-Soviet rupture that this memorandum is
addressed.
A. Implications of Rupture for Communist China
and the Soviet Union.
3. We can expect increased national antagonism
between the Soviet and Chinese states. The present
rupture signifies that Communist ideology has not
only failed to overcome nationalism within the bloc,
but has indeed aggravated such sentiment. The USSR
of necessity places its own interests--which it
identifies with bloc interests--before those of China.
Peiping, believing that such Soviet behavior imperils
China's ambitions, at home and abroad, insists in
turn that only its interpretation of Leninist
doctrine can save the Communist movement--and China,'s
interests--from dreadful harm. Because these basic
positions seem unlikely to change under successor
leaderships, because they involve as well a pro-
found competition for authority, and because they
will probably be intensified to the degree that
Communist China emerges as a great world power,
the prospect is probably not just for rupture but
for increased levels of tension between these two
giant neighbor states. They may remain nominal
allies for some time, but even so this tension
will almost certainly be reflected in increased
meddling in each other's internal affairs, more
attempted subversion of the other's party and mili-
tary leaders, and more regard for border defenses
and troop dispositions against the other.
4. We will consequently see a growing incompati-
bility of Soviet and Chinese interests. Increasingly,
the questions which cause the USSR to be concerned
chiefly with its own national interests--military
relations with the US, nuclear war, Germany, and
the difficulties of resource allocation amid the
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increasing costs of military and space programs--
will almost certainly result in less coincidence
of Soviet and Chinese interests. Also, the pres-
ent gulf. which separates Chinese and Soviet socie-
ties will probably widen, the one remaining much
more austere and revolutionary for some years to
come, the other looking forward increasingly to en-
joying the fruits of domestic gains won.
5. We can also expect an accelerated emer-
gence of two competing and hostile Communist world
centers, with accompanying disruption of world
Communism. The collapse of unitary authority within
world Communism is a development of major conse-
quence. The appearance of China as a second center
of Communist authority has already impaired Soviet
prestige in the movement and made it more difficult
for the USSR to contain impulses toward autonomy in
the other parties. In Eastern Europe, this has
been an important catalytic factor in stimulating
Rumania to resist Soviet economic dictation, and
other Eastern European parties will probably be
emboldened from time to time to insist on national
interests, although none will probably wish to imi-
tate the Albanian breakaway. World-wide, Communism
will come to be a beast of more variegated aspect:
a spectrum of parties, some in power, some not, com-
plete with all kinds of dissident groups and fac-
tions. The Sino-Soviet rupture will probably not
in the near-future seriously impair the ability of
the world movement to injure non-Communist posi-
tions and interests. The rupture will, however,
dampen morale and even basic belief among Commu-
nists. It will complicate CP efforts to palm off
Communism on uncommitted audiences as "scientific"
truth guaranteed to yield amazing new brotherhood
and progress dividends. And it will markedly re-
duce the ability of Moscow to continue enlisting
other CPs in support of the USSR's diplomatic and
other interests.
6. There will be an increase in the Chinese
presence and in Chinese-sponsored racialism and
radicalism in Asia, Africa, and Latin America.
Such Chinese activity has been harming Soviet in-
fluence in these areas for some time. The rupture
will further stimulate Peiping to these ends, in
the belief that the situation in the underdeveloped
countries gives them a number of advantages over the
Soviets: economic and revolutionary situations
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much more akin to those of China than of the Soviet
Union, antiwhite sentiments, histories rf griev-
ances against the colonial powers, and--perhaps,
most telling--a proclivity for irresponsible action
which Peiping can encourage much more than can Moscow.
Although we can expect some increased susceptibility
to these Chinese efforts among extremist movements
in the underdeveloped world, such emphasis will in
many cases work to Peiping's detriment, and demand of
the Chinese the most varied and subtle tactical touch.
7. There will probably be a decrease of Chinese
confidence in the deterrent effect of the Sino-Soviet
Alliance on US forcefulness in the Far East. Commu-
nist China's failure thus far to seek to gain its
foreign policy objectives by the exercise of all-out
force, Peiping's brave oratory to the contrary, has
of course chiefly been the result of respect for the
overwhelming military power the US has appeared ready
to bring to bear against it. This has been in part
the product of Chinese uncertainty with respect to
Soviet support. The most recent deterioration in
Sino-Soviet relations has almost certainly reinforced
Soviet concern lest Chinese rashness involve the USSR
in an East-West nuclear war not of its own choosing,
and caused Peiping to suspect that the USSR would
let China absorb US punishment so long as vital So-
viet interests were not endangered.
8. China's economic and military programs will
continue to suffer greatly from the denial of Soviet
support, although China will probably increasingly ex-
plore the possibilities of obtaining needed industrial
supplies from nonbloc sources. The depth of Chinese
ill-feeling toward the USSR is perhaps illustrated
best by the known costs China has accepted in defying
Moscow. The decline of Soviet deliveries and techni-
cal assistance since 1960 has already caused enormous
harm to China's economy and military establishment.
China's leaders have thus succeeded in cutting off
China from both bloc and .nonbloc aid for her eco-
nomic development and military programs. Moscow has
one remaining sanction--denial of the POL currently
supplied to China--but China has already inquired
about obtaining POL from nonbloc sources. Whether or
not Khrushchev applies this sanction, China will at-
tempt to expand its trading relations with nonbloc
countries. It will probably succeed, particularly
with respect to Japan, Western europe, and Southeast
Asia. This expansion will probably not, however,
make up the losses suffered from the decline of Soviet
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support--either in over-all trade level, or es-
pecially, in the unique nexus of patterns, proce-
dures, and technical assistance which obtained a
few years ago in wino-Soviet economic relations.
Moreover, Peiping's interest in greater trade with
Japan and the UK, for example, may exert a more
restraining effect on its foreign and military pol-
icies in Asia than might otherwise be the case.
9. The Sino-Soviet rupture will probably not
cause either Moscow or Peiping suddenly and radi-
cally to change its basic objectives or attitudes
toward the US in the near future: the morning after
even a complete break, Communist China and the Soviet
Union would still be sworn to our destruction, and
not yet critically weakened in the hostile power
they could bring to bear against us. The Sino-So-
viet rupture will probably not remove or materially
lessen substantial Far East problems facing the US:
eventual Chinese Communist advanced weapons status;
Chinese belligerency and encouragement of Communist
insurgency in Southeast Asia: continuing fear of
China in Asia, and uncertainty concerning US in-
tentions; and the possibility that the Chinese Com-
munists will some day undertake such rash military
action, in the Taiwan Strait or Southeast Asia, as
to initiate larger hostilities in the Far East.
Also, Peiping will in time almost certainly gain
sufficient world support for UN entry, even 'though
Soviet and Indian advocacy of its cause will prob-
ably lessen.
10. The rupture will create unique new prob-
lems for the US. Whether a complete Sino-Soviet
break occurs or not, the US - Soviet - Chinese Com-
nist equation will be changed significantly. Mos-
cow will continue to probe US intentions with re-
spect to Communist China, and will seek to persuade
us that there are benefits to be gained by accepting
the USSR's peaceful and honorable professions at
face value.* China will meanwhile probably grow
somewhat more important that it has been in the
equation, and Moscow and Washington may well find
it more difficult to read Chinese intentions, in
times of acute crisis, than one another's.
*See paras. 20-21 below.
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11. The Sino-Soviet rupture will create seri-
ous new problems affecting the policies of third
states. Soviet "peaceful" stances will almost cer-
tainly be interpreted somewhat liberally by many US
allies, and will further complicate US efforts to
maintain firm lines against Soviet pressures and
cajolery. In West Germany, particularly after Ade-
nauer steps aside, added pressures may develop for
establishing a new modus vivendi with the USSR.
President de Gaulle may tend be confirmed in his
view that the Chinese "yellow peril" demands of the
West that Moscow not be alienated. In the case of
Japan, the inducements the USSR has at its disposal,
especially its ability to return certain of the
southernmost Kurile Islands to the Japanese, might
cause Tokyo leaders to consider using the Sino-So-
viet estrangement as an entering wedge for explor-
atory bargaining. Also, the USSR's lessening influ-
ence--and, presumably, restraint--with respect to
Peiping may cause increased fears of China among its
neighbors in Asia.
12. Although China's potential for expanding
foreign trade is limited, some attractive commercial
opportunities are likely to arise, especially for
Japan and Western Europe, as China looks to the West
for capital goods and raw materials it once purchased
from the USSR. The commercial ties that might re-
sult could run counter to US policies toward Peiping
and complicate our relations with our allies.
13. In their struggle with Moscow the Chinese
will doubtless continue to try to capitalize on the
division of the world into white and non-white,
developed and undeveloped countries. The Chinese
will be careful to mute racialism in those instances
where they will be seeking greater support from
"white" parties (e.g., Argentina, Belgium, Aus-
tralia, and New Zealand). The net effect, however,
will probably be to stimulate racialist sensitivities.
The Chinese will probably encourage radicalism in
those areas where they can make the Soviets appear
timid without committing China to overt physical
support of radical actions. For its part, Moscow
may on occasion undertake more dangerous courses
than might be the case in the absence of Chinese
pressures; indeed, this was probably a factor in
the USSR's Cuban missile-base venture. In some
cases, such as in Italy, Moscow's waning control
over the local CP may have the effect of enhancing
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the nationalist cast and respectability of the
party which in turn could increase its political
strength. In more backward settings, on the other
hand, the weakening of Moscow's control may at
times lead some CP's to increased radicalism.
C. Opportunities for the US.
14. To a greater degree than we feel is
generally appreciated, the Sino-Soviet rupture has
been the by-product of US policy. The nature of
the Communist system, and Soviet dominance of that
system, have from the outset tended to dictate that
Communist China--proud, not indebted to the USSR
for its revolutionary victory, and potentially a
world power--would eventually defy Moscow. Neverthe-
less, even though the developing rupture of the past
seven years or so has been caused primarily by Soviet
and Chinese actions, it has probably come more quickly
and perhaps more profoundly because of US actions.
US firmness and nuclear power have presented the USSR
with enormous problems of national defense, overrid-
ing all other Soviet interests--certainly that of
regard for the Chinese ally. US firmness has denied
Khrushchev foreign policy gains anything like those
he has so long predicted as justifying, for Communist
audiences, the risks and costs of his "peaceful co-
existence" course. The US has kept Mao from achieving
his heart's desire of "completing the Chinese revolu-
tion" by acquiring Taiwan; indeed, we have not even
let him take the offshore Quemoys and Matsus.
15. These pressures and these frustrations of
Soviet and Chinese Communist ambitions represent a
fruition of basic US containment policy. In our
view, a general continuance of such overall US effort,
combined with increased US initiative and tactical
flexibility, offers considerable prospect for further
aggravating and weakening many of those aspects of
Soviet and Chinese power already damaged by develop-
ing Sino-Soviet estrangement. We doubt the efficacy
of opting basically to support either Communist
antagonist against the other, since such US action
would carry danger of commitment which would operate
against our true interest over the long run. Rather,
there would appear to be merit in maintaining our
firm and patient position toward both Peiping and
Moscow. At the same time, and as the occasion may
arise, we can attempt to keep our enemies in play
against each other.
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16. Without suggesting that there be the least
reduction in US firmness or vigilance with respect
to Soviet objectives and power, we think that there
are a few questions where US and Soviet interests
may coincide sufficiently to offer some promise of
actions which might help to retard China's growth
in power or to restrain some possible Chinese foreign
policy folly. Such possible actions, discussed be-
low, relate not so much to US-Soviet cooperation, as
to US moves undertaken either with less concern for
Soviet reactions or, in some cases, in the anticipa-
tion of Soviet acquiescence.
17. The principal such question may be that
of delaying the emergence of a nuclear-armed Com-
munist China. Nuclear proliferation will certainly
benefit neither the US nor the USSR, particularly
so in the case of an ambitious, hostile, and unpre-
dictable China. This coincidence of interests will
of course have increasing relevance for US-Soviet
arms and testing negotiations. Additionally, new
implications may in time develop, perhaps with regard
to such questions as possible US-Soviet exchange of
information on China, US or Soviet sanctions against
China, and US and Soviet benefit from any accidents
or delays China's advanced weapons program might
suffer.
18. Such partial coincidence of interests
might also make less risky the buildup of US striking
power against China in the Western Pacific and the
Far East, by making clear to Moscow--by the type of
US weapons and their disposition--that this US power
was not directed principally against the USSR. Simi-
larities of US and Soviet interest may also develop
situations where added Soviet assistance to India,
say, might not be wholly detrimental to US interest
in fashioning counterweights to China in Asia. In sum,
the Sino-Soviet rupture may well facilitate US tough-
ness in any future US confrontation with Communist
China, should the need arise, by somewhat lessening
the likelihood of extreme Soviet responses--provided
of course that US actions did not appear to the Soviets
to endanger the basic Communist position in East Asia
or otherwise to threaten vital security interests of
the USSR.
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19. As Eastern European parties move cautiously
to promote their economic interests, acquire national
prestige, and gain a greater voice in the formulation
of Soviet bloc policies, opportunities for closer
Western contacts and a greater exercise of US influence
will tend to increase. Many parties in the non-Commu -
n.istworld will be more vulnerable to splitting activities
and harassment which should, in time, lessen their effec-
tiveness in national politics. The Sino-Soviet rupture
will also provide us an opportunity to play psychologi-
cally on the most deep-seated Chinese and Soviet fears
of the other: Chinese suspicion that Moscow and Wash-
ington are about to gang up against Peiping, and Soviet
concern about China's long-run power and expansionism.
20. Finally, the Sino-Soviet rupture may encour-
age Moscow to alter its traditional view that world
politics is essentially a bipolar struggle leading
eventually to Communist world victory. This traditional
outlook can explain individual renegades from Marxism,
but we doubt that it can be sustained in the face of
a defection of the scale of China and its retinue of
other Communist confederates. The rupture with China
may thus support that tendency in Soviet thinking
which appears to be seeing the world in terms of
pragmatic greys rather than dogmatic blacks and whites.
This in turn may cause the USSR to perceive a need of
the West. Indeed we now are seeing, and probably will
increasingly see, various Soviet approaches to the
US at China's expense. For the foreseeable future
these will probably be largely tactical devices designed
in part to get the'US to soften certain of its East-
West negotiating positions.
21. We should note that whether Soviet concern
over China will rise sharply over the long run may
in part depend on China's growth of power: the more
such power, the more pressure on the USSR seriously
to court the US. If China begins clearly to boom,
the USSR may in time decide that it must modify
certain of its basic objectives in order to gain
Western support against a fearsome China--even in
the event there should continue to be a disparity
in Soviet and Chinese technical-military power. The
chances of such an eventual genuine Soviet demarche
are not now great, but they do seem sufficient at
least to justify US and Western planning now for
meeting the strange new hazards and opportunities
such a contingency might entail.
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