THE NEW REGIME IN GHANA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00826A000400010049-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 14, 2004
• Sequence Number: 49
• Publication Date: March 11, 1965
• Content Type: MF

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11 Mart/h 1966
No. 1158/66
Copy No.
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
THE NEW REGIME IN GHANA
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
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This Document contains information affecting the Na-
tional Defense of the United States, within the mean-
ing of Title 18, Sections 793 and 794, of the U.S. Code, as
amended. Its transmission or revelation of its contents
to or receipt by an unauthorized person is prohibited
by law. The reproduction of this form is prohibited.
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No. 115/66
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
11 March 1966
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
The New Regime in Ghana
1. After years of steady leftward movement under
Nkrumah, the po"li:ticalpendulum in Ghana has suddenly
veered sharply to the right. Within a matter of hours
on 24 February, long disaffected senior army and po-
lice officers toppled the Osagyefo's authoritarian,
Marxist-oriented power structure and set Ghana on a
fundamentally different course. Tn ter.ms of the coun-
try's foreign affairs, this has already resulted in
a dramatic curtailment of the old regi.me's extensive
involvement with the Communist world and brought
other changes having the effect of putting Ghana in
line with the moderate African states. Ghana had
been the most dependable African base of operations
for the Communist world. Internally, the intention
at least for the present apparently is to reconstruct
the body politic within a framework inspired in large
measure by liberal Western values. So far, this pro-
found upheaval has received overwhelming popular ap-
proval,
2. At this early date, liowever,it cannot be
considered certain that Ghana will make orderly prog-
ress along the altered course. The new regime ap-
pears to have taken hold quickly and effectively,
but it is still very much in its initial shakedown
phase, and lines of real authority and influence are
embryonic. Above all there is the extremely diffi-
cult economic situation inherited from the Nkrumah
era. The new leaders seem realistically appreciative
of the magnitude of the problem facing them on this
front--indeed, the current sorry economic .plight of
basically wealthy Ghana was a primary consideration
prompting them to depose Nkrumah. However, the
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realities are such that it would seem very likely
that neither the new leadership nor foreign friends
can appreciably ease the severe economic squeeze on
the populace in the weeks immediately ahead. The
degree of severity will depend in part on how far
the auste~?ity reform measures are actually implemented.
An6ther conditioning factor will be the new regime's
success in obtaining fast delivery of desperately
needed imports.
3. Two weeks after the coup there is no ques-
tion that the forces which carried it out are firmly
in control throughout the country. All regular army
units and even the special presidential guard evi-
dently rallied to the elements which spearheaded
the operation within a few hours of its initiation.
The well-organized network of police, disarmed ar~d
purged by Nkrumah two years ago following an attempt
on his life by a policeman, .'has. been rearmed, giv-
ing the new regime additional muscle, The small air
force and navy have also endorsed the change.
4. It is similarly clear that Ghana's present
rulers enjoy the enthusiastic support of the vast
majority of the populace, The US Embassy in Accra
has reported that the publ'ic'ized anti-Nkrumah demon-.
strations there have far the most part been genuinely
spontaneous. No curfew has been imposed and none
has been needed at any time since the coup, and
military personnel were removed early from the
streets and most nonmilitary installations. More-
over, not one of the many prominent Ghanaians out-
side the country at the time of the coup has de-
clared fogs Nkrumah. Most top officials who were
traveling with Nkrumah, even old ones who were per-
sonally close to him, have returned to Ghana and
pledged support to the new government.
5. This reaction among Ghanaians bears out re-
current indications in recent years that virtually
all segments of the country's society had become
alienated from Nkrumah, the hero of independence nine
years ago. The erosion of his once massive popular-
ity stemmed mainly from his arbitrary rule, his pro-
communist proclivities, and, especially, the economic
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squeeze and dislocations felt at all levels begin-
ning abut 1961.
6. Since 24 February Ghanaian affairs have
been directed by a National Liberation Council (NLC),
composed now of eight army and police officers. It
is headed by popular General Ankrah, whom Nkrumah.
had fired on suspicion of disloyalty last summer,
lthough not a grea ea is
nown a u he members of the government,
they all have reputations for professional competence.
The key leaders, at least, are personally anti-Com-
munist and pro-Western, although they have hereto-
fore eschewed active politics in accordance with the
British tradition in which they were schooled. They
seem likely to be particularly friendly'.to the US.
7. The new leadership, inexperienced in civil
administration, is backed up by some half dozen im-
portant new functional committees made up of senior
civil servants and specialists. Apparently the most
important of these is an Administrative and Political
Committee which reportedly stands between the NLC
and the other committees dealing with such specific
areas as foreign affairs and the economy. Again,
all persons named to these various committees are
reputed to be competent professionals. Most of
them, including all members of the key economic com-
mittee, are believed to be favorably disposed to
the West.
8. Among Britain's African dependencies, if
not all of Black Africa, the indigenous civil serv-
ice inherited by free Ghana in 1957 was the most
solid and best prepared for independence. Despite
Nkrumah's progressive estrangement from the West,
especially after 1960, most of these civil servants
remained Western oriented. Some top-flight ones
were so keenly dissatisfied with Nkrumah's regime
that they found employment outside the country.
Many of those who remained were outspokenly critical,
in private, of Nkrumah's arbitrary rule and left-
ist policies.
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9. Many of Nkrumah's instruments of personal rule col-
lapsed immediately and since the day of the coup the new
leadership has been focusing heavily on dismantling Nkrumah's
remaining power structure and laying the foundations for the
"new Ghana." Beginning with the dissolution of Nkrumah1s
formerly pervasive political party, all the organizations
and institutions used to perpetuate his control have either
been suppressed entirely,or, like the press and the Ghana
Trades Union Congress (GTUC), are being thoroughly purged
and revamped. All available political officials and lead-
ing party activists of the old regime are evidently still
being detained, although reportedly most are to be released
fairly quickly. Commissions of inquiry have been set up to
probe official corruption under Nkrumah. Some 1,000 politi-
cal prisoners, most of whom had been incarcerated under the
hated Preventive Detention Act first passed in 1958, have
been set free. Not included among these were the two one-
time cl?se Nkrumah associates whose acquittal at a treason
trial in 1963 prompted Nkrumah to emasculate Ghana's pre
~vious;ly:'iridepenclerit ;judiciary.
10. Among major policy changes actually-?announced--
notably by General Ankrah in important speeches on 28 Feb-
ruary and 2 March--those in the economic realm are the most
basic and significant. They have been accompanied. by de-
nunciation of the mismanagement, waste, and corruption of
the old regime.
11. Although the stated general aim of the new lead-
ers is a "progressive welfare society," the intent clearly
is to reverse the official commitment, under Nkrumah, to a
ruinously; inefficient variant of state socialism. Ankrah,
guided by the Western-oriented economic committee, has
indicated that future emphasis will be on enlarging the
private sector, partly at the expense of some of the
existing state corporations. Government spending, espe-
cially for nonproducive prestige projects and African pro-
grams so favored by Nkrumah, is to be sharply retrenched.
Publicly, stress has been placed on national self-reliance,
but the new regime obviously is counting upon major help
from Western countries.
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12. Specific actions already taken under these
new guidelines designed to get the economy moving
again include curtailment of operations by the na-
tional airline--long a heavy money loser--and aban-
donment of Nkrumah's overly ambitious seven-year
development plan, A new plan is to be prepared dur-
ing a two-year stock-taking period beginning with
the introduction of a new, reduced-expenditure bud-.
get next July. To provide some immediate relief to
the populace, the stiff social security tax and some
customs duties and sales taxes on certain essential
imports have been reduced. Existing trade pacts
under which an increasing proportion of Ghana's trade
had been diverted to Communist countries in recent
years are to be respected, but will be reviewed as
part of a general, long-term move towa~^d greatly re-
duced trade controls. All Soviet and Chinese de-
velopment projects have been suspended for the pres-
ent, and Ghana's representation abroad reportedly
is to be cut back sharply. At the same time, ap-
proaches have been made for some $100 million in
Western aid for the remainder of 1966 to meet ex-
ternal liabilities and to finance imports.
13. This profound economic shift comes at a
time when Ghana's economy had reached a new nadir.
For the average Ghanaian, visible ills include ram-
pant inflation--25-30 percent over the past year--
rising unemployment, declining real incomes, and
food and consumer goods shortages. From a national
perspective, they are highlighted by a national debt
massive for a country such as Ghana--$l.l billion--
and serious trade and budget deficits.
14. Less visible, but equally serious, is the
general structural imbalance of the economy. Ex-
cessive government spending not only generated the
deficits and debt, but also led to investment in
long-term projects which are nonproductive and in
some instances totally useless. Many of these
debts will fall due in the next few years. Such
investment was most often financed by short- or
medium-term "supplier credits" at high interest
rates. Imports were progressively directed to the
public sector while those for the private economy
were reduced, with the result that prices of con-
sumer goods spiraled upward and manufacturing and
commercial firms were frequently forced to reduce
or suspend operations for lack of vital materials.
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15. Nkrumah blamed Ghana's economic woes on
the decline in world prices for cocoa---Ghana's chief
export--since the late 1950s. Actually, however,
cocoa earnings have remained remarkably stable des-
pite price fluctuations. The current critical im-
passe is almost wholly attributable to irraaianal~'.
expenditure by the government. As a result of Nkru-
mah's forced-pace socialism, at least tWo thirds of
the wage-earning labor force was employdd by the
government on the eve of the coup. At the same
time, declines in private investment and employment
had not been counterbalanced by increased production
from the enlarged public sector.
16. From the outset the new rulers have pub-
licly denied that their accession to power meant
any "automatic" changes in foreign policy and have
stressed their adherence to Ghana's long-standing
official policy of nonalignment. According to
Ankrah, the only difference would be that hence-
forth this posture would be followed strictly "in
theory and practice" in contrast to the."lip-service"
observance by Nkrumah--a clear allusion to the de-
posed president's general identification with the
Communist world,
17, So far both deeds and private words have
in fact added up to a very abrupt and extensive
curtailment of Ghana's involvement with Communist
countries in f~.vor of closer ties with the West.
This basic policy shift was most dramatically illus-
trated by the expulsion of all Soviet and Chinese
technicians ordered on 28 February, presumably
largely as a s~urity measure. The evacuatidn of
the Chinese, totaling approximately 175 advisers
and their families, was substantially co3npleted
within four days. The exodus of the much larger
Soviet cbnting~ht--at least 500 technicians plus
dependents--is expected to continue until mid-March.
After that the presence of Chinese and Soviets in
Ghana is supposed to be confined to 18-member em-
bassy staffs and a few press representatives, Re-
ported pressure from some military members of the
N.bC for a complete rupture with the two Communist
powers has so far been overruled by concern, espe~'.
cially on the part of Harlley, for the credibility
of the new regime's professions of nonalignment.
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18. Other actions immediately detrimental to
tYie Communists include the expulsion of East Germany's
small trade mission, which had enjoyed quasi-diplo-
matic status under Nkrumah, and the revocation of
Aeroflot?s landing rights, forcing a suspension of
its Accra service. The latter action followed re-
ceipt of news on 28 February that a special air-
craft of the Soviet civil air line, was transporting
Nkrumah from Peking to Moscow and reflected feax
that the Russians might try to fly him back-into
Accra.
19. Ghanaian missions in Eastern Europe
evidently will be among the first to be closed out
in the current economy drive. Communist countries
are likely to be distressed, however, should a
mass exodus of Ghanaian students there set in as a
result of-a reported invitation by the NLC to all
students who are "unhappy" with their conditions
to come home. There are some 1,000 Such Ghanaians
in Communist countries and they have frequently
been at the center of altercations involving African
students.
20. In contrast with these developments, the
new regime has already resumed diplomatic relations
with Britain, which Nkrumah had severed last Decem-
ber over Rhodesia. Moreover, the key leaders have
repeatedly expressed in private their good will
toward the US. On one occasion, Ankrah, in a per-
haps not entirely happy parallel, said he looked
forward to developing with the US ambassador a
relationship just as close as Nkrumah had had with
the Soviet representatives
21. A similarly sharp policy reversal is being
implemented in African affairs, a sphere in which
Nkrumah expended major sums of money and much energy
in pursuit of grandiose dreams of primacy in a
politically united continent. Announcing flatly that
"the days of harboring and training po]:itical refu-
gees to subvert other independent states are over,"
Ankrah has pledged to honor the nonintervention
principles of the Organization of African Unity (OAU)e
The new leaders' sincerity in this connection was
underscored by their closure, on the very day of
the coup, of the secret upcountry camp at which suc-
cessive groups of "freedom fighters" from a variety
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of i~}dependent countries and still dependent terri-
tories received training in guerrilla techniques
from Chinese Communist instructors. Subsequently,
some of the refugees involved in such activities
were placed under detention.
22. Special reconciliation missions are soon
to visit Ghana's immediate neighbors, all estranged
by Nhrumah, who regarded them as neocolonialist
puppets. Ankrah has also indicated that his govern-
ment will work to strengthen the OAU as an organ-
ization of equal sovereign states. He pledged sup-
port for efforts of.'.its African Liberation Committee,
generally ignored b~ Nkrumah, to speed the liberation
of remaining colonial territories. Such actions and
assurances have contributed to the prompt recognition
of the new Ghana regime by a significant number of
the moderate African states.
23. There seems to be no reason why Ankrah and
his associates should not remain securely in power
and continue Ghana's new Westward-inclination in the
months immediately ahead. No domestic pressure
points or interest groups with a significant poten-
tial for threatening the new status quo have been
identified. Nkrumah's leftist sycophants, even if
soon released from detention, would have little
chance of stirring up trouble should they be so in-
clined. With the possible exception of labor leader
John Tettegah, they had no "constituency" of their
own, but were always entirely dependent on Nkrumah's
favor. Tettegah, a tY~ibal brother of the principal
coup leaders and above all an opportunist, might
will land on his feet somewhere in the new regime.
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24. Although the new leaders have professed a de-
sire to return to representative civilian government "as
soon as possible," they apparently will be in no hurry
to implement their promise of a new constitution and
free elections. Moreover, Ankrah, at least, seems to
be rapidly developing the personal political ambition he
has denied and initially seemed not to have. On 1
March he indicated privately his disinclination to turn
back power any time soon to politicians, including any
of the anti-Nkrumah exiles who now may try to resume an
active role in Ghana. He reportedly now favors reten-
tion of control by the NLC for approximately two years
and is considering offering himself for election--pre-
sumably as head man--when a civilian government even-
tually is formed. For the present all political parties
and activity are banned and all the politicians are out
of the picture.
25. As the new regime settles in, the special new
committees of high-powered civil servants seem likely to
play an increasingly important role. They are already
reported to be exercising more and more.influence on the
NLC, most of whose members are not equipped for policy
formulation. Recent statements asserting the NLC's dedica-
tion to the ""fig.ht" against colonialism and racial dis-
crimination "in every part of the world" may well be a
direct reflection of this. The composition of the~for-
eign affairs committee--one of its members formerly headed
Nkrumah's activist African Affairs Secretariat--strongly
suggests that it is probably trying to move the NLC back
toward a more militantly "African" posture. In the future
greater efforts may also be made to strengthen the regime's
avowed nonaligned image.
26. The new leaders will for some time probably be
highly :j.umpy about the intentions of Nkrumah, but his pros-
pects for obtaining any significant material support ap-
pear dim. The ousted president's continued presence in
Guinea has helped sustain this nervousness and the NLC's
consequent susceptibility to all sorts of unconfirmed re-
ports about foreign-supported plans to restore Nkrumah
by force. Two such reports available here are certainly
highly exaggerated at befit. At present there is no firm
evidence that any power which q~ould make a meaningful con-
tribution to such a project has agreed to da so. Moreover,
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2'7. At the least, the new regime's intra-African
relations promise to be complicated for some time by the
more radical African regimes' emotional opposition to
Nkrumah's ouster. In addition to Tourd's frenetic and
essentially empty gestures in Nkrumah's behalf, Egypt's
Nasir now appears inclined to play a.leading role in or-
ganizing further African expressions of disapproval of
the coup. There are indications that plans are afoot to
hold a conference partly for this purpose in Cairo later
this month. Meanwhile, Zambia has moved formally to termi-
nate active relations with Accra, while the NLC itself has
initiated a rupture with Guinea.
28. For the immediate future, however, the eco-
nomic crisis will almost certainly remain the most press-
ing and potentially damaging problem facing the new gov-
ernment. Serious foreign trade deficits cannot be re-
duced in the short run, since rising imports are necessary
to relieve shortages of consumer goods and to revive pri-
vate manufacturing and commercial activity. Similarly,
exports cannot be quickly diversified or markedly in-
creased. Most of the cocoa crop has already been sold
for this year, much of it committed to the USSR. Other
important exports--diamonds, gold, manganese, timber, and
bauxite--.have been stagnant or declining. Domestic food
production cannot be increased immediately either, al-
though the government has appealed to the farmers toY.i.n-
crease plantings during the coming rainy season. Moreover,
the apparent determination to reduce government spending
and otherwise to decrease governmental participation in
the economy promises to swell unemployment until the pres-
ently battered private sector can be rejuvenated suffi-
ciently to take up the slack.
29. The government's proposed tough; economic measures
would probably accelerate the dissipation of the euphoria in
which most Ghanians currently appear to share. If the
further hardships which appear inevitable over the next few
months are severe, they could lead to grumbling and perhaps
even some strikes and disturbances, although hardly, it would
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seem. to any. ground swell of support..-for Nkrumah's restora-
tion. Sensitive to these possible repercussions, the
NLC has begun to warn the populace that the country's
economic problems cannot be resolved quickly and
that continued austerity will be required for about
two years. Efforts are being made to foster a last-
ing identification of the economic troubles with the
old regime.
30. Some significant help is in sight. With
the new leaders evidently prepared to move forward
quickly with a stabilization program along the lines
recommended by the International Monetary Fund last
year, Ghana's prospects of obtaining upwards of $30
million from the IMF now are bright. Meanwhile,
West Germany and Britain are evidently prepared to
help keep the new regime afloat financially and pro-
vide basic food supplies until the international ar-
rangements are worked out. In addition, British
technical assistance will be offered, and London
banks are expected not to press for immediate set-
tlement of Ghana's short term debt to them.
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