PENDING US-SOUTH KOREAN STATUS-OF-FORCES AGREEMENT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00826A000500010059-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 2, 2005
• Sequence Number: 59
• Publication Date: April 8, 1966
• Content Type: IM

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This Document contains information affecting the Na-
tional Defense of the United States, within the mean-
ing of Title 18, Sections 793 and 794, of the U.8. Code, as
amended. Its transmission or revelation of its contents
to or receipt by an unauthorized person is prohibited
by law. The reproduction of this form is prohibited.
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OCI No. 0802/66
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Office of Current Intelligence
8 April 1966
Pending US-South Korean Status-of-Forces Agreement
1. South Korea's pending status-of-forces agree-
ment with the US threatens to become a major domestic
political issue which could damage US interests.
2. Whatever the Pak government does about the
treaty will provide the opposition with campaign
issues in next year's election. If the government
has not signed a status-of-forces treaty by election
time, it is open to the charge of failing to obtain
a long-sought national objective. If it signs the
pending treaty without changes, the opposition can
accuse it of allowing the US to treat Koreans like
second-class people. The latter charge would be
particularly effective because of the general belief
that Korea is doing more than its share to help the
US in Vietnam.
3. There is strong opinion. within the govern-
ment that Korea's involvement in Vietnam is a lever
that should be used to get the US to reopen negotia-
tions. Factions in the government party might seize
the opportunity to attack President Pak if he makes
no effort to revise the present treaty draft. The
ensuing dispute would be sure to create even greater
political instability.
4. Opposition politicians and the press assert
that the government has accepted terms for dealing
with criminal jurisdiction over US servicemen, civil
claims, and labor relations that are unfair to the
Koreans. The government itself is dissatisfied with
parts of the treaty, which has been virtually ready
for signing since last summer. The reasons given by
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Seoul for stalling have been, first, the prospect
of serious domestic political trouble over normalizing
relations with Japan late last year, and, after that,
the issue of more Korean troops for Vietnam. Offi-
cials now are talking privately of delaying the
signing until next year or later.
5. Unhappiness with the pending treaty focuses
primarily on the provision dealing with exercise of
criminal jurisdiction over US servicemen. Dissatis-
faction. is not so much with the substance as with the
phrasing, which seems to the Koreans to take less
account of their prestige than. similar US agreements
with other countries. They are particularly sensi-
tive to the notion that the Japanese are accorded
greater rights.
6. Foreign Minister Yi Tong-won. has a strong
personal stake in renewed negotiations. His poor
performance in, defending the troops-for-Vietnam
measure before the National Assembly cost him the
confidence of President Pak, his sole source of po-
litical support, and thus badly damaged his stand-
ing in. the government. Yi would like to refurbish
his image by posing as the staunch defender of
Korean. interests in status-of-forces negotiations.
7. No matter which way the Korean, infighting
develops, it is likely to have an. adverse effect
On US interests. Regime and opposition. members
alike portrayed the US as being ungenerous during
the debate on sending more troops to Vietnam.
Motivated by the same parochial political interests,
they are ready again to make the US the target of
their criticism.
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