THE SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00472A001800030001-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 25
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 4, 2001
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: September 1, 1965
• Content Type: REPORT

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OCI No.0635/65
CoIfy- ` 9
WEEKLY REPORT
THE SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM
1 September 1965
DIA Declassification/Release Instructions on File
INTELLIGENCE AND REPORTING SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE INTERAGENCY
VIETNAM COORDINATING COMMITTEE
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GROUP 1
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OCI No. 0635/65
Published by the Directorate of Intelligence
Central Intelligence Agency
THE SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM
(26 August - 1 September 1965)
C O N T E N T S
Page
THE WEEK IN PERSPECTIVE iii
Map, South Vietnam, following page
I. THE SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM
A. POLITICAL SITUATION
Premier Ky warns against further
student demonstrations (p. 1);
Protest rally in Da Nang denounces
General Thieu (p. 1); Buddhist in-
volvement remains uncertain (p. 2);
criticisms
of Ky p. 2); military directorate
faces further stress (p. 3); Incon-
clusive government talks with FULRO
(p. 3); Retail price index slightly
higher (p. 4); New exchange system
goes into effect (p. 4).-
B, MILITARY SITUATION 6
Operations again favor GVN (p. 6);
Incident statistics (p. 6); Major VC
threat possible in III Corps (p. 6);
VC mortars and artillery are analyzed
(p. 7); Two major clearing operations
improve communications only slightly
(p. 7); Large-scale operations and VC
contacts decrease (p. 8); Significant
activities in various corps zones(p. 8).
-i-
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C. RURAL RECONSTRUCTION
GVN outlines measures to imple-
ment pacification program (p. 10);
Ky considers decentralization is
key to effectiveness (p. 10);
General Lansdale to advise on econ-
omic and social programs (p. 10);
Number of returnees drops sharply
(P. 10).
Page
10
II. THIRD COUNTRY DEVELOPMENTS 12
Premier Ky calls for united effort
by free nations, announces new
visit (p. 12); Foreign minister
goes to Singapore (p. 12); Ky reported
disappointed with Thai reception
(p. 12); African tour planned for
Vietnamese diplomat (p. 13).
III. DEVELOPMENTS IN THE BLOC 14
Two new SAM sites spotted in DRV
(p. 14); Six US aircraft lost to DRV
fire (p. 14); North Vietnamese dele-
gation confers in Paris (p. 14); DRV
friendship group returns from Moscow
(p. 14); Brezhnev attacks US-Vietnam
policy (p. 15).
ANNEX SOUTH VIETNAM BATTLE STATISTICS
(The Weekly Report on the Situation in South
Vietnam is based on contributions from CIA, DIA,
and INR; it is edited and published by CIA without
final coordination. A fully coordinated Monthly
Report will be disseminated Friday, 10 September,
and on the first Friday of every month thereafter.)
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Premier Ky has spoken out against continuing student
unrest, warning that existing laws will be utilized to deal
sternly with antigovernment demonstrations. Although
remaining nonviolent in nature, and with meetings still
relatively poorly attended, the student protest movement
has picked up some slight momentum. The ousting from
power of chief of state General Thieu now seems to be
the principal objective of the students, with the mobiliza-
tion decree fading as a target of criticism. Ky has
answered this particular challenge by emphasizing that
government leadership is on a collective basis.
Private criticism of Premier Ky by 25X1X
has added an ominous note to the
student unrest in central Vietnam. =charges that Ky 25X1X
is not up to the responsibilities of the premiership, and
predicts that the government will not last more than two
months. =thus far is taking a detached attitude to-
ward student demonstrations in Hue, and he may well
view this situation as a potential vehicle for coming into
power in Saigon. The US Embassy, in an assessment of
the political situation, points out that the grace period
has ended for the present regime and that the generals
must pull together if they are to survive against internal
opposition.
The significant military development of the week was
the intensification of Viet Cong activity in the Saigon area.
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I. THE SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM
A. POLITICAL SITUATION
1. In an effort to quel simmering student un-
rest, Premier Nguyen Cao Ky has warned that the
military regime will not tolerate unconstructive
criticism and will deal harshly with antigovern-
ment demonstrations. Ky, in a 31 August statement,
said that the government would be forced to imple-
ment existing laws against smear campaigns, a clear
reference to student attacks against chief of state
General Nguyen Van Thieu. Ky emphasized that
since governmental decisions are reached on a col-
lective basis, no one individual can be singled
out as a target of criticism. It is problematical
whether student critics will be deterred to any
significant extent by Ky's words alone, since one
of the key charges leveled against the Saigon gov-
ernment is its failure to implement a sweeping
26-point reform program announced by Ky soon
after assuming office.
2. Student opposition to the government
gathered some slight momentum during the past
week, but is still far from being a strong move-
ment. Demonstrations, which had largely been con-
fined to Hue and Saigon, on 30 August spread to
the city of Da Nang where several thousand people
attended an antigovernment rally in the central
market. The crowd, generally orderly as in the
case of all demonstrations to date, applauded
speeches denouncing General Thieu, Thuting
of Thieu from power, rather than opposition
the government's mobilization decree, now seems
to be the principal focus of the student struggle
movement. Hue continues to be the center of stu-
dent discord, and although attendance at the al-
most daily demonstrations there remains relatively
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small, some degree of popular influence is seen
in the success of student calls for short periods
of work stoppage by shop owners and cyclo drivers.
3. The exact role of militant Buddhist leader
Thick Tri Quang in the current agitation in Hue is
still uncertain. Quang apparently has now left
Saigon for Hue, but thus far has not thrown his
considerable weight directly behind the students.
According to one report, the 30 August demonstra-
tion in Da Nang received some direction from Bud-
dhist leaders, although they remained in the back-
ground. also
suspects TEXT Tne recent
reports of a new peace movement being organized
by youthful Buddhist leader Thich Quang Lien may
be a devious plot to bring about government repres-
sion, thereby providing the Buddhists with an
issue.
4. An ominous aspect to the student unrest
is the private criticism of Premier K made re-
cently by 25X1X
25X1X On 25 August voiced the 25X1X
opinion to a official that the Thieu-Ky gov-
ernment would not last more than two months 25X1X
argued that Ky is overwhelmed by the respon es
of office, that the government has not fulfilled
any of its promises, and that the people-
-particu-larly those in I Corps--are becoming restless.
25X1X
Although _ previously had always exhibited a
willingness to work in a form of partnership with
Ky, he may view the current student unrest as a
potential vehicle for vaulting into power in
25X1X Saigon. However, is playing his typically
cautious game, an is difficult to tell at what
point his tolerance of the student protest move-
ment might be construed as more than merely al-
lowing critics a chance to blow off steam.
has said that he would take steps to head o any
anti-American manifestations.
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5. Further indications of stresses and strains
within the ruling Military Directorate have been
revealed by Foreign Minister Tran Van Do, who says
he is worried by signs of mutual suspicion and
rivalry between Ky, Thieu, as well as 25X1X
among their immediate follo . has also com-
plained of the lack of progress in the government,
charging that the decision-making process is too
slow because of the need to obtain Directorate
approval.
6. The US Embassy feels that the grace
period has ended for the present regime, and
that Ky and the other generals must be prepared
to cooperate and present a unified front to oppo-
sition if they are to survive. The embassy ap-
praisal notes that sufficient time now has elapsed
for potential opponents to have measured the
strengths, weaknesses, and vulnerabilities of the
Saigon regime. The appraisal points out that
while it is important for the government to act
decisively to put down disorders that might erupt
in trouble spots, due caution must be exercised
to avoid alienation of power groups such as the
Buddhists.
7. The Vietnamese Government is still en-
gaged in inconclusive talks with leaders of the
dissident tribal organization known as FULRO. A
recent report suggests that FULRO's initial de-
mands--including that of autonomous status in an
envisioned federated republic of Vietnam--are being
scaled down to more reasonable objectives center-
ing about reforms in local administrative and
economic matters. Vietnamese leaders are divided
between those who advocate a ruthless handling of
the FULRO issue--i.e., bombing dissidents unless
they submit fully to Saigon authority--and those
who favor a lenient approach. The overall problem
is complicated by the traditional distrust that
exists between the Vietnamese and the minority
tribesmen. In this connection, Vietnamese leaders
have also shown extreme sensitivity to US programs
utilizing the tribesmen for paramilitary operations.
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8. Directory Chairman Nguyen Van Thieu dis-
cussed GVN conditions for negotiations and peace
in a speech at the Thu Duc Reserve Officers'
School on 27 August. Thieu called on the Commu-
nists to put and end to their political and
military organizations as well as their sabotage
activities in South Vietnam, and to withdraw all
their troops and cadres to the North. "'As far
as we are concerned," he said, "the above pre-
conditions have to be met if the Viet Cong want
to talk about negotiations and peace." He also
added that "we cannot barter our honor, our ter-
ritorial integrity and national sovereignty as a
nation with aggressors." Thieu dismissed as a
Communist trap all talk of neutrality and "a
democratic coalition."
Economic Situation
9. The retail price index moved up again
last week, rising by 1.5 percent; it is, however,
only 1.1 percent higher than a month ago. The
price index for US-financed commodities dropped
0.9 percent, having risen earlier in the month.
It is now 2.7 percent higher than a month ago,
and 5.4 percent above official levels. The
Saigon rice market continues to be stable;
stocks are declining, however, as scheduled im-
ports have not arrived as soon as expected and
needs have increased due to continued refugee
inflows.
10. The new exchange system arranged with
the GVN last week went into effect on 31 August.
It is intended to curtail the black market and
help restore GVN control over foreign exchange.
The liberalized exchange arrangement for foreign
personnel is reinforced by the introduction of
a military payment certificate system.
11. Vietnamese coastal shipping capacity re-
mains at 16,000 tons per month, far below the 54,000
tons required. As reported in the Weekly Report
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of 11 August, the GVN was to charter eight additional
vessels by 27 August, but these ships have not yet
come into service. Meanwhile, the US Mission is
making its own arrangements for eight Japanese
vessels, and expects to have them in service around
15'September, increasing monthly capacity to about
40,000 tons.
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MILITARY SITUATION
1. Military operations favored the GVN again
this past week, although the kill ratio decreased
to 3.06 to one in favor of government forces
from the 14 to one ratio of the previous week.
Viet Cong activity increased slightly and was
characterized by the usual pattern of terrorism
and harassment. Attacks were limited generally
to lightly defended government centers of influence
in the interior, and the Viet Cong generally
avoided contact with major South Vietnamese and
US forces. Two battalion-sized attacks were re-
ported-one each in III and IV Corps.
2. The week's incident total increased from
486 to 534. Terrorism was high as usual, com-
prising 62 percent of all incidents, or 329 as
compared to the previous week's 296. Sabotage
decreased slightly, from 78 to 73, but included
numerous instances of rail removals and destruc-
tion. There was a rise in antiaircraft actions,
with 79 against 50 the'previous week. Propaganda
incidents fell off to 41, from 51. The IV Corps
zone was the scene of the largest number of inci-
dents--190, or 36 percent of the total.
3. A moderate increase of Viet Cong activity
was reported from III Corps where a major threat
may be developing. Ralliers have stated that a
Viet Cong regiment, designated the 302nd, has
completed its training cycle in Tay Ninh Province
and is now moving eastward into the area comprising
Binh Duong and the southern portions of Binh Long
and Phuoc Long Provinces. In other developments
in III Corps, a series of Viet Cong attacks in
Long An Province in the vicinity of the Capital
Military Region caused heavy friendly casualties.
An estimated 450 Viet Cong were involved in one
attack. The simultaneous attack on Tan Nhut out-
post--about 12 miles from the capital--and the
mortaring of near-by Binh Chan district town fol-
lowed by just a few hours a Liberation Front broad-
cast urging encirclement of Saigon and increased
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attacks on communication lines. Viet Conk; ac-
tivity in IV Corps was highlighted by a battalion-
size attack against a government outpost in An
Xuyen Province.
4. The Viet Cong extensively employed mortars
and heavy weapons in harassing actions last week,
and used artillery on two occasions. Analysis of
rotating bands of duds and fragments recovered
after the 24 August bombardment of Bien Hoa Air-
base shows use of US-type M48 rounds associated
with US 75-mm, howitzers. After the shelling of
Tan Uyen, about eight miles north of Bien Hoa,
on 24 August, projectile duds and impact fuzes
from 70-mm. ammunition used in the Chinese Com-
munist/Japanese type 92 infantry howitzer, were
recovered. This is the first confirmed use of
70-mm. pack howitzers of this type since early
1964. Howitzer ammunition has been captured by
ARVN forces on several occasions.
5. Interdiction of lines of communication
by road-blocks, railroad sabotage, interruption
or prohibition of travel, taxation, harassment,
and killing of drivers continues to a significant
extent throughout the country. As a consequence
of major GVN and US clearing operations on Routes
19 and 21, the communications picture improved
somewhat; however, military traffic on these
roads must still be escorted. National Route 1
remains closed in Quang Ngai, and Binh Thuan and
Binh Thy Provinces. Route 19?is closed to the
west of Pleiku city but passable to the east.
Routes 7 and 14 are closed. Interprovincial
Routes 40 in Phong Dinh Province, 7 in Kien Giang
province, and 1 in Phuoc Long Province are closed
to military traffic. The national railroad is
operating from Saigon to Xuan Loc. Long Khanh
Province: Song Mao, Binh Thuan Province to Ninh
Hoa, Khanh Hoa Province; Phan Rang, Ninh Thuan
Province to Dalat, Tuyen Duc Province; and from
Hue, Thua Thien Province to Dong Ha, Quang Tri
Province. COMUSMACV reports that the Viet Cong
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have been demonstrating increased mobility through
the use of captured trucks in II and III Corps and
by junks in the numerous waterways of the delta.
6. GVN/US operations of battalion or larger
size decreased during the week from 103 to 88 and
those making contact with the Viet Cong also de-
creased by 14 percent to 41. Small unit actions
increased to 21,180 for the week but those re-
sulting in contact with enemy forces decreased
slightly. As evidence that the Viet Cong are
avoiding friendly forces, the total number of
operations making one or more enemy contacts was
less than one half of one percent of the total
number of combined small and large units actions
initiated by the GVN and US.
7. In I Corps, government military activity
was concentrated in the coastal regions, with the
major emphasis on securing operations. II Corps
military actions were aimed at opening the roads
into the highlands to facilitate the movement
of supplies. Convoys in this sector travelled
Route 19 from Qui Nhon to An Tuc and on Route 21
from Nha Trang to Ban Me Thuot without incident
last week. The center of ARVN military activity
in III Corps was in Hau Nghia and Long An Provinces
in support of Hop Tac. B-52 raids were also carried
out against Viet Cong installations in War Zone D
with unknown results. In IV Corps, operations
in the delta were highlighted by a search and
destroy mission against a Viet Cong battalion
which had been spotted by aerial reconnaissance.
Four battalions, quickly helilifted into the
area, received heavy fire at the landing zone,
with 29 of the 54 transport helicopters hit by
ground fire. Air strikes enabled the ground
forces to advance. Although 50 Viet Cong are
known to have been killed, major enemy elements
were able to escape after dark. Government
casualties numbered 57 killed and 114 wounded.
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8. Follow-up reports on operation LAM SON
190 in Quang Tri Province indicate that the
13 August B-52 strike was a devasting surprise,
demoralizing the Viet Cong who lost 20 to 40
killed in the strike. Also, friendly reoccupa-
tion of the Ba Long Valley is a great psychological
boost for the GVN.
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C. RURAL RECONSTRUCTION
1. The first joint session of the US/GVN Council
held since 23 July was convened on 28 August, and dealt
with the subject of pacification, which Premier Ky
described as the single most important program in Viet-
nam. But Diem, special assistant to the premier,
touched on the broad outlines of an effective pacifica-
tion program, but did not develop any new concepts.
In a discussion of the outlines for the GVN program
it was determined that implementation of the pacifica-
tion program will be the responsibility of the Ministry
of Rural Construction. This ministry will have under
its jurisdiction (a) a pacification representative in
each province; (b) the training, replacement, and
supervision of cadres; (c) defensive units for the
cadres; (d) development of the Chieu Hoi program; and
(e) a strong program for refugees.
2. In response to a question from the Ambassador
regarding implementation of the new pacification pro-
gram, Premier Ky replied that the government did not
intend to create new cadres. Ky said it is envisioned
to use assets at hand more effectively. Consideration
is to be given to reorganization so that more authority
can be decentralized to the corps commanders and prov-
ince chiefs rather than maintaining large central
organizations in Saigon. Under this plan, for example,
the province chief would normally be the pacification
chief for the province. The failure to release budgeted
funds from Saigon to the areas where they are needed
was cited as an example of a need for decentralization
of programs so that maximum effective use of resources
can be achieved.
3. It was announced in Saigon during the week that
General Lansdale has been appointed chairman of the US
mission liaison group to the GVN Central Rural Construc-
tion Council. His other responsibilities will include
being an advisor to the US Mission on the implementation
of economic and social programs considered vital to
defeating the Communist insurgency effort.
4. According to GVN officials, 523 persons returned
to government control during the period 22-28 August.
This total represents a sharp drop from the previous
week when 2,697 individuals were reported to have re-
turned to the government side. Of the total number,
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158 were military, 33 political cadres, three draft
dodgers, and 329 civilians. Last week the totals in
these categories were 155 military, 58 political
cadres, one draft dodger, and 2,483 civilian returnees.
5. During the past week, several trips by the
Minister of Social Welfare convinced him that the
government is going to have to take a greater interest
in the refugee problem. One solution may lie in the
proposal to create a ministerial post to deal with
the subject. The recently-created US Mission Refugee
Task Force is currently developing plans for assist-
ing in handling the refugee problem. Generally,
the new system calls for the US to continue to advise
the GVN and to recommend courses of action, but on a
basis of increased "positive participation," i.e.,
the US will be ready to step in when gaps appear in
the GVN's capabilities to cope with a particular
situation.
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II. THIRD COUNTRY DEVELOPMENTS
VN VISITS TO ASIAN COUNTRIES
1. In a radio broadcast to the nation on 28 August,
Prime Minister Nguyen Cao Ky reported on his recent
visits to the Republic of China and Thailand. Ky stated
that in order to check the Communist tide, "the free
nations must unite themselves, not only by means of
cultural and commercial exchanges, an exchange of
advisors, or token mutual assistance, but by working
out a common policy and strategy with definite responsi-
bilities so that they can help one another when the
need arises, and together carry out counteroffensives
at the right moment." He concluded the speech by
announcing that he will visit Malaysia in the next few
days. Premier Ky will reportedly also visit Singapore
and Korea by mid-September.
2. After attending Malaysian Independence Day
celebrations in Kuala Lumpur on 31 August, GVN Foreign
Minister Tran Van Do reportedly went on to Singapore
to prepare for Prime Minister Ky's visit.
3. Ky was disappointed
with th c p on ne rece RAINY ng his recent visit
to Thailand. He reportedly stated that the Thai did
not even give him a fair hearing, let alone indicate a
willingness to bear a greater part of the burden for
the defense of Southeast Asia against the Communists.
The Thai Government indicated to Ky that it
was unable to offer the armed combat or support units
he was seeking in view of the unsettled conditions in
Northeast Thailand.
B. AFRICA
1. Foreign Minister Tran Van Do told Deputy Ambas-
sador Johnson that he planned to send Vinh Tho on a
tour of African nations. Tho had been nominated as
Ambassador to Addis Ababa by the Quat government but
is currently in Paris. Tho is to go to Tananarive,
where the GVN hopes to establish representation, and,
will
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also stop over in Dar es Salaam to look into the
question of GVN representation in Tanzania. The US
Embassy has suggested that the GVN send a cabinet
minister on a tour of Africa but a Foreign Ministry
official said that he did not know of any minister
who could now be soared. US officials have also
suggested that during his Malaysia visit Tran Van Do
talk to Nigerian Foreign Minister Bamali about an
official GVN visit to Nigeria.
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III, DEVELOPMENTS IN THE BLOC
A. MILITARY
1. Two new surface-to-air missile (SAM) sites--
numbers 17 and 18--have been discovered in North Viet-
nam since 25 August. The first site, disclosed in
drone photography of 24 August, is about 6.5 miles
south of Hanoi. The second site disclosed by recent
high altitude photography is some 75 miles northwest
,of Hanoi at the Yen Bai rail yard along the important
Hanoi - Lao Cai rail line. The Yen Bai site is in an
area that has recently come under heavy US air.attacks,
resulting in interdiction of the rail line at several
places. It is probable that in the weeks ahead the
Communists will construct additional SAM sites on this
and other key lines of transportation and communication
radiating from Hanoi.
2. Also since 25 August, six US aircraft have
been lost over North Vietnam, all to ground fire.
B. POLITICAL
1. The first high-level North Vietnamese Communist
Party delegation to gain entrance to a Western country
arrived in Paris on 25 August. The delegation consists
of four officials including Politburo member Le Duc Tho,
Minister of Heavy Industry Nguyen Van Tran, and eight
"advisors." The avowed purpose of the delegation's
two-week visit to France is to hold consultations with
the French Communist Party (FCP), which proferred then
the invitation. Thus far, the delegation has toured
noted Communist shrines in and around Paris and met
with FCP officials. French Government officials have
indicated that they would be willing to meet with the
DRV delegation. The French officials involved would
probably be medium-level representatives of the Quai.
2. The North Vietnamese Friendship delegation
headed by Politburo member Hoang Van Hoan left Moscow
for Hanoi on 28 August after concluding a two week
visit in the USSR. The visit constituted the final leg
of a six week trip which had previously taken the dele-
gation to China, North Korea and Mongolia. While in
the Soviet Union, Hoan met with leading party and govern-
ment officials and was accorded a reception on a par with
those given to the delegation in the other countries
-14-
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NO FOREIGN DISSEM
T9 h PYTrnnATTxY}1 TC At? ~T
 Approved For lease 2001 /09'14 CJ"P79T0047 01800030001-9
NO FOREIGN DISSEM
BACKGROUND USE ONLY
visited. In keeping with the stated purpose of the
delegation "to thank these countries for their assist-
ance to the DRV," Hoan's remarks praised the aid
rendered to his country by the Soviets. However,
while these remarks were well within the expected
verbal flourishes demanded by the occasion, they were
somewhat less effusive than those he made in China.
SOVIET UNION
Soviet Party chief Brezhnev used the occasion of
a 27 August Kremlin dinner in honor of visiting UAR
President Nasir to issue a sharp and personal denun-
ciation of President Johnson's Vietnam policy. Brezhnev
accused the US of attempting to starve the North Viet-
namese into submission. He quoted the President as
asserting "with satisfaction" that the destruction of
schools, hospitals, and the irrigation network in the
DRV is "in accord with the planned objective."
BACKGROUND USE ONLY
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 US COMBAT CASUALTIES IN VIETNAM
INCLUDING NORTH VIETNAM
Non-fatal
---Non-fatal Wounds
Fatalitie
s
Wounds
-Fatalities
C
umulative, 1961 - 1964
255
1524
C
umulative, 1965 to date
363
1573
Total
618
3097
(Figures do not include 44 carried as missing
or I8 carried as captured.)
Thr
ough 23
August
73
57
300
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-Company and battalion sized attacks
--- Battalion sized attacks only
h I ~ ~ I ~ I I I I I I I ~ I N I I_ LWA J_LLll
-11' N"A~u
DEC
SECRET
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 Approv N&\Il ~~SS~B
MEMORANDUM FOR:
LSP0030001-9
2 September 1965
OCI No. 0635/65A
Recipients of
the
Publication,
The Situation
in
South Vietnam,
Week yy Repo
TOcT- e. 35/55)
SUBJECT Additional page.
Please add the attached page to follow the
final page of the 1 September 1965 Weekly Report.
Approves prp%jVjGg0j@t@?ft/ FMD04 0p p1p030001-9
SECRET
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SOUTH VIETNAM BATTLE STATISTICS, 1965
PERSONNEL LOSSES (KILLED IN ACTION, MISSING IN ACTION, CAPTURED)
GOVERNMENT
VIET CONG
~
JAN I FEB I MAR APR I MAY JUNE
* WOUNDED NOT INCLUDED, SUCH FIGURES UNAVAILABLE ON VIET CONG
JJh AMI A n l 1,AA
GOVERNMENT
= VIET CONG
I FEB MAR I APR I
MAY I
I JUL I
SEPT OCT I
I JUL I
1]6 I I
tub Through ze August
AUG I
n
OCT I
JUL AUG SEPT- OCT I NOV I DEC I
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