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July 1, 1963
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Approved For Releas01/04C,,d'lOt MDr N74.12&fQ 14q(30003-6 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY DD/I RESEARCH STAFF INTELL IGENCE MEMORANDUM CIA/ RS IM 63-14 1 July 1963 OCI No. 2133/63 SUBJECT: A Checklist For the Sino-Soviet Talks High-level Sino-Soviet talks (without Khrushchev and Mao) are to begin in Moscow on 5 July. The two parties speak of composing their differepces sufficiently to make worth while a conference of all the parties, similar to the l357 and 1960 Moscow conferences, perhaps before the end of the year. The attached checklist of Soviet and Chinese posi- tions in the dispute ? is arranged under the headings of: The State of the Dispute, The Next Step (Bilateral Talks), The Backdrop (The 1957 and 1960 Declarations), Questions of World Communist Strategy (in five parts), State Rela- tions, and The 'Unity' of the Movement (in six parts). The positions, taken from Soviet and Chinese statements of the past `few months, are given in the words of the parties themselves, although most of the statements have been tidied a bit. Not all of the positions in the dis- pute are given--those relating to aspects of strategy could run on for many pages; but the more important are. The checklist shows how difficult it will be for the two parties to reach an agreement, even an agreement on a stable truce. It is designed to help the interested spectator in his reading of whatever pronouncements, in one voice or two, may emerge from the Moscow talks. The DDI/RS has had useful contributions to this memorandum from several colleagues in OCI and ONE. )i: 3,,g IN vn p.a".uti E p~"t`d t' {+S & & 1,F_Yi7 Ft ii Ss P~' Tj ir HE ;r3, P~ ~~J k4r Release 2001/04g4j?ffirn 14000300W. o~ fJ$ Approved For Release 20014M 1fifjj $A 0014Q430003-6 17 The differences between us are of long standing. They are not to be explained by the different conditions in which we work, but are serious differences on questions of principle. Differences between us have arisen recently. They can be expo#ined by the differ- ent conditions in which the parties are working, and they need not turn into a sharp conflict. There is underway a "third great debate" (the first two being Lenin versus Kautsky and Bernstein, and Stalin versus Trotsky and Bukharin), between the Marxist-Leninists and the "modern revisionists," be- tween revolutionary Marx- ism-Leninism and "bour- geois ideology." Our op- ponents are afraid to pub- licize our case against them. A polemic on fundamental problems has indeed arisen, a polemic in which our op- ponents have attacked the common line of the world Communist movement. These polemics damage our common interests, giving aid and comfort to the enemy. The persistent errors of We cannot agree that the our opponents have exposed movement is "on the brink the bloc and movement to of an abyss," but it is increasing "danger of a true that a "highly import- split." ant moment" has arrived. Comment: Only in recent months have the Chi- nese admitted publicly that the dispute is serious; they now are more willing than the Russians to describe it as that. The Russians take the same view of it privately, however, and they are no longer contending, as in Approved For Release 2001/04/09 : CIA-RDP79T00429AO01400030003-6 CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Releas 01/ "#DHIX WAg50014 0003-6 their February 1963 letter to the Chinese party, that the cohesive factors in their relationship are of greater importance than the divisive factors. The Chinese all along have seemed eager to debate, confident that they have the better case (as indeed they do, by the book), The Russians in two periods (winter 1961-62 and winter 1962-63) have contended that a public debate is necessary (a view they take when they think they are winning the debate), and in two periods (spring 1962 and spring 1963) have contended that such debate is a bad thing (their view when they think they are losing). The Russians currently assert that the Chinese are breaking an agreement to halt polemics; the Chinese deny that they agreed. This question in itself--whether to halt polemics, and how to define a halt-- will be hard to handle. The Chinese have recently become more will- ing also to describe the movement as being on the verge of a split; the Russians have put this possibility less sharply, in terms of "mutual alienation," or "subversion of (our) unity." If the parties were choosing their words carefully, the difference in the terms would suggest a Chinese willing- ness to initiate a formal. break, and a Rus- siar unwillingno.s, to do ::;o; however, the Russians might be, glad to see the Chinese take the ;initiative, while the Chinese might really be unwilling to do so. Approved For Release 2001/ fflMJWMjOjH914001400030003-6 Approved For Release 2001 / Q14MERMIQA00I4 0003-6 I%W Soviet We have always advocated comradely discussion; we proposed bilateral talks more than a year ago, and others have recently agreed. We have always advocated comradely discussion, and we welcome the recent Chi- nese agreement to have bilateral talks. The questions that need to be discussed, in order of importance, are: (1) the strategy and tactics of revolution today; (2) op- posing imperialism and de- fending peace; (3) the lib- erat ion struggle; (4) strengthening the might and unity of the bloc; and (5) strengthening the unity of the movement. The move- ment needs a new definition of its general line. We want to discuss the full range of questions in dis- pute, and:we are willing to have as many talks as neces- sary. We have always been opposed to public exposure of our differences. Lately the CCP has been subject to "pre- posterous attacks," by So- viet leaders and spokesmen among others. We have re- plied to some attacks, but, The questions that need to be discussed, in order of importance, are: (1) strengthening the might of the bloc, e.g. for peace- ful economic competition; (2) the fight for peace and peaceful coexistence; (3) the struggle against imperialism; (4) support of the national liberation movement; and (5) strengthen- ing the unity and cohesion of the bloc and movement. We are ready to discuss whatever questions the Chi- nese want to discuss. Since February 1962 we have urged an end to pub- lic polemics; thus, while we could answer the "ground- less attacks" in the Chi- nese press, we will not. The most recent Chinese letter /14 June7 also Approved For Release 200186 FQ ?Rff AI;001400030003-6 Chinese Approved For Releas2 01/ BE-Vfp 9p014QZ30003-6 Chinese despite the CPSU's com- plaint of "groundless at- tacks" on it, we have not yet replied directly to the Soviet attacks, If our charges are groundless, why is the CPSU afraid to print them? No one has the right to order an "end to open polemics" in order to keep the other side from replying. All who care about the unity of the camp and the movement hope that our talks will help to elimin- ate differences, strengthen unity, and create favorable conditions for holding a meeting of all the parties. Soviet contains "gt^ undless and ^less attacks"'.on, the CPSU and other parties. We will not print it, because it would cail..for a. public reply which would provoke fresh polemics--contrary to our understanding,. the 'wishes of other parties,' and the spirit of our imminent meet- ing. "We should like.to ,hope" that a meeting will improve the atmosphere, and that after a meeting we can carry out a series of measures to overcome the existing difficulties. Comment: In the second set of positions above, the question of first importance to the Chi- nese--"the strategy and tactics of revolu- tion"--in the sense that they have made it the center of their criticism of the Soviet party, does not appear at all on the Russian list; the Chinese usually combine their first question with part of their second, as in their 14 June letter, in which they speak of the bloc's "general line" as "di- rented again~,-t!.the counterrevolutionary global strategy of U.S. imperialism." In that 14 June letter, the Chinese presented their views on "questions that need to be discussed in the talks" in the form of 25 points occupying 35 pages and then added that there were "other questions of common Approved For Release 2001/O i-f),Nf ~V Af001400030003-6 Approved For Release 2001/t",-YnfW-i-V"ALOO14RW0003-6 concern" such as deStalinization and the theses of the 20th and 22nd CPSU congresses that should be discussed. Note that the Russians do not commit them- selves to talking as long as necessary (i.e., as long as the Chinese think neces- sary). The Russians have implied privately that they know they cannot resolve the dis- pute, no matter how long they talk. Approved For Release 2001/t4fffATY]VMT 4A9f001400030003-6 Approved For Release 2 01/""D' 1f 4 9AP014 0 30003-6 THE BACKDROP - THE 1957 and 1960 DECLARATIONS Chinese The crux of the dispute is the interpretation of the 1957 and 1960 declarations of the Communist parties. All of the fundamental con- clusions expressed in the 1957 and 1960 declarations are still valid. We have been absolutely faithful to the 1957 and 1960 declarations, whereas others have not been. The general line expressed in the declarations is one of resolute revolutionary struggle, which cannot be "one-sidedly reduced to 'peaceful coexistence,' 'Peaceful competition,' and 'peaceful transition' ... 11 We have been faithful to, and we are determined to defend, the 1957 and 1960 declarations. "We are deeply convinced that there are no grounds for a re-examination" of that line. The most recent CCP letter /14 June7 again makes an "arbitrary inter- pretation" of the declara- tions and "distorts their major theses." Comment: The most recent (1960) of the state- me nt and declarations issued after a multi- party conference was a mishmash of Soviet and Chinese positions which satisfied neither party. Within a few weeks, both parties had reaffirmed all of their former positions. The Soviet statements given above do not make apparent the degree of Soviet dissatis- faction with the 1960 declaration. While both parties have departed from some of the "joint" positions taken in that declara- tion, the Russian departures have been more obvious; for example, that declaration spoke of revisionism as the "main danger" and was Approved For Release 2001/ DEN AA001400030003-6 Approved For Release 2001/f3fPj'~WMj-VWjj9 hard on Yugoslavia, whereas the Russians (as the Chinese say) are themselves revisionists and are conciliatory to Yugoslavia. For this reason--the obvious Russian 'departures-- and because the 1960 declaration supported the Chinese on issues of authority and dis- cipline (e.g. the principle of unanimity) and provided for further multiparty confer- ences, the declaration has been of more use to the Chinese in the dispute than to the Russians. Approved For Release 2001/t*",N;gpfnrNI"Af001400030003-6 Approved For Release 2 01/t" fTT Af0014-0003-6 QUESTIONS OF WORLD COMMUNIST STRATEGY (1) Strategy versus Tactics It is necessary to have a strategy as well as tactics. We always distinguish be- tween'strategic and tacti- cal questions. Our opponents pretend to have both strategy and tactics,:: but they subor- dinate strategy to tac- tics, and in specific strug- gles they swing between "adventurism" and "capitu- lationism," as witness their conduct of the mis- sile base venture in Cuba. Our "paper tiger" thesis calls for despising the enemy strategically, in the long term, while re- specting the enemy tacti- cally and seriously study- ing him; therefore, it is neither capitulationist nor adventurist. Our strategy, the strategy of the world Communist move- ment, is set forth in the 1957 and 1960 declarations. Whereas agreement is neces- sary on questions of stra- tegy, opinions may differ on tactics, although we should seek unity on these too. The "paper tiger" thesis as usually presented en- courages an underestima- tion of the enemy. The thesis when spelled out is a platitude: of course we believe that in the long run we will win; of course we adapt our tactics to particular situations. Comment: Until recently, Khrushchev has preferred to blur the distinction between strategy and tactics in order to give him- self maximum maneuverability; the Chinese have not let him get away with it. Approved For Release 2001/]WR 9jt001400030003-6 Approved For Release`2,g01/L' P 1-DEN"~9f0014( 0003-6 The Chinese recognize that Khrushchev has a strategy (of sorts), but they dislike its points of emphasis to such a degree that they dismiss it as improvisation, as no strategy at all. The Chinese letter of 14 June in effect called for a new world Communist strategy along Mao's old lines. Similarly, the Russians recognize that Mao shows flexibility in some respects and from time to time, but they see Mao's strategy as simple-minded, so confined as it is to an obsessive hatred of the United States and an obsessive vision of revolutionary opportunities. Approved For Release 2001/t4i"f 17 l-11itOO1400030003-6 Approved For Release201/t*JE~ X A9E0014 0003-6 QUESTIONS OF WORLD COMMUNIST STRATEGY (2) The Balance of Power The balance of power in the world has already changed in favor of social- ism. Soviet The balance of power in the world arena "is changing" steadily in favor of social- ism. We recognize that imperial- ism has powerful military weapons, and our "paper tiger" thesis has always in- cluded the admonition to respect the enemy tactically (i.e. militarily). However, the bloc and its friends are superior in other respects, so that they need not submit to "nuclear blackmail" and can conduct a much more aggressive struggle. Leftwing Communists repeat old slogans, think it is "easy" to deal with imperi- alism, and "recklessly un- derestimate" the strength of imperialism, especially its military strength. Leftwing Communists have always urged a course which would risk the defeat of Soviet power--a counsel which is really a "cry of desperation, an attitude of capitulationism." Comment: It is uncertain whether either Moscow or Peiping ever really believed, as both pretended to believe for some years, that the bloc enjoyed military superiority over the West; in any case, the Chinese believed that the Soviet deterrent was such that the USSR could pursue a much more mili- tant program. The USSR's retreat from its missile base venture in Cuba last fall--a venture aimed at the achievement of a situation in which Approved For Release 2001/ li~ftjWRT&A9t001400030003-6 Approved For Releasgp01/04(V? TFIZ ~ BI4( 30003-6 a much more militant program could be pur- sued--should have made clear o ze Chi- nese (who criticized the venture after the fact as "adventurist") that the Soviet deterrent was not what they believed it to be. However, the failure of the venture has not affected the abiding Chinese thesis that political (moral and ideological) fac- tors are of greater importance, so that Communist parties need not be deterred from armed struggle and other forms of violence by their opponents' superiority in arms. Thus the Chinese thesis in practice calls for the Chinese to respect the enemy tac- tically, utfor other parties to plunge into action despite the odds, Approved For Release ,VY01400030003-6 Approved For Releasqj01/0(DNIQYBEqVAI914(0003-6 QUESTIONS OF WORLD COMMUNIST STRATEGY (3) "Peaceful Coexistence" It is "wrong" to make peace- ful coexistence the general line of bloc foreign policy. Peaceful coexistence with those who are not ill-dis- posed toward us is possible, but maximum pressure must be maintained against the United States at all points. Peaceful coexistence, which is the "general line" of bloc foreign policy, is the only correct principle for relations between states with different social sys- tems, as Lenin taught us and as the Chinese them- selves profess to believe. A certain leader /Khrushchev7 does not struggle; his soft interpretation of peaceful coexistence extends even to the relations between op- pressors and oppressed, and negates the struggle against imperialism and for liberation, Peaceful competition will not establish socialism, and the building of a so- cialist state cannot re- place the liberation strug- gle. A certain leader /Khrushchev7 who believes in the good will of Western leaders, pins his hopes on agreements between great powers. Peaceful coexistence per- mits a vigorous struggle between systems by all means short of war, and be- tween classes by all means including armed struggle when necessary, and it con- tributes to the steady de- velopment of the liberation movement. We will be victorious in peaceful economic competi- tion; and the victory of socialism in the world is advanced "first of all" by building the blocs economy. It is not necessary to believe in the good will of Western leaders in order to believe that negotiations are worth while; and they are. Approved For Release 2001/0t9e)f4p-y -1,01400030003-6 Approved For Releas NW , e 2.001/0q0fqI We do not reject all com- promise, only "unprinci- pled" compromise; some com- promises advance the people's cause, others (as in Cuba) are "treacherous." Soviet A negotiated settlement even on bad terms, such as the Brest-Litousk tre?aty-.. /-or the October 1962. agree- rment on Cuba7, may be ac- ceptable in-the short run, if it preserves us for our ultimate victory. Comment: The Russians view the balance of power as making peaceful coexistence neces- sary, notably with the United States. The Chinese emphasize that Khrushchev's version of it dilutes the orthodox Communist hos- tility to the West, discourages and inhibits revolutionary forces everywhere, and pre- vents Peiping (lacking Russian support) from "liberating" Taiwan. The Chinese letter of 14 June is again scornful of Khrushchev's emphasis on 'peaceful coexistence.' Approved For Release 2001/0tQbR YM? "X f01400030003-6 Approved For Releasep01/0419f),VFIZBFLrIVMAEI4 0003-6 QUESTIONS OF WORLD COMMUNIST STRATEGY (4) Wars A world without wars is impossible so long as cap- italism exists, and the imperialists incessantly foment local wars (pages of illustrations). There is a possibility of banishing world war before capitalism has been wiped out. The hope of preventing world war depends on pro- gress in the struggle against imperialism and in support of oppressed na- tions. The modern revi- sionists beg imperialism for peace, instead of struggling. The modern revisionists, who exaggerate the import- ance of technology, also exaggerate the consequences of world war, which would be serious but would destroy only imperialism, not the people. The modern revisionists, fearing the expansion of local wars, are insincere about supporting "just" wars in this category. The prevention of a new world war is a thoroughly realistic task, in part be- cause the imperialists fear our military might. The Chinese themselves claim to be striving to prevent a world war and to bel ieve this possible. The movement must take into account the "basic qualita- tive change of military technical means of conduct- ing war"; the world looks to us to prevent the "ulti- mate catastrophe" of world war. Local wars in general should be avoided, but there are "just" wars, and these we firmly support. Approved For Release 2001/0t9e)f p]Z]W Y-L01400030003-6 Approved For Release4Q01/O4ff).AT" B " 140QW0003-6 The revisionists' interest in disarmament is a good example of seeking an agree- ment which would be disadvan- tageous to the bloc and to the liberation movement; even the interest is disad- vantageous. Disarmament may or may not be a realistic goal, and progress toward it will in any case be slow, but at the least it is an effective issue. Comment: The Russians tend to imply an in- creasing ability to deter-:wars of all kinds, although they no longer assert expressly that the West is increasingly deterred from local wars; the Chinese complain bitterly when Moscow blurs this question. The Russians emphasize the importance of Soviet military power (as compared with Chinese rhetoric) as a deterrent, emphasize also the fearful consequences of a world war (and imply that the Chinese are indif- ferent to the consequences and may even desire such a war), and avoid a commitment to give material support in local wars to anti-Western forces (colonial peoples, newly- independent countries, "liberation" forces in underdeveloped countries, rebellious elements in developed Western countries). The Chinese have a strong concern about dis- armament, as they want the very weapons which a disarmament agreement would abolish or restrict. The Chinese accuse the Russians of obtuseness, cowardice, and treachery on these matters, and call for "sacrifices." Approved For Release 2001/0401400030003-6 Approved For Release4P01/040()T 140 0003-6 QUESTIONS OF WORLD COMMUNIST STRATEGY (5) Tactics in Underdeveloped and Developed Countries Chinese No revolutionary party will struggle if it has abandoned the goal of overthrowing the old system and no longer believes that it can wino As Lenin taught, leftism overestimates the possi- bility of movement and flourishes revolutionary phrases. Revolutions occur when conditions are ripe. "Export of revolution" is a meaningless concept: only counter-revolution is ex- ported. Modern revisionists exag- gerate the possibility of gaining power by political means; peaceful means may sometimes be used to the point of the transition to socialism, but then the state must be smashed. The underdeveloped areas are the "focus of world contradictions"; the Com- munist movement must vigor- ously support this struggle, for it is "decisive" for our cause. We are against the export of both revolution and counter-revolution. There are good possibilities for gaining power by peace- ful means; the Chinese them- selves admit such a possi- bility. Of course, if the exploiting classes use vio- lence, the working class must also The national liberation movement is an integral part of the world revolutionary process, but the fate of the world will not be de- cided in the underdeveloped areas Approved For Release 2001104M ~~ 4~ X1400030003-6 Approved For Release4p01/ f3' 1 ,W- PNf 149B0014003Q 0003-6 Modern revisionists sub- ordinate the liberation struggle to peace, and even help the imperialists to suppress it. The Chinese program, with its emphasis on a rural base, armed struggle, and the early hegemony of the Communist party, is the model for people of the un- derdeveloped areas. Peaceful coexistence serves to advance the liberation struggle, which increasingly deals defeats to imperialism. No party /except ours7, re- gardless of its size,, experi- ence, and prestige, can define the tactics of revo- lutionary struggle in other countries. The major parties of North The experienced parties of America and Western Europe North America and Western are all led by cowardly Europe are working well in revisionists. difficult conditions. Comment: The Russians and Chinese agree that Neatest opportunities lie in the under- developed countries, but disagree as to the weight of these countries in the struggle, and disagree also about the prospects for military action and about the speed with which the Communists can move for control (the Russians are more cautious). The Chinese now appear to be directly urging to militancy the receptive parties or factions of parties in these countries, rather than genuinely urging the Russians to urge them, as the Chinese want the gospel to come from Peiping. The Chinese do not, however, urge a militant course on all of the Communist parties of the underdeveloped countries; they do not urge it, for example, on the Indonesian party, because they do not want to disturb their Approved For Release 2001/t4f 3 =JVNT 41~9L001400030003-6 Approved For Release 0l/t4f) IW7fffil%40014Q 30003-6 good relationship with the Indonesian party and with Sukarno. As for the developed countries, the Russians may or may not really believe that some of the parties (e.g. Italy's) can come to power by parliamentary means, but they seem at least to believe that a militant course for these parties at this time would alienate them from their societies and thus make them useless for more positive action later; more- over, Moscow has useful relationships now with those governments. The Chinese, lacking such relationships with most of the developed countries, complain about the European orien- tation of Soviet policy and profess to see revolutionary opportunities there as elsewhere, to be exploited by large-scale strikes and violence. Approved For Release 2001/t46 l0f %001400030003-6 Approved For ReleaseJP01/0eolS F 11 iN' i(, A&014O 30003-6 Chinese After summer 1959, another party /the CPSU7, which wants Its own program to be the universal model, at- tacked our general line and our "leap forward" and commune programs, and said that we were carrying out an "advent'urist" policy in directing the work of the state. There may be different in- terpretations of concrete problems of socialist con- struction; e.g. we expect innovations as underdeveloped countries move toward social- ism. However, the exaggera- tion of "national peculiar- ities" is a mistake. Every socialist country must rely mainly on itself for its construction. Those who favor "division of labor" and "specializa- tion" seek to impose their will, and put economic pres- sure on us, They speak of not letting ideological is- sues intrude, and then "per- fidiously tear up" hundreds of contracts. The Cuban comrades have discovered what the as- surances of a certain fra- ternal country /:the USSR7 are worth. -' - A certain Communist country /the USSR7 has not on'.y failed to support us in our clashes with a non-Com- munist state /India7, but has actually supported our enemies. Each socialist country can solve its national tasks "only in the closest colla- boration" with other bloc states. Differences may arise on the forms and methods of our cooperation. Stable and dependable economic re- lations are necessary, so ideological differences should not be "mechanically" transferred to state rela- tions. The might of the bloc "reli- ably defends the victories of socialism." As is well known, we always give strong support to our friends. Approved For Release 2001/Q&91.\qVVLV~WAI 01400030003-6 Approved For Releas~Q01/0&70MM ,~T B ~Q0140, 0003-6 In state relations with us, a certain country has consistently been guilty of great-nation chauvinism. As for the CPSU's claim not to sow hostility, we will not recapitulate the "many unpleasant events," but will ask the CPSU to abide by this statement in the future. Ideological and tactical differences must not be used to fan nationalistic prejudices, distrust, or discord among socialist people. We have never done anything to encourage hos- tility toward the Chinese people among our people. Comment: The Russians in recent years have been emphasizing China's economic and mili- tary backwardness, and the great reduction of Soviet aid since 1960 has of course made it even more difficult for Peiping to solve its problems. The Russians have also under- scored China?s dependence on the USSR for military protection against the West: this is a very sore point, as the USSR does not provide to China or help the Chinese to make the modern weapons which would reduce that dependence. The Soviet support of India, which is to increase, has been painful, and the Russians, knowing themselves vulnerable on this issue, have not really replied to Chinese statements on the matter. The Russians have often implied that an im- provement in Chinese behavior would be mater- ially rewarded; the Chinese have scorned these overtures, and have implied that the USSR will have much to worry about when China, without substantial Soviet help, becomes a great power. Approved For Release 2001/OCIP"NPMPTQUI?4i~01400030003-6 Approved For Release ,Q01/(l MVPDD EPAPIAgBOO 140QA30003-6 (1) The Need for Unity Chinese What is necessary first of all is to strengthen the unity of the movement --one of the conditions for the victory of our cause. No matter how serious our differences,. we should be patient and find ways to eliminate them, in order to unite our forces against the common enemy. However, the touchstone of proletarian international- ism is no longer whether each Communist party defends the USSR, but whether it defends the entire camp, the unity of the camp on the basis of Marxism-Leninism. Moreover: those who claim to be trying to break down the barriers of nationality, color, and geographical lo- cation are really trying to efface the difference between oppressors and op- pressed and to hold back revolutionary struggles. As the Chinese note, the guarantee of all our suc- cesses lies in strengthen- ing the unity of the move- ment. Future generations will not forgive us if we fail to find the strength in ourselves to overcome our existing differences. In working out its own line, each Communist party must bear in mind the interests, aims and tasks of the move- ment as a whole, its "gen- eral line" at any given period. The unity of the world pro- letariat means class anti- imperialist solidarity,:.-not organization along national, racial or geographical lines; organization on the latter lines would do harm to our struggle. Approved For Release 2001/t46 r "16.1,qt4001400030003-6 Approved For Release POIG W-IUA%Xc-~TA8MA00140 0003-6 Finally: the parties must unite on the basis of our interpretation--the Marxist- Leninist interpretation--of the 1957 and 1960 declara- tions. Those who defend the "erroneous opportunist line" of a "certain socialist coun- try" /he USSR7 are not de- fending unity- Soviet The basis for our unity al- ready exists--the 1957 and 1960 declarations, all of the fundamental conclusions of which have been confirmed by life itself. What is needed now is the concerted observance by all parties of these jointly-formulated appraisals and conclusions. Comment: In asking all parties to consider the interests of the entire camp or movement, each of course means its conception of the overall interest, in -wl hh its own interest is. placed first. The Chinese see unity as one of the conditions of victory, the other being a Marxist-Lenin- ist program, as they define it, on which the parties can unite. The Russians want the Chi- nese to stop criticizing them, to stop prosely- tizing among the other parties, and to stop threatening to set up a separate movement. As a part of their cultivation of anti-Soviet Communists both inside and outside the bloc, the Chinese, who pose as spokesmen for all colored peoples, have already begun to split the fronts on geographical lines, and are try- ing to set up their own organizations without Soviet participation. Approved For Release 2001OGW.IEEYWI4A001400030003-6 Approved For Releas J? 01/Q "1.jE 'I0IgEO014030003-6 (2) The 'Equality' of the Parties Chinese In interparty relations, we stand for independence and equality, and we wel- come the Soviet party's recognition of the equality of the parties. We support the principles of the "complete equality of rights" of all parties and of "equal demands" upon all parties, large or small, without exception. If, as the CPSU says, there are no superiors or infer- iors in the movement, then it is impermissible to im- pose the program or line of one party on other parties as the "common program" of the movement. In working out common posi- tions, we stand for the "at- tainment of unanimity through consultation." We cannot have the "wielding of batons"; that kind of unity means "split." There are no.superior or inferior parties. We never impose our line; but other parties may freely adopt-- and sometimes do adopt--our positions as their common line. Socialist equality means both the "right to parti- cipate equally" in working out the general line, and the "equal responsibility" of the parties for the im- plementation of that line. Comment: Both parties believe that some parties are more equal than others. The Russians even. agree that the Chinese as well as the Rus- sian party has special status; a less import- ant party could not have got the same conces- sions from the Russians that the Chinese party has. But the Russians will not give the Chi- nese a status as special--amounting to an ex- change of roles--as they would like. Approved For Release 2001/CqO Approved For Release0'N0 A. A'RDP GW416419AO0140430003-6 With regard to multiparty conferences, for.. Peiping Chinese equality means Chinese veto power (which Peiping in effect had, at the last conference), while for Moscow Chinese. equality means--or should mean--Chinese sub- mission to the Soviet-dominated majority. Approved For Release 200GWgVMVbA;hA001400030003-6 Approved For Releasp01/1ff,P'pg4lq~0014g0003-6 (3) The Source of the Danger Our opponents, who once All of us agreed that re- agreed that revisionism is visionism was the main the main danger, now claim danger at the time, but that dogmatism and sectar- that dogmatism and sectar- iankdm are the main dangers. ianism could become the main danger to individual parties. Modern revisionism is still "Leftwing opportunism" is the main danger, now "no less dangerous than rev is ion ism. " Comment: The Chinese 'legal' case is good, in that the 1960 declaration of the 81 par- ties asserted that revisionism was the main danger, and there has been no subsequent multiparty conference with the authority to change that formulation. The Russians in recent months have more often described the Chinese and their supporters as "leftwing opportunists" than as dogmatists, in part because this turns against the Chinese the charge of "opportunism" that Peiping has made against Moscow. The Chinese have con- trived an evasive answer to the charge of dogmatism--namely, that dogmatism is expressed as mechanically copying the policies of another or submitting blindly to his will. They seem to believe that there is no such thing as left opportunism, although they have defended them- selves against charges of left adventurism. Approved For Release 2001/ fPV lWNTYR9 001400030003-6 Approved For Releasgp OQIUcTTIA0014qWO003-6 (4) Friends and Enemies The modern revisionists treat enemies as friends and friends as enemies. We are the friends of all "peoples," but not of cer- tain leaders. Our opponents have tried to ruin Albania for not obeying their baton, while they have tried to "reverse the verdict" of the 1960 conference on the "trai= torous Yugoslav clique" and have since wooed the Yugoslavs. The CPSU letter says that the CPSU hopes that Soviet- Albanian relations may be improved. But everyone knows that the CPSU is re- sponsible for the deteriora- tion in Soviet-Albanian rela- tions. We continue to be- lieve that the CPSU must take the initiative to im- prove relations. The question of attitude toward Tito's clique is a "major question of prin- ciple," because they are "traitors to the Communist cause." We have been very patient with the Albanian party, which has been very rude to us; and we are trying to improve relations with Yugoslavia, a socialist country building socialism, while trying to help the Yugoslavs correct their mistakes. Our proposal last February for bilateral talks with the Albanian party was re- jected; we are still pre- pared to hold a meeting, and we "do not reject the thought" that relations can be improved. The Albanian and Yugoslav issues are both matters of principle, but they must not be allowed to overshadow the main problems of our times, Approved For Release 200' FICI VNgr-IA: 4001400030003-6 Approved For Releasq,;001IMgTp1la`jb Af#0014W30003-6 Chinese The Chinese Communist party will "never" allow traitors to be brought into Communist ranks. Spokesmen for the Soviet party have attacked the glorious parties of China, Albania, North Korea, North Vietnam, Indonesia, Burma, Malaya, Thailand, Japan, and New Zealand. Under the slogan of combat- ting the "cult of the indi- vidual,"' certain persons are interfering in ? the in- ternal affairs of other par- ties and are trying to force them to change their leader- ships. "What is this if not subversion?" But they them- selves are cowardly, fear the truth, lack popular sup- port, and will be brought down. Communist parties cannot "unilaterally expel" other Communist parties from the movement. The Soviet party highly re- gards the struggles of the parties of Western Europe and North America attacked by the Chinese, and also the struggles of Asian, African, and Latin American parties. The CPSU has liquidated the effects of Stalin's person- ality cult and has completely restored Leninist principles in relations among fraternal parties and states, includ- ing the principle of non- intervention in their inter- nal affairs. The CPSU cen- tral committee "unanimously approves" Khrushchev's con- duct of relations with the CCP. Comment: While the Chinese no doubt detest Tito and the Russians no doubt detest Hoxha, Tito is useful to Peiping as a surrogate for Khrushchev, and Hoxha serves Moscow as a surrogate for Mao. The Russians have recently seemed more willing than the Chinese to compromise by treating both the Yugoslav and the Albanian parties as com- ponents of the movement. Talks about a conference Approved For Release 2001 Pj ALA001400030003-6 Approved For ReleasoW0'NU '/69`!C(P- N TOO AO014OQ 80003-6 might break down simply on the issue of whether to invite Yugoslavia; although the Chinese might prove willing to have the Yugoslav party at end, in order to put Khrushchev and the Yugoslavs on trial together there, in recent weeks Peiping has seemed intransigent on this point. The Albanians much resent the Soviet descrip- tion of their case as a secondary matter. They have sometimes seems to fear the possi- bility of a Sino-Soviet deal at their expense, but this seems unlikely, because Chinese prestige with Peiping's actual and potential supporters would decline greatly if Peiping were to abandon Albania. The nine parties (in addition to China's) specified as attacked by Soviet spokesmen comprise the Chinese camp in the dispute; they range from all-out supporters (the Albanians) to on-balance supporters (the North Vietnamese). Although most of the parties of the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America (in addition to the Western parties attacked by Peiping) support the Soviet party in the dispute, the Chinese do not attack the parties of the underdeveloped areas, because they believe they can compete successfully with Moscow for influence over them, and there are in fact pro-Chinese factions in many of them; a few of them would probably support the Chinese on some issues at a multiparty conference. The most recent Chinese letter tends to con- firm that Peiping's fulminations last fall about "subversion" in the Chinese party re- flected some overture from the Russians to their known or suspected supporters in the Chinese leadership; the conciliators of the USSR do not seem to be Mao's likely successors. Whether there are conciliators of the Chinese among Russian leaders is uncertain; the Soviet leader (Kozlov) who has had the best treatment in the Chinese press now seems to be out of the running. Approved For Release 200JMWIDAA001400030003-6 Approved For Releas01/G 9D1ffMWWT44A00I 4 j30003-6 (5) Prospects for a Multiparty Conference Since April 1962, we have been urging a conference of all /now about 907 of the Communist parties, of the type held in November 1957 and November 1960. Necessary conditions for such a conference are the cessation of polemics and the cessation of attacks on the Chinese camp. The USSR should also take the initiative to improve re- lations with Albania, but we will not cease to expose and condemn Yugoslavia. The questions to be discussed at a multiparty conference are mainly those of strategy and tactics, and intrabloc and interparty relations. The discussions of these questions at a conference must be in accordance with the principles of Marxism-Leninism and the statements of the 1957 and 1960 conferences. In our May 1962 letter to the CCP, we advocated col- lective discussion /6y a smaller group7. There are now "sufficiiint grounds" for a conference of all the parties. Preparation for such a con- ference should include a bilateral Sino-Soviet meet- ing, the cessation of polemics in the open press, and the cessation of criticism of another party within one's own party and in communica- tions to third parties. The conference should center on the common tasks of strug- gle, the advance of the lib- eration movement, the soli- darity of the bloc and the unity of the movement. In preparing for a confer- ence, parties should thor- oughly analyze "new occur- rences in international life" and their own imple- mentation of earlier "col- lective decisions" of the movement. Approved For Release 2001/ ".Df ,R ygtA001400030003-6 Approved For Release.$00T/0Q09 -TC( '&NT46 A0014QQ,p30003-6 If the principle of reach- ing unanimity through con- sultation is accepted--as provided in the 1960 declara- tion of the parties--then one should not speak of a "majority" or "minority," or rely on a "so-called majority in order to force through one's own erroneous line and carry out sectarian and splitting policies." Soviet Previous conferences have shown that a common line can be worked out only when the "all-around experience of all...detachments" is properly taken into consid- eration. Comment: The Russians have dragged their feet on a conference of all the parties, believing on the ' basis of their 1960 ex- perience that their authority would be further diminished. Whether an agreement on ceasing polemics, and an agenda and an invitation list for a conference, can be worked out is prob- lematical. If a conference is held, the Chinese will stand on orthodoxy, while the Russians will contend that new devel- opments in the world require new approaches. The final set of positions shows the Chinese declaring clearly that they will not submit to the principle of majority rule, and the Russians declaring indirectly their continued favor for majority rule. Looked at another way, the Russians do not have a majority: as Peiping may contend, the parties of the Chi- nese camp have at least half of the Communist party members inlhe world. Approved For Release 200 /@dVM ftAhA001400030003-6 Approved For Releasg001/GTdUJMNiUd4001444D'30003-6 (6) Prospects for a Compromise Chinese We are for unity--genuine unity, not sham unity: unity on the basis of Marxism-Leninism and the 1957 and 1960 declarations, not on the basis of the Yugoslav program or any other such revisionist basis. Soviet We are striving for cohes- sion, to prevent the "sev- erance of some detachments" of our movement. Of course, Communists cannot tolerate concessions on basic ques- tions of theory. On matters of principle, Marxist-Leninists must "differentiate between right and wrong and straighten things out." The question is: will dif- ferences be straightened out on the above basis, or will there be a split? While remaining "implacable" on principles, we will try to "clear the path of all superficial things prevent- ing our cohesion." The question is: will we advance in one rank, or engage in a harmful strug- gle? Comment: Chinese statements here as elsewhere are less flexible than Russian statements: the Chinese are thanking along straight lines, want things "straightened out" on these lines, and speak of a "split" as the alternative; the Russians suggest a willingness to live with a great variety of differences among the parties, provided that those who differ with Moscow (from the Yugoslavs to the Chinese) refrain from polemics, obstructionism, and evangelism. Even in the best case, which would be the holding of another conference of all the parties and the Approved For Release 2001/? 0& 41~9.6001400030003-6 Approved For Relea 00'i'/bQd9' FG1PI~DNT16l75A00141 030003-6 issuance of another "unanimous" declaration, it is hard to see how the reconciliation could be anything but unstable and temporary. As- suming that the Chinese would again insist on and get veto power in the working out of a dec- laration, the Russians would have to compromise heavily to get a "unanimous" statement, and even then the Chinese would refuse to be bound later by any position in the declaration which was not actually their own; and assuming that the Chinese would again refrain from using their veto power absolutely, but would use it to eliminate the most offensive Russian positions and to qualify the others, the Russians too would have a declaration-within a declaration which they could present as a justification for their program. (On any other assumptions, there would be no declaration at all: lack of a Chinese veto would mean a 100 percent Russian declaration, absolute use of the Chinese veto would mean a 100 percent Chinese declaration; each party would prefer no declaration to a declaration dictated by its opponent.) The Chinese know that they cannot succeed, in a .conference of all the parties, in attracting the majority to their side, they can at best use the conference to "expose" Khrushchev and to enlarge their camp. And the Russians know that they cannot solve their Chinese problem through a conference, they can at best use the confer- ence to display their domination of the majority of the parties and to placate those parties which think of a conference as a serious effort to repair the damage to the movement. In the second-best case, there will be no declaration, but simply a truce, an agreement to cease public polemics--which would almost certainly be unstable and temporary. In the worst case (for the move- ment) there will be no conference, or the Chinese camp will walk out; either way, the Chinese might sponsor a conference of their own, issuing a new Communist (Real Communist) Manifesto. Approved For Release 200(/, dVM f9A001400030003-6