EVOLUTION OF COMMUNIST POSITIONS CONCERNING NEGOTIATIONS

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• Publication Date: January 4, 1968
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- INTELLIGENCE~ MEMORANDUM
EVOLUTION OF COMIVIUNIST POSITIONS
CONCERNING 'NEGO'T'IATIONS
Pleas r iurn_t9
Presentation Staff
4 January 1966
OCI No. 0482/65
Copy No.
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLYGENcE
Office of Current Intelligence
CONFIDENTIA L
GROUP I
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification,
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This Document contains information affecting the Na-
tional Defense of the United States, withip the mean-
ing of Title 18, Sections 793 and 794, of the U.S. Code, as
amended. Its transmission or revelation of its contents
to or receipt by an. unauthorized person is prohibited
by law. The reproduction of this form is prohibited.
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OCI No. 0482/65
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Office of Current Intelligence
4 January 1966
Evolution of Communist Positions
Concerning Negotiations
Summary
The DRV position on settling the war has remained firmly
based on its four-point proposal set forth last April. Sev-
eral of these points are an accurate gist of the 1954
Geneva agreements; others, however, depart from both the
spirit and the letter of the accords. Hanoi has not made
explicit whether it regards the carrying out of the four
points as preconditions for negotiations on the war; its
most recent, statements, however, implicitly suggest that
it does.
The peace terms of the. National Liberation Front have
never been precisely delineated by, the Communists; both
Hanoi'a.nd the Front, however, regard a manifesto of,Front
intent in the war published last March as containing their
peace proposals. In general., the Front has taken a tougher
position'than Hanoi on the question of US withdrawal from
Vietnam prior to the start of negotiations.
Peking has maintained the most adamant stand of any
of the Asian Communists against negotiations. It has
both-condemned Soviet encouragement of talks and obliquely
warned Hanoi against starting negotiations. Although the
Soviet Union apparently is encouraging Hanoi to seek
political alternatives to the war, the indications are
that Moscow is prepared for the time being to continue
military aid to the DRV.
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1. The North Vietnamese attitude toward a "set-
tlement" of the war has remained basically unchanged
since DRV Premier Pham Van Dong put forward a four-
point proposal on the conflict in a speech on 8 April
1965 before the DRV National Assembly. This proposal
was issued as a reply to President Johnson's speech
of 7 April at Johns Hopkins University. Dong's four
points were as follows-
a. Recognition of the basic national
rights of the Vietnamese people--
peace, independence, sovereignty,
unity, and territorial integrity.
According to the Geneva agreements,
the US Government must withdraw
from South Vietnam US troops, mil-
itary personnel, and weapons of all
kinds-, dismantle all US military
bases there, and cancel its mili-
tary alliance with South Vietnam.
It must end its policy of interven-
tion and aggression in South Viet-
nam. According to the Geneva agree-
ments, the US Government must stop
its acts of war against North Viet-
nam and completely cease all en-
croachments on the territory and
sovereignty of the DRV.
b. Pending the peaceful reunification
of Vietnam, while Vietnam is still
temporarily divided into two zones
the military provisions of the 1954
Geneva agreements on Vietnam must be
strictly respected. The two zones
must refrain from entering into any
minilary alliance with foreign coun-
tries and there must be no foreign
military bases, troops, or military
personnel in their respective ter-
ritory.
c. The internal affairs of South Vietnam
must be settled by the South Vietnam-
ese people themselves in accordance
with the program of the NFLSV without
any foreign interference.
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d. The peaceful reunification of Vietnam
is to be settled by the Vietnamese
people in both zones, without any for-
eign interference.
`P ' 2;.After 1111sit:ing these points, Dong asserted that the
DRV Government considered the "stand" expounded in,them
"the basis for the soundest political settlement of the
Vietnam problem," If this "basis is recognized," Dong
stated, "favorable conditions" will be created for a
"peaceful settlement." The North Vietnamese apparently
attached this vague formulation to their proposals in
order to leave themselves some maheuvering room should
they at some point decide to modify or expand their
terms. Subsequently the North Vietnamese have never
made it completely clear whether they regard the. four
points as preconditions for negotiations or only as
proposals to be discussed after negotiations have been
started.
4. The DRV's position on this question, however,
was again obscured by the remarks of Ho Chi Minh in an
interview with.'. :a;; prominent French newsman which was
broadcast on 15 August by Hanoi radio. Although he
did not explicitly make US troop withdrawal a precon-
dition for talks, he did call for "tangible proof"
that the US accepted all of the DRV's four points.
Since Ho?s interview, other DRV statements have also
occasionally called for tangible or "concrete" proof
that the US accepts the four points. They imply,
but do not state explicitly that such proof must be
given before any talks are started.
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8. The second point in Pham Van Dong's pro-
posals is an accurate gist of the intent of the
1954 accords. The accords stated that the demili-
tarized zone should not be interpreted as a polit-
ical or territorial boundary, but only as a military
demarcation line. The accords also referred to the
goal of eventual reunification of Vietnam, and
banned military alliances, foreign military bases,
and so forth, pending reunification.
9. In the last two points of Dong's pro-
posals, however, the DRV has departed almost
entirely from the spirit as well as the letter of
the Geneva Agreements. The thrust of points 3
and 4 is that the settlement of Vietnamese polit-
ical affairs is to be left entirely to the Viet
.namese people without any foreign supervision.
The Geneva, agreements, however, definitely pro-
vided for an international supervisory presence,
at least while the initial arrangements for a
further political settlement were being worked
out in Vietnam. The International Control Com-
mission (ICC),set up under the accords, had as
one of its missions the ?supervision: of elections
in 1956 in both North and South Vietnam for the
expression of the "national will" on the question
of reunification.
10. Although left unstated, it appeared
to be the intent of the Geneva agreements that
an international presence would also be necessary
to guarantee the establishment of democratic
government after elections on the issue of reuni-
fication.
11. Despite Hanoi's constant harping in
its propaganda on the necessity of adherence to
the Geneva Accords, DRV spokesmen in private have
indicated that the agreements could be ignored in
whole or in part if circumstances warranted. I
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12. The so-called "peace terms" of the Com-
munist-controlled Front group in South Vietnam were
set forth on 22 March interspersed within a rambling
five-point statement. Essentially, the Front's
five points were as follows:
a. The condemnation of US policy in
Vietnam along with a catalogue of
US war "crimes" there since 1954.
b. An expression of the determination
of the Vietnamese "people" to
"kick out" the US "imperialists"
from Vietnam and to '?liberate"South
Vietnam. According to the state-
ment, the Vietnamese will never
stop fighting until their ultimate
objectives of "independence, democ-
racy, peace, and.,.ne.utralityk' have
been obtained. The "only way out"
for the US is to "withdraw" from
South Vietnam. The statement de-
clared that "at present, all ne-
gotiations are useless" on the war
as long as "the US imperialists
do not withdraw all troops, weap-
ons, and means of war from Vietnam,
and as long as the Liberation Front
does not have the "decisive voice."
By this the Front apparently meant
that it should have a dominant
voice in any,political settlement
of the conflict.
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c. A pledge of determination to "ad-
vance toward" the reunification of
Vietnam.
d. A declaration that the Front has
the ''full right" to receive inter-
national assistance. While.,rely-
ing primarily on its own force, the
Front. "will buy war materiel from
any country," and will call "if
necessary" for foreign volun-
teers.
e. A call on all South Vietnamese peo-
ple to join in the fight to "lib-
erate" the South.
13. At its publication, the Front statement
was primarily touted by the Viet Cong as a manifesto
of their intent in the war. It was not until af-
ter Pham Van Dong's speech setting forth the DRV's
four-point peace proposal that both Hanoi and the
Viet Cong began to point to the Front statement
of 22 March as containing the Viet Cong peace terms.
Subsequent-Front statements have largely echoed
the 22 March manifesto, differing only in that
several of them hardened the Front's position on
the withdrawal of US forces. A statement of 14
June, for example, claimed that "all negotia-
tions are useless" if the US imperialists "have
not yet withdrawn" from South Vietnam. A Front
centr-a committee statement Of 25 November, how-
ever, did not attach any condition of timing to
a withdrawal as a preliminary to a`.settlement.
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14. Although there is no explicit evidence
to support the contention, we believe the appar-
ently harder Front position on US withdrawal during
the last few months, in contrast with Hanoi's, is
maintained primarily for tactical reasons by the
Viet Cong. Hanoi's final position on this point,
whatever it turns out to be, would probably be
the deciding word if the Vietnamese Communists
decided to move toward a political settlement.
15. Peking has maintained an adamant stand
against negotiations on the Vietnam situation, and
has repeatedly lashed out at the Soviet Union for
trying to promote talks on the problem. The most
recent major attack on Moscow came on 30 December
1965 in a People's Daily editorial charging that
the Soviets are helping -the US in "its plot of
peaceful negotiations." The Chinese asserted that
such "appeasement and capitulationism" merely
serve to "inflate the aggressive arrogance of the
US."
16. The Chinese have continued to stress
their support for the Hanoi four-point formula
and the Liberation Front five-part statement on
negotiations. On 14 December People's Daily
reiterated the Chinese position that th-es-e-77orm
the "only correct basis" for the solution of the
Vietnam question. The closest Peking has come to
stating that the withdrawal of US troops was a,
prerequisite for negotiations came in a People's
Daily editorial on 20 July, which asserted that
iNpwithdrawal of US troops is "the basic point
and most important prerequisite for the settle-
ment of the Vietnam question" and added that so
long as US forces remain in South Vietnam "there
is no point" in talking about other aspects of a
Vietnam settlemept.
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17. Peking publicly disparaged the current US
peace initiatives on 1 January, charging that the
pause in air attacks was nothing but the prelude to
a new US escalation of the war, and asserting that
the US objective in advocating "unconditional dis-
cussions" was to fo?ce the Vietnamese people to suk-
render and to accept the."permanent stay" of US troops
in Vietnam. The People's Daily editorial on New
Year's Day applauded North etnamese determination
in the struggle with US "imperialism" and asserted
that Hanoi had "pointedly scuttled" the US "peace
intrigue."
18. Immediately after the first US bombing at-
tacks against the DRV, the Soviet Union appeared
willing to try to arrange negotiations of some sort
on Southeast Asian problems. However, as the war
intensified and Chinese attacks on Soviet "collusion"
with the US mounted, the USSR retreated from this
position. By the end of February Moscow was already
maintaining that the US must cease its bombings be-
fore there could be negotiations. While the Russians
were quick to endorse the Hanoi government's four
points in general terms and have firmly adhered to
the position that peace in Vietnam can be found only
by using the four points as a "basis-," they have con-
tinued to place major emphasis on the impossibility
of any negotiations while the US is attacking the
territory of a "fraternal state." They have advanced
no other explicit preconditions to negotiations.
19. With the escalation of the Vietnam war,
Soviet officials have continued to stress privately
Moscow's lack of maneuver room and have clearly in-
dicated their frustration over their inability to
do very much to influence US policy in Southeast
Asia. Although Moscow has stayed in step with Hanoi
on the question of negotiations, there is enough
evidence to indicate that the Russians are almost
certainly using their influence to urge DRV leaders
to keep a flexible position in order to take full
advantage of unforeseen developments and opportunities.
20. The Soviet leaders apparently see no pros-
pect for any immediate break in the war. They can
be expected to persist in their line that a cessation
-9-
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of US air: strikes is a necessary first step toward
talks. In this context, the forthcoming visit of
one of the, USSR's top leaders--party secretary
Shelepin-to North Vietnam is particularly interest-
ing., His visit represents a direct challenge to
China's influence in Hanoi, and will mark the first
trip to the-DRV by a high-level Soviet'leader since
the Kosygin mission last February. The Soviets
probably feel that the current pause in US bombing
raids against the DRV provides a good opportunity
to encourage Hanoi to seek political alternatives
to the war.
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