CAMBODIA'S FOREIGN POLICY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00472A000600050021-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 2, 2004
• Sequence Number: 21
• Publication Date: December 1, 1965
• Content Type: IM

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OCI No. 2946/65
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Office of Current Intelligence
1 December 1965
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
Cambodia's Foreign Policy
1. The often unfathomable, sometimes senseless
and frequently amusing fluctuations which have char-
acterized the day to day conduct of Camboodia's eaowhat,
eign policy over the past 12 years
coherent and consistent
t and remarkably the fact that Cam-
in facy.ct, has The been coheren
bodia+s policy has Prince Sihano aa_hal
hief practitioner
tion of Cambodia's foreign
2, The primary motiva
of Cambodia as a nation
policy is the preservation in the final analysis,
state. Although survival is, the difference is that
the root policy of all nations,
Cambodia feels that its continued existence isrin real
and constant jeopardy. In recent years
emo-
tion has been in part an expression of Sihanouk's emo-
tional response to factors beyond his control--the
in population and power between Cambodia it also
discrepancy
h which no
and neighbors
certain d hiand storicalafacttst
has been based o
Cambodian nationalist can ignore.
3. To Sihanouk and other Cambodians, the key
factor in the modern history of the Indochina peninsula
has been the unrelenting pressure exerted on Cambodia's
territory from Thailand and Vietnam. Otlerbfactors, stru French colonialism and thavehbeen imporgant too. In
US and Communist China, these latter are overlays
the final analysis, however,
to the fundamental problem of Vietnamese and Thai
imperialism.
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4. In fighting for its territorial integrity,
Cambodia has been handicapped by its relative weak-
ness; it simply cannot match the power of Vietnam
and Thailand. The Cambodians therefore have been
forced to rely on the less reliable skills of diplo-
matic maneuver. In the nineteenth century, with
its back to the wall, Cambodia called on France to
protect it from its more powerful neighbors. The
French protectorate, from the Cambodian perspective,
was no euphemism. If France exacted a high price
for its protection, if its control impinged heavil_;r
on Cambodia's sovereignty, that was unfortunate.
It was more important that Cambodia be preserved.
5. The situation changed in the 1950s. The
postwar wave of nationalism which swept Indochina
also claimed many young educated Cambodians, includ-
ing Sihanouk. Cambodia could not continue as a
French colony forever. More important, however, was
the fact that the power realities in Indochina were
changing. To the Cambodians, France was a spent
force, and a new constellation would have to be
brought into being if Cambodia's integrity was to be
preserved.
6. Sihanouk is no ideologue, and when he
espoused "neutralism" as the right path for Cambodia's
foreign policy, it was from practical rather than
theoretical considerations. "Neutralism" was a
fashionable posture for the newly independent nations
in the early fifties and Sihanouk undoubtedly thought
it prudent to keep Cambodia in step. More impor-
tantly, in its emphasis on diplomatic rather than
military solutions to problems, and its emphasis on
avoiding entanglement in the cold war, "neutralism"
was consonant with Cambodia's traditional position
and the realities in Indochina. Sihanouk put his own
stamp on "neutralism," however. As he viewed it,
neutrality enabled the small nation to exert a dis-
proportionate amout of influence by playing off one
great power against ano Th er.
7. Sihanouk played this game adroitly for ten
years. He managed to keep his relations with the US
in good repair, although he felt that the US was in-
volved with Thai and South Vietnamese plotting against
his government. At the same time, however, he was
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slowly improving relations with Communist China.
This balance began to be disrupted in the early
sixties by the growing strength of the Communists
in South Vietnam.
8. At some point, perhaps as early as 1961,
Sihanouk became convinced that the Viet Cong were
going to win in South Vietnam. He viewed with
alarm what he regarded as US obtuseness to the
real situation in South Vietnam and continuing US
reliance on the Diem government, which he regarded
as doomed to failure. His prescription was negotia-
tion with the guerrillas while their strength was
still limited. The object of the negotiations would
be to "neutralize" South Vietnam, which in Sihanouk's
terms meant to keep Vietnam divided. His persistent
calls for a Geneva-type conference from 1962 to the
present reflect this policy.
9. Cambodia's swing to the left, underway
from at least 1961, became more pronounced in 1963.
Phnom Penh's relations with the US deteriorated,
principally because the US would not support negotia-
tions with the Communists., At the same time Sihanouk
was laying the groundwork for what he was coming in-
creasingly to believe was a necessary accommodation
with Hanoi and Peking. The problem for Sihanouk was
shaping up as one of timing--when the Diem government
fell in November.
10. The reverberations in Phnom Penh were almost
totally unexpected. It is still unclear why Sihanouk
acted as he did. The most persuasive theory is that
Sihanouk was frightened by what he regarded as the US-
sanctioned murder of Diem, and his most immediate con-
cern was to reduce drastically US presence in Cambodia.
Sihanouk may also have calculated that the disruption
in Saigon would shorten the time before the Viet Cong
victory; hence there would be less time for Cambodia's
accommodation. At any rate, Sihanouk renounced US
military and economic aid, sent home the 100-man US
military advisor contingent and encouraged a cut-.,.a ac12.
in the size of the US Embassy in Phnom Penh. A 17-
ro:Ath period of strained relations ensued which
culminated in Cambodia's breaking relations with the
US in May 1965.
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11. One of the problems resulting from the
termination of US aid was the necessity of finding
an alternate source of military hardware. Sihanouk
naturally turned to France, the one country in the
west with which Cambodia has maintained.good relations,
to'-.e Soviet Union, which had already supplied Cam-
bodia with four obsolescent jet fighters, and to its
new "number one friend," Communist China. In late
1964, Peking agreed to supply Cambodia with enough
small arms to equip 27,000 men, in effect agreeing
to supplant the US as the quartermaster for the
Cambodian armed forces. In the past week, Peking
has agreed to supply small arms for an additional
10,000 men as well as some antiaircraft weapons and
11 obsolescent planes, including a few jet fighters.
12. For Sihanouk, Chinese military aid serves
two purposes. It has enabled the Cambodian armed
forces to improve its defensive posture along the
Thai and South Vietnamese borders. It also under-
scores, in a material way, Peking's not entirely
convincing public promises for "all-out support" if
Cambodia is "invaded." Sihanouk has been willing
to pay for Peking's support by taking the Chinese
line on a whole series of international issues of
secondary interest to Cambodia. He has been far
less responsive on matters directly affecting Cam-
bodian interests.
13. He took an exceptionally hard line with
the North Vietnamese and the Viet Cong, for example,
during talks in Peking late last year. When the
Communists refused to knuckle under to some of
Sihanouk's more extravagant demands, the talks broke
down. To Sihanouk, the episode was but another
example of Vietnamese perfidy, a warning that the
Vietnamese, whatever their political persuasion, were
a threat to Cambodia. In a remarkable speech in P Hon
Penh early this year, at a time when he was hosting
the leftist Indochinese Peoples Conference, Sihanouk
warned the Cambodian military that "Vietnamese im-
perialism" of whatever political coloration was the
real danger to Cambodia.
14. As long as Sihanouk believes that the Viet
Cong will win in South Vietnam, and that the US will
be forced to negotiate its way out, we can expect
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Cambodia to hold to its present leftward course. By
continuing to call Cambodia "neutral," however,
Sihanouk indicates that he is not yet ready to burn
all his bridges. He has already discovered that
breaking relations with the US and curtailing his
contacts with the West have severely reduced his
room for diplomatic maneuver. There are strong in-
dications that Sihanouk hopes to repair some of the
damage by improving Cambodia's relations with Great
Britain and Australia. A more fundamental change
in Cambodia's course will depend to a great extent
on the course of the war in South Vietnam.
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I Decembbr, 11965
OCI No. 2946
CopyNQ
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGLNCEgF
Office of Current Intelligence
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WARNING
This material contains information affecting
the National Defense of the United States
within the meaning of the espionage laws,
Title 18, USC, Secs. 793 and 794, the trans-
mission or revelation of which in any manner
to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
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