A REVIEW OF ELECTION PROCESSES IN SOUTH VIETNAM

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• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00826A000400010040-7
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• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 13, 2004
• Sequence Number: 40
• Publication Date: March 10, 1966
• Content Type: MF

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SECRET
10 March 1966
FOR: Mr. Adam Yarmolinsky
Deputy Aseistant Secretary
'mations' Security Affairs
D.prtint of Defonsit
A Review of Ilection Processes
In South Vietnam
eh a memorandum which may be relevant
o a disuaiou we had following tho 3 March
Rostov luncheon meeting. The memorandum, prepared
for Ambassador Unger, reviews the circumstances
of the six nationwide elections held in South
Vietnam since 1954. The annexes referred to in
the text are listed but not included, the originals
having been sent to Ambassador Unger.
=WARD W. PROCTOR
Acting Deputy Director for InteIlig$nc.
At t nt
No. 0790/66
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SECRET
Identical Memos w/att sent to:
Honorable Francis M. Bator
Honorable Robert W. Moser
Lt. General A. J. Goodpaster
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INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
9 March 1966
OCI No. 0790/66
Copy No.
A REVIEW OF ELECTION PROCESSES IN SOUTH VIETNAM
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
Office of Current Intelligence
GROUP I
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification
SECRET
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WARNING
This Document contains information affecting the Na-
tional Defense of the United States, within the mean-
ing of Title 18, Sections 793 and 794, of the U.S. Code, as
amended. Its transmission or revelation of its contents
to or receipt by an unauthorized person is prohibited
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OCI No. 0790/66
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Office of Current Intelligence
9 March 1966
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
A Review of Election Processes in South Vietnam
Since Vietnam was partitioned in 1954, the gov-
ernment of South Vietnam has conducted six national
elections as well as a number of by-elections for the
national assembly and scattered village and hamlet
elections. The six nationwide elections have indluded
a referendum deposing Bao Dai as chief of state and
establishing Ngo Dinh Diem as president of a South
Vietnamese republic, a presidential election in 1961,
three national assembly elections, and an election of
provincial and municipal councils throughout the coun-
try last year.
All of these elections have been carefully con-
trolled by the government, primarily for the purpose of
preventing Communist exploitation, but also to restrict
non-Communist opposition. Opinions vary among both
Vietnamese and American observers on the extent to which
such elections have been mere travesties of the popular
will, bearing "scarcely even a surface resemblance to
democratic processes," or were efforts toward at least
partial development of representative government. Al-
though the character and blatancy of government control
has varied from election to election, and even from area
to area in a given election, the overriding observation
appears to be that South Vietnam's elections have pre-
s6rved the form of popular consultation while the gov-
ernment remained in control of the proceedings.
The most obvious instance in which the outcome was
clearly and confidently weighted from the start in the
government's favor was the referendum ousting Bao Dai in
October 1955. Both the voting procedures and the at-
mosphere in advance of the balloting were calculated to
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produce the desired results, whereas the nearly unanimous
vote given to Ngo Dinh Diem was in no sense an accurate
measure of his actual popular support.
The election bearing the least earmarks of government
dictation was that establishing provincial and municipal
councils, held in May 1965 under the government of Phan
Huy Quat. In this instance, results varied widely from
province to province, but in general reflected the power
of local officials or local political and religious
groups. In this case, however, the national government's
stake was minimal because of the local and purely ad-
visory character of the councils being formed, Even so,
national and provincial authorities exercised a direct
control through the advance screening of all candidates.
With regard to the intervening elections, the gov-
ernment's conduct has varied. The national assembly
election held in 1956 was one of the most carefully
staged, yet least controversial, perhaps because it was
largely ignored by developing oppOsition factions. By
1959, with political lines more sharply drawn, the gov-
ernment's ability to avoid at least minor setbacks was
less assured. Presumably as a result, government dicta-
tion in some areas of the country was almost total,
whereas in others, reports of manipulation and even
intimidation were prevalent.
In 1961, only five months after an unsuccessful
coup attempt and in the face of growing Viet Cong mili-
tary activity, Diem was re-elected to office in a presi-
dential election which had all the outward trappings of
genuinely free voting. This result was obtained by
careful advance management of his opposition and the
election campaign, with only scattered reports of irregu-
larities. In the last assembly election of September
1963, Diem's position was under strong challenge by the
Buddhists, backed by much of the entire spectrum of
his traditional political opposition. Yet elections
were held with little outward indication of direct gov-
ernment interference and with the usual favorable
outcome.
Common to all elections held under the Diem gov-
ernment, and also to some extent to the single election
held under Diem's successors, are certain devices to
ensure the results within a facade of democratic pro-
cedure. One such device has been a government educational
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campaign to bring a large voter turnout, and to explain
the processes of the voting itself. This campaign
has enabled government workers and agents to publi-
cize the government's position or candidates, while
seldom going so far as to explain to the people the
meaning of elections or the power of the ballot.
The government's use of this type of campaign has
been aided by a high degree of political apathy out-
side of major urban areas, and by local acceptance
of and respect for authority which causes the peasant
to react by doing as he is asked. Thus it has appeared
that peasants usually voted as their local officials
wished them to, although there is very little evidence
that they were specifically ordered to vote a certain
way.
Under all election ordinances to date, the gov-
ernment, or committees appointed by government authori-
ties, are empowered to screen all candidates, who
may be declared ineligible for a variety of reasons
ranging from questionable political pasts to moral
turpitude or bankruptcy. This precaution has been
deemed necessary to prevent Communist agents from
penetrating the government, and will almost certainly
be retained in any future elections as long as the
Viet Cong political and military threat persists.
This regulation has also, however, provided a means
for weeding out candidates unsympathetic to the gov-
ernment. When this could not be done at the outset
Of an election campaign, it has been possible to dis-
qualify undesirables for technical violations of the
regulations. Spreading of rumors has sometimes in-
duced a candidate to step down. In more extreme
cases, other pressures, such as direct warnings to
a candidate to withdraw, and even arrest, have re-
portedly been used.
South Vietnam's electoral laws have generally
permitted all citizens of both sexes over the age of
18 to vote, with the proper identity card. Actual
registration of eligible voters was not undertaken
until the 1956 election; checks against the possibil-
ity of voting more than once have been tightened some-
what in subsequent years, but still permit irregu-
larities. There are no provisions for absentee bal-
lots, which may partly account for regulations per-
mitting senior government officials and military
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troops to vote in whatever area they may be operat-
ing during an election, if they are unable to return
to their residences. Use of the army in particular
has reportedly been a device for guaranteeing the
election of a progovernment candidate.
There has been a plethora of reports from both
government and opposition sources concerning govern-
ment-sponsored irregularities--pressure on rural of-
ficials to bring about the desired results, use of
government officials in campaigning, loopholes in
ballot counting, and tampering with ballot boxes.
Most examples of voting so far observed by Ameri-
cans have been generally free of corrupt practices,
if not always of voter confusion.
Broadly speaking, the Saigon government's abil-
ity to determine the course of an election stems
both from the electoral laws themselves and the re-
fusal to sanction the emergence of any well-organized
opposition political parties. The laws, while os-
tensibly providing equal treatment and equal resources
for all candidates, have tended to favor government-
sponsored parties and movements and to handicap non-
government or independent candidates. Government
control of the campaigns--including the printing of
leaflets and posters and designation of sites where
they may be displayed or disseminated--as well as
of news media has ensured the weight of publicity
to the government side. The electoral commissions
and pollwatchers themselves permit of government
control and, if required, of government intervention
to distort the voting outcome.
In every internal election since its inception,
South Vietnam has faced the danger of disruption by
the Communists, but this has not occurred to date
other than in isolated cases. Initially, the Commu-
nists were probably too weak to carry out any major
interference with the 1955 referendum, and even
Hanoi's calls for a massive boycott were largely un-
heeded. In subsequent years, the Communists still
apparently felt unable Or unwilling to make a test
of strength over a South Vietnamese election, pos-
sibly because they felt the elections themselves
would reflect little credit on Saigon. In more re-
cent years, when there has been some evidence of
Viet Cong contingency plans to sabotage elections,
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extreme government security precautions have appar-
ently deterred them. In 1965, moreover, the govern-
ment made no effort to carry out elections fOr_pro-
vincial councils outside of areas'Securely under its
control.
The 1955 Referendum
The first popular vote in South Vietnam was the
referendum held on 23 October 1955 to depose Bao Dai,
the French puppet emperor and then chief of state,
and to install then premier Ngo Dinh Diem as president
and chief of state of'an independent republic.: This
step was considered necessary by Diem to establish
his credentials as popularly acknowledged head of
a non-Communist South Vietnamese government able
to compete with the Communist regime in the North.
The referendum was to be the first of three steps
which would enable Diem to resist the elections
called for by the Geneva agreements of 1954 to unify
Vietnam under what Diem was convinced would be Com-
munist rule. The second step was the proclamation
of a constitution to give the government and state
of South Vietnam a legal basis. The third step was
to be the establishment of an elected national as-
sembly capable of speaking for the Vietnamese people
on the issue of the unification elections.
The regulations governing the referendum were
set forth in a decree of the Interior Ministry on
6 October 19550 (Annex A) fixing the date of the
referendum. This decree clearly posed the issue
as a choice between retaining Bao Dai or creating
a democratic regime under Diem, thus in effect
virtually prejudging the outcome. In order to
ensure as large a mandate as possible, all per-
sons over 18 were permitted to vote provided they
had been registered in a recent government census
and possessed a census card. The only check
against an individual voting twice was the stamp-
ing of his identity card. The decree also fixed
the hours of voting, specified the establishment
of one polling boothfor every 1,000 persons, and
left it up to the government regional delegate, or
province chiefs, prefects, and mayors so deputized
by him, to specify the polling sites.
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The form of the ballotA.tself, specified in the
decree, was designed tO favor ,Diem. The ballot was
a single card, perforated so that it might be torn
in half, with one half, to be deposited in an envelope
in a ballot box and the,other half discarded? On one
half was a picture of Diem* and the words "I depose
Bao Dai and recognize Ngo Dinh Diem as chief of state
with the mission tO install a democratic regime." On
the other half was a picture of Bao Dai, with the
words "I do not depose Bao Dal and do not recognize
Ngo Dinh Diem as chief of state with the mission to
install a democratic regime," No opportunity was
given to the voter to opt for deposing Bao Dai and
electing some one other than Diem as chief of state.
The decree also provided for supervision of each
polling,Place,Itly an administrative commission of
three members to be "in charge" of the voting. The
commission was headed by a "chief," appointed by the
government delegate or by the province chiefs, mayors,
and prefects as deputized.. The other two members of
the commission were to be picked on the spot from
literate voters present when the balloting opened--
presumably a measure to ensure impartiality but one
obviously susceptible to prearrangement. Finally,
the chief had full powers to police the polling place,
and to recruit other voters to assist as needed.
The provisions of the 1955 decree on the count-
ing of the ballots offered little guarantee against
tampering with the voting. The ballot box was
locked, with both the chief of the administrative
commission and the older of the two other members
having a key. When the voting ended, the box was
opened and the number of envelopes counted against
the number of stubs in 100-ballot books. At that
point, the administrative committee chose persons
from voters still around the premises to sit at dif-
ferent tables while sealed envelopes were distributed
to them. The envelopes were then opened and read by
one of the voters while two others recorded the re-
sults. The administrative commission then recorded
the total results, but did not announce .them pub-
licly, sending the tally to the next highest commis-
sion, or "central commission," presumably at the
district headquarters level.
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This body in turn tallied results from subordi-
nate commissions for forwarding to a provincial com-
mission and finally a regional commission; towns and
chartered cities sent results directly to the re-
gional commission. (At that time there were three
official regions under a government delegate, cover-
ing the provinces of southern South Vietnam, central
Vietnam, and the high plateau area.) The regional
commissions in turn tallied results sent from the
subordinate provinces for forwarding to a "general
central commission." This body, appointed by the
Ministry of Interior in Saigon, compiled the final
total and announced the unofficial nationwide results.
At no previous time were local results for a village,
province, or region publicly announced, suggesting
ample opportunity for vote jiggering if required.
Two government ministries played major roles in
the preparations of the 1955 referendum--the interior
and information ministries. This role was exercised
in part through two committees, a referendum com-
mittee responsible for the election arid an informa-
tion and propaganda committee responsible for voter
education. The former committee included representa-
tives of the two above ministries and representatives
of various political groups. The groups so repre-
sented were almost entirely government-sponsored or-
ganizations such as the National Revolutionary Move-
ment (NRM)--the government's mass party, a league
of civil servants, a progovernment Cao Dai party,
and other government-backed groups.
The propaganda committee, also including gov-
ernment officials, was responsible for getting out
the vote, including visits by cadres to private
houses in Saigon and other major towns. It was also
responsible for organizing meetings to explain the
referendum, sending radio and film trucks to the
rural areas on a similar mission, providing mobile
polling booths for remote areas and hospitals, and
arranging transportation for outlying hamlets to
authorized polling sites.
The official results of the referendum, as an-
nounced by the minister of interior on 26 October,
showed 5,721,735 ballots, or 98.2 percent of the
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total vote, cast in favor 9f Diem, and only 63,017
or 1.1 percent in favor of Bao Dai. Invalid ballots
numbered 44,155 or .7 percent of the total. Voter
participation was said to be 97.8 percent of those
eligible, with only 131,398 such persons not voting.
Although a sweeping victory for Diem had been
a foregone conclusion, the US Embassy questioned the
98.2 percent plurality as ?casting serious doubt on
the honesty of the election. This, together with
the heavy reported voter turnout, appeared incompat-
ible with the difficulties of rural travel to polling
places, the high degree of voter illiteracy and ig-
norance, and the apathy in some circles, including
announced boycotts by some opposition political and
religious factions.
There were scattered reports of voting irregu-
larities. One report indicated that, although se-
crecy of the actual voting was preserved, the dis-
carded portions of the ballot were merely dropped on
the floor where, if nothing else, mounting pictures
of Bao Dai had a psychologically suasive effect on
undecided voters to join the Diem bandwagon. US
observers saw no JAcregtaRtitieHr but opposition
leaders charged various malpractices including the
use of different colored ballots for Diem and Bao
Dai, to enable Diem's agents to spot ahd intimidate
pro-- Bao Dai voters, as well as outright manipula-
tion of vote counting. None of these charges was
ever firmly substantiated.
The US Embassy, in the absence of contrary evi-
dence, concluded that the true outcome of the elec-
tion might possibly have been close to the results
claimed by the government for a variety of reasons.
The primary reason was the biased election campaign,
which fostered a strongly pro-Diem and anti - Bao
Dai atmosphere. With Bao Dai in Paris and unable
to plead his case, the government-controlled press
and radio had a monopoly on all campaigning. Sharp
attacks were mounted against Bao Dai, playing up his
alleged subservience to the French and his corrupt,
playboy habits. Anti - Bao Dai and pro-Diem pam-
phlets and banners abounded, and effigies of Bao Dai
were even strung along main thoroughfares in major
towns. Moreover, the Diem government had for some
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time been setting the stage for the premier's con-
solidation of power, fomenting divisions in opposi-
tion groups, and setting up its own supporting fac-
tions.
However much the 1955 referendum may have had
the character of a "farce," as it was labeled by
Hanoi, there is little doubt that it reflected a
popular desire to replace Bao Dai. While it was by
no means a valid expression of support for Diem, it
nevertheless was at least a consultation of the pub-
lic which enabled him to claim more support than
had ever been demonstrated by the regime in North
Vietnam. Finally, the lack of any disruption by
the Communists, including their unsuccessful call
for a boycott, served to undercut Communist claims
of vast support in the South.
The 1956 Assembly Election
Although Diem busied himself with the drafting
of a national constitution following the referendum,
he apparently felt confident enough after his land-
slide vote to change his procedures. His original
plan was to submit a draft cpnstitution either to
another public referendum or to a national assembly
for approval. In the interest of a more democratic
appearance, he decided to hold earlier elections
for a constituent assembly, which would participate
in the drafting, and would serve as a national as-
sembly or legislature after approval of the consti-
tution.
The date for the national assembly elections
was eventually set for 4 March 1956, slightly more
than five months after the referendum. Two elec-
toral ordinances were issued on 23 January, provid-
ing for a 123-member body, with roughly one repre-
sentative for every 60,000-80,000 voters. (Annex
B and C) The seats were to be apportioned, how-
ever, partly by regions, with at least four seats
to represent the ethnic tribes and 12 seats to rep-
resent refugees from North Vietnam. Thus, in ef-
fect, the election ordinance provided for an assem-
bly reflecting as much the regional and administra-
tive divisions of the government, as of a true popu-
lation unit.
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The election laws again provided for voting by
all persons over 18, an age which enabled the govern-
ment to capitalize on its various youth groups. How-
ever, in this election, all voters had to be validly
registered, although a census card was still ade-
quate for identity. To be a candidate for the as-
sembly, a person had to be a citizen at least 25
years old, with "regular military status" (presum-
ably not subject to early draft), and without tainted
background. Certain residence requirements were de-
manded of government officials and commissioned and
noncommissioned military officers desiring to run as
candidates from areas where they were stationed. Both
voter and candidate lists were screened by govern-
ment-picked bodies.
The electoral commissions which screened and ap-
proved candidates were to include a judicial offi-
cial as chairman, or a province chief as an alter-
nate, plus one representative of the local government
and one representative of the voters, chosen by offi-
cials. According to available information, of 524
candidates filing by the deadline, 421 were approved
by the electoral commissions; :16 later withdrew
before the election. Of 76 candidates in Saigon,
nine were either eliminated or "withdrew." Some 400
voters were also reportedly dropped from the Saigon
registration lists for one or another reasons of un-
suitability.
The election ordinances provided for secret bal-
lot, and for a polling committee in each voting
place, plus pollwatchers for various candidates. Sep-
arate ballots, however, were issued for each'candi-
date, with the voter placing the ballot of his choice
in a sealed envelope for deposit in the ballot box,
and discarding the rejected ballots. The procedure
for counting ballots was also revised from the 1955
method, with ballot boxes being opened in the pres-
ence of the pollwatchers and unofficial results in
each voting place and at each electoral commission
level being announced on the spot. The winner in
any given electoral district was the candidate with
the largest number of votes, or the older of two can-
didates in case of tie. Official tally for the en-
tire assembly was to be announced by the electoral
commissions within three days.
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As in the 1955 campaign, there were two princi-
pal committees responsible for the conduct of the
campaign: an official election propaganda committee
to explain the election and get out the vote, and a
"candidate's campaign committee" to allocate funds,
select and print campaign literature, organize meet-
ings, allot radio time,and apportion sound trucks.
The composition of the candidates' campaign committee
clearly favored the government-sponsored aspirants.
It contained a representative of each political group
running candidates--nearly all of which were govern-
ment-sponsored groups--and one representative of all
independent candidates. In case a district had only
independents running, the committee would have two
members agreed on by the contenders; if they could
not agree, a responsible government official appointed
the two representatives.
The government bore all expenses of the campaign,
allocating funds at a rate of one piaster per voter
for each electoral unit. In theory, this regulation
provided equal treatment for all candidates, and
permitted no advantages to the wealthy. In practice,
it penalized a constituency with a large number of
candidates as compared to one of equal size with
only two. Government practice, which enabled Diem
to take advantage both of the financial provisions
and of the lack of organized political party opposi-
tion,was to try to consolidate all government parties
behind a single candidate. However, in most cases,
even independents were either covert government sup-
porters or running with government blessing if they
survived the screening process.
Another regulation in the avowed interest of
impartiality also worked in the Diem government's
favor. This was the limiting of the campaign period
from 20 February to 2 March, with real momentum get-
ting under way only about half way through the cam-
paign. Campaign activity was limited to the distri-
bution of posters and leaflets, house to house calls,
radio speeches, and organized rallies at which lit-
tle debate went on except for presentation of candi-
dates, their records, and platforms--all quite simi-
lar. With the campaign committee weighted by pro-
government representatives, the printing of litera-
ture for nongovernment candidates was often delayed
until well into the campaign.
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There was no official regulation for impartial
access to the press. Censorship was lifted on the
eve of the campaign, but the imposition of stiffer
penalties for "tendentious" commentary served to
deter any newspapers which may have wished to espouse
a nongovernment or antigovernment candidate. In
fact, of some 405 total candidates, only about 50,
including Diem's brother Nhu and his wife, received
any real press attention.
Although Saigon officials claimed a voter par-
ticipation of 90-95 percent of registered voters,
the US Embassy estimated about an 80 percent turn-
out, or roughly 4.8 million of some six million
eligible. Participation varied widely, from 95 per-
cent in the highlands to 33.2 percent in one dis-
trict in the western delta. In general, voting
was lighter in the southern provinces.
Of the 123 seats, approximately 50 were won by
the government's NRM party. More than 35 others
were members of other government sponsored parties,
and only 36 were so-called independents. Of these,
at least 18 were identified as pro-Diem. Thirty-
three of the government-favored candidates were
defeated. In all, only three members of the assem-
bly were identified as true independents. These,
the only active members of the assembly's "minority
bloc," conceived of their role as a loyal "watchdog"
opposition rather than as true opponents of the gov-
ernment, although in private conversations, they were
at times critical of the regime.
The 1956 elections were boycotted by most of
the Vietnamese opposition parties and politicians,
and the elections were followed by some criticism of
government methods, including allegations of arrests
and intimidation. One candidate was reportedly kid-
naped, another's approval delayed until just prior
to election day. There were reports of pressure put
on province chiefs and their subordinates to assure
victory for government-backed candidates on pain of
losing their jobs. As in the case of the referendum,
there were rumors of multicolored ballots to favor
the government, and reports of misuse of government
vehicles and of ballot manipulation. The strongest
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pressures were applied in the northern provinces and
the highlands, the fiefdom of Diem's brother Ngo Dinh
Can, while government influence was applied more
subtly in the South. Although the election regula-
tions were largely adequate and impartial on the sur-
face, and most of the conduct of the balloting cor-
rect, the procedures offered wide leeway for govern-
ment control of the campaign and its outcome.
The 1959 Assembly Elections
Accounts of the 1959 elections, in which all as-
sembly seats were at stake, suggest that it was the
dirtiest and most openly rigged of all. By that time,
the Diem government's power and control mechanisms
were well entrenched, and the opposition had grown
in size and in bitterness, if not in effectiveness.
New electoral laws, (Annex D-C), proclaimed on
25 and 26 June 1959, brought some changes from the
1956 ordinances. Voting districts were revamped to
follow an alleged basis of one deputy per 55,000_vot-
ers. Some provinces were combined into single elec-
toral units rather than following the earlier princi-
ple of at least one deputy per province regardless of
population. The number of delegates from Saigon was
increased from seven to nine, although one leading
opposition figure pointed out that, on a strict popu-
lation apportionment, the capital city should have
had 20 deputies.
Provisions for special representation for North
Vietnamese refugees were dropped, government funds
allocated to the campaign were doubled to the amount
of two piasters per voter, and there was some tight-
ening of voting procedures with the issuance of voter
cards, from which the corner would be clipped after
the voter cast his ballot. Provisions for secret
balloting were retained, as were the campaign com-
mittees of candidate representatives to regulate the
campaign and apportion campaign resources. The cam-
paign period was extended from 12 to 14i days, or
from 15 to 29 August, with the elections themselves
held on 30 August.
There were 625 candidates for the 123 seats, in-
cluding 521 runAing as independents and 91 under the
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government's NRM party label. Seventy candidates
withdrew during the course of the campaign, while
165 were refused certification by the electoral com-
missions from the total initially filing candidacies.
The primary tactic used to exclude candidates was to
charge violation of the election regulations. How-
ever, there were reports of other pressures and
threats being applied to induce withdrawal, and one
prominent candidate in Saigon was accused of offer-
ing bribes.
Reports of an intensive government effort to
assure the outcome of the election were widespread.
The Can Lao Party, the government's elite political
control apparatus, was reportedly ordered to conduct
a widespread publicity campaign to explain the elec-
tions, partly through organizing popular study move-
ments in which voter choices could be influenced.
Province chiefs were widely alleged to have been
warned to deliver victories for government-sponsored
candidates. One pro-Diem deputy, however, claimed
that while Diem had ordered all province chiefs to
use all reasonable means to elect favored candidates,
these measures must be within the law as he wished
"no scandals."
Both government and ',Antigovernment sources
testified to the widespread use of the Civil Serv-
ice, particularly the Civic Action Ministry (prede-
cessor to the current Rural Construction Ministry),
to influence the elections. One source claimed that
members of the government's civil service political
party were notified to select personnel from their
bureaus in Saigon to work in the provinces, and that
up to 30-50 percent of civil servants were so tapped.
An antigovernment source claimed, for example, that
the Civic Action Ministry sent 30 workers from Saigon
to Kontum Province, the Finance Ministry sent employ-
ees to Pleiku, the Economy Ministry sent employees
to Dinh Tuong in the delta, and that some 1,400 gov-
ernment cadres were heavily engaged in campaigning
by mid-July, one month before the campaign officially
began. In each province, the local Civic Action
chief was designated to serve as chief of the offi-
cial campaign "information and propaganda" committee.
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In this election, there appears to have been in-
creased use of the provision allowing military troops
to vote wherever they might be operating on election
day to influence the outcome. A number of sources
claimed that, while the voter still sealed the bal-
lot for the candidate of his choice in an unmarked
envelope, discarded ballots were carefully collected
and studied by government agents to gauge voting
trends. Where a government candidate appeared td be
in difficulty, the province chief ordered troops
sent to vote in that district to rescue the candidate
in trouble. Since the troops were not on the local
list of registered voters and could vote with an
identity card rather than a voter's card, it was
widely alleged that many of thelii voted in several
districts.
There were widespread allegations that military
troops voted extensively in the areas around Saigon,
although voting places -where US observers were present
revealed no instances of irregularities or disorders.
There was, however, a considerable concentration of
military and security troops in the Saigon area on
the election day. According to Diem's security
chief, this was because of reports that the Viet Cong
were planning extensive interference in the provinces
of the Eastern Region--generally surrounding Saigon--
as well as the introduction of agents to distort
voting in Saigon itself. One source claimed that
some 41,000 troops voted in the Saigon districts. The
extent to which troop voting actually affected the
outcome in the government's favor is unknown. A
number of reports claimed that troops frequently de-
fied the apparent wishes of their commanders and cast
votes for nongovernment candidates.
There were other reports of irregularities in
connection with the 1959 contest, including marking
of ballots to invalidate those of opposition candi-
dates, withholding of ballots from objectionable can-
didates from the stack handed a voter, switching of
ballots deposited in ballot boxes, and forcing voters
to change their votes after examining discarded bal-
lots. There were widespread reports of the use of
threats and bribes against both recalcitrant candi-
dates and voters.
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Most of these reports could not be verified,
although there was little doubt that the government
remained generally in control of the election pro-
ceedings. It is probable that there was, in fact,
little direct government interference in the actual
voting, the controls being exercised more broadly
through the screening process and the campaigning
itself. Voting in Saigon generally appears to have
been relatively free, with only four of the nine
deputies elected being government-backed candidates.
In the provinces, government manipulation was
clearly more widespread, although several contests
were extremely close, and some government candi-
dates were defeated. In many of the northern prov-
inces, however, the voting was little more than a
pro forma public ratification of the government's
will,. This region was the virtual fiefdom of
Diem's brother Can, who handpicked all of the can-
didates, subjected the populace to a massive propa-
ganda campaign which amounted to instructions on
how and for whom to vote, turned out 99 percent of
the registered voters in the Hue area and surround-
ing province, and rolled up majorities for govern-
ment candidates of from 91 to 99.8 percent. While
there was some evidence of behind-the-scenes resort
to pressure and threats, there was none indicating
fraud in the balloting or ballot counting. The
rural population, in particular, long conditioned
to totalitarian methods, first by the Communists
and then by Can's machine, displayed little under-
standing or desire for a free choice and appears to
have carried out the role expected of it.
The voting was less well staged in the south-
ern provinces, where the government organization
was less effective. Nevertheless, the 1959 elec-
tions resulted in a landslide for the government,
both in official and independent candidates who
were sympathetic. Seventy-eight of the 123 seats
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were won by members of the NRM party, nine rep-
resentatives of other parties were government
supporters, and only five of 36 independents
elected were regarded as "genuine." Of these
five, two were well-known oppositionists in
contrast to the 1956 assembly in which even the
three independents were not anti-Diem. Accord-
ing to US Embassy data, the total vote was re-
ported at 7,328,735, a figure not exactly com-
patible with data published by the official
government press on 9 August which listed only
6,738,992 eligible voters. Voter turnout re-
portedly varied from about 82 percent of those
eligible in Saigon, to 99 percent in areas of
central Vietnam.
A final act by the government which tended
to mar the 1959 elections was the disqualifica-
tion of two deputies elected from the Saigon
area, who were never permitted to take their
seats. One of these, well-known oppositionist
Phan Quang Dan, was accused of violations of the
electoral law and bribery, and was allegedly
temporarily detained during the campaign. The
other, a disaffected former Can Lao member, Nguyen
Tran, was similarly charged with electoral vio-
lations. Both men were convicted of the charges
by a court ruling, providing Diem the excuse
not to intervene on their behalf while professing
to favor letting them ?take their seats.
1960 Assembly By-elections
By-elections were held in two districts of
Saigon on 10 January 1960 to fill the national
assembly seats left vacant by invalidation of
the elections of Phan Quang Dan and Nguyen Tran
in 1959. Candidates were restricted to those
who had been contenders in the August 1959 elec-
tion and in both districts, the previous runners-
up were elected.
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The by-elections aroused far less voter in-
terest than had the 1959 race, with the excep-
tion of one newspaper which violently attacked
one of the two winners. Both of the victors
were former deputies in the 1956 assembly and
both bore some semblance of genuine independents.
One of the victors evidently had strong covert
backing of the Can Lao organization, although
he was not the official government-sponsored can-
didate. The other, a well-known labor leader
and ostensible Can Lao member, did not have of-
ficial endorsement of the government's NRM Party
and there are indications that some unsuccessful
efforts were made to induce his withdrawal.
The victory of these two candidates, with
at least questionable government sanction, pos-
sibly reflected Diem's willingness to allow a
reasonably free voter choice in order to avoid
renewed charges of election rigging, such as fol-
lowed the 1959 elections. There were, however,
strong indications of government duplicity in
its claims of 80 percent voter participation,
as opposed to the report of one Saigon paper
that only 68.2 percent of eligible voters in one
district, and 55.6 percent in the other, partic-
ipated? The government rationalized its figure
on the use of a different base, i.e., the number
of voter cards issued as opposed to registration
figures. That in turn raised questions about
the number of voters not receiving cards because
of "administrative difficulties."
The US Embassy estimated that, at a maximum,
no more than 77 percent of eligible voters could
have turned out. The total vote in., both districts
was considerably less than in 1959, apparently
due both to normal apathy toward by-elections and
probable boycott by disillusioned supporters of
oppositionist leader Dan. The embassy believed
that the major reason for the government's appar-
ent exaggeration of voter turnout was to cover
up an embarrassing contrast between the 1959 and
1960 vote. In Dr. Dan's district in 1959, voter
participation had been 112 percent of registered
voters, presumably reflecting heavy military vot-
ing in an effort to defeat Dan.
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Assembly By-Elections in 1957
Three by-elections were held on 17 February 1957
to fill vacancies in the National Assembly caused by
the resignations of three deputies who had been ap-
pointed to positions of secretaries of state in the
Diem cabinet. These by-elections were regulated in
the same manner as the elections for the constituent
assembly in 1956 and followed the same pattern. They
were quiet and orderly. No significant opposition
arose, and the victors were members of the govern-
ment's two mainstay parties, the NRM and the Can Lao
(Revolutionary Workers' Party).
The elections were held in the first district
of Saigon-Cholon, the capital district of Ninh Thuan
Province east of Saigon on the central coast, and
in the first district of Phu Yen Province also in
the central coastal area. As in 1956, lists of vot-
ers and candidates were drawn up and published less
than a month before the election; electoral commit-
tees of three members were appointed to organize and
control the campaign; equal numbers of posters and
leaflets, equal funds and equal use of radio cars
and radio time were apportioned to contestants.
The campaign in Saigon involved seven candidates.
One withdrew only two days before the election; of
two more who had originally filed for the race, one
withdrew before the campaign opened and the other
had his name stricken from the roles. The campaign
got under way on 6 February with the display of
posters and candidates' symbols and programs, but
developed no momentum until the final week, when two
well-attended public meetings led to some lively
public questioning and some heckling. In one of
these meetings, the campaign committee rejected some
audience questions which presumably could have em-
barrassed the government.
The campaign was essentially a contest between
two of the contenders, with government political
party workers moving openly only in the last few
days to back the government-favorite, presumably be-
cause he had been felt to be an easy victor in an
open vote. Little serious effort was made to ob-
tain a heavy voter turnout, and well over half of
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the district's registered voters abstained, compared
to less than 20 percent in the same ward in 1956.
The government candidate won with 7,485 votes although
his principal competitor compiled 4,328 votes, well
above the other contenders.
This election appears to have been relatively
smooth and well-organized, generally noncontroversial,
and with only minimal government interference to as-
sure the outcome. It was marred by only one incident,
the exhortation of a Catholic priest in the Saigon
cathedral to his parishioners to boycott the elections
because of the Diem government's generally repressive
policies.
The election contest in Ninh Thuan Province re-
sulted in a heavy victory for the Can Lao Party can-
didate, the only surprise in the race stemming from
the fact that he was an apparent favorite of Presi-
dent Diem's older brother Bishop Ng 0 Dinh Thuc
rather than of Ngo Dinh Can, another brother who was
the actual strong:man in the northern provinces of
South Vietnam. Can's personal favorite, who ran
under no party label, was presumably abandoned by
the government machine as a result of some behind-
the-scenesdanally pressure on Can to switch his sup-
port. In this by-election, the government brought
out some 40,587 voters from the total registration
of 45,514.
The Phu Yen contest was evidently tightly con-
trolled, with the government favorite, an NRM mem-
ber, the only well-known figure and assured of an
overwhelming majority. Only 419 of the 38,161 vot-
ers did not participate.
The manner and
showed no departure
dures' and policies.
the majority of the
system of elections
too demoralized and
system.
outcome of the three by-elections
from previous government proce--
They served to demonstrate that
public seemed to accept Diem's
as normal, with the opposition
ineffective to challenge the
1961 Presidential Election
Under South Vietnam's constitution, promulgated
on 26 October 1956, Ngo Dinh Diem was designated
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president on the basis of the 1955 referendum with
a five-year term to expire on 30 April 1961. The
presidential elections held on 9 April 1961 were
thus his first direct test as a presidential candi-
date, even though up for re-election. In view of
the rising Viet Cong insurgency, Diem could have
invoked constitutional powers to postpone the elec-
tion, but he chose to hold them as scheduled, with
his victory a foregone conclusion.
Control of the election appears to have been
vested in an Election Bureau of the National Assembly,
which made all official announcements on the approval
of candidates, rather than the Interior Ministry as
in the past. In addition to Diem and his running
mate, Vice President Nguyen Ngoc Tho, there were two
other competing slates. One of them was headed by
Nguyen Dinh Quat, a rubber planter and former as-
semblyman who(shad reportedly broken with the govern-
ment. His running mate was Nguyen Thanh Phuong, a
former Cao Dai general and relatively well-known
opposition figure with little organized following.
The other slate was headed by an elderly herb doc-
tor of Chinese descent, whose running mate, Nguyen
The Truyen, was a similarly aging engineer of some
prominence in Saigon's anti-Diem intellecutual
circles. Two Vietnamese exiles in Paris, of pos-
sibly greater vote-getting potential, attempted to
file candidacies, but were rejected on grounds of
faulty documentation.
Similar to earlier elections, the conduct of
the campaign was regulated by a Central Campaign
Committee of three members, representing each can-
didate. Diem's representative and chairman of the
committee was the vice-president of the national as-
sembly; representatives of the other two tickets
were another assemblyman and a journalist. As in
the past, the committee's role was to assure each
candidate equal access to government funds earmarked
for the campaign, equal access to campaign litera-
ture, news media, and rallies.
The campaign committee chairman announced that
the campaign would be governed by two principles:
equal resources for all so that it would be completely
democratic, and preservation of national unity in
the face of the growing Communist threat. In prac-
tice, the first principle favored Diem, as previously,
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particularly since he could as president engage in
considerable campaign activity under the guise of
official duties. The foremost result of the second
principle, considered legitimate in a country sub-
jected to increasing military and subversive chal-
lenge, was an agreement by the candidates to refrain
from personal attacks on one another. All campaign
literature and themes were also screened by the
campaign committee to weed out any slogans or goals
espoused by the Communists, such as national reuni-
fication, reduction of military strength, or suprem-
acy of the proletariat.
Diem is reported to have issued the usual call
for support from officials in the provinces, but
to have stressed the desire for a large popular
vote above any measures to control the voting it-
self. In general, local officials appear to have
observed the strict impartiality imposed by the
campaign rules, although there were isolated instances
of pressure and voting distortiOn.. No restric-
tions were placed on the government-controlled press,
which for the most part described the President's
activities with dignity and respect while mounting
increasingly derogatory attacks on the opposition
candidates. As the campaign progressed, there were
numerous occasions of heckling and harassment of
the opposition, presumably by progovernment groups.
In the 1961 election, the role of the govern-
ment-sponsored NRM party and even of the Can Lao
was muted to a more clandestine type of activity,
while greater use was made of such groups as Ngo
Dinh Nhu's Republican Youth group and Madame Nhu's
Women's Solidarity group. Although use of private
funds by the candidates was strictly forbidden,
nothing was said in the electoral laws of political
party funds or organization. The government pos-
sessed all of the assets on this score, neither of
the opposition slates having any organized political
backing. The opposition candidates, however, evi-
dently obtained quiet assistance from many tradi-
tional Diem opponents, raising in the course of the
campaign most of the criticisms made by such politi-
cians over the years.
The law governing the election preserved such
principles as secret ballot, poll inspection, and
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other safeguards. The balloting appears to have
been conducted with a minimal degree of interference
and with reasonable honesty. Diem received about
89 percent of the total vote, or 5,983,338 votes,
compared to 456,416, or seven percent, for the
Tan-Truyen slate and 296,396, or four percent, for
the Quat-Phuong ticket. Invalid ballots numbered
29,470. Both oppositionist candidates at one point
sharply challenged the validity of the election re-
sults, but later retracted their charges.
According to official returns, 7,231,137 per-
sons were eligible to vote, and 6,723,720 votes were
cast, for a turnout of 93.35 percent. Participation
varied from about 77.8 percent in Saigon to close
to 100 percent in some areas of central Vietnam.
In some provinces, however, voter participation was
abnormally low, 31-45 percent of eligible voters,
while in others it exceeded voter registration,
presumably because of military voting. Diem's per-
centage of the vote varied from a low 62.3 in Saigon
to 98.2 in the high plateau area.
However, much the statistics on Diem's plurality
and the voter turnout may appear questionable, neither
US observers nor some 30 foreign newsmen who covered
the elections in Saigon and the provinces noted any
blatant election fraud. There were, however scat-
tered reports of irregularities, such as monitoring
discarded ballots, postelection tampering *ith'the
vote, and bribes and coercion to control supporters
of the opposition. Candidate Tan charged that a
number of his propaganda agents had been arrested
and threatened, although not harmed, and Quat al-
leged that two of his cadres had been beaten and
a third arrested. At one point, Quat's bank funds
were blocked because of alleged tax arrears.
The government was nevertheless apparently
careful to keep harassment of the opposition to a
point below that of provoking either candidate
into withdrawing. Apart from his advantages from
the electoral machinery, Diem benefitted from a
divided opposition, neither of whom was nationally
known. The election ballots themselves, while
the same color and size for each candidate,
prominently displayed Diem's familiar name and
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picture in contrast to symbols beside the names of
the other candidates, a water buffalo for Quat and
a lotus flower for Tan. Neither Quat nor Tan was
able to campaign extensively in the countryside,
both because of the shortness of the campaign and
the allocation of meetings and speeches in the Sai-
gon area.
Although scarcely an example of a genuinely
free election, the US Embassy concluded at the time
that the presidential contest was conducted with a
reasonable degree of honesty, and certainly far
fewer protests than followed the 1959 elections.
In a certain sense moreover, it was a reasonable
reflection of the will of the majority of the
people, if not in terms of enthusiasm for Diem,
at least in terms of a preference for Diem over
the other available choices. Furthermore, although
instances of Communist terrorist activity including
sporadic interference with rural voting were more
prevalent than in any previous election, the cam-
paign and voting were conducted with no serious
challenge from the Viet Cong who had given every
prior evidence of seeing the contest as one between
the government and themselves.
National Assembly Elections of 1963
National assembly elections were originally
scheduled to be held in 1962, with the end of the
three-year terms of deputies elected in 1959.
However, the constitution was amended to extend
the terms to four years because of the danger of
holding elections in conditions of increasing in-
security from the Viet Cong insurgents. The elec-
tions,originally set for 31 August 1963,were,further
postponed under the martial law prevailing at the
time to cope with growing Buddhist agitation against
the government. The election finally took place
on 27 September 1963, shortly after martial law
was lifted.
The government had begun to prepare for the
1963 election by early June, with amendments to the
1959 electoral law proposed by the government and
passed by the national assembly. There were essen-
tially four major changes in the law, two of which
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were potentially restrictive. One significant change
was the substitution of a single ballot, containing
names of all candidates within a given constituency,
for the previous system of separate ballots for each
candidate. This was designed to reduce opportunities
for fraud, such as buying or selling of ballots and
checking voter preferences by examining discarded
ballots. Some deputies, however, questioned whether
the new system would not confuse peasants forced to
mark, rather than merely select, ballots.
The other changes involved a provision that only
the Vietnamese language could be used in campaigning,
a device which could be used to disqualify certain
minority candidates sbch as Khmers or montagnards; in
fact, no persons of Cambodian descent were elected to
the 1963 assembly although four montagnards were re-
turned. Another change, allegedly intended to pre-
vent "frivolous" candidacies? required a 5,000-
piaster deposit by all candidates, to be forfeited
if a candidate scored less than five laercent, of the
total vote; simultaneously, the government allocation
to cover campaign expenses of each candidate was re-
duced from two piasters for every voter in his district
to one-half piaster.
Another major change authorized the national
assembly to exercise final power of review over the
propriety of the election conduct, an authority pre-
viously handled by the executive or the judiciary ,a
individual cases. Two subsequent amendments in July
provided compensation for candidates falsely accused
of election irregularities and that no elected can-
didate found guilty of violations by the courts could
take his seat before the court decision became public.
In contrast to more than 600 initial aspirants
for the 1959 assembly, only 355 candidates were listed
in the first posting of lists, and only 289 actually
were listed on the election day ballots, or little
more than two candidates per seat. In 45 districts,
there were unopposed candidates including Diem's
brother Nhu and his wife. No genuine oppositionists
were on the final list of approved candidates.
The decrease in the number of persons running
for the assembly was due to a variety of factors.
The government encouraged or pressured several in-
cumbents not to seek re-elettion, andr-screehing Of
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applicants was particularly stringent. Moreover,
disillusion with the assembly as a genuine public
forum and with Diem's treatment of his opponents ap-
parently discouraged most anti-government politicians
from attempting to compete; both of the true opposi-
tionists elected in 1959 were imprisoned by 1963. The
required deposit may have deterred other potential
contenders.
The government, under serious attack from Bud-
dhist quarters, appears to have had three primary
considerations in the elections. One was to produce
a large voter turnout to discredit charges that it
had no support. A second was to conduct the elections
with sufficient order, efficiency and appearance of
fairness as to bolster its prestige domestically
and abroad. The third was to prevent any serious
disruption by either the Viet Cong or other anti-
government elements: Although these factors took preced-
ence over measures to assure a resounding government
victory, the government evidently felt sufficiently
confident of its ability, through candidate screening
and other techniques, to control the election outcome.
One device resorted to by the government was
reportedly the issuance of more than one voter card
to "reliable" persons, possibly in part to assure a
large total vote. A report that some polling places
were ordered to close as soon as an assigned quot- of
total votes had been reached may indicate an effort
to avoid exceeding voter registration in areas where
multiple individual voting occurred. Several pro-
vincial constituencies did tally more votes :than reg-
istered voters, possibly through military or civil-
service voting. There were also scattered reports of
tampering with the voting count or of the election of
candidates in dubious circumstances. Embassy obser-
vers had no opportunity to witness any counting of
ballots, although the actual balloting appeared to be
conducted with genuine secrecy.
Official Vietnamese statistics listed a total
vote of 6,329,831, or 92.82 percent of the 6,809,078
eligible voters. Although this turnout was hailed
as testifying to the "eagerness of the Vietnamese
people to take part in the nation's activities," there
is some reason to question the official figures. One
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embassy officer, for example, observed that in one
provincial capital polling site, some 67 percent:
of the registered voters had cast ballots by 3 PM,
and that, despite light voting for the remainder of
the day until the polls closed at 6 PM, the govern-
ment reported a 93 _percent turnout. In Saigon,
participation was reported as 85.15 percent,
an unusually high number of invalid ballots were
counted, believed to have represented a heavy pro-
test vote. This raises the possibility that pres-
sure was used to get out the voteand that opposi-
tionists preferred to invalidate their ballots rather
than be identified as abstaining.
Of 123 victorious candidates, 60 were incumbents
and 96 were candidates officially backed by the govern-
ment. Twenty-five incumbents were defeated, possibly
including some of the 15 government-sponsored can-
didates defeated. With almost no genuine independents
and no opposition figures in the contest, and the
few who tried having been disqualified in advance,
the character of the assembly was largely one of
docility, detracting from the essentially orderly
and outwardly democratic election procedures.
1965 Provincial and Municipal Elections
Elections were held on 30 May 1965, under the
government of Phan Huy Quat, to establish council- in
all provinces, the prefecture of Saigon-Cholon, and the
chartered cities of Hue, Da Nang, Dalat and Vung Tau.
These councils replaced those appointed under earlier
regimes, with somewhat expanded membership: 30 on the
Saigon council, and from 6 to 15 members on provincial
and other municipal councils as determined by popula-
tion, electoral districts, local budgets, and security.
No national issue figured directly in the elec-
tions, and council candidates campaigned purely on
local matters. There were approximately 1,000 total
candidates for a total of 471 seats. In most areas
this meant at least two contestants per seat, although
only 17 persons ran for 12 seats on the Hue city council,
six others having withdrawn in discouragement over Bud-
dhist power.
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Under the laws governing the voting (Annex 11),
balloting was limited to areas there local authorities
could assure adequate security for voters. All citizens
over 18, registered on electoral lists and possessing a
voter card, were entitled to take part. As in earlier
cases, electoral lists were publicly posted, first to
permit amendment on the basis of omission or error and
secondly, as a final listing. Soldiers and their de-
pendents located in military camps were to have their
electoral lists drawn up by their unit commanders and
submitted for approval to city mayors or district chiefs
befOre posting.
All citizens aged at least 23, having a "legal
military status" and without a criminal, pro-Communist,
or pro-neutralist background were eligible to become
candidates. Excluded, however, from running within the
"domain of their functions" were provincial and munici-
pal officials, magistrates and justices of the peace,
commanders of police units, and military officersr
commanding military zones or units of company level
and above.
The lists of both voters and candidates were
screened by provincial or municipal boards, headed by
a judge or other judicial officer and including as mem-
bers three elective officials or notables to represent
the voters and three local government representatives.
This expansion of the screening boards served to increase
voter representation, even though...indirectly. Ti e
boards were also responsible for checking election re-
turns in their localities.
An. electoral campaign committee was also set up
in each'province and chartered city, to represent the
candidates?each authorized one member?and.to supervise
the organization and operation of the campaign. The
duration of the campaign was set from 15 May to noon on
29 May. All expenditures were to be borne by the prov-
inces or cities concerned, with a maximum of one-half
piaster per voter in the electoral unit allotted per
candidate; however, the decree provided for a minimum
and maximum fund allotment, and candidates were permitted
to assume any additional expenses from their own resources.
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The electoral ordinance returned to the principle
of a separate ballot for each candidate, to make distinc-
tion easier; the candidate could also use a party or
individual symbol provided it was not an international
emblem or religious symbol, a prohibition possibly aimed
at the Buddhists and Catholics. Balloting was secret,
with every voter entitled to cast votes for the total
number of provincial council membership by selecting the
proper number of candidates' ballots and depositing them
in an envelope.
Every poll was to be operated by a board, consist-
ing of a chief designated by the appropriate majorcor
province chief, and two members selected from voters
present. Each candidate was entitled to a pollwatcher.
Counting of ballots was done openly at the polling site,
with the results forwarded to a central board in each
electoral unit, which announced unofficial results. Re-
turns had to be certified and also reported ,to the in-
terior ministry in Saigon.
According to the provisions laid down by the Quat
government, the terms of provincial and municipal coun-
cillors were fixed at three years, with one-third of a
council being elected every year. The third standing for
re-election in 1966 and 1967 was to be chosen by lots.
An official of the present Ky government informed
the US Embassy in late February 1966 that the gow?n-
ment planned to proceed on schedule with the municipal
and provincial elections this spring. Previously,
Saigon's military rulers had been considering postpone-
ment of the elections by'extending terms of present
councillors to a full three years.
The councils elected in 1965 were authorized more
authority than similar councils establiShed by the Diem
regime, including certain "rights of decision" on bud-
get and revenue matters, public property management,
public works and welfare programs, public contracts, and
boundary redistricting. In certain other matters they
had purely advisory functions. Within the context of
certain provincial and municipal matters, they had the
authority to demand central government action against
defiCient administrators. Council members were also to
be eligible as candidates for any national assembly.
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According to US observers, the provincial elec-
tions in 1965 were well organized and provided no obvious
indications of irregularities or coercion. Viet Cong
activity was at ,normal levels during the election, but
only in isolated instances did the Viet Cong interfere
with voting. Public attitudes ranged from enthusiasm
in some areas to apathy in others, with the rural areas
generally showing greater interest. Voter turnout was
reported by the government to have been 72 percent of
registered voters, a considerably lower turnout than
generally claimed in elections held under the Diem regime.
The US Embassy estimated that registered Voters probably
averaged only about 50 percent of the potential voting
population, given the degree of government control and
the restriction on voting in secure areas only.
The character of the provincial and municipal coun-
cils has.. varied:.from province to province and 'City tocity,
With those in Saigon and sui.i.ounding aia Dinh*Province con-
taining several effective members. Candidates who had
served previously on provincial councils tended to be
elected, as did favorites of local political, religious,
and labor groups. Buddhists generally dominated the
Hue council, and the Hoa Hao sect various councils in the
delta where the sect is influential. Many of the candi-
dates were independents, primarily professional men,
civil servants, and teachers. In some areas, province
officials have found the councils useful and constructive,
in others obstructive, and in several provinces they are
largely inactive.
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