THE SITUATION IN VIETNAM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00472A001900030012-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 19
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 7, 2012
• Sequence Number: 12
• Publication Date: March 26, 1965
• Content Type: MEMO

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26 March 1965
HIGHLIGHTS
Recent military attacks on ?the DRY have helped
raise morale in South Vietnam, but there is a danger
that morale will again drop sharply if the Saigon
government cannot follow through with significant
political and military progress against the Commu-
nists. On the Communist side, it now appears that
in the coming days they will play heavily on threats
that theyrare going to step up their support to the
Viet Cong through the dispatch of more armsand pos-
sibly volunteers. ?They will be seeking IQ raise
further international apprehension over the chances
of greater bloc military involvement in Vietnam,
hoping thereby that Washington can be pressured into
dropping or slowing its own military program.
I. The Military Situation in South Vietnam:
There has been a slight intensification of activity
by both the Viet Cong and government forces, Sev-
eral small-scale attacks have been reported in guer-
rilla-infested Darlac and Kontum provinces in the
central highlands, while the coastal railroad has
been sabotaged in two widely separate areas (Paras
24).. The press continues to .report Viet Cong troop
build-ups in the vidinity of Saigon (Para 5). A
large-scale government heliborne operation in
Choung Thien Province has been terminated with dis-
appointing results (Para. 6).
II. Political Developments in South Vietnam:
Saigon's foreign minister believes morale is on the
upswing in the wake of the air strikes (Para. 1).
ARVN combat troop morale is also reported rising
(Para. 4). The US Mission in Saigon also believes
that there has been a noticeable improvement (Para 5
although it sees a danger that this Could change
quickly (Para. 6).
Premier Quat has indicated that he still
considers the military a stumbling bloak to a more
stable government in Saigon (Para. 3) . A Catholic
leader, lukewarm toward Quat and suspicious of the
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?
Buddhists, has reported a rumor that various gen-
erals may attempt a'coup during Ambassador Taylor's
trip to Washington (Para. 7).
III. Military Developments in North Vietnam:
We now have partial photographic results of the 26
March air strike against several DRV radar 'sites.'
These photographs indicate only moderate damage to
the installations (Paras. 1-3).
IV. Other Commuhist Military Developments: No
bloc military movements related to Vietnam have been
detected.
stories alleging that Communist China is
n er er ng with the delivery of Soviet aid to the
DRV (Paras. 2 and 3).
V. Communist Political Developments: Official
bloc propaganda organs are fully backing the 22
March Liberation Front call for weapons aid,and, if
necessary, volunteers? (Paras. 173),.,.. Moscow is
privately continuing its probes for any sign of
change in US policy on Vietnam (Para. 6). ProPa,-
ganda emphasis on the gas issue has now shifted to
an official level; Moscow has delivered a protest
note to the US, and the DRAT has issued a government
statement (Paras. 7 and 8).
VI. Other Major Aspects: The Italian Social-
ists are moving to undercut the Moro government's
support of US policy in Vietnam by exploiting the
gas issue (Para, 1). Prince Sihanouk has again
threatened to break relations with the US if another
Cambodian is killed by a South Vietnamese incursion
(Para. 2).
ii
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I. MILITARY SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM
1. The military situation in South Vietnam
reveals a slight intensification of operational
activity by both the:Viet Cong and government
forces.
2. MACV's military report for 24 March shows
56 Communist-initiated incidents, 14 occurring in
the reporting period. Three armed attacks and one
ambush were listed; the bulk of incidents reported
comprised harassing fire against government _troops,
posts, and watchtowers, hamlet entry and harassment,
sabbtage against land lines of communication, and
mine detonations.
3. In the I Corps area, the Viet Cong sabotaged
the rail lines in Quang Nam Province. Within the II
Corps, Communist guerrillas staged two attackS in Dar-
lac Province, one against a land development center de-
fended by a Popular Forces platoon and the other against
a Regional Forces company. The first assault resulted
in two government soldiers killed and 100 houses "burned;
the second action produced only minor :friendly casual-
ties. In Kontum Province, a government lailitary out-
post was attacked and destroyed by an unknown number of
Viet Cong. Small arms fire was placed on a district
chief's vehicle in Quang Duc Province and on anew life
hamlet in Tuyen Duc Province. In the III Corps, an
ARVN supply convoy was ambushed in Binh Duong Province,
killing eight government troops.
4. In Long Khanh Province, the Viet Cong exploded
mines under an armored train some 50 miles northeast of
Saigon, overturning one armored car, derailing four
freight cars, damaging a considerable number of rail
sections and crossfies? and causing friendly person-
nel casualties of two killed and six wounded. A Popu-
lar Forces platoon in Long An Province and a govern-
ment post in Binh Duong Province received harassing
fire. Within the IV Corps, mortar and small arms fire
was directed against posts and watchtowers in Phong
Dinh, Chuong Thien, and An Uyen Provinces. No cur-
rent actions were reported in the Capital Military Dis=
trict.
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5. Reports continue to appear in the press of
suspected large concentr tions of Viet Cong heavily
equipped with mortars moving into districts adjacent
to Saigon. Government rtillery has reportedly bom-
barded the suspect enemy positions for five consecu-
tive days.
6. The level of government-initi ted ground
operations of battalion strength or larger increased
to 19, with lTsearch-and-destroy operations initiated
on 24 March, none of which resulted in significant
contact with the Viet Cong. Unconfirmed press reports
state th t a large-scale _helicopter and ground oper-
ation involving elements of two government battalions,
initiated on 25 March against a suspected Viet Cpng
concentration in Chuong Thien Province, ended today
after only light contact with the elusive guerrillas.
-
Nine insurgents were killed, one captured, and an
ammunition dump blown up. During the operation, a_
US Army helicopter gunner was Wounded by enemy anti-
craft fire'. No other government casualties were re-
ported. Company-size or smaller operations conducted
on 24 Marchdeclined to 2,081. Only six contacts, -
were made with the Viet Cong, with minor losses re-
ported on both sides.
7. USAF/VNAF combat air oper tions increased
sharply, particularly in terms of the number of
close air support, interdiction, and logistics mis-
sions flown. Results from American and Vietnamese
aircraft missions for 24 rch indicate 18 Viet Cong
were killed and 99 structures destroyed. The press
reports that American B-57 jet bombers and F-100
fighters yesterday bombed :.nd strafed suspected Com-
munist guerrilla concentrations in Tay Ninh and Binh
Dinh provinces, the results of which were not im-
mediately available.
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II, POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN SOUTH VIETNAM
1. South Vietnam's foreign minister, Tran Van
Do, told Ambassador Taylor yesterday that he felt
morale in the country was definitely on the upswing.
He believed that the air strikes were causing con-
cern in North Vietnam, and that some consideration
should now be given to an acceptable basis for end-
ing the war at a proper time. Do said that he con-
sidered it unrealistic to expect Hanoi, for reasons
of face and self-preservation, to capitulate un-
conditionally unless completely defeated; he there-
fore thought a formula should be found to give Hanoi
a choice between surrender and continuing the war.
2. Premier Quat,' in a separate conversation
with the ambassador on the same day, discussed
various problems including manpower needs. He again
indicated that he felt the present shortage could be
met by the accelerated mobilization program and that
he foresaw no need to seek third-country combat
forces. He indicated that this did not apply to
possible US-force increases in the magnitude of
10,000 for support activities.
3. Quat also said that he regarded prospects
good for greater political stability except for dif-
ficulties with the military who still considered
themselves an element apart from the government.
He indicated some concern over the reported decisions
on command changes taken by the Armed Forces Council
on 20 March, and agreed that it might be helpful if
he could persuade the generals to suspend Council
meetings for as long as a year until things stabilize.
Quat showed an interest in a US evaluation of the 45
province chiefs--10 rated excellent, five inadequate,
and 30 adequate--and of the new minister of economy
as unsatisfactory. Quat said he would consult his
cabinet on these matters, but implied that changes
would only occur gradually.
4. Colonel Tran Ngoc Huyen, chief of the army's
psychological warfare directorate, recently cited the
150-200 daily letters from combat troops in the field,
in response to army psywar broadcasts. He said they
indicate a sharp increase in morale since the air
strikes and a belief that victory over the Viet Cong
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is now possible "in the measurable future." Huyen
voiced concern with Generals Thi and Ky, commenting
that he received some troop complaints about the pre-
occupation with politics and luxury living of senior
officers while the ranks were giving their lives in
the field.
5. US Mission reports on the effects of the
air strikes on South Vietnam agree that a noticeable
morale improvement has occurred, particularly as the
bombings have become more sustained in the past week.
Enthusiasm appears greatest among the military. Ap-
proval is also apparent in the comments of government
officials, top Buddhist leaders, and various elements
of the Catholic community. Although much of the sup-
port is tied to notions of a deeper US commitment,
an early end to the war, or a stronger negotiating
position vis-a-vis Hanoi, the embassy has observed
less tendency to consider the burden now entirely up
to the US than had been feared.
6. At the same time, there is a danger that
early disappointment over the likelihood of internal
improvement or peace--now reportedly increasingly
discussed in the provinces--could cause morale to
drop sharply. Saigon has asked for some photos of
the strike results to counter Viet Cong propaganda
that civilians are major targets.
7. Father Quynh, a prominent leader of Catholic
refugee circles, recently added his own lukewarm
appraisal of the Quat government to similar comments
of his colleagues. Quynh left the impression that
his group planned no dramatic initiatives, although
he voiced suspicion of Buddhist intentions and also
concern over reports of Air Vice Marshal Ky's role
in the recent Armed Forces Council meeting. He re-
ported a rumor, however, that certain generals might
attempt a coup next week during Ambassador Taylor's
absence, a rumor for which there is no currently
known substantiation.
8. Buddhist lay leader Tran Quang Thuan has
outlined a reported plan under which the Buddhists
would, in phases over the next year, attempt to
establish a lay anti-Communist organization. Thuan
said the organization, under a lay "brain trust",
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would permit Buddhist monks to retire entirely to
religious matters, unless the religion came under
challenge. He added that Thich Tri Quang, in the
interim, hoped to devote himself to .a program of
increased training and discipline of Buddhist monks.
9. Outbreaks of bubonic plague and cholera are
prevalent in at least six provinces of central Viet-
nam, and some cases have been noted in Saigon. Ac-
cording to a World Health Organization spokesman,
deaths from the plague include two in Saigon and one
in Binh Dinh Province. There is little information
to date on whether the diseases have attacked the
refugee circles in several central provinces, or
whether Viet Cong forces are affected.
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III, MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS IN NORTH VIETNAM
1. Only partial photographic results have so far
been:, received on the coordinated strikes against four
North Vietnamese radar sites by US naval aircraft
on 26 March. About 75 planes took part in the
raids which hit installations at Bach Long Island,
Ha Tinh, Cape Mui Ron, and Vinh Son at about 1400
local Vietnam time (0100 EST).
2. The photos confirm pilot obsekvations
of additional light damage to the
Vinh Son installation, which was also hit in a
strike on 22 March. No damage was apparent in
the photos to the radar antennae at Cape Mui Ron
and Bach Long Island. Photographic results of
the strike on the Ha Tinh site are not yet availa-
ble.
3. Two US pilots were recovered safely after
their aircraft ditched at sea following the strike.
One aircraft was shot down, while the other expew-
rienced medhanical. difficulty.
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?
IV. OTHER COMMUNIST MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS
1. We have not detected any bloc military
movementswhich appear related to the situation in
Vietnam during the past twenty-four hours.-
2. With regard to Soviet military aid to North
Vietnam,
stories alleging that Communist China is inter-
fering with the delivery of such lassistance.
the Chinese were insisting
that they take over military aid shipments at
the Soviet border and handle delivery of the
equipment of the DRV themselves.
3 The Soviets claimed they had tried without
success to overcome Chinese objections by ar-
guing that it was essential for Soviet technicians
Accompany; tlieL-shipinepts-;.whithincluded_ "air-to-
ground rockets and antiaircraft missiles"--in
order to install the equipment and teach the
Vietnamese how to use the new weapons,
to
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? V. COMMUNIST POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS
1. Official bloc propaganda organs are throw-
ing their full weight behind the 22 March Liberation
Front call for weapons and, if necessary, volunteers.
Peiping and Hanoi each have replayed the other's
comment on the Front statement. The North Vietnamese
Army journal Quan Doi Nhan Dan, as quoted by Peiping,
voiced the readiness of-RiTiTe-southerners, regrouped
north in 1954, to respond to the call of the Front,
return to the south, take up arms, and annihilate the
enemy. Hanoi radio on 26 March reported the 25 March
Peiping People's Daily editorial welcoming the Front
statement. The North Vietnamese broadcast quoted
the Chinese as saying that they "solemnly declare"
that they will send "all necessary material aid, in-
cluding weapons," to the South Vietnamese "people"
and that they are "ready" to send their own men
whenever the Front wants them.
2. Moscow TASS on 24 March repeated the Front
call for increased weapons aid as well as its con-
tingent request for volunteers. Komsomol Pravda,
the official Soviet youth journal, on 26 Match high-
lighted the fact that Russian women and children are
volunteering to serve in Vietnam alongside men who
are willing to fight for Communist North ,Vietnam
"to the last drop of blood."
3. Reuters reported on 26 March that a North
Vietnamese Embassy spokesman in Moscow asserted that
"entire Russian Army units" have volunteered to fight
in Vietnam, but that the Soviet Government had, as
yet, made no decision on their offers. No Soviet
Government official has yet mentioned the possibility
of regular army units volunteering for Vietnam.
4. In an effort to give the impression of
world-wide support for the Front call, Hanoi radio
reported on 26 March that volunteers from Hungary
and Burma have offered to fight in Vietnam. Radio
Havana ha 's reminded its people that Cuba was the
first to offer to send volunteers to Vietnam.
5, North Korea on 26 March also jumped on the
bandwagon with a formal statement in support of the
Front call, affirming that "all the people of the
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socialist states should offer all forms of aid" and
should, if necessary, "dispatch their volunteer
fighters." According to the statement, Pyongyang
will give "all typesof material aid...including
weapons" to Vietnam.
6. The Soviets continue their private efforts
to probe for some signs of change in US policy toward
Vietnam, especially regarding diplomatic action to
bring about a negotiated settlement. A Soviet dip-
lomat told a US correspondent in London that Moscow
just doesn't understand US motives in the crisis and
wonders how far it is prepared to go in defining its
terms for a settlement. The Soviet official main-
tained that the degree of Soviet assistance to North
Vietnam will depend upon an "accurate evaluation" of
US intentions. Much the same line was taken in a 23
March conversation in Moscow between K. Rudnev, vice
chairman of the Soviet Council of Ministers, and the
Canadian ambassador. While Rudnev was probably, giv-
ing his own personal views, Ambassador Ford concluded
that his remarks concerning the goals of US policy in
Vietnam reflected a "genuine bewilderment" on the
part of the USSR as to US intentions.
7. The emphasis in bloc propaganda on the gas
issue has now shifted to an official level. Moscow
on 26 March, delivered 'a Foreign Ministry note to
the US Embassy charging that the use of "poisonous"
gases in South Vietnam had the approval of the US
State and Defense Departments. The US Embassy in
Moscow believes the Soviets probably intend thb
note as a "major propaganda piece",and that they
will soon publish it in the Moscow press.
8. The Hanoi Government also issued an of
statement on 26 March assailing the use of
"toxic" gases in Vietnam. The statement called the
action an, "intolerable provocation" against the Viet-
namese, and claimed that it would only result in
rallying more "vigorous" support from the "socialist
countries and the world" for the insurgent war effort.
9. So far, the US air strike of 26 March has
not drawn a major propaganda reaction from the bloc.
Hanoi, as usual, claimed great success in shooting
down the attacking aircraft. According to the North
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Vietnamese, 16 planes were downed, making a total
of 77 since the raids began. Both Moscow and Pei-
ping have repeated the North Vietnamese claims.
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VI, OTHER MAJOR ASPECTS
1. The use of nonlethal gas in Vietnam led
the Italian Socialist directorate to issue a reso-
lution on 24 March condemning the US action. The
Christian Democratic - Socialist, coalition had 15ub-
licly backed the US position in Vietnam last month,
but the Socialist reaction to the gas issue seems
likely to undermine this support to some extent.
Socialist leader Nenni believed the incident "would
not cause difficulty within the government itself"
but he "recognized that the issue could assume
dangerous proportions in Parliament."
2. Prince Sihanouk has again threatened to
break relations with the US if another Cambodian
is killed as a result of a South Vietnamese border
incursion. Sihanouk's "last warning" came in re-
sponse to alleged South Vietnamese border viola-
tions on 21 and 23 March when eight Cambodian
casualties were reported, including three killed.
Sihanouk has issued such warnings before, especially
during periods of heightened border tension, with-
out following through. A serious incident shortly
after this latest warning, however, could force
his hand.
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