THE VIET CONG DEFECTION RATE*

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00472A000600050018-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 22, 2004
• Sequence Number: 18
• Publication Date: December 2, 1965
• Content Type: IM

25X1
OCI No. 2948/65
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Office of Current 'Intelligence
2 December 1965
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
The Viet Cong Defection Rate*
("C. a
50018-2
88
Summary
The rate of defection among Viet Cong soldiers.
which rose sharply in March, April., and May, leveled
off between June and October. It may now be rising
again. The number of 'Viet Cong turncoats still is
relatively low.
1. From June 1964 until late February 1965, for
every thousand soldiers in the Liberation Army, about
1.5 defected each month under the Chieu Hoi program.
Between early March and late May 1965, the rate rose to
five per thousand a month.- On the basis of 27 days in
November, the rate appears to be rising again, about. 7.5
Viet Cong per thousand defected last month (see chart).
2. The March to May rate rise coincided with a
large-scale step-up in commitment of US combat aircraft
in South Vietnam, Prisoner interrogations suggest: the
expanded use of air power in part caused the rate rise.
The increased use early this year of conscription by
the Viet Cong and the employment of the draftees away
from home may also partially explain the March to May
rise. Although statistical breakdowns are not yet. avail-
able, it is apparent that, as in other armies, Viet: Cong
conscripts are more disposed to defect than volunteers.
This memorandum is the second experimental product
of an effort to provide a better and more current mea-
sure of Viet Cong morale. It is being circulated only
within CIA. Comments are invited.
ARMY review(s) completed.
25X1
 or Ralaa ' & EdEZC fYl-
OnnrnvcV..~ r ID_RIlP79d790f1f1f1R000rJOO18-2
3. Why the defection rate leveled off in early
June is difficult to determine. The Viet Cong may have
grown more accustomed to air strikes, or may have taken
additional steps to curtail defection. The increasing
presence of the PAVN troops may also have served to
stiffen southern backs for a time. The apparent increase
in rate in November may be a reflection of the heightened
intensity of fighting.
Notes on Method
4. To establish monthly rates of defection, the
number of Chieu Hoi military defectors was applied to
estimated Viet Cong strength figures. Both numbers are
acknowledged to be rough.
5. Some military defectors are not listed under
the Chieu Hoi program. Some tabulated by MACV as cap-
tives in battle would better be described as defectors.
We do not believe the number is high, however. In any
case, the rate of battlefield surrender has not risen in
the last 17 months; which would seem to indicate that the
number of this type of defector has not increased appre-
ciably.
6. Margins of error in estimating Viet Cong
strength are high and probably vary widely from. period
to period. Moreover, there is a time lag between the
presence of a new Viet Cong unit and its confirmation
by MACV. We have attempted in this memorandum to adjust
earlier estimates of Viet Cong strength to reflect the
presence then of Communist units confirmed only recently;
by MACV. Thus, the infantrymen of the 325th PAVN Divi-
sion, whose presence in the south was confirmed by MACV
in June and September, were added to the strength esti-
mates of January and February, when the 325th is thought
to have entered the south.
018-2
SE GRE -I -
 Approved For Release 2005/06/01 : CIA-RDP79TOO472A000600050018-2
DEFECTION RATE 4
PER THOUSAND
ESTIMATED
VIET CONG STRENGTH*
(1,000"s)
CHIEU HOI
MILITARY DEFECTORS
VIET CONG DEFECTION RATE
1964
Jun Jul Aug Sept Oct Nov Dec
121
121
121
121
121
122
123
163
210
222
163
155
191
280
Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sept Oct Nov
132
144
152
156
159
162
165
169
174
177
-
227
212
445
553
894
748
866
1094
715
963
-
**
* Includes main force, guerrilla, and support.
49885 **Based on 27 days in November,
Approved For Release 2005/06/01 : CIA-RDP79T00472A000600050018-2
 STAApproved For Release 2005/06/01 : CIA-RDP79T00472A000600050018-2
Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt
Approved For Release 2005/06/01 : CIA-RDP79T00472A000600050018-2