Document Type: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
Release Decision: 
Original Classification: 
Document Page Count: 
Document Creation Date: 
December 16, 2016
Document Release Date: 
August 2, 2005
Sequence Number: 
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
March 18, 1966
Content Type: 
PDF icon CIA-RDP79T00826A000500010002-8.pdf205.28 KB
Approved For Release 2005/08/10 : CIA-RDP79T00826A000500010002-8 SECRET INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM FIDEL CASTRO SPEECH OF 13 MARCH DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE Office of Current Intelligence 18 March 1966 OCI No. 1161/66 Copy No. GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and doclasolficalion Approved For Release SOC(C1g.Efl RDP79T00826A000500010002-8 Approved For Release 2005/08/10 : CIA-RDP79T00826A000500010002-8 This Document contains information affecting the Na- tional Defense of the United States, within the mean- ing of Title 18, Sections 793 and 794, of the U.S. Code, as amended. Its transmission or revelation of its contents to or receipt by an unauthorized person is prohibited by law. The reproduction of this form is prohibited. Approved For Release 2005/08/10 : CIA-RDP79T00826A000500010002-8 Approved For Release 200,R'qP79T00826A000500010002-8 OCI No. 1161/66 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY Office of Current Intelligence 18 March 1966 INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM Fidel Castro Speech of 13 March Summary Fidel Castro's speech of 13 March at Havana Univer- sity reflected deep concern over domestic and foreign problems. The Cuban leader castigated the Chinese for their cavalier disregard of trade commitments with Ha- vana and implicitly accused the quarreling Russians and Chinese of exposing lesser Communist regimes to "imperial- ist" threats. Apparently less disposed than before to follow a policy of moderation and coexistence in the hemisphere, Castro attacked Chilean President Frei for the first time. Finally, in what appears to be fresh evidence of his regime's need for scapegoats for its economic shortcomings, Castro vowed a purge of "dilet- tantes and playboys." 1. In his speech of 13 March at Havana University, Fidel Castro hurled new insults at Peking and charged that the Chinese leaders, in their old age, have con- fused Marxism-Leninism with fascism. The attack was es- sentially a reiteration of Castro's earlier statements, and came exactly one year after his first criticism of China. He repeated most of his charges of 2 January against the Chinese for reducing rice shipments to Cuba, as well as his complaint of 6 February that Chinese representatives had distributed propaganda materials among high Cuban officials and had attempted to sub- vert Cuban officers. In directly criticizing the Chi- nese leadership, Castro was more contemptuous than heretofore, but it is not likely that he will sever relations with Peking at this time, or that the Chi- nese will be provoked into a complete break. Castro probably will confine himself to baiting the Chinese, perhaps by demanding a reduction in the 50-man embassy staff in Havana and by harassing other Chinese repre- sentatives in Cuba. k-7 -L.:d k__4 IV Approved For Release 2005/08/10 : CIA-RDP79T00826A000500010002-8 Approved For Release 2005/@8eAPT9T00826A000500010002-8 2. In calling for greater military aid to Viet- nam, Castro was less impassioned and more explicit than he has been in the past. He appeared to outline the extent of Cuba's willingness to help and may have intended to set the stage for delivery of token anti- aircraft or other defensive equipment to North Vietnam. He said: "It is not necessary to perform an offensive act. It is enough to give Vietnam all the conventional armament necessary for the antiaircraft struggle." Castro again implicitly criticized the Sino-Soviet rift for exposing "small and weak" countries, such as Cuba and Vietnam, to the threat of "imperialism." 3. For the first time, Castro denounced Presi- dent Eduardo Frei of Chile and his Christian Democratic Party, and said that in Chile "the only way to win the revolutionary struggle will be by the armed struggle." He denounced Frei as a coward, a liar, and a reaction- ary. In the past, Castro had hoped to break out of his diplomatic isolation in the hemisphere by encourag- ing better relations with Chile and hence excluded Chile from his diatribes against the "reactionaries and puppets" of Latin America. His belligerant criti- cism of Frei on 13 March, however, suggests that Castro is losing interest in coexistence and compromise in the hemisphere. The attack reflects the same militancy he displayed at the recent Tri-Continent Conference in Havana. 4. Castro's concern with Cuba's various internal problems was also a recurring theme. He discussed the economic hardships which "Chinese treachery" had brought upon Cuba's consumers and indicated that 1966 sugar production at best will barely exceed 5 million tons--l.5 million tons short of the objective. But Castro was most agitated and defensive about wide- spread rumors of increased opposition within his re- gime. He denied press reports that there had been student demonstrations at Havana Univbrsity two weeks ago in connection with the trial of Major Rolando Cubela. Castro appeared confident of his grip on power and said that Cubela would not be executed be- cause of the benevolence and confidence of the revolu- tion. 5. Castro announced that there will be a purge of "not more than fifty" -dilettantes and playboys in the Foreign and Foreign Trade ministries for their Approved For Release 20SECP79T00826A000500010002-8 Approved For Release 2005/08/10 : CnET 9T00826A000500010002-8 SECR excesses and pursuit of what he described as the "dolce vita." Since coming to power in 1959, Castro has persistently and puritanically endeavored to end the vice and corruption which were typical of some segments of Cuban society. In addition, for at least a year, Castro has sponsored young and pre- sumably more efficient technicians in high govern- ment posts and has removed many of his veteran col- leagues of the revolution. His purge of dilettantes appears to be an intensification of these policies and a result of his continuing need to find scape- goats for the regime's failures. 6. On 17 March, the Central Committee of the Cuban Communist Party announced that Major Efigenio Ameijeiras was the first to lose his party and mili- tary posts. Although Ameijeiras was a friend of Cubela, he did not figure in the trial proceedings, and his complete loyalty to Castro has never been questioned. He was one of the twelve who survived Castro's invasion of Cuba in 1956 and fought along- side him through the entire Sierra Maestra campaign. Ameijeiras frequently has been described as a drunk- ard, a marijuana user, and a reprobate. His dismissal therefore, is not related to larger political is- sues and is an outgrowth of Castro's clean-up cam- paign. 7. It is likely that only a f u E res will I" ncluded in the purge, ertain labor and military leaders will be ous e , but there are no indications that the regime will move concertedly against any one group. 25X1 Approved For Release 2457Q89J:'CA fTDP79T00826A000500010002-8 Approved For Release 200 d 1 jk-RDP79T00826A000500010002-8 SECRET Approved For Release 2005/08/10 : CIA-RDP79T00826A000500010002-8 25X1 Approved For Release 2005/08/10 : CIA-RDP79T00826A000500010002-8 Next 4 Page(s) In Document Exempt Approved For Release 2005/08/10 : CIA-RDP79T00826A000500010002-8