THE SITUATION IN VIETNAM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00472A001900010003-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 2, 2012
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: February 11, 1965
• Content Type: MEMO

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/23: CIA-RDP79T00472AO01900010003-8
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/23: CIA-RDP79T00472AO01900010003-8
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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/23: CIA-RDP79T00472AO01900010003-8
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/23: CIA-RDP79T00472AO01900010003-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/23: CIA-RDP79T00472AO01900010003-8
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY'
Office of Current Intelligence
11 February 1965
The'"Situation' in Vietnam as of 1030 EST .
The 11 February Air Strikes
1. One hundred nine US carrier-based aircraft parti-
cipated in a retaliatory air strike against the,Chanh Hoa
army barracks north of Dong Hoi at approximately 0100 EST
today. This installation is adjacent to Dong Hoi airfield
and has an estimated capacity of 2000 troops. It is be-
lieved to house elements of thePAVN 325th Infantry
Division.
2. The US strike aircraft encountered poor weather
conditions and light. to moderate ground fire in the target
area. Three planes, including one photorecon'aircraft`
accompanying the mission, were lost. However, two of the
pilots were recovered.
.3. Preliminary pilot reports indicate that the Chanh
Hoa target area was severely damaged. At least three barracks
complexes were observed to be.burning heavily. Results
of post-strike photo reconnaissance are not.yet available.
However, a verbal report from a post-strike aircraft
describes many buildings blackened and standing without
roofs or windows.
4. A combined US-South Vietnamese air strike in_ ,
volving 52 aircraft was conducted at approximately 0245.EST
against the Chap Le army barracks. This complex,'believed
to contain 'the headquarters of the DRV 270th-Independent
Infantry Regiment, was also hit in-the-8 February South
Vietnamese air force attack.. Photographic analysis of
that strike shows light to moderate damage.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/23: CIA-RDP79T00472AO01900010003-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/23: CIA-RDP79T00472AO01900010003-8
5. All of the aircraft participating in the Chap
Le attack have returned safely to their bases. Post-
strike reconnaissance on the attack is not yet available.
Returning pilots, however, report at least five buildings
in the target area destroyed and several explosions at
nearby AAA installations which were hit.
Communist Military Reaction
8. No Chinese Communist or Soviet mili-
tary reaction has been detected during the past twenty-
four hours..
Developments in South Vietnam
9. Aggressive Viet Cong military activity continues
in widespread areas of South Vietnam, although there have
been no reports thus far of significant new enemy attacks
.today. The singling out of Americans as targets of violence,
probably in retaliation for the airstrikes against the
North, is indicated by the mutilation of.three American ad-
visers whose bodies, were found yesterday-when'government
troops recaptureda district town north of Saigon which
had been overrun by the Viet Cong on 9 February. Confirmed
US casualty figures in yesterday's terrorist bombing of the
enlisted men's billet in Qui Nhon now stand at 2 dead and
18 wounded. Twenty three are still being sought in the
debris..
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 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/23: CIA-RDP79T00472AO01900010003-8
10. Simultaneous with the billet bombing, Viet Cong
terrorists attacked a nearby police station with grenades,
wounding two Vietnamese, policemen. Two Viet Cong were
captured. Seven other policemen were wounded in another
grenade attack on an outpost near the billet, and a nearby
power station was also attacked with grenades. Today,
.a fleet of some 50 junks, suspected by local officials of
being Viet Cong, was dispersed off Qui Nhon by ARVN fire.
Earlier reports of an."amphibious attack" by:these junks
have not been confirmed, and there is'some possibility
that the incident resulted from neverousness on the part
of local officials shaken by earlier events in the town.
11. MACV reports that in the first ten days of
February, there have been 213 US casualties, including 14
KIA and one MIA. 141 of these casualties resulted from
last Sunday's attack on Pleiku. These figures apparently
do not include losses sustained in the Qui Nhon terrorist
bombing.
12. The military developments of the past few days
have overshadowed the political maneuvering in Saigon,
and have lent some urgency to the formation of a new
government. Agreement seems to have been reached on the
designation of Interior Minister Nguyen Luu Vien as pre-
mier, and an announcement is expected shortly. However,
continuing conflicts among the principal power elements are
reflected in the difficulty being experienced in selecting
individual cabinet ministers.
DRV Internal Situation
13. The first post-strike report on conditions
in North Vietnam has been received from the Canadian
ICC representative in Hanoi. According to the report,
there was no evidence of public concern evident in Hanoi
as of 8 February, nor any outward signs of a renewed
civil defense alert or special defense precautions.
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16. Peiping is moving cautiously while at the same
time attempting to.encourage Hanoi and to deter the US
from moves to enlarge the conflict by increasingly belliger-
ent propaganda. There has been a steady escalation in the
Chinese war of words since 8 February and massive anti-US
rallies are being staged all over China. The editorial
blast in People's Daily on 10 February is very tough. It
warns ominously that if the US is bent on spreading the
war to China Peiping will "have no alternative but to go
along with it to the very end," and that in such an event
"the whole of Southeast Asia, the whole of Asia would be
aflame with the revolutionary fire." The editorial notes
that America's "meager force" in Asia is spread thinly
over a "long arc from South Korea to Indochina", and that
if the conflict Were expanded, the "time, place and scale
of the war" would be beyond US control.
17. This latest outburst contains Peiping's most
specific public commitment to action in response to new
US moves thus far. It is very carefully stated, however,
in terms designed to give the Chinese wide freedom of choice
as to their reaction. Speaking of a US decision to enlarge
the struggle, Peiping asserts in the English language broad-
cast version of the editorial that "an invasion of the DRV
is also an invasion of China" which the Chinese would be
duty-bound to oppose with "concrete action." This is
much more precise than the formulation used is the official
statement about the Vietnam situation issued by Peiping on
8 February--and earlier following the Tonkin Gulf incident--
which used the broader term "aggression." Thus refined,
the Chinese promise to help Hanoi defend itself is firmest
in the contingency Peiping probably regards as most remote,
a major ground offensive against North Vietnam. In other
more likely situations the Chinese leave themselves room
for maneuver.
18. Peiping's latest statement implies that it ex-
pects more air strikes against the DRV but makes no pro-
mist of an immediate Chinese response. Instead, it claims
that such attacks will never succeed in frightening the
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/23: CIA-RDP79T00472AO01900010003-8
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"South Vietnamese people" and declares that whatever the
US does they will "certainly redouble their efforts to deal
one heavy blow after another on the US aggressors,"
Communist Political Developments
19. A joint Soviet-DRV statement was issued on 10
February following Kosygin's departure from Hanoi.' It
proved to be relatively bland and non-committal The
US reaffirmed its pledge to render "necessary assistance
and support" to the DRV, but strongly implied in the state-
ment that it intends to carry out the commitment step by
step, carefully weighing the extent of its involvement
against future US actions in Indochina. The statement as-
serted that "regular consultations" would beheld on
"measures which should be taken to strengthen" North Viet-
namese defensive capabilities.
20. There was no indication in the statement that
Kosygin had extracted a pledge of support from Hanoi on
issues in contention in the Sino-Soviet dispute. No men-
tion was made, for example, of the proposed meeting of the
Communist "editorial commission" in Moscow on 1 March,
thus casting doubt on whether the Soviets were able to
win Hanoi's agreement to participate. The statement also
failed to refer specifically to future Soviet economic as-
sistance to North Vietnam. In a farewell speech in Hanoi,
Kosygin mentioned only that an "exchange of views" on the
subject had taken place.
21. The Soviet Premier is now in North Korea, after
a short stop in Peiping for further talks with Chinese
leaders including Mao and Liu Shao-chi. No information is
available on these discussions. There are some indications
that Kosgyin's decision to include Pyongyang on his itinerary
was hurriedly made. His trip adds to the thesis that the
Soviet Union has begun a concerted effort to increase its
overall influence with the Asian Communist parties. Since
the new Kremlin leaders came to power, North Korea has
dampened;, down its pro-Chinese polemics.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/23: CIA-RDP79T00472AO01900010003-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/23: CIA-RDP79T00472AO01900010003-8
w w
V I E-T A}M
Hanoi
REPRISAL TARGETS
North Vietnam
0 U. S. Targets
X Vietnamese Targets
* Alternate Target
0 MILES 200
650210 6
/Chanh Hoa Bks.
p Dong Hoi Bks.*
Chap Le Bks
SOUTH
VI ETNA,-~M
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TOP SECRET
TOP SECRET
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