AFRICAN RESPONSE TO THE RHODESIAN REBELLION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00826A000100010005-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 3, 2006
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: January 3, 1966
• Content Type: IM

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INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
3 January 1966
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AFRICAN RESPONSE TO THE RHODESIAN REBELLION
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
Office of Current Intelligence
TOP SECRET
GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
d.clossificotion
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Office of Current Intelligence
3 January 1966
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
African Response to the Rhodesian Rebellion
Summary
The Rhodesian rebellion has demonstrated again
the fundamental radical-moderate division in Africa,
exposed the impotence of the Africans, and awakened
bitter feelings of frustration which may lead to
actions against Western interests. The impetuous
3 December resolution of the Organization of African
Unity (OAU), steamrolled through by a comparatively
small group of foreign ministers, was actually imple-
mented by only a handful of radical countries, and
even then probably only because of the energetic
efforts of Tanzanian President Nyerere and OAU Sec-
retary General Diallo Telli. The majority of more
moderate states rallied around public statements
questioning the wisdom of the resolution by the
Presidents of Zambia and Kenya, the Prime Minister
of Nigeria, and the Emperor of Ethiopia and prevented
a stampede. The crisis has, however, reopened fis-
sures in the OAU, and may hasten the fragmentation
of Africa into competing blocs. The radical states,
especially Tanzania, although realizing that overt
African military intervention is beyond their present
capabilities, will continue their activist roles if
economic sanctions--in which they have not the slight-
est faith--do not speedily bring down the Smith re-
gime. They may support sabotage and terrorism in the
hope of causing a breakdown of law and order within
Rhodesia, in the hope of forcing Britain to inter-
vene militarily.
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African Frustration
1. The crisis over Rhodesia has dramatized once
again both the division in Africa between the militant
states and the majority of more moderate countries, and
the extreme difficulty of pursuing a common policy
through the Organization of African Unity (OAU). In
exposing Africa's impotence before the world, the
crisis has awakened bitter feelings of frustration,
humiliation and racial inferiority which may lead to
extreme, and sometimes irrational actions against
Western interests.
2. Africa's intense emotion about Rhodesia and
its inability to take any effective action to alter the
situation were reflected in the resolution passed by
the OAU Council of Ministers on 3 December to break
diplomatic relations with London if it had not "taken
steps to crush" the Smith regime by 15 December. The
"unanimous" vote can be attributed to the zeal of the
more activist foreign ministers and the inability of
others to make the voice of reason heard in such an
emotional atmosphere. Several countries spoke against
the resolution but subsequently caved in under the
strenuous pressure.
3. The activism of the foreign ministers is
probably much more representative of general African
popular sentiment than the subsequent back-tracking of
their chiefs of state. The resolution was not binding
on member countries and nearly all of them had second
thoughts about the wisdom of actually breaking relations
with the UK. Some had important economic or military
assistance at stake and most realized that a break would
do nothing to solve the Rhodesian problem and, in fact,
would make Britain's task more-difficult.
4. Nine of the more militant states eventually
broke with London, but those with any important eco-
nomic ties with the UK have made it clear that theirs
is a diplomatic gesture that hopefully will not affect
working relations. Khartoum seems content to let the
full British staff remain except for the Ambassador and
military attache, for whom no departure deadline was
given. Cairo and Algiers would like to retain British
consular representation and have allowed British diplo-
mats a month to depart. Guinea, Mali, Mauritania and
Congo (Brazzaville) had no significant ties with London.
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5. The only countries which took any meaningful
action were the two Commonwealth members, Tanzania and
Ghana, and London appears ready to cooperate in keeping
the economic disruption to a minimum. Tanzania's Presi-
dent Nyerere will permit some British diplomats to re-
main in Dar es Salaam with the Canadian Embassy, and
will allow the UK the full use of Tanzanian facilities
in support of Zambia, He has assured the 1,200 British
members of the Tanzanian civil service of their safety.
Both Nyerere and Ghana's President Nkrumah intend to
remain in the Commonwealth for the time being, although
the latter appears to be seriously contemplating leaving
the grouping before very long. With' ha a there has
been strop opposition to the break
6. In all probability even the militant countries
might not have broken with the UK if it had not been for
the agitation of three radical leaders: Nyerere, Guinea's
President Tour6 and OAU Secretary General Diallo Telli,
a national of Guinea. Public statements by Zambia's
Kaunda, Ethiopia's Haile Selassie, Kenya's Kenyatta and
Nigeria's Balewa expressing the misgivings felt by most
African leaders about the resolution were probably all
that prevented the majority of African states from being
stampeded into a rupture with London.
Nyerere in the Van
7. Nyerere played the principal role in goading
others to abide by the OAU resolution and in creating
the illusion that there was an Africa-wide momentum to-
ward a break which no revolutionary African leader could
8. Following Kaunda's statement of 8 December
that a break by Zambia, Kenya and Tanzania would cause
difficulties for Zambia and the UK's contingency sup-
port plans, the Tanzanians urged Nasir to use his influ-
ence to convince Kaunda nevertheless to implement the
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resolution. Kaunda met Nyerere on 11 December in the
hope of persuading him not to break, but Nyerere claims
he convinced Kaunda of the necessity for all Africans,
with the exception of Zambia, to go ahead.
In a press conference the same day tie sai
that African countries must stop "using" Zambia to con-
nive to get out of their commitment to the resolution;
the validity of that resolution could not be questioned
as the foreign ministers had been given a clear mandate
from the heads of state.
The Radical Bandwagon
10. Meanwhile, Diallo Telli was waging a hard
campaign from Addis Ababa to keep OAU members in line
on the 15 December deadline.
11. There is little doubt that all this activity
created the desired bandwagon effect, especially after
Guinea and Tanzania actually broke with London on the
15th.
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13. Mali, Mauritania, and Congo (Brazzaville) also
broke relations on 16 December. That same evening Cairo
announced its break in a move that surprised both British
and Egyptian diplomats. Although Egypt had been lobbying
at Addis for military action by the OAU, apparently it
had been relatively reserved on the ultimatum to the UK.
On 13 December Cairo had called for another OAU foreign
ministers' meeting on 21 December to examine the situa-
tion in the light of the reservations a ressed by many
member countries about the resolution.
14. In light of Cairo's action, the Sudanese GGov-
ernment reversed its position on the evening of the 17th
and agreed to break. Algeria's announcement on the next
day completed t o of solidarity by all the more
militant states
Top
Somali officials, who made a state visit to Tanzania in
mid-December, have also taken a militant stand on the
OAU resolution, although their country has had no rela-
tions with the UK since 1963.
15. The radicals' momentum has been temporarily
broken, but in Addis the atmosphere remains emotional
and the extremists--including major elements in the Ethi-
opian power structure--are putting great pressure on the
Emperor. Reportedly Egypt, Ghana, Guinea and Tanzania,
in pressing Ethiopia to sever relations, are using the
telling argument that Addis is not a fit site for the OAU
headquarters if Ethiopia is unwilling to implement the
decisions of the body, and are threatening to back a
shift to another capital unless the Emperor goes along.
The radicals are also attacking Nigerian Prime Minister
Balewa as a "stalking horse for Britain" because of his
refusal to break relations and his call for a Common-
wealth conference in January.
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The Moderates Shore Themselves Up
16. In an effort to ease the pressure on the
moderates, Kenyatta, Uganda's President Obote, and the
Emperor--consulting in Nairobi on 19 December-,-called for
an immediate meeting of African heads of state, although
there had been almost no response to the Emperor's ear-
lier call for summit consultations or to Cairo's request
for another foreign ministers' meeting, Both Kenyatta
and Obote spoke strongly about the foolishness of a diplo-
matic break and were disdainful of those, like Nyerere,
who cut relations but expected British aid to continue.
The Emperor was less forthright. Kenyatta also castigated
his fire-eating foreign minister, in the presence of the
others, for presuming to commit Kenya to such a resolu-
tion. Any summit meeting would follow the Commonwealth
conference scheduled for 10 January in Lagos.
17. This spate of calls for urgent meetings has
created confusion in many African capitals, where chiefs
of state are either uncertain how to proceed or believe
that there is nothing to be gained by further conferences.
The militants oppose a summit gathering on the grounds
that the Addis resolution was final, but they seem to
approve of Cairo's suggestion for another foreign min-
isters' meetin which would be emp \,'` i-,,d to implement it
unanimous) .
Strains on the OAU
18. In pushing for implementation on the basis of
African solidarity, Nyerere and the other radicals have,
in fact, reopened old fissures in the OAU. They would
probably prefer to pursue their militant objectives in
Rhodesia under an OAU umbrella, but some are moving to-
ward the view that an Africa composed of various blocs
would be preferable to the present virtually ineffective
OAU. Few Africans have the slightest confidence in the
success of the economic sanctions against Rhodesia, and
many believe that African-supported terrorism is the only
practical policy to apply in Rhodesia, Since Wilson has
reiterated that British force can only be used in Rhode-
sia when law and order is threatened, they feel Africa
must create such conditions.
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19. The militants recognize that they have-few
assets to work with in Rhodesia. The OAU Committee of
Five created in Accra last October is already engaged in
military planning, however, Although more manageable
than the entire OAU, its membership--Tanzania, Zambia,
Kenya, Nigeria, and Egypt--carries some of the same con-
flicts of the full OAUO Rhodesians in the Committee's
Mbeya training camp in western Tanzania apparently in-
clude some recent returnees from the USSR. Other
Rhodesians will soon be returning from military training
in Algeria,
20, Although overt military intervention by the
OAU seems out of the question at this time, among the
nine states who have broken with Britain are nearly all
those (Uganda excepted) who militarily supported the
Congolese rebels last year. This time they have fewer
human resources, but greater experience, ample materiel
stockpiled in Tanzania, and a cause with almost universal
black African backing. A major problem again will be
a divided leadership among the indigenous nationalists.
Prospects
21. As in last year's Congo crisis, Nyerere is far
beyond the African mainstream and Tanzania will almost
certainly play a major role in the fight against the
Smith regime, He is a man of great principle and a fa-
natic on the question of southern Africa's liberation,
He views Rhodesia as the key to the Portuguese terri-
tories and South Africa, and the fact that Africa's
assets are limited at the moment will not alter his
determination to solve the problem one way or another.
22. The militants, however, can be effective only
if they have the use of Zambia as a staging area. This
is probably why Nyerere has urged Kaunda not to allow
British troops to be stationed in Zambia, and why he is
so adamant that they should be posted on the Rhodesian
side of the Kariba, dam. He fears Kaunda will be hesitant
to provide Zambian facilities for Rhodesian terrorists
as long as Smith can threaten destruction of Kariba.
Nyerere, however, is sincerely concerned with Kaunda's
survival and the eventual development of close economic
ties and political union between Tanzania and Zambia.
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23. Some other militant Africans may be willing t
push matters even further, F
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