THE SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00826A000500010052-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 27
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 4, 2007
• Sequence Number: 52
• Publication Date: April 6, 1966
• Content Type: REPORT

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SECRET
OCI No. 0368/66
~?
Copy No.
THE SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM
6 April 1966
INTELLIGENCE AND REPORTING SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE INTERAGENCY
VIETNAM COORDINATING COMMITTEE
DIA review(s)
completed.
USAID review SECRET
completed GROUP I
State Dept. review Excluded from o omatic
completed downgrading and declassification
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WEEKLY REPORT
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THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECT-
ING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES
WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS,
TITLE 18, USC, SECTIONS 793 AND 794, THE TRANSMIS-
SION OR REVELATION OF WHICH IN ANY MANNER TO
AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.
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L t.IUK_n1 Aftwo
OCI No. 0368/66
Published by the Directorate of Intelligence
Central Intelligence Agency
THE SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM
(31 March - 6 April. 1960)
THE WEEK IN PERSPECTIVE
Map, South Vietnam, facing page
1. THE SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM.
A. POLITICAL SITUATION
The political situation is fluid
enough to be solved or simmer on
(p. 1); Da Nang and Hue have been
focal points (p. 1); Saigon demon-
strations kept under control (p. 1);
Saigon government trying carrot-and-
stick tactics for a solution (p. 1);
Political convention promised (p. 1);
Ky delays con.fron.tation in Da Nang
(p. 2); Airlift of tanks planned (p. 2);
Hue 1st Division commander's loyalty
questionable (p. 2); Buddhists and
northerners absent from preliminary ses-
sions of planned political convention
(p. 2); Buddhist monk Tri Quang has
reiterated his position on a political
solution and has claimed responsibility
for the antigovernment movement in I
Corps (p. 3); The Buddhist antigovern-
ment campaign lends itself to possible
Viet Cong exploitation (p. 3); Saigon's
ruling.generals have varying ideas for
ending the political crisis (p. 4).
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Page
Communist activity continued at high level
with terrorism attributable to attempts
to intimidate the populace, (p. 7);
Weekly statistics (p. 7); Friendly
large-unit actions increase (p. 7);
Notable allied successes in I, II, and
III Corps (p. 8); Air strike results
noted (p. 8); Viet Cong most active in
I Corps (p. 9); Concentrated VC efforts
expected in 11 Corps (p.10); Terrorism
increase in IV Corps (p. 11); Status of
transportation routes (p.11).
Map, Transportation Routes, facing page 11
Population apathetic to military-clerical
struggle (p. 12); An Giang Province now
is National Priority area with new chief
(p., 12); Development funds being spent
faster this year (p. 12); Favorable Chieu
Hoi returnee figures noted (p. 13); VC
fail, to intimidate refugees (p. 13)?
Map, North Vietnam, facing page 14
Liberation Front and North Vietnamese
delegations to Soviet congress echo Com-
munist determination but emphasize middle-
of-the-road position in Sino-Soviet dis-
pute. (p. 14).
GVN economy and finance minister in
Seoul for trade talks (p. 15); Foreign.
Minister Do's press conference plays up
Hanoi?s Trojan. Horse policy (p. 15);
West Germany pledges hospital ship
(p. 15); ROK JCS chairman discusses
sending 20,000 troops (p. 15).
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ANNEX: South Vietnam Battle Statistics--Personnel
Losses (Weekly)
South Vietnam Battle Statistics--Incidents
and Attacks (Weekly)
(The Weekly Report on the Situation in South Vietnam is
based on contributions from CIA, DIA, and INR; it is
edited and published by CIA without final coordination.)
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THE WEEK IN PERSPECTIVE
The political situation in South Vietnam has con-
tinued to deteriorate, particularly in I Corps, but also
through the spread of demonstrations in II Corps and
in Saigon itself. The Ky government is still trying to
resolve the problem with action on two fronts, includ-
ing possible imminent use of force to reassert its
authority in Da Nang and steps to move ahead on its
plans for a constitutional council in Saigon. The crisis
could be approaching a climax but may well simmer on
for some time.
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SOUTH VIETNAM
CURRENT SITUATION
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1. The political situation has continued to de-
teriorate, particularly in I Corps, but is still suf-
ficiently fluid that it could either move toward a
final. showdown, or continue to simmer on for some time.
2. During the past week, demonstrations continued
in various towns of I Corps, with the main focus on
Hue and Da Nang, and with increasing evidence of par-
ticipation by local police, army troops, and civil
servants. Protest activity has spread increasingly
in the provincial capitals in II Corps, with disorders
reported in Pleiku, Nha Trang--now under martial law,
and Dalat--still in a state of tension despite the
dispatch of combat police units.
3. In Saigon itself, demonstrations led by Bud-
dhist youths have occurred almost daily this week,
although police and airborne troops have kept the
situation under control. On several occasions, how-
ever, tear gas and other riot techniques have been
required to disperse unruly groups of demonstrators.
4. The character of the protest activity has
shifted almost entirely to denunciations of the gov-
ernment in Saigon and of the US for alleged "political
interference." On one occasion in Saigon, demonstra-
tors reportedly were heard shouting slogans favoring
Ho Chi Minh, and simultaneously attacking the moder-
ate wing of the Buddhist hierarchy.
5. After leaving most of the burden of handling
the protest campaign to local authorities such as the
extremely passive officials in I Corps, the military
government in Saigon now is trying to curb the unrest
with a combination of carrot-and-stick tactics. This
dual policy was spelled out by the -top generals at a
press conference on 3 April, following a convocation
of the Armed Forces Congress, or supreme governing
authority in the country. A communique on the con-
gress' decisions announced that a national political
convention., representing various political and re-
ligious views, would be held to hammer out a plan. for
transitional steps to civilian rule. At the same time,
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it was announced that "strong measures" would be
used to restore order in the country, with Premier
Ky making it clear, under questioning, that troops
would be sent to "retake" Da Nang from "Communist
hands." In a third step, Vietnamese officials acted
to defend the US from charges of interference and
"colonialism."
6. On 4 April, Ky began the airlift of three
Vietnamese Marine battalions to Da Nang air base in
apparent preparation for a move on the city. Ky
himself flew to the base to take charge of the oper-
ation, but after conferences with I Corps commander
General Chuan, put off any immediate move, and is-
sued a public statement partially retracting his
earlier charge that Da Nang was under Communist con-
trol. Although details of the Ky-Chuan talks are not
available, Chuan has indicated publicly that he
warned Ky of possible armed conflicts between the
marines and I Corps units which he had brought in
to defend Da Nang.
7. Although Ky returned to Saigon on 5 April,
he apparently has not abandoned his determination
on a show of force at Da Nang, whose mayor he has
accused of fomenting agitation and of allowing Com-
munists into the "struggle" movement leadership. Ky
has arranged for the airlift to Da Nang airfield of
tanks which would accompany marine elements on. a
move to seize key points in the city such as the
municipal offices, police headquarters, and the
radio station. Military Security Service chief
Colonel Loan, Ky's former air force deputy, is re-
portedly charged at present with conducting the op-
eration, but the timing is still in doubt.
8. Of the two South Vietnamese Army divisions
normally based in I Corps the 2nd Division, head-
quartered at Quang Ngai city, is regarded by Sai-
gon officials as loyal. The new lst Division com-
mander at Hue, General Nhuan, is an ardent Buddhist,
whose troops have been active in antigovernment
demonstrations. Nhuan, soon after marine units be-
gan arriving at Da Nang air base, openly declared
his sympathy for the "struggle" movement, vowing to
defend Hue not only against the Viet Cong but against
a Saigon "takeover." He also attempted to send some
units to help defend Da Nang against Ky's marines.
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Since Ky's retraction of his charges of Communist
control in Da Nang, however, Nhuan has been pri-
vately declaring his quarrel with Saigon over, de-
ploring a US decision to withdraw US advisers from
the 1st Division's tactical units, and promising to
send troops now in. Hue back to their operational
base. The ultimate loyalties of I Corps commander
Chuan are still questionable, but it is clear that
he has strong reservations against an operation im-
posing government control in Da Nang by force.
9. While the use of government troops against
I Corps continues to be imminent, the government is
simultaneously proceeding to press forward on a po-
litical solution in Saigon. On 6 April, preliminary
sessions of the projected national political conven-
tion were begun. These followed several days of in-
tensive private government communications with leaders
of the Buddhist hierarchy, hinting at concessions in
an effort to get Buddhist leaders to tone down agita-
tion before force is required. Although the Buddhists
indicate some willingness to continue a dialogue to-
ward political compromise, their position has shown
little real give. Buddhist Institute chairman Thich
Tam Chau previously counseled patience to give the
government time to meet its "promises," but on 5
April he told a crowd in Saigon that the national
political convention was actually a step backward by
Ky, and that the Buddhists were demanding an elected
constituent assembly within three months. Buddhist
leaders have boycotted the preliminary session of the
national convention, as apparently, have representa-
tives of both I and II Corps.
the full political con.ven.tion, pre-
sumably still without Buddhist and northern partici-
pants, will meet early next week and set up a con-
stitution. drafting body essentially as last envisaged
by the ruling Directorate. This plan involves a
council, with one-half of its membership drawn from
the provincial and municipal councils elected in
1965, and one-half appointed from among leading po-
litical and religious factions. This formula has
already been declared unsatisfactory by the Buddhists.
11. A conversation of Buddhist monk Tri Quang
with an American observer on 6 April elicited a
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repetition of Quang's position that a political solu-
tion, requires either a "constituent assembly" com-
posed entirely of members from the local councils,
or an assembly to be elected in three months. This
assembly would be empowered to confirm the present
government leadership--Chief of State Thieu and Pre-
mier Ky--in office, thus obviating the need for the
military Directorate, as well as to draft a consti-
tution and electoral laws. This would lead to a
truly representative government, responsive to the
assembly as a legislature. Quang insisted that the
Buddhists had not set out to "overthrow," but rather
to "strengthen," the present government, but he im-
plied that Ky would be "finished" if he used force
against central Vietnam. Quang stated that he was
responsible for the antigovernment movement in I
Corps, and implied that, despite the movement's
anti-American overtones, he fully recognized Viet-
nam's need for US support.
12. There has been no question of the influence
of Tri Quang and the Buddhist organization in the
present antigovernment campaign. Although allega-
tions of Viet Cong influence on or direction of
Quang and other members of the Buddhist hierarchy
have long been made, they cannot presently be sub-'
stantiated. There is an obvious parallel between
the propaganda, tactics, and organizational struc-
ture of the present "struggle movement"--a multitude
of "struggle committees" representing various eco-
nomic and social strata among the populace--and
those of the Communists. Low-level Vietnamese se-
curity penetrations have reported considerable evi-
dence of Viet Cong penetration particularly in Da
Nang, of the "struggle committees," which draw
heavily on key Communist target groups such as
students, workers, and Buddhists. Whether or not
the Buddhists are witting, or merely feel that they
can use and contain Communist influence, their anti-
government campaign obviously lends itself to pos-
sible Viet Cong exploitation.
13. There continue to be signs of strain among
Saigon's ruling generals over the proper means of
dealing with the present crisis. Premier Ky is
taking a somewhat ambiguous position, of alternately
advocating both a tougher line and greater concessions
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than are deemed wise by some of his colleagues.
Directorate Secretary-General Chieu, who was
temporarily "seized" by antigovernment elements in
Hue while on a mission to try to bring ousted I
Corps commander Thi back to Saigon, feels he is now
under some suspicion by the Saigon junta. Chieu
tends to advocate a moderate course; he apparently
now feels that Thi is the only general with the po-
tential to bring I Corps back into the fold, provided
he is not driven into open collaboration with-'the
"struggle groups." Defense Minister Co, normally
hostile to Buddhist aspirations, is now in Da Nang,
where, although reported to be a
hostage of antigovernment elements, he is publicly
proclaiming that he is working out a political solu-
tion.
Economic Situation
14. At a press conference on 30 March, Minister
of Economy Au Truong Thanh emphasized the GVN's duty
to combat inflation and announced tax measures calcu-
lated to yield about one billion piasters in addi-
tional revenue per year. Strict collection of the
automobile tax and the tax on excessive rents is
expected to yield 600-700 million piasters. The
conversion of the tax on restaurants and bars from
a percentage of the proceeds to a flat assessment is
expected to yield an estimated 400 million piasters.
Thanh left open the possibility of additional taxes
within the next two months. He also stated that
commodity prices (particularly pork and cement) had
leveled off during March, except condensed milk
prices which were risirg because of supply shortages.
Thanh felt that strikes at the port of Da Nang
threatened to increase the cost of living in that
area, but the congested port conditions in Saigon.
would improve during the next three months because
of US assistance in customs and clearance procedures.
15. Embassy Saigon believes that Thanh's tax
measures will produce less than one million piasters
in additional revenue and that, in any event, they
will fall far short of the four billion piasters in
taxes agreed on at Honolulu. Our embassy also
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believes that Thanh is overly optimistic about the
stability of commodity prices. The comparative
price stability of the past few weeks is largely
the result of the caution and restraint by the
business community, because of the anxiety and un-
certainty generated by GVN economic policies. Con-
trary to Thanh's statement, condensed milk prices
have fallen because of the arrival of PL 480 sup-
plies.
16. Governor Hanh of the National Bank told
embassy officers on 1 April that the political crisis
had exacerbated the economic slowdown which was
originally precipitated by the execution of the Chi-
nese businessman, low official prices for importers,
and police pressures on the business community. He
confirmed, however, that the police presently have
stopped checking the books of importers. Moreover,
although Hanh was originally in favor of an import
deposit system, he now feels that such a system
would cause many importers to back away from import-
ing. He feels that the GVN should do everything pos-
sible to encourage importers rather than place addi-
tional burdens on them. He favors an increase in
official prices to permit importers to make a reason-
able legal. profit, even though he realizes that
official prices cannot be raised for political
reasons. Embassy Saigon comments that, while
almost everyone agrees on the desirability of raising
official prices, nobody is willing to initiate such
action in view of the present state of political flux.
17. According to the USAID Index, retail prices
in Saigon for the week ending 28 March were one per-
cent above a month ago. The increase in rice prices,
following the announcement by the GVN of a high pur-
chase price for rice, was the primary factor.
18. In the Saigon free market, the prices of $10
bills and $10 MPC (scrip) rose by one piaster each
to 166 and 115 per dollar respectively, Gold prices
fell from 246 piasters per dollar to 242, thus re-
versing the trend of the previous two weeks. In
Hong Kong, the piaster dollar cross rate, after re-
maining at 159 for six weeks, fell to 155.
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1. The over-all level of Communist-initiated
activity continued high for the week ending 2 April.
2. During the period there were 905 Communist-
initiated incidents compared to the previous week's
1,064. There were eight attacks, of which one was
large-scale, and 651 acts of terrorism, compared to
the previously reported 15 and 671. The continued
high rate of terrorism can be attributed to increased
attempts to intimidate the population and stem anti-
Viet Cong sentiment. Reports received indicate that
the people blame the Viet Cong for the injuries sus-
tained from increased allied artillery and air at-
tacks. The kill ratio favored Free World forces 4.0
to 1, down from the preceding week's 4.2 to 1. A
fifty-percent decrease was registered in Viet Cong
casualties with 962 killed and 72 captured reported.
Vietnamese casualties for the period were 155 killed,
337 wounded and 26 missing or captured--a total of
518 compared to the last period's 996. United States
losses for the week were 101 killed, 690 wounded and
12 missing--a total of 803 compared to the last re-
port of 726. Free World forces' losses decreased
from 86 to 69. The South Vietnamese lost 104 weap-
ons (two crew-served) and captured 255 (eight crew-
served.
KIA
WIA
MIA/ TOT
CAPTURED CASUA
AL
LTIES
US
101
690
12 80
3
ARVN
155
337
26 51
8
THIRD COUNTRY
18
51
0 6
9
VIET CONG
962
---
73 1,03
5
GVN/Allied Activities
3. Friendly large-unit operations again increased
with 108 recorded. Small-unit actions decreased while
enemy contacts remained about the same.
4. In I Corps, Army of Vietnam (ARVN) units and
elements of the 3d Marine Amphibious Force reacted to
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a Viet Cong attack in Quang Ngai Province on 28 March
with Operation INDIANA/QUYET THANG 72. During the
operation, which terminated on 30 March, the marines
lost 11 killed and 45 wounded while inflicting losses
of 69 killed, six captured, and 19 individual weapons
on the Viet Cong. In Quang Nam Province, US Marines
terminated Operation. KINGS on. 28 March. US losses
in the eight-day operation were five killed and 46
wounded while Viet Cong losses were 59 killed, one
captured, and 14 individual weapons. The 1st ARVN
Division conducted Operation LAM SON 250 in Quang
Tri Province from 27 to 30 March, during which a
significant engagement took place with the Viet Cong
804th Main Force Battalion. Final results were 35
friendly killed and 80 wounded; Viet Cong losses were
58 killed, six captured and 25 individual weapons.
5. In II Corps, elements of the US lst Cavalry
Division participating in Operation LINCOLN in Pleiku
Province encountered heavy resistance on 30 March.
Cumulative results to date are 33 US killed, 83 US
wounded, five missing, and three UH1D Iroquois heli-
copters destroyed. Viet Cong losses are 373 killed,
seven captured, plus 79 individual and six crew-
served weapons. The forces involved in US/RO.K Oper-
ation FILLMORE have had a series of minor clashes
with the Viet Cong. Cumulative results from the
continuing search-and-destroy operation are six US
killed and 37 wounded (33 US, 4 ROK). Friendly
forces have inflicted losses on the Viet Cong of
115 killed, 26 captured and 26 individual weapons.
The final results of Operation MANG HO V, terminated
by the Capital ROK Division in Binh Dinh Province
on 26 March, were 1.7 friendly killed and 48 wounded,
while Viet Cong losses were 349 killed, 281 captured
plus 27 individual and two crew-served weapons.
Three operations conducted by ARVN forces (two in
Binh Dinh Province, one in Kontum Province) resulted
in total friendly losses of 38 killed, 64 wounded,
and Viet Cong losses of 200 killed and five indi-
vidual weapons.
6, In III Corps, elements of the US 25th In-
fantry Division conducting Operation CIRCLE PINES
south of Cu Chi, Hau Nghia Province, have killed
149 Viet Cong, captured five and also 13 individual
weapons and one crew-served weapon. Friendly forces
have lost 32 killed and 195 wounded.
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7. There were no operations of significance in
IV Corps during the week.
8. Free World forces conducted 108 battalion or
larger-size operations during the week; 46 achieved
contact--32 ARVN, 10 US, two ROK, and two combined.
There were 19,177 small-unit operations, including
3,309 conducted by US forces. Of the 133 achieving
contact, 79 were conducted by US units.
9. There were fourteen B-52 Stratofortress mis-
sions flown over South Vietnam during the week ending
3 April with ground follow-up action scheduled for
only one of these missions. Post-strike photography
reports on FINE SAND IV shows 73 craters inside the
impact area and 27 outside.
three mid-February strikes in Tay Ninn
Province, NET TON I, II, and III, resulted in 75 to
145 Viet Cong personnel killed or wounded. In the
same area a radio station reportedly was partially
destroyed, a large number of barracks, several
liaison stations, and the headquarters of the Viet
Cong provincial commander were destroyed. During
the period 25-31 March a total of 3,231 tactical
air strikes and armed reconnaissance sorties were
flown by the combined efforts of the US Navy, Air
Force, Marine and VNAF aircraft.
10. In addition to close air support, direct
air support and interdiction missions in support of
ground operations, pilots reported the following dam-
age was inflicted: 3,072 structures, 90 sampans, 29
bunkers were destroyed; 2,114 structures, 37 sampans,
seven. bunkers and three AW sites were damaged. In
addition, there were four roads cratered, 14 caves
and 22 foxholes collapsed and 41 secondary explo-
sions were observed. A Marine F8E Crusader crashed
after a bombing run south of Da Nang from an. unknown.
cause; the pilot is listed as missing. A Navy A4E
Skyhawk pilot was rescued after he ejected from his
aircraft when it had a flame-out. An. Air Force F-100
Supersabre was shot down by enemy ground fire south-
west of Saigon. The pilot was rescued.
Communist Activity
11. The highest incident rate for South Vietnam
during the week occurred in. I Corps, with 286 reported.
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ar(ai ill *40
On. 28 March, an. un.iden.tified Viet Con.g battalion.-
size force attacked the positions of the 3d Battalion,
5th ARVN Regiment in Quang Ngai Province. Friendly
forces lost three killed and 21 wounded. The Viet
Cong lost 70 killed and eleven weapons. The district
towns of Trieu Phong, Quan.g Tri Province, and Phu Loc,
Thua Thien. Province, were mortared by the Viet Cong.
Special Forces units report that an. unidentified
1,800-man. regiment armed with antiaircraft weapons and
120-mm. mortars has infiltrated into Quan.g Tri Prov-
ince. It has also been. reported that the 118th PAVN
Battalion (estimated strength 400) is located in the
province area. This battalion, could be part of the
unidentified regiment. The presence of these units
and others previously reported could cause a serious
threat to the Khe Sanh Special Forces camp, the Ba
Long Valley outpost, as well as other district towns
and friendly units in the two northern provinces.
Reported Viet Cong unit movements in other provinces
indicate the possibility that five enemy regiments
now may be in Quan.g Ngai Province.
12. Viet Cong activity decreased in. II Corps dur-
ing the week. Despite decreased activity, indica-
tions are that concentrated efforts will be made
against friendly installations in, the area. Likely
targets for future attacks are the district towns
of Plei Me, Duc Co, and Le Thanh in Pleiku Province.
A captured Viet Cong document identified the 3d
Battalion., 101st PAVN Regiment in. Quang Duc Province.
This is the first report since October 1965 of ele-
ments of this regiment in Quang Duc Province.
13. An, estimated two-company Viet Con.g force at-
tacked Xuan Loc, Long Khanh Province in. III Corps.
The headquarters of the 10th ARVN Regiment, the
province capital and the Xuan. Loc Airfield received
75-mm. recoilless rifle, 81--mm. mortar, and small-
arms fire during the attack. On 28 March, the 3d
Brigade, US 1st Infantry Division at Lai Khe, Binh
Duon.g Province, received 10 rounds of mortar fire
later identified as 4.2
inch. This is the.first confirmed in:stanc.e Of the Viet
Con.g employing 4.2 inch mortars in III Corps. The
Viet Cong captured two 4.2 inch mortars in. Quan.g
Ngai Province in October 1964 and two in Dinh Prov-
ince in. December 1964. In, the Capital Military
SEG`E.ET
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CURRENT OPERATIONAL STATUS OF MAJOR TRANSPORTATION ROUTES AND COASTAL RAILROAD
1--~-i- Section of operable railroad
Section of inoperable road
Note: Routes are inoperable primarily
because of Viet Cong sabotage/
interdiction efforts.
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 Approved For Release 2007/09/04: CIA-RDP79T00826A000500010052-3
Region, Viet Cong terrorists attacked the Victoria
Bachelor Officers' Quarters in. Saigon. The terror-
ists drove an explosive-laden. truck to within 15
feet of the entrance, killed the guards and deto-
nated the explosives. The explosion caused six
deaths (3 US, 3 VN) and 116 wounded (107 US, 3 AUS,
6 VN). The lower three floors of the structure
were heavily damaged while the remaining floors
and an, adjacent building sustained moderate damage.
It is believed that one Viet Con.g was killed in
the attack. Two suspects have been detained..
14. Acts of terror increased in IV Corps during
the week with 234 reported. This increase can be
attributed to stepped-up tax collection efforts by
the Viet Cong. As a result of attacks by Viet Con.g
forces of unidentified size on, two posts in. Bac
Lieu and Kien. Phon.g provinces, ARVN forces suffered
losses of 12 killed, 20 wounded, 17 missing, and
43 weapons. The Viet Con.g lost two killed and one
weapon.
15. National Route 1 is closed -south of Mo Duc
in. Quang Ngai Province; and in. Binh Dinh, Phu Yen,
Khanh Hoa, Ninh Thuan, Binh Thuan, Binh Tuy, and
Long Khanh provinces. Route 14 is closed north of
Dak To in Kontum Province; in Pleiku Province south
of Pleiku City; and in Darlac, Quang Duc, Phuoc Long,
and Binh Long provinces. Route 9 is closed in Quang
Tri Province. Route 4 is closed in Vinh Long Prov-
ince.
16. The National Railroad is operating between
Saigon and Xuan Loc, Long Khanh Province; between
Ca Na, Ninh Thuan Province and Ninh Hoa, Khanh Hoa
Province; between Dalat in Tuyen Duc Province and
Phan Rang, Ninh Thuan Province.
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C. REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT
1. In the opinion of US Mission officials approx-
imately 90 percent of the population is not involved
with and is not sympathetic toward the political power
struggle between the ruling military elite and the in-
fluential clerical elite. This apathy toward the civil-
ian-military struggle movement is the result of the
popular view that the parties, with which the individual
Vietnamese does not identify, are dealing with an issue,
civilian constitutionalism, which is too abstract for
him to perceive. Even thought the struggle has been
cast in the name of the people and their right to self-
determination, the populace has been inculcated with
"attentisme" (a wait-and-see attitude) for too many
centuries to identify actively with the major pressure
groups.
2. An objective of the revolutionary development
program is to gradually involve accessible portions of
this 90 percent of the population with the government's
programs so that the individual can perceive the issues
and rationally support a government which is acting on
its behalf. Nearly three million of the country's 16
million people live in urban, GVN-controlled areas,
which means that approximately 80 percent of the popula-
tion is rural. About 85 percent of the population is
engaged in agriculture as a means of living.
3. In February, the chiefs of An Giang and Chau
Doc provinces were replaced. Both provinces are heavily
influenced by the Hoa Hao religious sect. The changes
thwarted moves to extend this influence in the delta.
The An Giang Province chief, Colonel Tran Van Tuoi, who
had successfully led the effort to make the province
the most secure in the country, has not been reassigned.
Former Chau Doc Province chief, Colonel Ly Ba Pham, who
is a Hoa Hao, will run An Giang. It is now a National
Priority Area for Revolutionary Development and receives
the largest provincial budget. Colonel Pham reportedly
will continue the emphasis on construction and develop-
ment but will be less solicitous of the all Hoa Hao
provincial council which is irritated by Pham's decision
to exclude it from participation in the province's rev-
olutionary program.
4. Provincial requests for revolutionary develop-
ment funds are being rapidly approved and the level of
c L- (;RE 1,
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expenditures is running approximately one million
Vietnamese piasters (US $10,000) per day more than
that expended during the comparable period in 1965.
Instructor training at the National Cadre Center
in Vung Tau has met with a setback. Only 70.of the
necessary 150 specialist instructors (for Civil Af-
fairs, Census-Grievance, and New Life Development)
have been obtained for training. The lack of quali-
fied instructors will have its greatest effect on
the second class of trainees scheduled to begin at
mid-year. This class is intended to provide for
3,200 specialist cadre.
5. Returnees (Chieu Hoi). With 27 of 43
provinces reporting, 323 returnees presented them-
selves to Chieu Hoi centers during the week which
began on 19 March. In toto, 1,724 military and
political Viet Cong have rallied during the first
25 days of March. The figure is approximately com-
parable to the record February period.
6. Refugees. On 26 March, a Viet Cong platoon
entered a reTugee camp in Quang Ngai Province and
harangued the 1,655 inhabitants to return to their
native villages. When the refugees refused, the
Viet Cong tried to destroy the 150 houses there.
Four hundred of the villagers whose houses were
destroyed fled to the district headquarters, where
they were supplied with emergency rations and were
promised help to rebuild their homes.
SECRET
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CHINA
~? X%.ong Van
.1`?? 1 1
Bao Lac? x...1??1 ..ti.
-.i ~..
?~ Ban Chieng
T H A I L A N D ~?
NORTH VIETNAM
25 50 75 Miles
25 50 75 Kilometers
--s
Bq Ho Su
.,-,DEMARCATION LINE
Dong Ha
? ?Quang Tri
SOUTH
Hue
? w ` VIETNAM
Muong Nong""'-.
Phu Ly0
Nam Dinh
Ninh Binh.''
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 Approved For Release 2007/09/04: CIA-RDP79T00826A000500010052-3
II. DEVELOPMENTS IN THE BLOC
1. Speeches by the heads of the North Viet-
namese and Liberation Front delegations at the
Soviet party congress this week reflected the Viet-
namese Communist efforts to maintain their middle
position in the Sino-Soviet dispute.
2. North Vietnamese party First Secretary Le
Duan's speech to the Congress appeared to be a clear-
cut reaffirmation of basic North Vietnamese policy--
to push ahead with the war in Vietnam and to garner
support from both the Soviet and Chinese Communist
camps. Le Duan devoted much of his speech to the
war in Vietnam, stressing Hanoi's determination to
pursue the war, expressing gratitude for the past
help of all Communists, and urging even more aid for
Hanoi. His expressions of gratitude to the Soviet
Union will undoubtedly sit poorly with Peking, as
will his praise of the Soviets as "the reliable
bulwark of exploited peoples throughout the world
in the struggle against the forces of international
reaction." Peking is unlikely, however, to view Le
Duan's performance at the Moscow conference as cause
to change its basic policy of support for Hanoi in
the war.
3. The Le Duan speech was undoubtedly intended
to make it clear that Hanoi has refused to follow
Peking down the path toward a complete break with
Moscow. On balance, the speech was a tactical victory
for Moscow over the Chinese, but the Soviet leader-
ship was made aware once again that Hanoi's willing-
ness at present to give Moscow its due is based mainly
on its need for continued Soviet aid in the war. Le
Duan emphasized that Hanoi continues to believe, as
does Peking, that the war can and should be pushed
to eventual victory despite the threat of larger US
intervention in the conflict.
4. The speech of the South Vietnam Liberation
Front delegate, Madame Nguyen Thi Binh, offered the
themes of Communist determination to carry on the war,
and gratitude for Soviet aid as expressed by Le Duan.
She summed up the Front's adamant stand on the subject
of a political settlement of the war by insisting that
the US must withdraw from South Vietnam, recognize the
Front, and "recognize the fundamental rights of the
South Vietnamese people as defined by the Geneve agree-
ments."
SE CRET
J
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1. On 2 April, according to Seoul press reports,
South Vietnamese Minister of Economy and Finance Au
Truong Thanh arrived in Seoul for a four-day visit to
discuss trade matters between the two countries.
1. During an interview to Vietnam Press on
1 April regarding the current Laos situation, GVN
Foreign Minister Tran Van Do stated that the presence
of North Vietnamese troops in Laos constituted an
obvious case of massive aggression as well as a
constant threat to the peaceful solution of the Viet-
nam problem. Do added that Laotian developments
showed that Hanoi regarded the concept of a coali-
tion government as nothing more than a Trojan Horse
device of obtaining power through ostensibly legal
means.
1. West Germany. A twelve-member German delega-
tion headed By Kmbassador-at-large Schmidt-Horix
visited Saigon from 17 to 30 March to discuss with
the GVN and the US mission plans for major increases
in German aid to Vietnam. The delegation signed an
agreement with the GVN to station the 3,000-ton
hospital ship Helgoland in Saigon harbor. (The ship
is expected to arrive in late June.) The West German
group also reviewed a number of other specific German
aid projects and considered ways to expedite them.
2. Republic of Korea. General Chang-kuk, chair-
man of the ROK Joint Chiefs of Staff, flew to Saigon
OD, 5 April for a ten-day visit to discuss the des-
patch of an additional 20,000 ROK troops to South
Vietnam. Although the opposition parties have re-
cently reiterated their opposition to more troops
because of the current political crisis in Vietnam,
the minister of national defense told the National
Assembly that the troops will go as scheduled.
XNEGRE'T
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SOUTH VIETNAM BALE STATISTICS
WEEKLY REPORT 26 MARCH--2 APRIL 1966
Viet Cong Incidents
Viet Cong Attacks
Weapons Losses
Atta
cks
EE
e Te
rro
rism
Sa
bota
ge
Prop
aga
nda
Antiaircraft Fire
is
2 9
.11
-07
M
AR
AP
R
M
AY
JU
NE
J
ULY
A
UG
SE
PT OCT
NO
V
DE
C JAN FE:: MAR
Company and battalion sized attacks
---- Battalion sized (and larger) attacks only
Government
Viet Cong
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IililIrli11I
MAY I JUNE I JULY
I I`r?1 I I 711
AUG I SEPT OCT
f 1 I
NOV DEC I JAN i FEB MAR
NOV I DEC I JAN I FEB MAR I
255
104
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SOUTH VIETNAM BATTLE STATISTICS
WEEKLY REPORT 26 MARCH 1966- 2 APRIL 1966
( IIIIIIp(III111I1!Ji!I
1 l l I i i i"l l T ~ F I B l- ~ l-
GVN /US/other Free World ! ! 3
Viet Cong/PAVN
hEt`M I US onl a! i ~ ~ J l_~ I
Total Personnel Losses
(Killed in Action, Captured or Missing in Action, excluding Wounded in Action)
255
1365
1243
2863
1524
6110
7093
14,727
12
136
41
189
UNE I JULY I AUG I SEPT I OCT 1 NOV I DEC 1 JAN I FEB TMAR
Total Friendly Forces Personnel Losses
(US/GVN/Other Free World)
Killed in action Missing or Captured in action Wounded in action
US Combat Casualties in Vietnam
(including North Vietnam)
Cumulative, 1961-1964
Cumulative, 1965
Cumulative, 1966 to date
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swl VOW
SECRET
SECRET
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