SOVIET STAKES IN THE INDIAN-PAKISTANI CONFLICT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00472A000600010009-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 11, 2003
• Sequence Number: 9
• Publication Date: September 17, 1965
• Content Type: IM

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OCI No. 2382/65
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Office of Current Intelligence
17 September 1965
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
Soviet Stakes in the
In an- a stan Con ict
1. The coincidence of US and Soviet aims in
the Indian-Pakistani confliCt hastbecomehinUreas-
ingly clear. Identity
and the US, however, has not always facilitated
.practical agreement on a common course fha Indian
Despite mutual interest in stability on
subcontinent and opposition to Chinese objectives,
the Soviet-US relationship with regard to India
and Pakistan is primarily one of intense rivalry
these
and competition for power and influence in possible
countries. In addition, while weighing pt give
moves in the current conflict, Moscow careful consideration to potential repercussions
within the Communist world--especially
the Vietnamese crisis. These considerations ion t together with the reIndia'norpresent
Pakistantwouldaseem to
alienate neither
preclude under present conditions any
Soviet-US course of action to further common
objectives.
2. Both Moscow and Washington have already
called for an immediate cease-fire and a return
to the status quo it?vernmentstandihashforcedved
embarassing to both g
China Both
them into a rather delicate balancing act.
chi
the US and the USSR recognize that only
profit from the current struggle on the subconti-
nent and therefore each hopes to prevent Peking
from deriving significant gains from further ex-
tensions of the conflict.
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3. Although there inote
puncements of
the recent series of Russian the Soviet Union
Indian-Pakistani hostilities,
probably considers th uinvdlving the
at the reached real crisis proportions or requiring SR9 direct national interests fthe? USthe subcontinento
a modification rsiintent on avoiding any strong
Moscow rather appppeaa situation
initiatives
fied and both sides give some aindication
is clarified suggestion or willing
that they are amenable to sugg st ion settlements
to use "good offices" for a peace
The spate of official statementssoover the Past
the points made
week has not added appreciably
final Soviet government statement of
in the orig however,
7 Septembers Indian representatives
probably exaggerated their recent conversations
have probab
was claim
with Soviet officiali,s position than to
probably in an attempt support for New Delh the cases pussian
4. Moreover, in addition to expressing iss
concern and appealing for a dampening
such pronouncements are
Pakistani tensions, of Ind-
designed to further the broader Soviet policy
attempting to under-score
goals. Moscow is thereby
its advocacy of peaceful settlement of internltiona
disputes and contrasts its posture with the "in-
The
statements" emanating from Pek.
cendiary Soviets also call further attention to their active
involvement oi n hernextlattempt affairs the weeks
to convene the
the
o-Asian Conference this fall iin Algiers.
Second leading up Afr to
Izvestia has pointed out the similarity
ov et efforts for a peaceful solution and those ica and
made by other leaders of the nations of host fr ities.
Asia. By focusing on Inds
Moscow may also hope to oxi?eemase3 venUS bn uild-up its
more
inability to prevent a
and deepening commitment in Vietnam.
5. On the other hand, the Soviets have ample
reason to be genuinely concerned. For example,
in the more active Chinese i volvemintthe form f lskirmishes
Pakistani conflict-mP Moscow
contingency
the a_mostaan?ousrto border--is Such
is probably a widening
is l
of the war might necessitate significantly deeper
Soviet involvement and would confront the Soviets
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with distasteful policy alternatives, In the
event of Chinese attacks on India, the USSR might
feel compelled to accede to Indian requests for military
and economic support. This would reverse Moscow"s
recent gains in Pakistan and the Sino_Soviet
conflict. Khrushchev's successors have attempted
to prevent, if possible, a return to the high
decibel count of the Sino-Soviet polemics of last
year. They may also be reluctant to overextend
Soviet commitments by deepening Moscow's involvement
in support of Indian
6. Although the Soviets have stressed their
"traditional friendship" with India, and have
largely avoided the basic issue of self-determination
for the people of Kashmir, they have shown them-
selves to be reluctant to alienate the Pakistanis.
Recent efforts by the USSR to improve relations
with Pakistan are part of a concernted campaign to
increase Russian prestige and influence elsewhere en
along its southern border, notably in Turkey,
and Afganistan. Thus Moscow appears determined,
if at all possible, not to antagonize Pakistan, or
drive it into the open arms of either Peking or
Washington, In sum, Moscow clearly hopes to prevent
the situation from developing in such a wayoasltoia
force a definitive choice between support
or Pakistan,
7, Recent developments, however, have created
an unusual, if not unique situation in which Soviet
and US aims do in large measure concide. The
Russians have shown themselves prepared to openly
defy the Chinese in the pasts The signing of the
partial nuclear test-ban treaty is certainly one of
the more striking examples, In the current
controversy, the Soviets have already--through
indirect--criticized the Chinese for "adding fuel
to the flames," The Soviets are clearly sensitive
to Chinese charges of Soviet-US collaboration. If
at some future point, however, Moscow considers
the time propitious, or feels compelled to take
some strong initiative, it would probably feel
less vulnerable by taking some sort of joint
action within the framework of the UN. The Soviets
resolu-
have ae4dandn6oSeptemmberSandrtthe efforts ofsUlThant.
tions of
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INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
17 September 1965
OCI No, 2382/65
Copy No.
SOVIET STAKES IN THE INDIAN-PAKISTANI CONFLICT
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
Office of Current Intelligence
GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification
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SE CRE T
 Approver Release 2003/03/28 : CIA-RDP79T72A000600010009-6 .
This Document contains information affecting the Na-
tional Defense of the United States, within the mean-
ing of Title 18, Sections 793 and 794, of the U.S. Code, as
amended. Its transmission or revelation of its contents
to or receipt by an unauthorized person is prohibited
by law. The reproduction of this form is prohibited.
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