THE SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00826A000500010035-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 2, 2005
• Sequence Number: 35
• Publication Date: April 1, 1966
• Content Type: IM

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OCI No. 0030/66
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Office of Current Intelligence
1 April 1966
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
The Situation in South Vietnam
(As of 3:33 P,M, Est)
1. The political situation appears to be rapidly
worsening.to the point where the Ky government must
either take drastic action to try. to restore its
authority or agree to major concessions to its Buddhist
opponents. The seizure of the secretary-general of the
Directorate,. General Chieu, by antigovernment elements
in flue this morning has pointed up the almost total
lack of responsible authority in I corps, and protest
activity appears to be increasingly spreading into II
Corps and even into the delta.
2. Hue and Da Nang were outwardly quiet as evening
approached, but a.civil servants strike was underway
in Hue, and new protest activity was being promised in
both cities. Both the Hue and Da Nang radio stations
continue to broadcast anti-government and anti-American
propaganda, with Da Nang students declaring that their
ultimatum to US authorities had expired and thus
tendering the possibility of actions against US installa-
tions in the city. In II Corps, student demonstrators
today attempted to seize the Dalat radio station, Budd-
hists protested in Pieiku, and demonstrators in Qui
Nhon challenged the compatibility of US military bases
with Vietnamese sovereignty. Following earlier Catholic
statements of dissatisfaction with the government, the
Cao Dai political religious sect in the delta today
added its voice.
3. General Chieu, meanwhile, is now reported to
be staying in General Thi's residence in Hue, along
with Police Director Colonel Lieu. There is some
speculation that Chieu has been released by his struggle
forces' "captors," and may return to Saigon tomorrow.
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Chieu is now being hailed by the Hue students as a
"comrade--in-arms": after mnaking a public address on
the Hue radio station in which he praised the goals
of the "struggle movement." However, Chieu's remarks
were a carefully worded statement of the mutuality
of government and civilian goals while defending the
military's more cautious approach to introducing
representative government.
4. The increasing acts of defiance, however,
seem likely to force the Ky government to an imminent
decision as to whether to-move forcibly to re-assert
control, or to make further concessions in an effort
to end unrest. Ky's own inclination has long been
toward a tough stand, but he is aware of the possible
pitfalls of merely playing into the hands of his
Although Ky claims to
have some Buddhist and other religious. backing for
his current plans to set up a partially representative
constitutional drafting committee, Buddhist assurances
in the past have meant little, with partial concessions
often generating stiffer Buddhist demands. Moreover,
attempts to translate such agreements into practical
steps could merely lead to new frictions among rival
religious and political groups.
6. At this point, any diminishing of public
agitation other than by the imposition of force would
almost certainly require a decision by the Buddhist
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leadership that it stood to benefit from further
efforts to reach a compromise with the government.
The more moderate Buddhist faction of Tam Chau in
Saigon has offered some hope in this direction, but
the key figure in the current agitation is Tri Quang,
who may well succeed, as in the past, in dragging
Chau with him? Quang's intentions are still not
clear; he may be determined to topple the government,
or he may be content, as he maintains privately, with
measures which will assure a more orderly, but rapid,
return to civilian rule. He probably could exert
sufficient influence to quiet the situation in I
Corps, but he may now be too deeply committed to
retreat.
7. What now seems evident is that, regardless
of whether Ky attempts and succeeds in the use of
forceful measures to restore order or yields to
Buddhist pressure, the position of the present govern-
ment will be weakened by recent events.. Ky today
reportedly told a crowd in the delta that. he was
declaring all further demonstrations illegal and
would use force to prevent agitation. He also held
out the threat of resigning if he did not succeed.
This threat may not be an idle one, but even if Ky
yielded to another general as premier, the opposition
to the present regime would probably not diminish
while Chief of State Thieu and Deputy Premier Co
remain key members of the Directorate.
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