THE SITUATION IN VIETNAM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00826A000500010055-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 13, 2006
• Sequence Number: 55
• Publication Date: April 7, 1966
• Content Type: MEMO

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7 April 1966
HIGHLIGHTS
Buddhists and the government claim agreement
"in principle" on a future government for South
Vietnam, but they apparently differ fundamentally
on the composition of a representative assembly.
Despite a Buddhist Institute call for a temporary
halting of violence, disturbances continued in Sai-
gon and there were reports of Catholic plans for
anti-Buddhist actions.
I. The Military Situation in South Vietnam:
US and South Vietnamese marines have terminated
amphibious assault/search-and-destroy Operation
JACK STAY after 13 days in the Rung Sat Special
Zone, southeast of Saigon (Para. 1). US 1st Air
Cavalry Division forces are continuing Operation
LINCOLN in southern Pleiku and northern Darlac
provinces, but without significant contact (Para.
2). B-52 Stratofortresses yesterday attacked Viet
Cong target complexes in Phuoc Tuy and Tay Ninh
provinces (Para. 3). Prisoner reports indicate
personnel from both PAVN and VC units are used
in South Vietnam as integrated units (Para. 5).
II. Political Developments in South Vietnam:
Buddhist Institute chairman Tam Chau has restated
demands for a popularly elected assembly (Para.
1). A Buddhist Institute communiqud called for
a temporary halting of all "struggle," but dis-
turbances were continuing in Saigon (Paras. 2-4).
Da Nang is calm, although the situation remains
fluid (Para. 5). General Khang has provided evi-
dence of strains within the ruling military Di-
rectorate (Para. 6). Northern refugee Catholics
may be planning massive anti-Buddhist demonstra-
tions in Saigon (Para. 7).
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IV. Other Communist Military Developments:
There is nothing o significance to report.
V. Communist Political Developments: In an
editorial in the pa rty Eeoretica journal Hanoi
has reaffirmed its opposition to any negotiations
other than on the terms of its own "four point"
proposal (Para. 1). This reaffirmation may in
part have been directed to Peking as evidence of
Hanoi's determination to carry on the war and to
the Liberation Front to shore up morale in the
face of further US troop commitments (Para. 2).
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1. THE MILITARY SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM
1. US and South Vietnamese Marines have terminated
Operation JACK STAY after 13 days in the Rung Sat Spe-
cial Zone, 28 miles southeast of Saigon. The amphibious
assault./ground sweep, initiated on 25 March by one USMC
battalion landing team (BLT) near the mouth of the ai-
gon River to locate and destroy Viet Cong forces harass-
ing vessels transiting the main shipping channel to Sai-
gon, resulted in Communist losses of 63 killed and num-
erous village facilities and fortifications destroyed.
American casualties included five killed, 31 wounded,
and two missing. A Vietnamese Marine battalion subse-
quently committed to the operation sustained no losses.
A total of 189 tactical air. strikes were flown in sup-
port of JACK STAY.
2. US 25th Infantry Division forces have been with-
drawn from Operation LINCOLN, currently in its 15th day
in:southern Pleiku and northern Darlac provinces. Five
battalions of the US 1st Air Cavalry Division are con-
tinuing the ground offensive, but with no significant
contact reported during the past 24 hours.
3. USAF B-52 Stratofortresses yesterday conducted
saturation bombing missions against two Viet Cong tar-
get complexes within a 45-nautical-mile radius of Sai-
gon. In the first strike, 12 B-52s. attacked two sus-
pected multibattalion Viet Cong training camps in Phuoc
Tuy Province, 40 nautical miles southeast of Saigon.
The second strike involved a continuation of the aerial
harassment program against Viet Cong War Zone "C" in Tay
Ninh Province, with three B-52s..: attacking enemy posi-
tions 45 nautical miles northwest of Saigon. No ground
follow-up operations were planned for either strike; how-
ever, psychological warfare leaflets were scheduled for
delivery immediately after the Tay Ninh bomb run.
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Viet Cong Activity
4. According to unconfirmed press reports,
Viet Cong guerrillas early today machine-gunned 25
chained Vietnamese captives when US-led government
troops closed in on a jungle prison some 70 miles
southwest of Saigon. Only four of the prisoners,
most of whom were civilians, reportedly survived.
Integration df VC/PAVN Units
5. Several Communist prisoners in South
Vietnam have provided further information on the
mixing of North and South Vietnamese personnel
in Viet Cong/PAVN military units. One South
Vietnamese captive stated that he was one of 40
South Vietnamese replacements in the 500th Trans-
portation Battalion of the Sao Vang (now known
as the 610th Division).. A North'Vietnamese prisoner
--a 15-year-old youth from the 95th Regiment=-
stated that at least two battalions of his unit
were 50 percent North Vietnamese and 50 * -percent
South Vietnamese. There have been several other
reports that the Communists were mixing personnel
based on their availability rather than worrying
about unit integrity.
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II. POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN SOUTH VIETNAM
1. Buddhist Institute chairman Tam Chau has
stated in Saigon that Buddhist demands still hinge
on the creation of a popularly elected assembly.
.The government's version of this assembly is that
it will be composed of 50 percent municipal and
provincial council representatives and 50 percent
appointees. Despite the exchange of letters
and communiques between the Buddhists and the gov-
ernment expressing agreement "in principle," their
positions apparently still differ fundamentally
on the composition of an assembly. One major
sticking point is probably the number of appointees.
2. Tam Chau also issued a Buddhist Institute
communique earlier today which called for the tem-
porary cessation of all forms of the "struggle" to
allow Premier Ky to confirm publicly verbal agree-
ments made--previously with Buddhist leaders. Ac-
cording to the press, the thrust of the Buddhist de-
mand was that Ky fully confirm his promise to yield
power to a popularly elected constituent assembly
within four to six months. The communique' also re-
quested amnesty for those involved in the antigovern-
ment movement.
3. Disturbances were continuing in Saigon as
of 12:00 p.m. (Vietnam time). According to the press,
students retreated into the Unified Buddhist Associa-
tion headquarters at midnight while riot control forces
used tear gas and fired shots over the demonstrators'
heads. The Buddhist clerics have prepared a protest
of the incident.
4. In addition, US military officials have re-
ported the presence of numerous small bands of hoodlums,
which place a burden on security forces. Today in Sai-
gon, a US motorcycle and one jeep were burned. One un-
known Caucasian has been abducted by the demonstrators,
according to press reports.
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5. The situation remains fluid in Da Nang, al-
though the city was quiet at 11:30 p.m. (Vietnam
time). US military officials have reported that
elements of the progovernment Vietnamese Air Force
may attempt to seize a small Vietnamese Army commu-
nications post outside the city sometime tonight.
I Lsome of the
junior officers in the forces at the airfield are
becoming increasingly impatient for action. There
was considerable confusion this morning as a red
alert was called by an element of the Vietnamese
Air Force which precipitated a similar alert among
the in-town struggle forces who were braced for an
air assault.
6. General Khang, commander of the Capital
Military Region, has provided evidence of strains
within the military Directorate. He said that sev-
eral senior officers were disturbed by the govern-
ment's lack of action against the Da Nang dissidents
and by Ky's seeming efforts to accommodate the Bud
dhists. Khang identified this "hawk" element as him-
self, General Thieu, Chief of the Joint General
Staff Vien, III Corps commander Tri, and IV Corps
commander Quang. Lending weight to a growing split
in the Directorate is a report from Da Nang that
General Co has been at least partially convinced
by I Corps commander Chuan that the "struggle move-
ment" has some justification and some chance of suc-
ceeding. Co reportedly intends to remain in Da
Nang until the marines from Saigon are withdrawn
from the air base.
7. General Khang also declared that northern
refugee Catholics are reportedly planning to send
"tens of thousands" of persons into Saigon within
two or three days to stage anti-Buddhist demonstra-
tions and to attack Buddhist pagodas and newspapers.
Khang indicated that security forces now in the cap-
ital are inadequate to cope with such large numbers.
Khang's information probably derives from low-level
sources but the Catholics have shown in the past a
capability to introduce such numbers into Saigon
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for demonstrations. Despite earlier Catholic state-
ments criticizing the government but urging calm,
there now are some indications of growing Catholic
concern over.the Buddhist campaign, including an
anti-Communist demonstration near Saigon by north-
ern Catholic, youths last weekend:.
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IV. OTHER COMMUNIST MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS
1. There is nothing of significance to report.
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V. COMMUNIST POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS
1. After several weeks of only muted comment
on the subject of a negotiated settlement in Viet-
nam, Hanoi has reaffirmed its opposition to any
peaceful settlement except on its own "four point"
peace terms in a lengthy editorial in Hoc Tap. The
occasion for the restatement of North Vietnamese
views on negotiations was the first anniversary of
the original pronouncement of its "four point"
peace proposal. According to the editorial in the
Party theoretical journal, Hanoi's position on ne-
gotiations has not budged an inch in the intervene
ing year. The US must accept the four points which
were printed in full and without change and must
"prove it by actual deeds"--a formulation used
most recently by President Ho Chi Minh in his Jan-
uary letter to heads of governments.
2. The editorial emphasized that the four
points constitute a package and must be accepted
"as a single entity." North Vietnam is not interested,
according to the article, in discussing just one,
or two, or three of the points. Until the US
agrees to all of them, there will be no discussions.
Point three--which calls for settlement of South
Vietnamese affairs without foreign interference and
in accordance with the program of the Liberation
Front--was singled out for special attention. Ces-
sation of hostilities, for example, was, according
to the editorial, it "question which comes fully un-
der the competence of the South Vietnamese people
and their Liberation Front."
3. Hanoi probably serves two purposes by such
a strong restatement of its opposition to negotia-
tions at this time. The article will certainly help
to reassure the Chinese that Hanoi remains firmly
opposed to a peaceful settlement now. The Vietnam-
ese have made a concerted effort in recent days to
assuage Chinese irritation over DRV attendance at
the Soviet Party Congress and to assure them that
it has not affected Sino-Vietnamese cooperation.
They have published a series of laudatory articles
on Chinese accomplishments and continue to charac-
terize Chinese-Vietnamese relations as very close
7 April 1966
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and friendly. The Hoc Tap editorial endorsing con-
tinued opposition to negotiations should also
please Peking. The stress on a significant role
for the Liberation Front in any political settle-
ment will also be reassuring to the Communists in
the South and may be designed to shore up any
flagging elan in that quarter.
7 April 1966
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