INDONESIAN COMMUNIST PARTY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00826A000600010043-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 22, 2002
• Sequence Number: 43
• Publication Date: April 29, 1966
• Content Type: IM

19TbT06A000600010043` t c, s
Release 2002/ POR- 3?
29 April 1966
OCI No. 1352/66
Copy No. (;
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
INDONESIAN COMMUNIST PARTY
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
office of Current Intelligence
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SECRET
GROUP 1
Excluded from automotic
downgrading and
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This Document contains information affecting the Na-
tional Defense of the United States, within the mean-
ing of Title 18, Sections 793 and 794, of the U.S. Code, as
amended. Its transmission or revelation of its contents
to or receipt by an unauthorized person is prohibited
by law. The reproduction of this form is prohibited.
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OCI NO. 1352/66
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Office of Current Intelligence
29 April 1966
Summary
Party
The Indonesian Communist Party has been re-
duced to an underground organization of unknown.
size. Efforts to reorganize will be carried out
under highly unfavorable circumstances. Although
the party will survive, its effectiveness as a
national political force seems likely to be vir-
tually nil for the next few years.
1. The Indonesian Communist Party (PKI), for
the third time in its history, has suffered a mas-
sive defeat. A functioning underground organization
survives, but its size is not known. Efforts to
reorganize will be hampered by unfavorable political
circumstances including an official ban of the party
and President Sukarno's loss of power, by the death
of several top leaders, and by the presumed infil-
tration of the PKI by army informers. Although
the PKI is sure to survive, its ef.fectiveness.as
a national political force seems likely to be vir-
tually n.il for the next few years.
Party History
2. The PKI, founded in. 1920, is the oldest
Communist party in the Far East. In. 1926, it
staged a series of revolts in Java and Sumatra.
These were easily suppressed by the Dutch adminis-
tration; the party was ban.n.ed; and most of its
members were executed, imprisoned, or exiled.
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3. The party regained its legal status in
October 1945--two months after President Sukarno
had declared Indonesia's independence of the
Netherlands and only a few weeks before the mili-
tary phase of the Indonesian revolution began. In.
September 1948--while the national fight for inde-
pendence was still in progress--the PKI staged a
revolt against the fledgling republic. Under cir-
cumstances that have never been fully explained,
Communist and pro-Communist army officers--supported
by the units they commanded--seized the city of
Madiun in East Java. Most Communist civilian
leaders, although apparently taken. by surprise,
felt they had no choice but to ally themselves with
and assume direction of the Madiun revolt, Anti-
Communist army units suppressed the revolt in two
months. Most top- and middle-echelon party leaders
were either killed in military operations or summarily
executed. About 35,000 persons--mostly troops who
had fought with the Communists--were imprisoned.
Faced by an imminent Dutch attack in December 1948,
however, the Indonesian Government released these
prisoners, and when independence was achieved the
following year, the new government took no further
action against the party.
4. After several years of confusion and par-
tial reorganization, the PKI in 1952 announced a
program of united front tactics which included strong
support of President Sukarno. Under these tactics
and the leadership of a youthful triumvirate--
D. N. Aidit, N. H. Lukman, and Njoto--the party
grew from an estimated membership of 12,000 in 1952
to a claimed membership of three and a half million
by 1965. Communist front groups probably accounted
for at least 15 million more. By September 1965,
Sukarno's policies had become almost indistinguishable
from the immediate goals of the PKI, and he appeared
to be pressing toward a regime of modified Communism.
1 October 1965
5. On 1 October 1965, a group that called it-
self the "30 September movement" kidnaped and mur-
dered six generals of the army General Staff. Having
evidence that PKI elements were involved, the army
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placed major responsibility for the movement on the
party and mounted a campaign to destroy it. By the
end of the year, Aidit and Njoto were dead, and the
party's overt organization was a shambles. On
12 March 1966, army commander Suharto, acting under
authority granted him by President Sukarno, banned
the PKI and its front organizations.
6. The precise details of the PKI's role in
the events of 1 October are not known., and, as in
the Madiun affair, may never be. Facts, probabilities,
and presumptions about the so-called "abortive coup"
have been arranged in a variety of plausible versions.
7. There is clear evidence that elements of
Communist youth, labor, and women's organizations
participated in the coup attempt. Several officers
of the army, air force, and police were involved. Of
these, at least one--an army brigadier general--is a
known. Communist; several of the other military
participants are suspected of either party affiliation
or Communist sympathies. Circumstantial evidence is
strong that at least some Communist leaders knew in
advance of the plot, and that Communists were involved
in directing coup preparations.
8. The army's anti-Communist campaign after 1
October involved mass arrests of members of the PKI
and its front organization and, in most provinces, the
banning of any activity by these groups. In, areas
where the PKI had been particularly active, such as
Central and East Java, local Moslems accompanied army
teams to help locate and identify Communists. As ar-
rests mounted, executions began.
9. The army's campaign enlisted sympathetic
civilian assistance throughout the nation. In strong
Moslem areas, this assistance rapidly assumed a fanat-
ical character. Moslem extremists in: many instances
outdid the army in hunting down and murdering members
of the party and its front groups. This activity was
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particularly true of Central and East Java, the prov-
ince of Atjeh in Sumatra, and the island of Bali.
10. Figures vary considerably as to the number
of persons killed. Since no records were kept, an
accurate figure is impossible to obtain. A govern-
ment fact-finding committee deputized by Sukarno
late last year to ascertain how many had died in the
anti-Communist campaign reported a figure of 78,000.
Unofficial estimates are considerably higher, rang-
ing from 250,000 to 500,000, but many of these ap-
pear to be based on exaggerated information. Execu-
tions reportedly are still being carried out in East
and Central Java by both the army and civilian
groups, but in far smaller numbers than last year.
11. Thousands of other Communists and Commu-
nist suspects have been imprisoned. Some of these
have already been "reindoctrin.ated" and released,
but others face execution o.r prolonged imprisonment.
Communists in the Djakarta area appear generally to
have fared better than elsewhere in that no mass
blood-letting has occurred there. This can probably
be attributed to the fact that army headquarters has
made its influence felt in the area and has emphasized
interrogation and at least some discrimination between
indoctrinated party members and the relatively unin-
formed individuals who were affiliated with party
front organizations.
12. In, 'terms of personnel losses, the party it-
self appears to have suffered more than. its front
organizations. Of the front groups, those that have
lost most personnel are, logically, those that were
the largest and most active--the Peasant Front (BTI)
which claimed nine million members; the labor federa-
tion (SOBSI) with over three million claimed members;
and the youth organization (Pemuda Rakjat), which
claimed three million members.
13. Communist response to the army's campaign
has been. largely one of retreat and passivity. When.
Sukarno, after some hesitation, refused to support
the 30 September Movement, PKI chairman Aidit went
to Central Java. Until his capture and execution,
probably in November, he seems to have spent much of
his time persuading minor Communist officials not to
go into open opposition.
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14. First and second deputy chairmen Lukman
and Njoto stayed in. Djakarta to take advantage of
Sukarno's protection and presumably to direct
strategy should the situation. swing to the left
again. In time, Njoto was arrested and is reported
to have been. executed, and Lukman went underground.
Other Communist leaders at all levels tried to go
underground in. early October.
15. Only in a few areas of Central Java and
in isolated instances in East Java and North Sumatra
did the PKI attempt aggressive action. These efforts
consisted chiefly of primitive sabotage and terrorist
sorties against non-Communist civilians and not
against the army. The Communists who took such
action had few firearms, and there is no firm evi-
dence that the army has discovered any significant
Communist arms caches.
16. In an. effort to escape army action., many
local branches of the PKI and its front organizations
dissolved themselves. In West Java, for example,
this voluntary dissolution occurred at the provincial
level. General Suharto's ban of the party and its
fronts in March 1966 officially confirmed at the na-
tional level a cessation of activity that already
prevailed.
17. M. H. Lukman--formerly the party's first
deputy chairman--apparently was appointed acting
chairman shortly after Aidit's death. Of the 50
PKI central committee members, at least four are
believed dead and 16 are believed to be in prison.
Two are in Communist China, and the whereabouts of
28 is unknown. Some of these 28 presumably con-
stitute the present central committee. Of 29 heads
of provincial or island committees, on.e is believed
dead, 14 apparently have been arrested, and the
whereabouts of 14 is unknown.
18. Certainly all but the hard core of the
party for the time being has melted away, but no
reliable figure for present active membership is
available. Indonesian sources have suggested the
figure of 100,000. The rapid growth of the PKI and
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its front organizations had been partially based
on low membership requirements and, as a result,
dedication and discipline presumably were transient
qualities among many adherents. A clandestine
organization also existed before 1 October 1965,
but its strength is not known,
19. The PKI still has secret members in other
parties, particularly the left wing of the National
Party (PNI) and the Indonesian Party (Partindo). A
formerly Communist-controlled youth group, the Con-
centration of Indonesian Student Groups (CGMI),
does not appear to have been hard hit by mass arrests.
In the past it was both a proving ground for young
Communists and an active recruiting base. Some con.-
tinued undetected infiltration Of the armed forces
must also be assumed. In the present political
atmosphere, however, the PKI is unable to use any of
these organizations to advantage.
20. The PKI has decided that it can expect
little assistance from Sukarno, once the party's
principal vehicle for gaining access to national
influence. The PKI believes that Sukarno is inter-
ested only in retaining the presidency and that he
will sacrifice everything to this end.
Reorganization
21. The party understandably is encountering
major obstacles in its efforts to reorganize. Aside
from the PKI's massive disarray and the additional
effort required to work underground, the party is
further frustrated by its suspicion of increased army
infiltration. The PKI believes the army is develop-
ing informers among party and party front members
who are gradually being released from prison.
22. Partly as a security measure, the central
committee is reported to have authorized a drastic
reduction in internal communication.
1211the 29 provincia and
is an committees have been granted virtual autonomy
and for the time being may determine their respective
courses of action without consulting the central com-
mittee or exchanging information with each other. In
Djakarta, where members of the area committee itself
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are suspected of being informers, subordinate units
have been instructed to avoid committee members.
23. For the time being the dominant party ac-
tivity apparently is to be the continued infiltra-
tion of neighborhood associations and village com-
mittees. Although Communists have lost control of
these community organizations, they still have
clandestine representation in them and hope to ex-
ploit lethargic rightist leadership. This type of
activity can be conducted from the cell level and
requires little or no supervision.
Government Concern
24. Despite the destruction wrought upon the
Communist Party, various government officials re-
main. concerned. Their particular concern is not
for the immediate future but for the period several
years from now when they fear that, despite govern-
ment efforts, the PKI will have succeeded in develop-
ing an effective underground organization..
25. With some 15 million persons having been
affiliated with front organizations and three million
with the party itself, government officials reason
that despite a probably low level of dedication on
the part of many of these persons, a large potential
must still exist for a reconstructed party. In.do-
nesian officials, both civilian, and military, have
speculated on the "vacuum in the social forces"
which may have been. caused by party proscription.
Deputy Prime Minister Adam Malik, who has over-all
responsibility for political affairs, has suggested
the establishment of a left-wing party which might
be able to absorb and bring into the national frame-
work large numbers of leftist malcontents and thereby
frustrate the development of a large PKI underground.
26. The government assumes the continuation
of a strong Communist potential in East and Central
Java, the major areas of previous Communist strength.
PKI leadership
in tnese regions, while presently experiencing dif-
ficulty in communicating with the central committee,
is relatively intact. The government is also con-
cerned about residual pro-Communist sentiment within
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the armed forces, particularly in. army and police
units which have been recruited in those areas.
Units under the deepest suspicion were sent to
Sumatra and Borneo last October simply to get them
out of Java and away from problem areas. Presumably
at some time they will be returned. Although in
the meantime an, effort is being made to "cleanse"
them of Communist elements, some degree of residual
infiltration must be assumed.
27. Further, some government officials wonder
about long-term bitterness among families and com-
munities which have lost members to army and Moslem
execution. squads.
28. The former overt organization of the In-
donesian Communist Party is disrupted and demoralized,
and as yet the party appears unable to take any
significant steps twoard reorganization. Many of
the basic conditions favorable to Communist resurgence
exist in Indonesia, but several factors will determine
whether and how soon the PKI can. exploit them. These
include the extent of continued suppression by the
government; the government's effectiveness in dealing
with extensive socioeconomic problems, which are most
acute in densely populated Java; the development of
non-Communist political expression. over the next few
years and particularly the government's ability to
avoid the political chaos of the early 1950s--caused
by multiple freewheeling and irresponsible political
parties; and the quality of Communist leadership
which has survived or which will be developed during
the next few years.
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