UNIFICATION ELECTIONS IN VIETNAM AS CALLED FOR UNDER THE GENEVA ACCORDS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00826A000100010016-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 23, 2009
• Sequence Number: 16
• Publication Date: January 6, 1966
• Content Type: IM

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TOP SECRET s
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Office of Current Intelligence
6 January 1966
Unification Elections in Vietnam
As Called For Under the Geneva Accords
1, The provision for elections in 1956 looking toward
reunification of North and South Vietnam was contained in a
declaration of the 1954 Geneva conference rather than in the
primary document signed at the conference. The Geneva agree-
ments themselves, titled Agreement on the Cessation of Hos-
tilities in Vietnam, contain the provisions of a cease-fire
in Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos, and the establishment of in-
ternational supervision of the cease-fire provisions.
2. Paragraph 6 of the Final Conference Declaration,
appended to the agreement, stipulates that the demarcation
line delineated in the agreement is related purely to a
military cease-fire and in no way constitutes a political
or territorial boundary. The same paragraph expresses the
conference's conviction that the agreement and the final
declaration create a basis for a future political settle-
ment in Vietnam,
3, Paragraph 7 of the Final Conference Declaration
contains the essence of the conference consensus that a
final political settlement, based on "respect for the
principles of independence, unity, and territorial in-
tegrity," will permit the Vietnamese people to enjoy free-
dom and democratic institutions "established as a re-
suit of free general elections by secret ballot." This
paragraph expresses conference consensus that such elec-
tions "will take place in July 1956" under ICC super-
vision, and that consultations toward this end by "rep-
.resentatives of the two zones"--North and South Vietnam
--should begin after 20 July 1955.
State Dept.
review
completed
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3. In addition to the fact that neither the US
Government nor the government of South Vietnam be-
came signatories to the Geneva agreement, a specific
declaration of 21 July by the US representative dis-
sociated the US from the Final Conference Declaration
with regard to the question of elections. Although
this statement noted the general US intention to abide
by the terms of the agreement to refrain from a re-
newal of hostilities, it expressed US reservations
concerning the possibility of truly free elections in
Vietnam. The US position was given as a Washington
declaration of 29 June 1954 on "nations divided
against their will," specifying that "we shall con-
tinue to seek to achieve unity through free elec-
tions, supervised by the United Nations to assure that
they are conducted freely."
4. Basic to this position was the expectation
that the Communist authorities in North Vietnam would
never permit genuinely free expression in any elec-
tion nor effective international supervision of such
elections. Moreover, at the time of partition and
up to the present, North Vietnam has a population
edge over the South of roughly two million persons.
Additionally, the ability of the South Vietnamese Gov-
ernment to establish itself as a viable entity was
at the time in grave doubt, and there was already
reason to believe that the Communists were prepared
to make every effort to subvert and undermine the
regime in the south.
5. A meeting held at the Department of State on
24 July 1954--chaired by then Vice President Nixon
and attended by the secretaries of State, Defense, and
the Director of CIA, and representatives of the White
House and Foreign Aid Administration--dealt specifically
with the problems of Southeast Asia, According to the
record of this meeting, Defense Secretary Wilson raised
the question of elections in Vietnam in 1956 and "asked
if we were likely to lose the whole country." The
secretary of state observed that "in view of the popu-
lation distribution. ..hethought we would have to take
the position in 1956 that conditions were not favor-
able for the free expression of the will of the popu-
lation." He further observed that "the fact that the
people in the north would probably vote as a bloc made
it extremely unlikely that the results of an election
would be favorable to us."
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6. In the intervening period until 1956, impor-
tant political changes took place in South Vietnam.
In October 1955, Ngo Dinh Diemi--serving as premier
since June of the previous year--held a nationwide
referendum deposing absentee Chief of State Bao Dai.
South Vietnam was declared a republic and Diem in-
stalled as its first president. From its early
years, South Vietnam faced formidable obstacles, in-
cluding the reconstruction of a war-weary economy and
popular morale, and a challenge from-dissident armed
sects. North Vietnam, preoccupied with its own re-
habilitation during this period, sat back and waited
for South Vietnam to fall into its hands. But by a
near "political miracle," Diem succeeded in consoli-
dating his position and in fashioning a highly cen-
tralized administration and a viable regime.
7. From the beginning, the Diem government took
the position that, since it was not a signatory to
the Geneva Accords--France signed on behalf of South
Vietnam--it was not bound by the requirements of the
agreements.' The US supported this stand. Moreover,
the international supervisory machinery, as fore-
seen, proved clearly inadequate to ensure genuinely
free elections.
8. In backing away from the elections, Diem
used two principal arguments: that Saigon, as a non-
signatory, was not bound by the Geneva Accords; and
that only a popularly elected assembly in South Viet-
nam would be competent to deal with such a vital mat-
ter. The question of elections was also linked to
the eventual withdrawal of the French Expeditionary
Corps, the French commander having joint responsibil-
ity with the Viet Minh commander for carrying out the
Geneva agreements. The question of how much authority
would pass from the French to the South Vietnamese
for execution of the agreements was a moot one in
which the ICC delayed taking a stand. Diem took the
position that it was essential that South Vietnamese
sovereignty, be complete and unquestioned before any
final position could be taken on unification elec-
tions.
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9, In a declaration issued on 16 July 1955,
Diem--still Premier at the time--did not specifically
reject elections as,,a means of unifying Vietnam,
but insisted that such elections be "genuinely free"
and voiced skepticism as to whether this was pos-
sible in North Vietnam, He reiterated that South
Vietnam was not bound by the Geneva agreements,
and stated that his regime would not entertain any
proposals from the Viet Minh until satisfied that
the authorities in North Vietnam placed national
interests above those of Communism. On the basis
of the arguments in the 16 July declaration, Diem
avoided initiating consultations with the North
on the subject of the elections, contrary to the
steps projected in Paragraph 7 of the Final Dee-
liration by the Geneva Conference,
10, Diem during 1956 took further steps which
strengthened his hand in ignoring proposals for
reunification elections, He pressed for the
withdrawal of the French Expeditionary Corps.
Just prior to the departure of the French High
Command, Diem declared on 6 April that his gov-
ernment would respect the armistice provisions un-
dertaken by the French, but would not be bound de
jure by the terms of the Geneva agreement, He
authorized the drafting of a constitution for
South Vietnam, to apply to all of Vietnam, thus
implying no recognition of the partition of Viet-
nam, A National Assembly--with unfilled seats
for eventual representation from North Vietnam?
was elected on 4 March 1956, The carefully manipu-
lated elections established an overwhelmingly
pro-Diem assembly which strengthened the gov-
ernment's posture foxy rejecting the political
solution envisaged by the Geneva conference, In
a note sent on 24 May 1956 to the British--as a
co-ohairmancarf the Geneva conference--the Diem gov-
ernment stated that "no practical consideration"
could be given to elections at that time in the
absence of "all liberties" in North Vietnam-,w) The
message added that South Vietnam was seeking
"practical solutions" to the problems arising
from the accords to the extent compatible with
its sovereignty.
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11, The Diem government issued no statement
formally rejecting elections as July approached.
However, on 20 July--the anniversary of the accords
--the government-sponsored mass organization,, the
National Revolutionary Movement, issued a resolu-
tion unanimously opposing the Geneva, agreements
"forever," and denouncing Viet Minh offers of con-
sultations as attempts to disorganize the "nation-
alist ranks" by proffering "fraudulent elections."
The resolution was tantamount to official policy
and complete dissociation from the Geneva agreements,
domestically, while preserving, on the international
plane, the Diem government's position that it con-
tinued to abide by the 1954 armistice provisions.
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