THE COMMUNIST BUILDUP IN LAOS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00472A000400010018-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 30, 2012
• Sequence Number: 18
• Publication Date: January 15, 1965
• Content Type: MEMO

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Central Intelligence Agency
Office of Current Intelligence
15 January 1965
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
The Communist Buildup in Laos
Summary
Although the military situation in Laos has
been quiet for several months, there has recently
been a significant reinforcement of North Vietnam-
ese forces in the Plaine des Jarres and the Pan-
handle. (See map) These movements have placed
the Communists in a position to meet any limited
escalation of hostilities by the US with a variety
of retaliatory moves, ranging from driving Kong
Le out of his position at Muong Soui through sei-
zure of one or more points on the Mekong to a
major offensive against the northern provinces
of South Vietnam.
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1. The Communist military posture in the
Southeast Asian border areas has been significantly
stiffened since last summer, when it became evi-
dent that the US was willing to engage in at least
limited escalation in its operations in Laos and
North Vietnam. In South China and North Vietnam,
this heightened readiness has principally been re-
flected by a substantial increase in air defenses,
including the transfer of 53 jet fighters to North
Vietnam.
2. In Laos, the Communist buildup has involved
a substantial input of additional troops from North
Vietnam. This reinforcement, although it provides
improved defenses for key installations and infil-
tration routes, also gives the Communists a capa-
bility to move sharply, and with little or no
warning, against targets in Laos and South Vietnam
should they decide on retaliation for increased
pressures brought to bear on them by the US.
3. Although the Communists have stepped up
their roadbuilding and counter-guerrilla activity
in northern Laos, the principal troop buildups
have been in the Plaine des Jarres area and in the
Panhandle region of south-central Laos. Since the
reopening of Route 7 to major convoy traffic in
late September, an average of 15-20 trucks a day
has moved from North Vietnam to the Plaine carrying
both troops and supplies. Roadwatch teams near
Route 7 have not reported for over three weeks,
suggesting they have been forced to take cover by
increased enemy activity. We believe ten North
Vietnamese battalions--probably including newly
arrived elements of the North Vietnamese 335th Bri-
gade normally stationed at Moc Chan--are now posi-
tioned on the Plaine des Jarres and to the east
along Route 7.
4. These forces, which up to now have been
engaged in only limited operations, could be used
to spearhead a drive against Kong Le's major posi-
tion at Muong Soul and westward along Route 7 to
restore Communist control over its junction with
Route 13, which was retaken by rightist forces
last summer. From this key road junction, they
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would be able to threaten Vientiane and Luang Pra-
bang. The units in the Plaine are also in position
to drive south on Route 4 past Tha Thom toward
Paksane in the Mekong River Valley.
5. Farther south, the buildup has dated from
the middle of December, with reinforcements moving
from North Vietnam along Route 12 to the Nhommarath-
Mahaxay region, and south on Route 23 to the Muong
Phine-Tchepone area.
6. The Communists have moved an estimated
1000-1500 troops--reportedly North Vietnamese--to
buttress their forces in the Nhommarath-Mahaxay
area. Communist forces in the area, now comprising
about five battalions, probably could succeed in
occupying the lightly-defended town of Thakhek on
the Mekong (a position easily taken by Communist
forces during the Indochina War following a drive
along Route 12).
7. A considerably larger number of Communist
troops--probably 4-5,000--have deployed southward
from the North Vietnamese border to the Muong Phine-
Tchepone area. Traffic analysis indicates that these
forces may include elements--perhaps even the head-
quarters--of the North Vietnamese 325th Division.
8. Positioned astride Route 9, these forces
have the capability of moving either westward into
the Mekong Valley to seize the government strong-
points at Savannakhet and Seno (site of one of the
two best airfields in Laos) or southeast along the
border for a subsequent move into South Vietnam.
The latter move would entail much greater logistic
problems and would take considerably longer to
develop. This threat might also be more difficult
for the US to recognize immediately, but--especially
if it wereundertaken in conjunction with other Com-
munist regimental size units thought to be stationed
in this border region--could seriously jeopardize
Saigon's already shaky control over the northern
provinces.
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