THE SITUATION IN VIETNAM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00472A001900010015-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 2, 2012
• Sequence Number: 15
• Publication Date: February 23, 1965
• Content Type: MEMO

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OCI No, 0774/65
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE-AGENCY
Office of Current Intelligence
23 February 1965
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
The Situation in Vietnam as of 0600 EST
.Political Developments in South Vietnam
1. There has been little change in the situa-
tion during the past 24 hours. General Khanh re-
,mains in Dalat, but Saigon radio announced today,
.that he has been appointed a "roving ambassador,"
thus apparently paving the way for his early de-
parture from South Vietnam. There is some indica-
tion that Khanh may, eventually be named either
ambassador to the US, replacing General Khiem, or
Vietnam?s representative to the UN.
2. Khanh may attempt to use the time remaining
before his departure in last-minute intrigues to
recoup his position. Since the other generals appear
solidly united in opposition to Khanh, however, it
seems unlikely, that any such attempt would succeed.
3. The Armed Forces Council meanwhile is be-
ginning to make changes in various key positions in
the military establishment. Among the first is the
appointment of General Tran Van Don, a major target
of General Khanh's coup a year ago, as chief of the
Central Intelligence Organization. Another important
change is the replacement of the.chief:`of police, who
has been.a particular object of. Buddhist wrath, by
a follower of General Thi, the I Corps commander..
.Thi has emerged from the latest upheaval with con-
siderably enhanced power.
Viet Cong Military Activity
4. MACV.notes a sudden spurt of Viet Cong
activity following the abortive coup attempt of 19
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February, but actions reported thus far have been
limited to harassment, sabotage and small-scale
guerrilla warfare. A National Liberation Front
broadcast of 20 February took note of the latest
leadership upheaval in Saigon, urging supporters
of the Front to take advantage of it by intensify-
ing their efforts both in the countryside-and in
the cities.
5. The senior US military advisor in II Corps
reports that the security situation in Phu Yen Prov-
ince has deteriorated markedly in recent weeks to
the point where it now-approximates that of adjacent
Binh Dinh Province. It is possible that the arms
cache discovered near the sunken Communist vessel
off Phu Yen had been intended to support efforts by the
Viet.Cong to consolidate their gains and expand their
holdings in Quang Ngai, Binh Dinh, and Phu Yen Prov-
inces and to open up new.areas of activity in Khanh
Hoa and other areas farther south along the coast.
Communist Political Developments
6. The Soviet Union yesterday warned once
again of the danger of expanding the conflict in
Vietnam. The Soviet press repeated calls for
negotiations to avoid such a development.
7. At the 22 February Soviet Army Day rally
in Moscow, Defense Minister'Malinovsky repeated
earlier Soviet pledges of "necessary support" for
North Vietnam and warned that US actions in Vietnam
threaten "to kindle the flames of a big.war." Soviet
propaganda media, meanwhile, stressed.that negotia-
tions offer the best way out of the current situation.
Referring to recent messages by Mikoyanand De Gaulle
to Cambodia's Prince Sihanouk, Moscow radio commented
that "any sane man" realizes that "immediate peace-ful negotiations" constitute the only alternative
to expanded war in Vietnam.
8. Hanoi radio noted, without comment, a Cam-
bodian Foreign Ministry note of 16 February which
repeated Sihanouk's recent messages to France, India,
the USSR and Burma. Sihanouk, requested these coun-
tries to intervene "immediately" to convince US and
British leaders to accept "without delay and without
prerequisites" conditions leading to the convening
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of the Geneva Conference. There has, so far, been
no hint of any give on the part of Hanoi toward
genuine negotiations. The North Vietnamese probably
hope that such calls for talks will encourage other
nations to put pressure on the US to halt further
military action against North Vietnam.
9. Peiping, claiming to quote the North Viet-
namese radio report of the Cambodian note, ignored
the call.for a conference altogether, stressing in
stead that part of the Cambodian statement which
demanded the US put an "immediate end to its,aggres-
sive war in Indochina."
10. The British Consul General in Hanoi be-
lieves that the North Vietnamese leaders were not
so impressed by the air strikes as to attempt to
restrain the Viet Cong. He thinks that they might
not be able to restrain them even if they wanted
to, since the Viet Cong now scent victory. The Consul
holds the opinion that the North Vietnamese leaders
are quite prepared to suffer further air strikes,
even ones wiping out major industrial` installations
in the Hanoi-Haiphong, area. The British official
described the leaders in Hanoi as "viciously self-
confident" and so thoroughly convinced by their
success against the French that nothing can prevent
them from gaining complete victory. He also regards
them as "unbelievably isolated" from outside reality.
11. In a conversation with the Indian ambas-
sador in.Moscow on 22 February, Soviet Premier Kosy-
gin condemned the US air strikes against North Viet-
nam and said that the Soviet leadership could not
possibly counsel Hanoi to encourage a cease fire
so long as US bombardments continue.
Communist Military Developments
12. Hanoi announced yesterday that "tens of
thousands" of youths and students are engaged in a
massive emulation campaign known as the "three-
ready" movement. Featuring such military "sports"
as forced. marches, weapons qualification firing,
and grenade throwing, the movement is evidently
aimed at increasing North Vietnamese civil defense
preparedness. In Hanoi alone, some 120,000 youths
.allegedly have signed up for the part-time military
training.
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13. The practical result of such an effort,
if it is efficiently carried out, would be the
formation of a large teen-age militia guard which
could serve as a ready source of conscripts for the
regular army and provide some measure of increased
military readiness. Communist China launched a
.similar campaign last summer to..build..up and arm
its burgeoning militia forces.
14. Some of the, International Control-Commis-
sion teams have begun withdrawing from North Vietnam
at the insistence of the Hanoi government. In issuing
the withdrawal demand on.13 February, Hanoi stated
that it could no longer assure the safety of the team
members in North Vietnam. The first teams reportedly
left from Dong Hoi, Hon Gay (on the coast near Hai-
phong),and Lao Kay on the Sino-Vietnamese border.
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