CHINESE COMMUNIST ACTIVITIES IN LATIN AMERICA 30 APRIL 1965

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00472A000700020038-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 16, 2004
• Sequence Number: 38
• Publication Date: April 30, 1965
• Content Type: MEMO

CHINESE COMMUNIST ACTIVITIES IN LATIN AMERICA
30 April 1965
roved For Re [se 2004/10/08 CIA-RDP79T00472AN0700020038-9
ev W.1,011 r Try
Approved For Release 2004/10/08 -: CIA-RDP79T00472A000!000200? ti d?wngro
-and ec oss fi cation
 Approved For' Release 2004/10/68 : CIA-RDP79TOt A000700020038-9
WNING
This material con aiRns information affecting
the National Defe7se of the United States
within the meaning of the espionage laws,
Title 718, USC, Sec 793 and 794, the trans-
mission or revelatio of which in any manner
to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
Approved For Release 2004/10/08 : CIA-RDP79T00472A000700020038-9
 Approved For Rele
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
MEMORANDUM
2A00W0020038-9
No. 1110/65
30 April 1965
Communist China's official presence in Latin Amer-
ica is still very small, but Peiping is working to in-
crease and strengthen ties with its supporters,, and the
hemisphere has become a Sino-Soviet battleground of
major importance. Peiping's exhortations to a head-
on revolutionary struggle strike a sympathetic chord
among dissident activist elements eager to wrest power
from the Moscow-oriented Old Guard leadership which
dominates Latin American Communist parties.
Approved For Rel
25X1
25X1
 472A00&&0020038-9
Approved For Rele se SEC kAA_MLJPIU 77
Chinese Communist Activities
In Latin America
1. The Chinese Communists view Latin America
primarily as a Sino-Soviet battleground and most of
their current activity is tied in with Peiping's
steadily worsening conflict with Moscow. Propaganda
beamed to the area calling for the "liberation" of
Latin America supports long-range plans for foment-
ing widespread chaos and revolution. Like Peiping's
modest subversive efforts, however, it appears de-
signed primarily as encouragement for opposition
to Moscow-oriented leadership among the rank and
file of local Communist parties. The Chinese are
also reliably reported to be actively working to
compete with the Cubans for the allegiance of some
militant Latin American revolutionary groups.
2. Although the leadership in most Latin
American Communist parties staunchly supports the
Soviets, there are divisions in Communist ranks
almost everywhere. There are splits between the
cautious and the impetuous, between the Old Guard
in control and younger men hungry for power. Pei-
ping's exhortations to head-on struggle strike a
sympathetic chord in some impatient splinter groups.
They quote Peiping and Havana against their opponents
in intraparty struggles, and the violence of the
Sino-Soviet polemic over strategy lends respectability
to their local heresies.
3. Chinese Communist propaganda is flooding
Latin America in ever-increasing volume. Peiping
broadcasts more than thirty-five hours a week in
Spanish and Portuguese, trumpeting its identity of
interests with the "masses" and the applicability of
Chinese Communist revolutionary experience to the
local scene. This is backed up by a few indigenous
propagandists, recruited as stringers for the offi-
cial New China News Agency (NCNA), who distribute
Spanish language editions of glossy Chinese magazines
and ideological journals.
Approved For Re'0220 100_40910glmrpA-Rl;)R79TQQ47-'A-QQ07000-100384
 6. Revolutionary take-over undoubtedly figures
in Peiping's ambitions but as yet the Chinese Commu-
nists have not been able to secure satisfactory bases
from which to operate. Working at a great distance
and with limited resources, Peiping has thus far had
little success in establishing an official presence
in Latin America. While a great many dissident lead-
ers have traveled to Communist China, Chinese per-
sonnel have had relatively limited access to Latin
America.
7. The Chinese Communist Embassy in Havana--
established in September 1950--remains Peiping's
only diplomatic mission in the hemisphere. Aside
from its bureau in Cuba, NCNA has Chinese officers
only in Mexico and Chile. Elsewhere it is repre-
sented by stringers recruited locally. Except for
Mexico and Chile, Chinese Communist attempts to use
trade ties as a lever to establish permanent rep-
resentation have thus far failed.
8, Communist China trades with only a handful
of Latin American countries. Last year Peiping
bought grain in Argentina worth about $100 million
and made purchases of grain and cotton in Mexico
amounting to about $35 million. Deals for Chilean
copper and nitrates during 1964 came to approximately
$4.5 million, including contracts for delivery in
1965, Over-all trade with Cuba totaled less than
$200 million.
Approved For Rel
25X1