THE SITUATION IN VIETNAM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00472A001900030014-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 7, 2012
• Sequence Number: 14
• Publication Date: March 28, 1965
• Content Type: MEMO

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28 March 1965
HIGHLIGHTS
Chinese Communist Foreign Minister Chen Yi
has formalized Peiping's offer, initially contained
in a party daily editorial of 25 March, to provide
aid to the Viet Cong. In a note sent today to the
North Vietnamese foreign minister, Chen Yi pledged
the South Vietnamese people all necessary aid, in-
cluding men if required. Peiping's contingent pledge
of manpower appears intended at least in part"to
discourage the further introduction of US combat
troops in South Vietnam, Soviet spokesmen both at
home and abroad are continuing their attempts to.
generate pressures on the US to moderate its policy
in Vietnam,
1. The Military Situation-in South Vietnam:
.The Viet Cong continue to emphasize sma -sca e
harassment, terrorism, and sabotage.(Paras. 2 and
3). Government operational activity has increased
slightly, but no significant results have been re-
ported (Para. 4),
II.- Political Developments in South Vietnam:
Premier Quat is aga n concerned over a posse ity
of a coup against him, citing rumors that General
"Big" Minh may be organizing a coalition of senior
officers to overthrow the government. However,
there is little other evidence at the present time
to,indicate a coup attempt is in the offing (Paras.
III. Military Developments in North Vietnam:
Weather continues to Belay pIanned air strikes. e
British consul in-Hanoi does not believe'that the
air strikes.to date have had a significant impact
on the Hanoi-regime (Para. 2). He notes that there
is little civil defense activity in Hanoi and has
seen no evidence of Soviet or Chinese troops there
or of Soviet and Chinese arms (Paras 3 and 4)..
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V. Communist Political Developments: Peiping's
foreign minister ? as formalized a previous offer of-
men and.material to the Viet Cong in a note to the
DRV foreign minister (Paras 1 and.2). Soviet-spokes
men continue to reflect Moscow's concern over the
developing situation (Para.. 3)-. Pyongyang is giv-
ing heavy propaganda::coverage to-its pledge of aid
and assistance to the Viet Cong (Para. 6).
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I. THE MILITARY SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM
la Viet Cong military activity continues to
be composed mainly of small-scale harassment, terror-
ism and sabotage. Government activity has increased
slightly, but no significant results have been re-
ported.
2. MACV's military report for 26 March listed
96 Viet Cong - initiated incidents, ten of them oc-
curring during the reporting period. This total
was considerably higher than has been-noted in re-
cent days; however, the MACV report for 27 March
shows a reduction to 63 incidents, a figure more in
accord with current trends,
3, Representative Viet Cong actions reported
on these two days included a small-scale attack on
an outpost defending a district town in Vinh Long
Province, harassment of rail and road bridges in
Quang Nam Province, and widely scattered harassment
of New Life Hamlets and government outposts.
4. Nineteen government operations of battalion
size or larger were reported in progress on 26 March,
and 20 on 27 March, Small-unit actions for 26. March
totaled 2,294, of which only 11 resulted in contact with
the Viet Cong. Figures for 27 March were 1,943 and
8,. respectively.
5, Forty Claymore mines were accidentally set
off when lightning struck a protective fence at a
US Special Forces camp in;Fle ku Province yesterday.
Fourteen were killed and 74 wounded, including one
US Speciil'Forces enlisted adviser.
6. At Da Nang a Vietnamese Al-H Skyraider
carrying a full load of ordnance today crashed into
a US C-123 transport aircraft. Both aircraft were
destroyed and the Vietnamese pilot of the Skyraider
killed{.-. Ah,American Marine Corps captain was killed
today when his H-34 helicopter was shot down by Com-
munist fire south of Da Nang.
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II. POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN SOUTH VIETNAM
1. Premier Quat is reported to have voiced new
concern over the possibility of a coup attempt against
his government. On 26 March Quat is said to have
told Buddhist leader Tri Quang that he was concerned
over rumors of coup plotting by a coalition of lead-
ers of the abortive 19 February coup, Catholic gen-
erals on the Armed Forces Council, and several other
generals--including General "Big" Minh-who are sched-
uled to be retired.on 1 April. Quat,suspects that
"Big" Minh, still in Bangkok, is the ringleader of
the alleged plot, which would also be aimed at Gen-
eral Thi of I Corps and General Ky, the Air Force
chief.
2. General Dong, commander of troops. in the
Saigon area, has also heard rumors that "Big" Minh
was planning an early comeback attempt, but he is
inclined to discount them. Dong indicated, moreover,
that the Armed Forces Council would stand by its
decision to retire Minh and several other generals
by 1 April.
(there is no other evidence
at the present time to.indi,cate that a coup attempt
is in the offing.
4. The Armed Forces Council reportedly met on
96 March to review the political implications of
the fact that the three top military posts are held
by Catholics: General "Little" Minh, armed forces
commander; General Thieu, minister of defense; and
General Cao, chairman of the Joint General Staff.
After being assured by General Ky that the Buddhists
had no objections, the Council decided to make no
changes.
5. A moderate student leader at Saigon Univer-
sity has claimed that the bombings of North Vietnam
have had a salutary effect on Saigon students. He
stated that students finally realize that Vietnam
is fighting a war and that they are thus less in-
terested in creating political disturbances. As
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evidence of the favorable influence of the air
strikes, the source cited.the recent election of
moderates to head the General Association of
.:Saigon-Students. He noted that last year this
student-organization had been misused by politi-
cal extremists who had dominated the leadership.
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III, MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS IN NORTH VIETNAM
1. Weather conditions are continuing to delay
planned air strikes.
2. According to the British consul in Hanoi,
who is currently visiting Saigon, the air strikes
as they have been conducted to date have had no
significant 'impact- on the Hanoi regime. He does
not believe that the strikes will make a real im-
pression until they start hitting the Hanoi-Haiphong
area.
3. He noted that there had been little in-
crease in civil defense activities. Some street
trenches are being dug but not many, and there
is no concerted effort to build air raid shelters.
He believed that a recent air raid exercise held
in Hanoi was for the purpose of dramatizing the
.situation and to demonstrate the efficiency and
volume of antiaircraft artillery around the city.
The atmosphere in Hanoi is generally as it was,
although the regime is attempting to engender
some spirit among the still largely unconcerned
young people by making them engage in shooting
and grenade"th'rowing. practice. Older people
appear to be more worried.
4. The consul stated that he had seen no
evidence of Soviet or Chinese arms and had
seen no Soviet or Chinese soldiers in Hanoi.
He had seen some crates about the size of a desk
with Soviet markings, but the contents were not
known.
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V. COMMUNIST POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS
1. Chinese Communist Foreign Minister Chen
Yi in a note to the North Vietnamese foreign min-
ister on 28 March has formalized Peiping's offer
of 25 March to-aid the Viet Cong. The wording in
.Chen's note and that of the 25 March party daily
editorial are almost identical. Chen pledges that
"the Chinese people will exert every effort" to
send the South Vietnamese people "the necessary
material aid, including arms and all other war
materiel, and stand ready to dispatch their men to
fight shoulder to shoulder with the South Viet
namese people whenever the latter so require."`
2. Peiping's contingent pledge of manpower
is. believed to reflect efforts to pressure the US
Government into halting the further introduction
of US combat forces into Vietnam. The 22 March
Viet Cong statement indicated that they would call
for "foreign troops" if the US continues to send
its own forces to Vietnam and further expands the
war.
3. Soviet spokesmen continue to underscore
Moscow's uneasiness and concern over the develop-
ing situation. In a mid-March conversation with
an Indian diplomat in Moscow, a Soviet Foreign
Ministry official reportedly took a hard line in
stressing that Moscow is determined to "meet the
US challenge in Vietnam by force if necessary."
When asked about possible repercussions on US-
USSR relations, the Soviet declared that the Viet-
namese situation is "too serious to be sacrificed
to any other consideration." Asserting that the
Soviet Union can not allow another Socialist coun-
try to come under direct attack, he remarked that
"the USSR also has a face to save."
4. In a recent conversation with the Italian
deputy foreign minister, Polish Foreign Minister
Rapacki expressed concern that the Soviets might be
forced by the course of events "to the point of no
return." He urged the Italians to press the US to
negotiate. When asked whether it was true that
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Peiping was not permitting.the Soviets to send ma-
teriel across China to North Vietnam, -Rapacki.did
not deny this.
5. Moscow continues its propaganda campaign
denouncing alleged US use of`poisonous gases..,So-
viet newspapers give big play to foreign reaction
and note "huge protest meetings" in several cities
in the USSR.
6< Pyongyang is giving heavy propaganda em-
phasis to its 26 March statement pledging'aid and
assistance to the "fraternal?Vietnamese-people,"
The central committee of the United Fatherland
Front--a quasi-official propaganda organization--
has called on all the people in North Korea "to
be fully prepared to be mobilized at any time in
case of necessity to directly assist the South
Vietnamese people." They also pledged a "volunteer"
force if the Viet Cong request it.
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