THE SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00472A001800050004-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 28
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 22, 2004
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: November 24, 1965
• Content Type: REPORT

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SECRET
OCI No. 0647/65
Copy No.
110
WEEKLY REPORT
THE SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM
24 November 1965
INTELLIGENCE AND REPORTING SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE INTERAGENCY
VIETNAM COORDINATING COMMITTEE
DIA AND DOS HAVE NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION
AND RELEASE.
SECRET
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THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECT-
ING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES
WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS,
TITLE 18, USC, SECTIONS 793 AND 794, THE TRANSMIS-
SION OR REVELATION OF WHICH IN ANY MANNER TO
AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.
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OCI No. 0647/65
Published by the Directorate of Intelligence
Central Intelligence Agency
THE SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM
(18 November - 24 November 1965)
C O N T E N T S
Page
THE WEEK IN PERSPECTIVE
Map, South Vietnam, facing page
I, THE SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM
A. POLITICAL SITUATION
Military Directorate begins Boa
sideration of constitution and per-
manent form of government (p. 1);
Saigon student group in sharp attack
on Ky government (p0 1); Government
seizes militant Buddhist and Catholic
publications (p. 2);
Saigon press and o er
groups manifest uneasiness over
growing American presence (p. 3);
Embassy survey notes increasing
public anxiety over US-GVN military
operations (p0 3);
continues to be encouraging (p. 4);
Role of present economic leaders
apparently in doubt (p. 4); Other
economic matters are noted (p. 5).
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Communist activity increases but
allied forces inflict significant
defeats (p. 6); Weekly statistics
show several new highs (p. 6); SIL-
VER BAYONET achieves greatest allied
success (p. 6); Action west of Plei
Me inflicts heavy casualties on three
or four PAVN regiments (p. 7); Other
action in I CTZ (p. 8); GVN surrounds
VC battalion in IV CTZ (p. 9); Series
of Communist multibattalion attacks
along the eastern coast causes heavy
government losses (p. 9); Road and
rail line interdiction is outlined
(p. 10).
Page
6
Map, Transportation Routes, facing page 10
Rural Construction Minister Thang
concludes series of budget meetings
(p. 11); Premier Ky presents land
titles to representative group of
farmers (p. 11); Other aspects of
GVN land policy (p. 11); Chieu Hoi
returnees show substantial increase,
especially military (p. 11).
Map, North Vietnam, facing page 13
Hanoi continues red carpet treatment
for visiting VC "heroes" (b. 13)
maintains "reasonable" posture by host-
ing non-Communist delegations (p. 14);
Moscow continues policy of restraint
toward both US and China. (p. 14).
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Page
III. THIRD COUNTRY DEVELOPMENTS 15
PAVN prisoner claims use of Cambodia
infiltrate South Vietnam . 15
Phnom Penh, however, feel no signs s-
cant use is being made of Cambodian
territory by Viet Cong (p. 15)
tion of ambassador on may ore-
shadow GVN diplomatic reshuffle in
Europe (p. 16).
ANNEX: South Vietnam Battle Statistics (Weekly)
US Combat Casualty Figures in Vietnam
(Weekly)
(The Weekly Report on the Situation in South
Vietnam is based on contributions from CIA,
DIA, and INR; it is edited and published by
CIA without final coordination.)
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THE WEEK IN PERSPECTIVE
A marked increase in the intensity of the fighting, in-
cluding a number of large-scale Viet Cong attacks in
scattered areas of the country, made last week the bloodiest
of the war to date. Many of the casualties resulted from the
heavy fighting between US troops and an estimated three to
four North Vietnamese regiments in southwestern Pleiku
Province, but heavy Viet Cong activity elsewhere indicated
a determined effort to maintain pressure on the population.
The political situation was disturbed only by a strong
public statement of opposition to the Ky government on the
part of the small Saigon Students Union, although there were
further indications of growing political ambitions on the part
of I Corps commander General Thi. The Ky government,
meanwhile, appears to be turning its attention toward long-
range development of. political institutions intended to satisfy
public desires for a more representative and legally-based
government.
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I. THE SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM
A. POLITICAL SITUATION
1. Saigon's military government last week turned
its attention to the problems of establishing long-
range political institutions and government legitimacy,
an iss press and political atten-
tion..
1
2. According to Premier Ky, current government
thinking envisages that the constitution, providing
for a strong executive with a fixed tenure, might hope-
fully be submitted to a public referendum sometime be-
fore the end of 1966. Some type of deliberative body
or senate, in which the various religious, regional,
ethnic, political, and labor groups would be represented,
is also under consideration. Ky told Ambassador Lodge
that some form of popular elections might be possible
during 1967, depending upon the evolution of public
political consciousness and the degree of security pre-
vailing at that time. Ky observed that, at the present
time, elections free of Communist intimidation could
probably be held in no more than one-fourth of South
Vietnam's villages.
3. On 19 November, leaders of the Saigon Students
Union (SSU) launched an unusually sharp public attack
on the Ky government, charging that it had failed in
its programs to date and that it lacked public support.
SSU President Tran Quang Tr:i, acting as the group.'s
spokesman, declared that the Ky government must go,
and that the meeting marked the opening of a struggle
between students and government. He also spoke crit-
ically of the adverse economic effects of the US mil-
itary buildup. Although the meeting was allegedly
sponsored by the SSU and Hue University students, no
representatives from Hue were present; a spokesman
from Catholic-oriented Dalat University, however, en-
dorsed the SSU stand. The US Embassy believes that
Tri and the SSU have only limited influence among
Saigon University students. It suspects, however,
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that Tri, who in the past has supported former premier
Tran Van Huong, may have been prodded by certain south-
ern regionalist politicians, as well as by disaffected
Catholic circles that have been publicly silent since
issuing a critical communique two weeks ago.
4. The embassy also reports that during the week
the government confiscated issues of the anti-American,
neutralist-leaning journal Sinh Vien Hue, published
weekly by the militant Buddhist-oriented "student strug-
gle movement" in Hue. At the same time and apparently
in an effort to strike a balance, the government also
seized issues of an aggressive Saigon weekly, Dai Doan
Ket, an organ of Catholic refugee priest Hoang uyn
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6. Although the silencing of Sinh Vien Hue, if
permanent, would remove the most bi er source of at-
tacks on the US except for Viet Cong/Liberation Front
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propaganda, indications of uneasiness over the growing
American role are manifest among all shades of the
Saigon press and other articulate groups. In addition
to the recent SSU criticism of economic disruption
resulting from the large American presence,
7. A recent survey by the US Embassy's provincial
reporting staff has concluded that there is increasing
public anxiety over the conduct of US and South Viet-
namese military operations. The survey, although neces-
sarily drawing largely on attitudes in provincial and
district towns and adjacent areas, notes that expressions
of concern are still largely restricted to a small circle
of politically conscious intellectual, religious, and
social leaders. There appears to be widespread ap-
preciation, particularly among local officialdom, of
US efforts to spare the civilian populace, although
some officials report considerable confusion among
local inhabitants over rapidly changing developments,
and others fear a serious disruption of the existing
social fabric. Although peasant attitudes could not
be firmly assessed, the embassy reporters were unable
to discover any basis for assuming that rural refugees--
many of them fleeing airstrikes or the threat of air-
strikes--were blaming the Viet Cong for their plight
or otherwise becoming more committed to the Saigon
regime. The US Embassy concludes that while no ground-
swell of antipathy toward the US or Saigon can be de-
tec:tedas a result of the intensified military pace,
the Viet Cong may be expected to exploit any critical 25X6
public mood.
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Economic Situation
9. Rice prices continued to decline, but general
retail prices leveled off after a two-week downward
trend. However, there was a rise in prices of US-
financed imports, notably construction materials of
iron and steel. In view of the increasingly short
supply of cement in Saigon, Minister of Economy Ton,
at the insistence of Saigon's mayor, has approached
US officials to see what can be done.
10. The future role of Ton and the other economic
leaders in the GVN is apparently in some doubt, ac-
cording to US Embassy reports. This is due to their
lack of forceful leadership in formulating policy and
in making a strong case to premier Ky, as well as to
intense attacks from "out" political groups, Ky and
his close military advisers do not generally comprehend
the economic situation or its possible remedies. Even
if he were to be educated to accept the policies of
Ton and the others, Ky may feel obliged to remove the
economic minister in response to political pressure.
11. The rice situation continues to be encouraging.
Delta deliveries in the past two weeks have averaged
1,243 metric tons (mt) daily, up from 1,011 mt in Oc-
tober. Saigon stocks are now at 40,211 mt, with other
known stocks totalling over 31,000 mt. It is generally
believed, however, that the early delta crop is poor
and that the continuing inflow of rice to Saigon prob-
ably represents "dishoarding" of last year's main
crop. In the meantime, the Ministry of Economy has
announced that rice prices set for government purchase
contracts would be maintained throughout the year.
Asked to suggest contract prices, rice merchants have
mentioned VN$675-700 per 100 kilogram for No 1/25 per-
cent broken. It is apparent that this suggestion re-
flects the continuing decline in rice prices, which
have been under VN$700 for over a month. This optimistic
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situation is dimmed somewhat by increased military
activity in rice areas, boding ill for production and
harvesting in the central provinces. The entrance
of PAVN units is also adding to the Viet Cong impact
on rice production.
12. :In an effort to control the flow of dollars
into Viet Cong hands, stricter measures are being en-
forced concerning the purchase of postal money orders
and the importation of dollars by US military personnel
returning from rest and recreation leaves. Vietnamese
officials are also taking steps to increase currency
control for other foreigners entering the country.
13. The Vietnamese Maritime Union strike ended
after two weeks as several hundred workers were granted
an across-the-board 1,500-piaster monthly increase.
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1. Communist activity increased again during the
week, but allied forces inflicted significant defeats
upon Viet Cong/PAVN units. The major US-PAVN confron-
tation in southwest Pleiku Province highlighted the
period; a subsequent series of large-scale Viet Cong/
PAVN attacks occurred along the eastern coast near
the Quang Ngai, Qui Nhon, and Tuy Hoa enclaves. The
Viet Cong appear determined to maintain pressure on
the population while increasing military activity.
2. Statistically, the period from 14 to 20 No-
vember showed several increases. The incident total
was 881, the highest since the record 975 in mid-
September; incident totals have now been above 700
for seven consecutive weeks. Attacks increased to
14 against seven for the previous week, terrorist
acts rose to 505 compared to 420, and sabotage in-
cidents climbed to 146 from 90. Communist weapons
losses reached an all-time high of 1,161 from the
previous week's 343, and known casualties also reached
a record peak of 2,398, including 2,262 killed and
136 captured. Allied totals also increased: com-
bined casualties were at a new high of 1,987, in-
cluding 1,270 GVN, 716 US, and one ROK; weapons
losses rose to 351 from 158.
3. The number of GVN/allied large-unit actions
showed a drop from 100 to 93, and small-unit actions
also decreased; resulting US contacts outnumbered GVN
contacts (100 versus 67) for the fifth consecutive
week. US combat deaths increased to 240 from the
previous week's high of 86, and US wounded also
reached a new record figure, 470, compared to 230
last week. The previous weekly record was 283 during
August. GVN armed forces casualty totals--357 killed,
807 wounded, and 106 missing or captured--also in-
creased, from 165, 286, and 56, respectively.
GVN/Allied Activities
4. Allied forces achieved their greatest suc-
cess of the war during Operation SILVER BAYONET in
southwest Pleiku Province. In addition to the
seizure of key terrain features from which opera-
tions can be continued into the Chu Phong base area,
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casualty totals as of 20 November show a major allied
victory over North Vietnamese forces. Confirmed PAVN/
VC losses were 1,429 killed and 20 captured; US
casualties were 215 killed and 358 wounded; GVN elements
lost seven killed and 50 wounded.
5. Artillery, naval gunfire, close air and B-52
strikes, and helicopter support all proved invaluable
throughout the week. SILVER BAYONET was supported by
17,241 rounds of 105 mm artillery, 354 close air sup-
port sorties, ten B-52 strikes, and 3,745 helicopter-
fired aerial. rockets. US naval gunfire and airstrikes
were effective during the series of enemy multibattalion
attacks that began on 21 November in the eastern coastal
area.
6. No significant naval developments were reported
during the week. A total of 4,920 junks and 17,921
persons were searched by Vietnamese Navy elements and
no sea infiltration attempts were disclosed. Contin-
uing bad weather in the northern area is affecting
sea force performance, but this is partially offset
by the steady showing of coastal force elements. The
number of junks on patrol, averaging 202 per day, is
indicative of the steady improvement.
Communist Activities
7. Communist military activity was highlighted
by the week-long action west of Plei Me in Pleiku
Province, triggered on 14 November when PAVN/VC ele-
ments attacked a company of the US 1st Cavalry Di-
vision in a helicopter landing zone. From this be-
ginning, the action developed into a full-scale
battle between at least three and possibly four
PAVN regiments and elements of the 2d and 3d bri-
gades, 1st Cavalry Division. Four GVN airborne
battalions entered the action on 18 November.
8. Heavy casualties were suffered by the Viet
Cong in other significant actions with government
forces at Tan Hiep airfield in Dinh Tuong Province,
at Hiep Duc district headquarters in Quang Tin
Province, and in Chuong Thien Province where an.
estimated Viet Cong battalion was surrounded.
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9. The Viet Cong attack at Hiep Duc on 16 No-
vember was the most significant action in the I Corps
Tactical Zone (CTZ). An estimated battalion of the
1st Viet Cong Regiment overran the town and destroyed
the headquarters defended by two regional force com-
panies, A two-battalion reaction force aided by close
air support, however, reoccupied the battle site on
18 November at an enemy cost of 363 killed and 86
weapons captured. Government losses were 35 killed
and 74 wounded. Seventy civilians were also killed,
40 as a result of the first Viet Cong assault. Other
activity consisted of minings and harassing fire,
the particularly against GVN forces in the Ba
Long Valley.
10. The week-long series of PAVN attacks and
counterattacks in the battle area southwest of Plei
Me in Pleiku Province, continued despite severe
casualties, pointed up a determined Communist effort
to defend this location. Elements of the PAVN 66th,
Song Lam, and 32d regiments, and possibIv the 250th
as well, were engaged in the fighting.
indicates that a Viet Cong local force
battalion was attached to the 66th Regiment. Ac-
cording to COMUSMACV, Communist strategy in this
area probably involves a continuing aggressive de-
fense until their position becomes untenable. At
this point, Communist forces would be expected to
move into Cambodia or adjacent areas within South
Vietnam. Small-unit actions accounted for the re-
maining activity in II Corps Tactical Zone.
11. An estimated Viet Cong battalion attacked a
GVN Marine company five kilometers south of Saigon
on the outskirts of Cholon, the largest action so
close to Saigon in some time. Other activity con-
sisted of harassing fire directed primarily at
allied troop units. Sabotage was concentrated along
Route 13 and its feeder routes, and was probably
designed to impede friendly forces operating in
Binh Duong Province.
12, ( >. 1 ? 1% 1
ii
captured on 16 November when six battalions of the
GVN 21st Division surrounded an estimated Viet Cong
battalion. Again, effective artillery and close
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air support were credited with inflicting heavy
casualties. GVN casualties were reported as eight
killed and 39 wounded. There were four other small-
scale attacks throughout the IV CTZ.
13. On 18 November, a multibattalion Viet Cong
force overran an airstrip defended by a GVN Ranger
battalion at Tan Hiep in Dinh Tuong Province, IV CTZ.
A GVN counterattack restored the airstrip to friendly
hands, but not before government forces suffered 46
killed, including 13 civilians, 55 wounded, and four
aircraft and five trucks destroyed. Viet Cong losses
at the airfield were 43 killed and two captured. An
immediate search-and-destroy operation was launched
by elements of the GVN 7th Division along the most
likely Viet Cong avenue of withdrawal. A day-long
pursuit, supported by artillery and air strikes, re-
sulted in an additional 156 Viet Cong killed and five
captured. GVN forces lost 11 killed and 53 wounded.
14. A series of Communist multibattalion attacks
along the eastern coast began on 21 November, as op-
erations elsewhere in this area by government and US
forces continued without significant contact. A regi-
ment-sized Viet Cong force attacked a GVN Ranger
battalion south of Quang Ngai city on 22 November,
but was driven off by US naval gun fire and air
strikes after sustaining heavy losses. According to
a MACV source, Viet Cong attacks were timed between
air strikes.
15. A Communist regiment-sized force reportedly
isolated Tuy An in Phu Yen Province on 23 November.
This action began the previous night when an esti-
mated battalion--reported as Viet Cong but possibly
North Vietnamese--attacked a company of government
troops guarding a bridge 15 miles north of Tuy Hoa.
The Communist force, described by a US observer as
wearing North Vietnamese-type long-sleeved khaki
shirts and camouflaged helmets,,next ambushed an
armored relief column, and then moved south to at-
tack the district town. At least five government
positions were neutralized and friendly losses
reportedly heavy, despite effective use of US naval
gunfire and air strikes.
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CURRENT STATUS OF MAJOR TRANSPORTATION ROUTES AND THE COASTAL RAILROAD
r--i--f Sections of operable railroad
Sections of closed road
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16. National Route 1 is closed in Thua Thien,
Quang Ngai, Binh Dinh, Binh Thuan, Long Khanh, and
Binh Tuy provinces. Route 9 is closed in Quang Tri
Province. Route 14 is closed in Kontum, Pleiku,
Quang Due, Phuoc Long, and Binh Long provinces.
Route 19 is closed west of Pleiku city. Route 7 is
closed in Phu Bon and Phu Yen provinces. Inter-
provincial Route 1 is closed in Binh Duong and
Phuoc Long provinces. Interprovincial Route 2 is
closed in Long Khanh Province. Provincial Route
10 is closed in Hau Nghia Province. The national
railroad is closed from Xuan Loc, Long Khanh Prov-
ince to Song Long Song, Binh Tuy Province; and be-
tween Ninh Hoa, Khanh Hoa Province, and the DMZ.
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C. RURAL CONSTRUCTION
1. The scheduled series of meetings between
Rural Construction Minister General Nguyen Duc
Thang, corps and division commanders, and province
chiefs concerning the preparation of FY 1966 pro-
vincial rural construction plans and budgets was
completed last week, General Thang, apparently
highly satisfied with these meetings, is now confi-
dent that the approved plans and budgets for rural
construction activities will be ready by the 1 Jan-
uary deadline. USOM officials still, have some com-
plex questions regarding the reconstruction plans
for the coming year, but they feel that any attempt
to make major revisions in policy or plans at this
stage would make it impossible to meet the target
date of 1 January.
2. On 17 November, Premier Ky presented land
titles to.a representative group of ten farmers oc-
cupying state lands in Tay Ninh Province. Land has
been surveyed and titles prepared for a total of 172
farmers now occupying 56 hectares in Tay Ninh Prov-
ince. This action follows a ceremony at Dalat in
Tuyen Duc Province in September, which inaugurated
the implementation of the government's policy of dis-
tributing state lands to the actual tillers. The
GVN estimates that there are a total of 180,000
squatters occupying 300,000 hectares of state land
throughout the country,
3. Other aspects of the GVN land policy in-
elude granting of full titles to farmers buying
land under Ordinance 57, which reduced landlord
holdings to a maximum of 100 hectares by expropria-
tion, and the subdivision and sale of former French-
owned rice lands now held by the GVN. About a month
ago, distribution of former French-owned lands was
initiated in Ninh Thuan Province with a ceremonial
presentation by Chief of State Thieu. No new titles
have been issued under this program, but some farmers
have provisional titles to their land and the period
of payment has been extended from six to 12 years,
4. A substantial increase in the number of Chieu
Hoi returnees was reported during the past week. A
total of 1,027 returned to government control, more
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than double the previous week's total of 438. Mili-
tary returnees constituted the largest single cate-
gory with 493 returning to government control; last
week military returnees totalled 217. Political cadres
who rallied to the government ; side numbered 115 this
week, compared to only 43 the previous week. Six
men in the deserter/draft dodger category returned to
GVN control as well as 413 civilians; for the previous
week, returnees in these categories numbered one and
177, respectively,
5, The US Embassy is interested in having the
GVN combine the psychological warfare and Chieu Hoi
functions into one ministry. The subject has been
broached to Premier Ky and he seems to approve of
the concept.
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2. To underscore the "militant bonds" that exist
between the people in both zones of Vietnam, Hanoi
this week continued to give red carpet treatment and
extensive propaganda play to the delegation of "mil-
itary heroes" of the Liberation Front currently in
the DRV. The delegation was feted at one ceremony
after another, and was greeted by senior politburo
figures including Ho Chi Minh. The extensive publicity
surrounding the delegation's visit and the emphasis in
regime propaganda on the solidarity that exists among
all Vietnamese in their determination to defeat the
"US aggressors," suggests that Hanoi is using the visit
to demonstrate publicly its faith in the fighting ability
of the Viet Cong and to strengthen the insurgents' de-
termination to continue the war.
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4. While the North Vietnamese have continued
to insist that any settlement of the war will be
achieved on Communist terms, Hanoi has been careful
to maintain a position in which the DRV can still
appear reasonable in its demands. An example of
this has been the regime's frequent willingness to
host non-Communist delegations that come to Hanoi
to discuss the fighting. The latest instance is the
visit of the former mayor of Florence, Italy, Georgio
La Pira, who has just returned from talks with the
North Vietnamese leadership. Hanoi probably told him,
as it has others in the past, that the US must stop
the bombings in the North and declare a unilateral
ceasefire in the South.
5. Moscow's statements in recent weeks have not
gone beyond standard condemnations of US actions in
Vietnam, and continue to avoid any mention of a negoti-
ated settlement of the war. The Soviet stance reflects
the USSR's apparent resignation to what it anticipates
will be a prolonged struggle in Vietnam, and under-
scores its continuing determination to avoid an open
divergence from Hanoi's stand.
6. Although the USSR also continues its policy
of restraint in answering Chinese attacks against Soviet
policy in Vietnam, it has apparently decided to reply--
indirectly--to Peking's 11 November indictment of US-
Soviet collusion over Vietnam. A 20 November Neues
Deutschland article, openly critical of Peking's anti-
Soviet tactics with regard to the Vietnamese conflict,
is aimed at convincing Communist audiences that Peking's
intransigence toward the Soviet Union is having broad
consequences for Hanoi's position in the war. TASS
promptly replayed the portions of the article that cited
Chinese obstruction of Soviet military aid to the DRV
as evidence that Peking is "putting ideological dif-
ferences above the struggle against imperialism."
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III. THIRD COUNTRY DEVELOPMENTS
A. CAMBODIA
1. A PAVN prisoner recently stated during a
GVN-sponsored press conference in Saigon that his
group had infiltrated South Vietnam through Cambodia,
and that local militia provided the group with sup-
plies, particularly rice. A preliminary interrogation
report, so far the only report on this development
from the US Mission, briefly mentions that the
prisoner entered through Cambodia but contains no in-
dication of local assistance. Moreover, American
newsmen who attended the press conference have con-
fidentially reported that the prisoner's statements
did not sound convincing.
report that on
of available evidence ere is no significant Viet
Cong use of Cambodian territory. Moreover, they feel
that no significant use of Cambodian territory could
be made by the Viet Cong without the connivance of
the government in Phnom Penh, and they see no evi-
dence that the Cambodian Government is considering
such connivance. On the contrary, they report, trends
in the Cambodian leadership appear to be away from
close association with the Communists and toward im-
,rr i r7 rnl nti nng with free world nations. (The
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C. Foreign Office Matters
Vu Van Mau, GVN Ambassador to London, resigned
as a result of a disagreement with the Foreign Office.
The point at issue ostensibly was whether or not the
GVN would pay for Mau's travel to Saigon to permit
him to participate in the annual examination of can-
didates by the law faculty of the University of Saigon.
(Mau was once dean of the law faculty.) The US Embassy
in Saigon reports that in view of earlier reports that
the GVN was considering replacing Mau, the Ky govern-
ment may have seized on the travel request as a pre-
text for forcing his resignation. There is no indi-
cation as yet of a replacement for Mau, but the GVN
reportedly is considering a realignment of the non-
resident ambassadorial representation in northern
and western Europe, primarily in order to strengthen
representation in the Scandinavian countries.
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SOUTH VIETNAM BATTLE STATISTICS, 1965
SECRET WEEKLY REPORT
in nine 12398 - -11
Wounded not included Such figures unavailable on Viet Cong.
WEAPONS LOSSES
Jan I Feb I Mar I Apr I May I Junel July I Aug I Sept I Oct I Nov I Dec
I Jan ; Febl 'Mar l Apr I May I June I July Aug I Sept I Oct I Nov I Dec I
Jan Feb I Mar 1 Apr I May I June I July I Aug I Sept I Oct I Nov I Dec I
Attacks Terrorism Sabotage ;.Propaganda \ Antiaircraft Fire
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US COMBAT CASUALTIES IN VIETNAM
INCLUDING NORTH VIETNAM
Non- fat
al
_
--
Non-
fatal
Wound
s
Fataliti
es
Wound
s
_
l
Cumulative, 1961. 1964
255 1524
_
Fata
ities
Cumulative, 1965 to date 840 4137
Total 1095 5661
(Figures do not include 96 carried as missing
or 27carried as captured.)
1
95
T
R
1 N
V M
E
II
II
It
II
~
I I
I
\ I
I
I
\I
I
I
I
I -
'
`
I
I
r
10
rr
1
~~
i
\
i
y
1
~
\
VIET CONG ATTACKS
NOV I DEC
Company and battalion sized attacks
Battalion sized (and larger)attacks only
2
T R
2 NOVEM
E
JAN I FEB I MAR
40892
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