THE SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00472A001800050003-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 33
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 11, 2003
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: November 17, 1965
• Content Type: REPORT

25X1 Approved For Rase 2003/10/01 : CIA-RDP79T00472A 180005 003-5
,,, SECRET
OCI No. 0646/65
Copy No. 110
WEEKLY REPORT
THE SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM
17 November 1965
INTELLIGENCE AND REPORTING SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE INTERAGENCY
VIETNAM COORDINATING COMMITTEE 25X1
State Dept., DIA reviews completed
SECRET
GROUP I
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THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECT-
ING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES
WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS,
TITLE 18, USC, SECTIONS 793 AND 794, THE TRANSMIS-
SION OR REVELATION OF WHICH IN ANY MANNER TO
AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.
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OCI No. 0646/65
Published by the Directorate of Intelligence
Central Intelligence Agency
THE SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM
(11 November - 17 November 1965)
C O N T E N T S
THE WEEK IN PERSPECTIVE
Map, South Vietnam, facing page
1. THE SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM
A. POLITICAL SITUATION
Premier Ky's recent absence while
visiting South Korea was occasion
for new signs of discontent in the
Catholic community (p. 1); I'Corps
commander General Thi and backers
also becoming increasingly assertive
(p. 1); departing South Vietnamese
ambassador has commented unfavorably
on Ky regime (p. 2); Saigon press
also less optimistic about prospects
for'political stability (p. 3); Viet
Cong warn of possible retaliation
for execution of any of 18 Vietnamese
recently tried for treason (p, 3);
Viet Cong also last week instigated
larger than usual number of demon-
strations (p. 3); retail prices
continue downward trend (p. 3); mari-
time strike may be near settlement
(p. 4).
Page
iv
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B. MILITARY SITUATION 5
Combat activity increased last week,
with accompanying sharp rise in Com-
munist personnel losses (p. 5);
Results of major operations by South
Vietnamese and allied forces were
generally favorable, with one excep-
tion (p. 5); marked decrease in con-
tacts with suspected Viet Cong junks
noted (p. 6); B-52 raids flown against
11 targets (p. 6); major Viet Cong -
initiated activity took place in II
and III Corps (p. 6); interdiction of
roads and rail lines is outlined (p. 7).
Map, Transportation Routes, facing page
Rural construction minister briefs
commander and other officials of III
Corps on revamped program for that
area (p. 9); similar briefings planned
for other corps areas through 18 De-
cember (p. 7); statistics on Chieu Hoi
returnees given (p. 9).
Map, North Vietnam, facing page
II, DEVELOPMENTS IN THE BLOC
A. MILITARY
Three additional SAM sites in DRV
confirmed this week (p. 10); SAM
defenses responsible for loss of two
US aircraft last week (p. 10); North
Vietnamese fighters considerably
more active in past weeks in areas of
US air strikes, but still steering
clear of'US fighters (p. 10).
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B, POLITICAL 10
Hanoi propaganda attempting to offset
Western press reports of Viet Cong
reverses (p. 10); Liberation Front
delegation to DRV viewed as effort to
bolster Viet Cong morale (p. 10); DRV
Foreign Ministry issues second state-
ment in two weeks condemning US build-
up in South (p. 11); new Peking blast
at Soviet leaders is probably admoni-
tion to Hanoi against reliance on
Moscow (p. 11) ;
III. THIRD COUNTRY DEVELOPMENTS 13
A. SOUTH KOREA 13
South Vietnamese Premier Ky visits
Seoul (p. 13); advisability of friend-
ship treaty, discussed during visit,
to be pursued through diplomatic
channels (p. 13); Ky told press in
Seoul he opposed peace talks now and
that US air strikes should be stepped
up to destroy DRV war potential (p. 13);
B. US BOMBING OF DMZ 13
Navigational error again cause of US
bombing of DMZ (p. 13); ICC discussed
stiff protest from Hanoi over incident
(p. 14)
ANNEX: South Vietnam Battle Statistics (Weekly)
US Combat Figures in Vietnam (Weekly)
South Vietnam Battle Statistics--Incidents
(Monthly)
South Vietnam Battle Statistics--Weapons
Losses (Monthly)
South Vietnam Battle Statistics--Personnel
Losses (Monthly)
(The Weekly Report on the Situation in South Vietnam
is based on contributions from CIA, DIA, INR; it is
edited and published by CIA without final coordination.)
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THE WEEK IN PERSPECTIVE
Combat activity in South Vietnam intensified last week,
continuing through the weekend with the largest US opera-
tion of the war being launched in western Pleiku Province
against regular North Vietnamese forces comparable in
size to at least one division. COMUSMACV has confirmed
the presence in II Corps of at least eight Communist regi-
ments, two of them Viet Cong and six North Vietnamese.
The political situation revealed increased signs of
restiveness, particularly among Catholic circles and
some evidence of increasing assertiveness by I Corps
commander General Thi. While there is greater press
discussion of the lack of real political stability, there
continue to be no signs of an imminent threat to the re-
gime.
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THE S I'TUATI:ON IN SOUTH VIETNAM
A. POLITICAL SITUATION
1.. Premier Ky returned from his official visit
to South Korea on. 1.4 No embe:r. On the 17th he was
scheduled to visit South Vietnam's Tay Ninh Province
to preside over a distribution of land titles to former
tenant farmers.
2. During Ky's absence, there were further signs
of restiveness in the political situation in Saigon.
Various leaders of the Catholic community, vho had
hinted in a communiqu.d issued. the previous week at
their discontent with certain government policies, con.-
firmed their growing concern in conversations last week
with US Embassy officers. Characterizing the communi-
que as nothing more than a mild warning to the regime,
several, priests told the embassy that they had presented
Chief of State Th:i,eu. with a list of five specific mat-
ters -which they considered prejudicial to their in-
terests and in need of government- action. They requested,
among other things, an official definition of their jurid-
ical status (a step that had recently been taken for the
Buddhists and the pol.iti.co-religious sects) and legal
disposition of the cases of certain Catholics recently
arrested on unspecific charges.
3. The Catholic leaders told the embassy that they
had given no publicity to their set of grievances, and
planned no overt action against the government at this
time, They left the impression that they might consider
other forms of protest, however, if the government took
no corrective action.. The Catholics also left little
doubt that their major source of concern was not so
much the performance of Generals Thieu or Ky as the in-
fluence of a government clique which they suspect of
being in league with militant Buddhist monk Tri Quang.
They identified the members of this clique as I Corps
commander General Thl, Police Director General Lieu,
and the secretaries of psychological warfare and social
welfare.
4. Also appare:n.t duringKy's absence was an in-
creased assertiveness on the part of General Thi and
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certain of his present backers, who tried to arrange
a celebration, for the first time, of the anniversary
of the abortive paratroop coup of 11 November 1960
against the Diem regime. Among the organizers were
Thi, Police Director Lieu, and the present 25th
Division commander, all of whom took part in the coup.
The group succeeded in having commemorative services
held by both the Catholics and Buddhists, but was
denied last-minute permission to hold a celebration
in a government-owned convention hall. This govern-
ment rebuke prompted criticism from some of the
politicians present at the celebration, which was
finally held in Thi's Saigon residence. Among these
politicians were former civilian chief of state Phan
Khac Suu and Gia Dinh Province councilman Phan Quang
Dan, both of whom are pressing behind the scenes for
some form of elected popular assembly, and Bui Luong,
an opportunistic labor leader with possible National-
ist Party (VNQDD) ties who in the past month has at-
tached himself to General Thi.
5. While in Saigon, General Thi held a press
conference in which he stressed his efforts to root
out corruption in I Corps. He was questioned about
charges, apparently stemming from Dai Viet Party
sources in I Corps, that he is financially subsidizing
the militant student newspaper in Hue, Sinh Vinh,
which is becoming increasingly anti-American and pro-
neutralist in tone. Thi admitted only that the paper
continued to publish without interference and stressed
that there was no press censorship in his corps area.
6. The departing South Vietnamese ambassador in
Washington, General Tran Thien Khiem, commented last
week that he considered Premier Ky merely a figure-
head, behind whom maneuvering was under way for the
fruits of what is now a clear US commitment to stay in
South Vietnam. Khiem described the chief contestants
for power as General Thieu, pushed by Dai Viet Party
members, and General Thi, backed by still unidentified
VNQDD members; he discounted any close ties between
Thi and Tri Quang? Khiem's remarks were made in the
context of his own plans to proceed about 1 December
directly to his new post in Taiwan rather than try to
return to Saigon where he might be associated with
recent coup rumors. Khiem also added that he did not
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agree with Ky's apparent policy of trying to in-
spire an Asian anti-Communist military alliance,
which he termed unrealistic. He commented that Ky
might better spend his time trying to unify disparate
military and civilian elements in South Vietnam.
7. The Saigon press, including both Buddhist
and Catholic-oriented newspapers, has also begun to
comment less optimistically about the prospects for
developing real political stability. Particularly
apparent in press editorials are insinuations that
the government has not yet won any significant popu-
lar enthusiasm, and statements of concern that it
may permit its prerogatives in administering the
country and running the war to be usurped by the US.
8. A Vietnamese military courtof the III Corps
area on 16 November handed down sentences in the trial
of some 18 Vietnamese charged with treason for running
a Viet Cong propaganda ring in the Saigon - Gia Dinh
Province area, The ringleader was given a death
sentence, and the others were sentenced to prison-terms
--mostly to less than seven years, although one ran got
20 years. A Viet Cong Liberation Radio broadcast on
11 November warned of possible retaliation in the
event of execution of any of the 18 "patriots."
9. The Viet Cong have in the past week apparently
instigated a larger than usual number of popular dem-
onstrations, involving from
100
to
1,000 villagers,
around district capitals in
I,
II,
and III Corps. These
demonstrations, protesting
air
and
artillery strikes
and demanding the release of relatives from South Viet-
namese military service, seem to reflect a carefully
coordinated attempt to display Communist influence
near populated centers, as well as an effort to foment
hostility toward the American role in Vietnam.
10. Retail prices continued the downward trend
which began last week. Once again rice prices eased
and are expected to hold near present levels through
December. For the first time in several weeks the
price of cement dropped, declining 13 percent from the
previous week. This break in the upward trend of cement
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prices is thought to be attributable to the arrival
of one shipload of cement and the anticipated arrival
of a second.
11. South Vietnam's maritime union, representing
stevedores for some 13 government-owned coastal ships,
last week went out on strike for wage increases, re-
portedly denied them for the past ten years. The
effect was to reduce total tonnage to the level avail-
able two months ago--i.e., to about half the 54,000-
metric-ton monthly requirements--and to leave USOM-
chartered ships to fill the gap. A recent press re-
port indicates that the government has agreed to raises
almost double the present salaries of the 300 union
members. One factor prompting the strike may have been
the higher rates paid to dockworkers by US and other
foreign shippers, as well as to certain categories of
workers employed in constructing new US base facilities.
Despite rising labor costs and some labor shortages,
US and South Vietnamese officials have agreed not to
set wage ceilings for Vietnamese under US contract,
but rather to stress training for needed categories
of laborers.
12. The embassy in Saigon has given economic
reasons supporting General Westmoreland's recent pro-
posal that out-of-country rest and rehabilitation
centers be set up, on the grounds that this might re-
duce inflationary pressure generated by piaster ex-
penditures of US soldiers and civilians during off-
duty hours. The embassy estimates that encouraging
GIs to curtail expenditures in Vietnam in anticipation
of R&R in another country would reduce off-duty spend-
ing by about 7 billion piasters in 1966. The governor
of Penang (Malaysia) told an American businessman
that he would be most favorable to the establishment
of an R&R center in Penang. Federal Malaysian ap-
proval has not yet been sought.
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1. Combat. activity increased during the past
week, particularly in the III Corps, with both the
tempo and intensity of the war continuing high through
the weekend. The largest US-initiated operation of the
war, SILVER BAYONET, began on 14 November in south-
west Pleiku near the Cambodian border, with elements
of the 1st Air Cavalry Division (US) confronting
North Vietnamese (PAVN) regular forces equivalent
to at least division size. Casualty totals during
SILVER BAYONET already exceed those recorded in the
US Marine victory near Chu Lai in August.
2. Communist personnel losses for the week end-
ing 13 November increased sharply to 1,173 from the
previous week.'s 733; 981 were killed and 192 captured,
compared with 536 and 197 a week ago. The kill ratio
for the week favored South Vietnamese forces 6 to 1.
The number of weapons lost by the enemy--343, includ-
ing 29 crew-served weapons--was the third highest
weekly figure this year. The figures of 89 US com-
bat deaths and 230 wounded set new weekly highs of
the war, for the second successive week.
3. The Viet Cong incident total for 7-13 No-
vember was 768, compared with 731 the previous pe-
riod--exceeding 700 for the sixth consecutive week.
The usual pattern of incidents prevailed, with ter-
rorism accounting for .more',.-than.half.
GVN/Allied Activities
4. Results of friendly major operations were
generally f vorable, with one exception: BLUE MARLIN
(Phase I), a combined US and Vietnamese Marine multi-
battalion search-and-destroy operation.on.11 and 12 No-
vember. No major contact was made in this operation
although several Viet Cong battalions were believed
to be in the area. Interrogation of villagers in-
dicated that the Viet Cong had about two days fore-
knowledge.
5. In the SILVER BAYONET operation this week,
a major enemy infiltration and base area appears to
have been encountered. Elements of at least four
PAVN regiments have been identified in the area.
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The intensity of the action is illustrated by casualty
totals at the end of three days' fighting: 88 friendly
troops killed and 118 wounded. The PAVN troops so
far have suffered 637 killed (body count) and 16 cap-
tured.
6. The final results of Operation HUMP, a search-
and-destroy effort in Bien Hoa Province on 7 and 8 No-
vember, involving the 173d Airborne Brigade (US) and
Australian elements, were: 48 US and two Australians
killed; 101 US and six Australians wounded; 423 Viet
Cong confirmed killed, 123 Viet Cong captured, and
15 ralliers taken,
7. The final Viet Cong body count following a
seven-hour battle north of Ben Cat on 12 November
between 1st Infantry Division (US) elements and un-
identified guerrilla forces showed 198 Viet Cong
dead. US losses were 20 killed and 83 wounded.
8. A marked decrease in contacts with suspected
Viet Cong junks was noted; apparently surf conditions
at river mouths and inlets have curtailed their ac-
tivities. The seasonal increase in the number of
junks at sea during the northeast monsoon has not yet
materialized. Results of sea, river, and coastal
force surveillance again declined, with 4,848 junks
and 18,462 persons searched.
9. B-52 raids were flown against 11 targets in
Long Khanh, Binh Long, Binh Duong, and Pleiku provinces,
bringing the over-all total of such strikes to 73 as
of 15 November.
Viet Cong - Initiated Activities
10, Seven Viet Cong attacks, three of large
proportion, were reported, with the major combat
activity taking place in II and III Corps. Main force
elements challenged two US units and attempted to am-
bush an ARVN Ranger Battalion.
11. In the I Corps, the majority of Viet Cong
incidents consisted of harassment of the US Marines in
the Da Nang and Chu Lai areas. There also were several
local demonstrations protesting air strikes and artillery
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fire. A new unidentified regiment (probably PAVN)
consisting of three battalions, is believed to be in
the Ba Long Valley area of Quang Tri Province.
12. Actions in Pleiku Province involving the
1st Air Cavalry Division (US) highlighted activities
in the II Corps. Two captives have indicated they
were members of the 304th Division (PAVN). One
claimed to be from the 66th Regiment and the other
stated he was a member of the 19th Transportation
Battalion. A new PAVN regiment, temporarily desig-
nated the Song Lam Regiment, has also been c.onf.irmed
by COMUSMACV in the II Corps. Confirmed Viet Cong
and PAVN regiments in the II Corps now total eight.
13. The intensity of Viet Cong activity in III
Corps increased, with two battalion-size contacts
reported, both apparently designed to lure ARVN re-
action forces into prepared ambushes. Both efforts
were repulsed, and friendly losses were light. A
well-equipped Viet Cong battalion of the 271st Regi-
ment (VC) engaged elements of the 173d Airborne
Brigade (US) near War Zone D in Bien Hoa Province,
during Operation HUMP. Australian elements en-
countered a Viet Cong company south of the Dong Nai
River during the same action. It was noted in both
engagements that the Viet Cong maintained close con-
tact in an attempt to reduce their losses from air
strikes and artillery. A strong Viet Cong battalion
engaged elements of the 3d Brigade, 1st Infantry
Division (US) during a road-clearing operation on
Route 13, north of Ben Cat, Binh Duong Province.
After a seven-hour battle, the Viet Cong broke con-
tact, having,suffered heavy casualties. The Viet
Cong attempted to ambush the 52d Ranger Battalion
(ARVN) and a Regional Force company along Route 15
north of Vung Tau, Phuoc Thy Province. Compromise
of the ambush by a Viet Cong defector permitted the
Rangers, supported by close air support, artillery,
and naval gunfire, to deploy and attack the Viet
Cong. The Viet Cong lost 131 killed. Friendly losses
were 17 killed and nine wounded.
14. Viet Cong activity in the IV Corps remains
concentrated in the provinces which encompass the
principal movement route from the IV Corps to north-
western III Corps. An ARVN reaction force was attacked
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CURRENT STATUS OF MAJOR TRANSPORTATION ROUTES AND THE COASTAL RAILROAD
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by the Viet Cong in Kien Giang Province on 9 Novem-
ber. Friendly losses were 35 killed, 21 wounded,
and 24 missing. Viet Cong losses are unknown.
15. National Route 1 is closed in Thua Thien,
Quang Ngai, Binh Dinh, Ninh Thuan, and Binh Thuan
provinces. In Quang Tri Province, Route 9 is closed.
Route 14 is closed north of Kontum City, south of
Pleiku City, south of Gia Nghia, and in Phuoc Long
and Binh Long Provinces. Route 7 is closed in Phu
Bon and Phu Yen provinces. The national railroad is
closed between Xuan Loc (Long Khanh Province) and
Song Luy (Binh Thuan Province); between Ninh Hoa
(Khanh Hoa Province) and Hue (Thua Thien Province);
and north of Dong Ha (Quang Tri Province).
16. For the present, the enemy maintains the
capability of conducting commando-type attacks against
base areas, airfields and other friendly facilities,
with the object of immobilizing a maximum number of
allied combat troops defending these areas. The
continuing buildup of enemy forces, coupled with
current dispositions, particularly in II and III
Corps, gives the enemy an increasing capability for
surprise attacks and ambushes with one or more regi-
ments; .
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1. South Vietnam's minister. of rural con-
struction, General Nguyen Due Thang, recently briefed
the commander of III Corps, as well as division com-
manders and province chiefs from that corps, on the
objectives and guidelines of 1966 plans, programs, and
budgets for the rural construction effort. Under the
revamped program, corps commanders will be involved in
the national rural construction planning effort, while
the supervision of provincial plans is being passed to
division commanders, who previously have had no official
responsibility for the rural construction effort in the
provinces.
2. Briefings of involved officials are planned
for the other corps areas. Following these briefings,
the individual provinces are to prepare plans, coordinate
them with the divisions, and hold final review sessions
at the corps level. These review sessions now are set
for the period 20 November through 18 December. Very
little time seems to have been allowed by the national
planning authorities for the coordination and meshing
of the various corps plans into a national plan by the
established 1 January deadline.
3. Chieu Hoi returnees numbered 438 during the
past week, as against the previous week's total of 368.
The largest single category of returnee was the military,
with 217--only 12 more, -.Lowever, than reported for the
previous week. Civilian returnees numbered 177, as
compared with last week's total of 108. Forty-three
political cadres rallied to the government during the
week, as did one draft dodger/deserter; in these
categories last week the returnees numbered 50 and 5,
respectively.
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II. DEVELOPMENTS IN THE BLOC
A. MILITARY
1. Three additional surface-to-air missile sites
in the DRV were confirmed in aerial photography this
week bringing the total number of SAM sites to 44. Two
of the new sites are northwest of Hanoi, the third is
located near Ninh Binh, south of Hanoi. Two SAM sites
(39 and 41) were struck by US aircraft this week; bomb
damage assessment is not yet available.
2. SAM defenses were responsible for the loss of
two US aircraft last week while five others were lost
to groundfire and one was lost for mechanical reasons.
Of the 160 aircraft lost to date over North Vietnam,
eight have been shot down by SAMs.
3. North Vietnamese fighters have become con-
siderably more active in the past several weeks in areas
of US air strikes. Several attempts have been made to
attack US support aircraft such as reconnaissance and
rescue aircraft, One such engagement occurred on 15 No-
vember when two unmarked MIGs attempted unsuccessfully
to engage two U'S RF-101 photoreconnaissance aircraft
in the vicinity of Yen Bai. DRV fighters have steered
clear of armed US fighters, however.
B. POLITICAL
1. Hanoi, in its propaganda and public state-
ments in the past week, has attempted to offset reports
in the Western press that the Viet Cong have suffered
reverses since the "massive buildup" of US combat forces
in South Vietnam. The DRV press has listed a series
of recent battles in the South as resounding victories
for the insurgents and as further proof that the Viet
Cong are still fighting vigorously and are defeating
large US units.
2. Regime propaganda also announced that the
Liberation Front had dispatched a delegation of "mili-
tary heroes" to the DRV on 15 November to express the
"solidarity of the South Vietnamese people against US
Approved For Release 201;p "- 7 TT00472A001800050003-5
 Approved F
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aggression." Overt contacts, of any kind between the
DRV party and government and the front are extremely
limited, and this unusual action may be another hint
that Hanoi is taking measures to bolster Viet Cong
morale. The delegation will probably receive the royal
treatment from the North Vietnamese, and its activities
will undoubtedly be extensively reported in the DRV
press. A sign of the importance with which the DRV
assigns to this move was the issuance of an editorial
in the party daily describing the delegation's inisSion
and purpose,
3. In addition, the DRV Foreign Ministry on
16 November issued its second statement in two weeks
condemning the increase in US forces in South Vietnam.
This statement and an editorial, on the same subject the
following day denounced alleged US violations of the
Geneva agreements and asserted that the Vietnamese
people are resolute in their determination to fight
against US imperialism. Both the editorial and the of-
ficial statement laid heavy emphasis on the possible
effect which the cost of the war and recent anti-Vietnam
activities in the US may have on bringing about a change
in American policy.
4. A polemical blast at the Soviet leadership by
Peking on 11 November was almost certainly intended as
a sharp admonition to Hanoi against reliance on Moscow
and a warning against alleged Soviet efforts to promote
a negotiated settlement. Attacking Breshnev and Kosygin
by name, the Chinese asserted in the People's Daily and
Red Flag that the Soviet leaders have ulterior motives
in giving aid--dismissed as a "certain amount" in no
way commensurate with Soviet capabilities--and are in
fact doing so only to keep the situation in Vietnam
"under their control with the object of striking a
"bargain with the US on it."
5. Last February, the article charged, the Soviets
had proposed to Peking and Hanoi that a new international
conference on Vietnam be called "without prior condi-
tions." This proposal, the Chinese asserted, was nothing
more than advocacy of "unconditional negotiations."
When this effort failed, the Soviets allegedly proceeded
unilaterally to discuss the question with the French,
Approved For Release 202TJYLTR. 1 79T00472A001800050003-5
 Approved Fo
47001800050003-5
and communicated Moscow's desire for negotiations to
various other Communist parties. According to Peking,
the Soviets then went on to collaborate with the Indians
and Yugoslavs in their efforts to act as "brokers" in
the Vietnam question,
6. The Chinese made it clear that they have no
intention of moderating their criticism of Soviet policy
in Vietnam and issued what amounted to a demand that
Hanoi follow Peking's lead. This latest outburst may
reflect anger over recent indications that the North
Vietnamese are continuing to take a middle position in
the Sino-Soviet dispute.
25X1
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 25X1
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1. Accompanied by his ministers of defense,
economy, and psychological warfare, South Vietnamese
Premier Ky made an official visit to South Korea from
8 to 12 November. The final communique on the visit
stated that Ky and Korean Prime Minister 11 Kwon Chung
had discussed the advisability of concluding a treaty
of friendship between their countries and had agreed
that details on this matter would be further examined
through diplomatic channels.
2. During his stay in Seoul, Ky held a press
conference in which he stated that he would "never sit
at a conference table to talk peace with the Communists."
He said that any Communist proposal for negotiations
would be "for the purpose of tricking us." In dis-
cussions with US Embassy officers, Ky and other GVN
officials have stated that the GVN would be thrown
into disarray if it entered into negotiations at the
present juncture. Ky also stated at his press con-
ference that it would be preferable to destroy the North
'Vietnamese war potential rather than to conduct bomb-
ings in the limited fashion now being pursued. Ky also
urged an alliance of non-Communist Asian nations.
took place on the morning of 13 November, in which,
because of a navigational error, several passes were
made at the Ben Hai bridge in the Demilitarized Zone
and one South Vietnamese policeman was killed. The
US Embassy has expressed regret to the GVN Foreign
Ministry for the bombing. A Hue consulate official
who visited the area shortly after the incident re-
ported that villagers appeared very upset. A family
from one of the damaged houses had fled to another
US BOMBING OF DMZ
1. Another US bombing of the Demilitarized Zone
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 Approved Fo Release 20@SEC IERDP79T004TMA001800050003-5
25X1
village, and police officers report that others
say they would like to leave.
2. The ICC met on 15 November to discuss a stiff
protest from Hanoi regarding the incident. The Cana-
dians told the US Embassy that neither the Indian nor
the Polish representative seemed unduly exercised.
The Pole suggested that the ICC address itself directly
to the United States instead of the GVN, arguing
that the
US
was the responsible party; the Canadians
opposed
this
move successfully. The ICC then addressed
a letter
to
the GVN liaison mission, asking for a full
report.
The
ICC also asked its team in the Demilita-
rized Zone to carry on its normal activities and to
give it a full report of the incident. Members of the
team were apparently crossing the Ben Hai bridge when
the bombing took place.
Approved For Re 2A001800050003-5
 Approved For-Release 2003/10/01 : CIA-RDP79T00472001800050003-5
SOUTH VIETNAM BATTLE STATISTICS, 1965
SECRET
PERSONNEL LOSSES
WEEKLY REPORT
6 NOV - 13 NOV
(KILLED IN ACTION, MISSING
Jan I Feb I Mar I Apr I May I Junel July I Aug I Sept I Oct I Nov I Dec I
Wounded not included Such figures unavailable on Viet Cong,
WEAPONS LOSSES
1,500
-VIET CONG
- GOVERNMENT
IN ACTION, CAPTURED)
148
83
250 a tai : ~r
at to aaa ill
49766 ^ Attacks ??? Terrorism ~~ Sabotage ....Propaganda Antiaircraft Fire
Jan I Feb I Mar 1 Apr I May I June I July I Aug I Septl Oct I Nov I Dec I
SECRET
158
Feb ['Mar I Apr I May I June I July Aug I Sept I Oct I Nov I Dec I
Approved For Release 2003/10/01 : CIA-RDP79T00472AO01800050003-5
 Approved For Release 2003/10/01 : CIA-RDP79T00472A001800050003-5
US COMBAT CASUALTIES IN VIETNAM
INCLUDING NORTH VIETNAM
I
I
I
I
~
~
~
1
j
II
478
I
II
I
I
l
i
I
I
~
i
l
T
R Ud
I
H
8
O
I
EMBER
I
Fatalities
Non-fatal
-
~-
-
Non
-fat
al
Wou
nds
I
Wounds
Fata
liti
e
s
I
I
Cumulative, 1961 - 1964
255
1524
I
Cumulative, 1965 to date
732
3779
Total
987
5303
(Figures do not include 96 carried as missing
.)
27 carried as captured.)
I
I
'
`
I
I '
I
I
~ i I
- ~- ,
II
~ ~I
v I
~
'
r
I II'
`
~~
1
,
,
I
I ~ II
~ II
I
II
I i ~
~ /f ~ ~I I ~I / ' 65
,
.
JUNE
Company and battalion sized attacks
- - - Battalion sized attacks onl
y
M
THOUG
I
~ 13 ~O~EMB
1~
I
R
13
JAN
49765
APR I MAY I JUNE
Approved For Release 2003/10/
JUL AUG SEPT OCT
: CIA-R P79T004 2A001800050003-5
 Approved For -Release 2003/1 0 ; ,-g.j4-RDP79T0041001800050003-5
South Vietnamese and Viet Cong Casualties and
Weapons Losses: 1962 - 31 October 1965
25X1
Time
Viet
Cong
Inci-
Killed
in
Action
Wounded
in
Action
Captured
or Missing
Total
Casualties
Weapons
Losses
Period
dents
GVN VC
GVN VC
GVN VC
GVN
VC
GVN VC
1962
1825
299
1294
475
212
116 39
0
890
1806
-
Jan
1963
927
453
1754
908
318
102 37
9
1463
2451
457
683
1964
1770
343
1223
913
-
555 24
0
1811
1463
917
532
1965
2206
904
2203
1938
-
471 56
5
3313
2768
1700
711
1962
1460
244
1205
300
316
124 35
3
668
1874
-
-
Feb
1963
788
379
1082
656
303
82 29
2
1117
1677
253
399
1964
2078
374
1055
916
-
303 28
9
1593
1344
708
471
1965
1982
880
1564
1840
-
1394 30
9
4114
1873
2454
620
1962
1961
523
1456
737
551
140 52
3
1400
2530
Mar
1963
1282
410
1443
851
368
66 22
2
1327
2033
467
367
1964
2160
439
1456
1249
345 53
1
2033
1987
814
532
1965
2056
751
2022
1633
720 39
4
3104
2416
1442
698
1962
1933
387
1596
532
292
151 41
5
1070
2303
Apr
1963
1331
506
1660
878
256
96 38
8
1440
2304
797
468
1964
2284
594
1671
1584
398 24
5
2576
1916
990
424
1965
1860
591
1909
1650
232 52
9
2473
2433
757
973
1962
1825
390
1756
509
352
94 52
4
993
2632
-
--
May
1963
1208
435
1895
889
295
94 69
5
1418
2885
463
564
1964
2143
458
1135
987
202 24
2
1647
1377
723
281
1965
2263
1049
1975
2143
873 54
8
4065
2523
1701
831
1962
1477
325
1666
613
413
77 44
1
1015
2520
-
Jun
1963
1311
389
1863
772
310
90 43
7
1251
2609
580
394
1964
2062
494
1005
1145
-
313 23
0
1952
1235
718
387
1965'
2597
1211
2208
1920
-
1260 18
9
4391
2397
2387
793
1962
1564
384
1544
686
424
212 54
2
1282
510
-
-
Jul
1963
1368
529
1918
1071
372
306 38
7
1906
2677
663
374
1964
3045
900
1427
1812
510. 21
9
3222
1646
1889
447
1965
2 520
11,30
2980
1391
540 5
80
3425
3560
1375
882
1962
1642
377
2271
626
367
63 66
9
1066
3307
Aug
1963
1349
411
1685
804
237
352 48
2
1567
2404
637
428
1964
2580
721
1449
1612
478 28
2
2811
1731
1106
619
1965
2498
808
3624
1945
287 60
6
3040
4230
705
1074
25X1
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 Approved Fo Release 2003/10/01 : CIA-RDP79T0047 A001800050003-5
Time
Viet
Cong
Inci-
Killed
in
Action
Wounded
in
Action
Captured
or Missing
Total
Casualties
Weapons
Losses
Period
dents
GVN VC
GVN
VC
GVN VC
GVN
VC
GVN
VC
1962
1375
419 221
8 646
365
59 44
6
1124
3029
Sep
1963
1763
672 198
2 1155
234
566 34
7
2393
2563
878
389
1964
3091
819 118
7 1759
-
737 23
0
3315
1417
1465
525
1965
2473
655 348
5 1724
-
266 83
8
2645
4323
778
838
1962
1357
365 196
7 619
286
64 37
3
1048
2626
-
-
Oct
1963
1422
428 152
0 989
244
398 23
6
1815
2000
753
330
1964
2827
739 161
7 1583
-
693 57
6
3015
2193
1510
482
1965
3330
961 387
4 2416
-
225 66
0
3602
4534
762
1013
1962
1311
410 198
2 834
368
92 56
1
13:16
2911
-
-
Nov
1963
3182
664 233
3 1554
373
665 25
2
2883
2958
1595
455
1964
1982
574 174
7 1404
-
410 57
0
2388
2317
1104
515
1962
1346
294 220
3 618
289
78 46
3
990
2955
-
-
Dec
1963
1921
389 144
0 961
191
320 19
0
1670
1821
724
546
1964
2504
1002 131
3 2053
-
1092 50
3
4147
2316
2111
666
Composite Annual Totals
Time
VC
Inci-
KIA WIA
Captured
or Missing
Total
Casualties
Weapons
Losses
Period
dents
GVN
VC GVN VC
GVN VC
GVN
VC
GVN VC
1962
19076
4417
21158 7195
4235
1270 570
0
12882
31693
5195
4049*
1963
17852
5665
20575 11488
3501
3137 4307
20290
28383
8267
5397
1964
28526
7457
1678517017
-
6036 4157
30510
20942
14055
5881
**1965
23785
8970
25844 18 800
-
6402 5218
34172
31062
14061
8433
*Monthly data unavailable for 1962 Weapons Losses.
**Through 31 October 1965
25X1
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 Approved For Release 2003/10/01 gtjRDP79T00472A001800050003-5
25X1
2. Viet Cong Incidents: 1962 - 31 October 1965
A T T A C K S
Time
Viet Gong
Small-
Propa-
Anti-
Period
Incidents
Scale
BN. Size
Co. Size
Total
Terrorism
Sabotage
Banda
Aircraft
1962
1825
528
0
21
549
839
180
257
--
Jan
1963
927
242
2
8
252
447
49
179
--
1964
1770
218
3
2
223
1244
129
174
--
1965
2206
57
1
5
63
1489
272
170
212
1962
1460
480
0
20
500
613
137
210
--
Feb
1963
788
181
1
13
195
433
69
91
--
1964
2078
211
3
3
217
1389
201
271
--
1965
1982
73
3
6
82
1411
267
91
131
1962
1961
561
0
27
588
660
290
423
--
Mar
1963
1282
333
0
11
344
653
131
154
--
1964
2160
198
1
4
203
1632
158
167
--
1965
2056
80
3
3
86
1476
240
90
164
1962
1933
470
0
27
497
1024
220
192
--
Apr
1963
1331
371
3
9
383
688
105
155
--
1964
2284
211
3
6
220
1738
169
157
--
1965
1860
38
4
1
43
1407
149
96
165
1962
1825
490
0
28
528
892
154
251
--
May
1963
1208
344
0
13
357
608
93
150
--
1964
2143
170
2
3
175
1418
217
140
193
1965
2263
40
11
7
58
1555
365
115
170
1962
1477
339
0
23
362
736
157
222
--
Jun
1963
1311
398
1
11
410
652
107
142
--
1964
2062
128
2
10
140
1390
176
162
194
1965
2597
62
6
1
69
1784
469
103
172
1962
1564
437
1
10
448
735
158
223
Jul
1963
1368
398
1
8
407
698
80
183
--
1964
3045
166
7
12
185
2132
286
224
218
1965
2520
42
6
0
48
1706
400
154
212
1962
1642
368
0
10
378
885
146
233
--
Aug
1963
1349
356
1
11
368
647
113
221
--
1964
2580
107
3
3
113
1775
315
173
204
1965
2498
38
5
9
52
1597
349
200
300
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 Approved For Release 2003/10/01 : CIA-RDP79T00472AO01800050003-5
SECRET
25X1
A T T A C K S
Time
Viet Cong
Small-
Propa-
Anti-
Period
Incidents
Scale
BN. Size
Co. Size
Total
Terrorism
Sabotage
ganda
Aircraft
1962
1375
382
9
391
624
178
182
--
Sep
1963
1763
483
17
503
889
164
207
--
1964
3091
110
4
118
1938
482
178
375
1965
2473
19
7
31
1530
278
185
449
1962
1357
406
1
12
419
583
189
166
--
Oct
1963
1422
359
0
6
365
802
105
150
--
1964
2827
75
6
2
83
1790
480
197
277
1965
3330
24
12
8
44
1969
415
198
704
1962
1311
411
3
7
421
614
144
132
--
Nov
1963
3182
631
3
11
645
1990
269
278
--
1964
1982
57
1
2
60
1391
247
109
175
1962
1346
375
1
8
384
670
107
185
--
Dec
1963
1921
258
0
3
261
1298
111
251
--
1964
2504
81
6
9
96
1719
318
128
243
1962
19076
5247
C
6
ompos
ite Annual
212
Total
5465
s
8875
2060
2676
No Data
1963
17852
4354
15
121
4490
9805
1396
2161
No Data
1964
28526
1732
41
60
1833
19556
3178
2080
1879
1965
23785
473
56
47
576
15924
3204
1402
2679
Approved For
P79T00472A001800050003-5 25X1
 Approved For'" tlease 2003/10/01 : CIA-RDP79T0047 001800050003-5
SOUTH VIETNAM BATTLE STATISTICS
MONTHLY REPORT
OCTOBER
PERSONNEL LOSSES
(KILLED IN ACTION, MISSING IN ACTION, CAPTURED)
5000
a,,. a.u
JFMAMJJASOND
1962
JFMAMJJASOND
1963
JFMAMJJASOND JFMAMJJASOND JFMAMJJASOND
1964 1965 1966
*Wounded not included. Viet Cong figures unavailable.
SECRET
Approved For Release 2003/10/01 : CIA-RDP79T00472AO01800050003-5
 Approved Fo lease 2003/10/01 : CIA-RDP79T0047 001800050003-5
SOUTH VIETNAM BATTLE STATISTICS
MONTHLY REPORT
OCTOBER
WEAPONS LOSSES
VIETNAM AND VIET CONG
VIES` 'R._
~GDtRT(MET
JFMAMJJAS ON D JFMAMJJASOND JFMAMJJASOND JFMAMJJASOND JFMAMJJASOND
1962 1963 1964 1965 1966
SECRET
Approved For Release 2003/10/01 : CIA-RDP79T00472AO01800050003-5
 Approved For-Release 2003/10/01 : CIA-RDP79T0047YA001800050003-5
SOUTH VIETNAM BATTLE STATISTICS
MONTHLY REPORT
OCTOBER
INCIDENTS - VIET CONG
SECRET
Approved For Release 2003/10/01 : CIA-RDP79T00472AO01800050003-5
 Approved For Rele - 47201800050003-5
25X1
Approved For Releate 200M
2A001800050003-5