POLITICALLY SIGNIFICANT GROUPS IN SOUTH VIETNAM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00826A000600010052-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 22, 2002
• Sequence Number: 52
• Publication Date: May 4, 1966
• Content Type: IM

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
4 May 1966
No. 0811/66
Copy No.,,--
POLITICALLY SIGNIFICANT GROUPS IN SOUTH VIETNAM
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
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SECRET
GROUP 1
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0( Aoding and
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This Document contains information affecting the Na-
tional Defense of the United States, within the mean-
ing of Title 18, Sections 793 and 794, of the U.S. Code, as
amended. Its transmission or revelation of its contents
to or receipt by an unauthorized person is prohibited
by law. The reproduction of this form is prohibited.
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No. 0811/66
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
4 May 1966
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM*
Politically Significant Groups in South Vietnam
Summary
South Vietnam has a multitude of religious,
political, and regional factions. Some are large,
loosely organized federations; others are just a
handful of men backing an influential leader. Only
the various religions have anything like a wide
popular base, but they are split internally, and
their followers are concentrated for the most part
in a few geographic areas. Of the religions, the
Buddhist faction headed by Thich Tri Quang has by
far the largest popular following. Only two of the
political parties have national significance and
these are also splintered internally.
At best no more than a tenuous guess can be
made on the potential voting strength and voting
strongholds of most of the politically influential
groups. It appears, however, that Buddhist-backed
candidates will garner the largest popular support,
and that it will take a rather strong alliance be-
tween other factions and groups to offset potential
Buddhist strength.
*Prepared by the Office of Current Intelligence
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1. Firm adherents of Buddhism probably comprise
only about 15 to 25 percent of the roughly 15.5 mil-
lion South Vietnamese. However, up to 60 percent of
the population has been estimated to identify it-
self loosely with the religion. The Unified Buddhist
Association (UBA), a national organization headquartered
in Saigon., is presently the principal vehicle for Bud-
dhist political influence. The UBA has at least a
partially effective provincial and grass-roots struc-
ture extending down to individual pagodas. However,
the UBA is divided along regional lines into two
major factions, which have tended to act as the mili-
tant and moderate wings of the association.
2. The Central Vietnamese Buddhist faction is
headed by Thich Tri Quang, whose power is centered in
the northern city of Hue and extends roughly from the
northernmost provinces along the coast to the southern
part of the central lowlands. Quang.'s influence is
greatest in. urban areas and mirrors the somewhat xeno-
phobic, militant attitudes of the central Vietnamese
populace with its traditional antagonism toward the
southerners. Quang's chief lieutenant is Thich Thien
Minh, the UBA's youth commissioner; his key lay fol-
lowers include the Hue University Rector Bui Tuong
Huan, Professor Le Tuyen., and former cabinet minister
Tran Quang Thuan. It has been estimated that the in-
fluence of the central Vietnamese faction extends over
as many as three million South Vietnamese. However,
probably less than one million of these are registered
voters. The faction has been. trying for some time to
form a lay Buddhist political party, the Vietnamese
Buddhist Forces (UVF), but the party is not yet
formally in being.
3. The more moderate southern wing of the UBA
is led by Thich Tam Chau, chairman of the Buddhist
Institute. Chau is actually a spokesman for the
refugee Buddhist clergy from North Vietnam, but he
appears to control the bulk of southern-born Bud-
dhists, estimated to number from one to three mil-
lion. The southern Buddhists, however, appear to
be far less tightly knit than those under the influ-
ence of Tri Quang's faction. Chau is less politically
effective than Tni Quang, and: has at times allied
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himself with politicians whose actions have later
cast discredit on him. His principal associates in
the clergy are Thich Tam Giac, head of the Buddhist
chaplain corps, and Thich Ho Giac, deputy chaplain
and a fiery orator.
4. A splinter group, the Southern Buddhist
Studies Association, is headed by lay leader Mai Tho
Truyen, who has been. prominent in international Bud-
dhist circles but has split with the UBA. Although
seldom involved in domestic Buddhist "campaigns,"
Truyen has participated in various government-
sponsored civilian councils. He may have several
thousand close followers, most of them scattered
among the southern provinces, as well as considerable
appeal among UBA adherents generally.
5. The Theravada Buddhist sect numbers more
than. 500,000. Members are largely of Khmer (ethnic
Cambodian.) stock, and live in the provinces border-
ing the Mekong River, primarily near Cambodia but
also in Vin.h Binh Province near the coast. They
have been, politically inert at the national level,
but their leaders--including Son Thai Nguyen, brother
of Khmer Serei leader Son Ngoc Tha.n.h--often exert
considerable influence in. the provinces where they
are concentrated. Nguyen's faction is considered
rather militant in its actions; the other major fac-
tion. Of the Theravada Buddhists, the Nguyen Thuy
Association, is an older, and more conservative
group.
6. It is estimated that there are between a
million and 1.5 million Catholics in. South Vietnam.
They have long been prominent among the country's
educated and administrative circles, and are nu-
merous among the military officer corps. The
Catholics are concentrated chiefly in Gia Dinh and
Bien Hoa provinces near Saigon, where there are sev-
eral refugee settlements. There are also pockets
of Catholic influence in the delta, east of Saigon,
and in. the northern provinces.
7. Almost a million of the Catholics are
refugees from Communist North Vietnam. They are
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very active politically and very vocally anti-Com-
munist. Their acknowledged leader is Father Hoang
Quynh, described as a militant,and a political
activist. During the past year, however, Quynh
has taken a rather moderate tack in relations with
the Buddhists and other sects, and his influence
has been challenged by other refugee priests, in-
cluding Fathers Nguyen Quan.g Lam, Nguyen Van Luc,
and Tran Van Kiem. Quynh often chooses to conduct
his political operations through an organization.
headed by lay Catholic leader Nguyen Gia Hien.
8. The Catholics native to South Vietnam are
less well organized and less aggressive than their
northern refugee counterparts. Their principal
leader is the archbishop of Saigon, Nguyen. Van. Binh,
generally a voice for moderation and a widely re-
spected figure. The most vocal of their political
spokesmen, however, is probably Father Ho Van Vui,
a more militant figure who broke openly with the
Diem regime.
9. The Cao Dai are an eclectic religious sect
combining elements of Buddhism, Christianity, Con-
fucianism, and animism. The sect was formally or-
ganized in 1926. Under the French, the Cao Dai en-
joyed a measure of political autonomy, including
their own army. They claim a following of one to
two million, although their real adherents probably
number closer to a half million. There are scattered
Cao Dai villages in the western provinces of the
delta, but the principal base of Cao Dai influence,
and the seat of the sect's "Holy See," is in Tay
Ninh Province, northwest of Saigon.. The Cao Dai
population. in. Tay Ninh appears to number a few
hundred thousand,
10. The sect suffers from serious internal splits
and it is problematical whether it could become a uni-
fied electoral bloc, although it certainly might elect
some members to an assembly. Former chief of state
Phan. Khac Suu is a Cao Dai, but representative of
the somewhat independent political Cao Dai elements
in Saigon..
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11. One principal faction of the sect, and prob-
ably the most nationally minded, is led by former Cao
Dai "general" Le Van Tat and his brother Le Trung Nghia,
who are strongly anti-Buddhist. Tat was chief of Tay
Ninh Province from Diem's overthrow until late in. the
Quat regime. Close to them is Tran Quang Vinh, a
"spiritual" leader who served as a member of the ad-
visory High National Council under the Quat govern-
ment. A rival of Tran Quang Vinh is Cao Hoai Sang,
who ousted Vinh from the "Holy See." Sang's poli-
tical ties, however, are not clear. Another of the
sect's factions is led by former "general" Nguyen
Thanh Phuong, who heads a small Cao Dai political
party, the Vietnamese Restoration Party. Phuong ran
as a vice-presidential candidate against the Diem
ticket in 1961. At least one Cao Dai faction, under
a Major M.ung, is openly affiliated with the Viet Cong.
12. The Hoa Hao are a spiritualist Buddhist sect,
with possibly close to a million followers, although
they claim two million. Most of the members are
concentrated in the westernmost area of South Viet-
nam--An Giang and Chau Doc provinces bordering Cam-
bodia, where they are the dominant political and
religious influence. The Hoa Hao still retain rem-
nants of their former private army, but they have
suffered from internal divisions and are still with-
out significant national influence. They are, however,
a source of recruitment for government paramilitary
troops in several delta provinces outside their own.
domain., and thus may be in process of spreading their
local influence.
13. Among the most important Hoa Hao leaders at
present are Colonel Tran Van Tuoi, until recently
chief of An Giang Province, and Colonel Nguyen Van
Hue, the chairman of the An Giang provincial council.
Hue is a follower of a once-powerful but unsavory
Hoa Hao "general," Tran Van Soai.
14. Other key Hoa Hao figures at present are
Colonel Ly Ba Pham, the new An Giang Province chief,
and Pham Ba Cam, a Saigon politician who probably
has little influence at the local level. One of the
many factions in the sect is led by Truong Kim Cu,
another former "general" and erstwhile troublemaker.
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The Dai Viet Party
15. The Dai Viets are one of the two nationally
significant political parties in South Vietnam. They
are also splintered into several factions, only two
of which are of importance.
16. The northern branch of the Dai Viet Party is
composed chiefly of refugees from North Vietnam, and
has little in the way of formal mass organization to
support its nationally prominent politicians. The
faction is led by Dang Van Sung, a publisher, and in-
cludes former premier Phan Huy Quat. Undersecretary
of Foreign Affairs Bui Diem, an adviser to Premier Ky,
has also been associated with this faction. As
national figures, some of these men probably could
draw a substantial vote, particularly in Saigon, but
they have no local strongholds.
17. The southern faction of the Dai Viet Party
has been weakened by events of the past two years,
and is partly splintered between southern and central
wings. Its nominal leader, Nguyen Ton Hoan, is once
again in exile after having been ousted as deputy
premier to General Khanh; he calls his party the Dai
Viet Nationalist Party. Hoan appears to have had
ties among several top military officers including
Chief of State Nguyen Van Thieu, whose brother,
Nguyen Van Kieu, is a prominent Dai Viet Party member.
Leadership of the faction by default now is claimed
by Ha Thuc Ky, whose actual base of power is in Quang
Tri Province in central Vietnam. Ky calls this fac-
tion the Revolutionary Dai Viet Party. Its popular
strength is unknown. The southern faction has been
estimated to have about 50,000 active followers.
The VNQDD (Nationalist) Party
18. Like the Dai Viets, the VNQDD Party has been
badly splintered. Its strength and organization are
greatest in the various provinces of northern South
Vietnam, known to the Vietnamese as "central Vietnam."
19. The southern branch of the VNQDD, based
largely in Saigon, does not appear to have extensive
grass-roots support. Among its leaders is Nguyen Hoa
Hiep, minister of interior under Quat and a somewhat
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ineffective administrator who used his government
post to build up the faction. Another old-time
VNQDD leader, also in Saigon, is Vo Hong Khanh, a
businessman and one-time minister in the Bao Dai
era. It was recently reported that Khanh will be
recognized by local VNQDD factions as the party's
national leader in an effort to unify the VNQDD as
a counterforce to the Buddhists. Also prominent
in the southern branch, although born in North Viet-
nam, is former deputy premier in the Quat govern-
ment, Tran Kim Tuyen.
20. The primary base of VNQDD strength is in
central Vietnam where the party appears to have some
genuine organization and a grassroots structure.
The VNQDD could probably command a following of a
few hundred thousand throughout central Vietnam.
The party has been particularly active in Quang
Ngai and Quang Nam provinces, where it has entrenched
itself to some extent in the provincial administra-
tion. It has nevertheless experienced internal
provincial factionalism, chiefly between younger
and older elements. The party has strength in
Quang Tin, and also has some following in Quang
Tri and Thua Thien provinces, but substantially
less than Tri Quang's central Vietnamese Buddhist
faction. Some VNQDD leaders in central Vietnam
have cooperated with Tri Quang in the past, but are
now in the process of allying themselves against
him. The secretary general of the central Vietnam
branch of the VNQDD is Nguyen Dinh Luong. However,
a genuine regional leader for this faction has not
yet emerged.
Independent Politicians
21. A large number of independent politicians,
most of them living in Saigon and heading their
own small political parties, are nationally promi-
nent and might well be elected if they were to be
candidates for a constituent or national assembly.
Some of these men wield influence in the current
political scene, but probably have no real power or
popular support outside of the political and govern-
ment circles in which they lobby. Many are former
government officials and ministers; others are leaders
of regional factions; some are former army officers.
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22. Among these men are Pham Quang Dan, a Gia
Dinh council member; Tran Van Van, a southern leader;
Hoang Co Thuy and his brother Hoang Co Binh, a Saigon
councilor; former premier Tran Van Huong, and such
figures as retired Generals Tran Van Don, "Big" Minh,
etc. In. very few cases is it possible to estimate
the extent and locale of support such men might draw
from the electorate, unless they were endorsed by
organized parties, religious groups, or the military.
Among them, however, are probably some of the coun-
try's best political and administrative talent, as
well as some of its most overrated politicians.
23. Of the numerous groups with which many of
the individually prominent politicians are associated,
the Southern Old Students' (or Dong Nai) Association
is one which could develop considerable strength, at
least in the southern part of South Vietnam. The
Association, founded in 1965 and headed by retired
General Tran Van Don, reportedly has about 1,200
members. More than 700 are in the Saigon area. Al-
though it is ostensibly an apolitical association
of alumni and teachers from four well-known lycees
in South Vietnam, the Association is actually a
cover for political activity by southern intellectuals
and politicians, many of whom wish to see a predomi-
nant southern voice in the government. Among other
members of the Association, which reportedly meets
regularly each month, are former chief of state Phan
Khac Suu and Tran Van Van, prominent in the now de-
funct High National Council and its secretary general,
Nguyen Van Loc.
24. Although there are several competing trade
unions, the only labor organization in South Vietnam
with any substantial following is the Confederation
of Vietnamese Labor, or CVT, headed by Tran Quoc Buu.
The union claims a membership of about 300,000 from
its affiliates, but actual strength may be less.
Most of the CVT support is in the Saigon area, but
it has some relatively important affiliates in Da
Nang and other cities of I Corps and in the delta.
The CVT gains some rural following from its planta-
tion workers' affiliate, but most of the plantation
areas are now Viet Cong - infested and residents
there may not be permitted to vote.
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25. Among the rivals of the CVT is the General
Confederation of Free Syndicates (CGSL), an unregistered
union led by Bui Luong, a somewhat unsavory political
figure who has sought to draw strength away from the
CVT. The Confederation of Vietnamese Trade Syndicates
(CSTV) under Vui Van Thien and a splinter group of the
CSTV under Le Van Thot and Le Dinh Cu are also rivals
of the CVT. The Thot-Cu group draws its present
strength from the textile workers, whose ranks have
reportedly been infiltrated by the Viet Cong.
Military
26. With approximately 600,000 men under arms,
the military could be a potentially powerful voting
bloc, although there has never been any evidence that
the military would vote as ordered in a secret ballot.
A past practice of allowing army troops to vote in
areas where they are currently based or operating
gives the army the potential of swinging the outcome
in a given electoral district. Most of the rank and
file of the military, however, would probably vote
their own political and religious persuasions, although
they might support popular military candidates. The
influence of the Buddhists among the officers and ranks
of both the army and police in I Corps has recently
been demonstrated; certain troops in the delta are
known to be strongly Catholic.
27. Veterans of the armed services also consti-
tute a potential political force, possibly allied
with the military. There are presently estimated
to be as many as 500,000 veterans in the country, but
they are less likely to vote as a bloc than in ac-
cordance with their individual political and religious
loyalties. The only significant veterans' organiza-
tion, the Veterans' Legion Associations des Anciens
Combattants V.ietnamiensreportedly has about 30,000
members; only some 4,000, however, are said to be
interested enough in the organization to pay dues.
Under the Diem regime the Legion was of little
significance, but it gained prestige from the election
of General Pham Xuan Chieu, secretary general of the
Directorate, as its president in September 1965, and
from the creation in February 1966 of a new cabinet
post for war veterans.
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28. About 60 percent of South Vietnam's popu-
lation is estimated to be below the age of 30. As
a result of past electoral laws which have lowered
the voting age to 18, youths in their teens and
early 20s could exert a significant political im-
pact. Rural and urban youths have different atti-
tudes and outlooks, as do working youths and students,
with the latter exercising the most vocal impact.
29. High school age youth apparently have long
been the major target of various pressure groups,
including the Viet Cong. Because they contain a
less sophisticated and more malleable age group,
the high schools have often provided the hard core for
political demonstration. Many of them reportedly con-
tain Communist cells. The Viet Cong regard the high
schools as a means of infiltrating confirmed followers
into the universities and as a source of military and
agent recruitment. The proportion of students over
18 is unknown, but somewhat greater than in US high
schools.
30. University students, often from conservative
middle-class families, remained largely uninterested
in politics until the Buddhist campaign against Diem
in 1963 enlisted their energies and organizations.
There is now a plethora of political organizations
in the country's four universities: Saigon with
16,000 students; Hue with some 3,600; Dalat with
about 1,600; and Van Hanh--a new Buddhist university
in Saigon--with a few hundred students. Both at Sai-
gon and Van Hanh universities, the students have
tended to be restrained in their political actions
over the past year. The Saigon Students' Union,
claiming 4,000 of Saigon University's student body
under Tran Quang Tri as president and To Lai Chanh
as executive committee chairman, has been particu-
larly resistant to recent political agitation. In
general, religious organizations in the Saigon uni-
versities, such as the Catholic Students' Federation
and the Buddhist Students' Association, have exhibited
less religious and political fervor than other student
groups.
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31. The students at Hue University, who gen-
erally represent a less privileged class and are
under strong Buddhist influence, have been more mili-
tant. The Hue Students' Union, under Tuan Xuan Kiem,
has been periodically in ferment during the past two
years and has been involved in recent "struggle move-
ment" activity. There is a militant, leftist faction
among the Hue faculty, including the rector, and the
student body has also been reported as increasingly
receptive to Viet Cong propaganda. The university
of Dalat is under Catholic administration, but has a
militant pro-Buddhist element.
32. The Chinese community in South Vietnam is
estimated at about a million, most of whom live in
Cholon, the Chinese city adjacent to Saigon. They
are Vietnamese nationals by decree of the Diem re-
gime, but have managed to retain their own schools
which teach Chinese and their internal societies
which have begun to operate more openly since Diem's
downfall. The Chinese are strongly entrenched in
South Vietnam's commercial life, but few have taken
an interest in politics.
33. The increasingly disturbed economic situa-
tion, however, together with increased government
efforts to bring Chinese youths into the armed
services, may draw the Chinese more openly into the
picture as a political pressure group. Although
most of them appear to be oriented to Taipei rather
than Peking, there is some Viet Cong influence among
them. A few Chinese firms, apparently motivated by
profits, supply the Viet Cong, and some Chinese
laborers, particularly in the textile industry, are
reported to be Communist agents.
The Montagnards
34. The ethnic tribes in South Vietnam number
about 500,000, and are scattered throughout the
central highlands, primarily close to the main
towns. If allowed to vote, they would probably
support tribal candidates, but as there are more
than 35 different tribes, any real cohesion among
the montagnards is questionable. One of the most
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prominent tribal leaders now active in the govern-
ment is Paul Nur, newly appointed to the commissariat
for montagnard affairs, but it is by no means clear
that he speaks for all the montagnards.
Popular Voting Strength
35. At the present time, there is insufficient
information to support any assessment of the poten-
tial voting strength and voting strongholds of any
or all of the politically influential groups and
factions in South Vietnam. Elections held under
the Diem regime were controlled or influenced by the
government in such a manner as to provide no frame-
work for a study of voting attitudes or habits. Al-
though provincial and municipal council elections
held under the Quat regime in May 1965 appear to have
been generally free of government domination, avail-
able data on them provide only a rough gauge of
political and religious influence among the electorate.
Moreover, the issues and candidates were local, and
the 1965 results may not necessarily have a valid
bearing on a national election,
36. It is not yet known whether the coming elec-
tions will be organized to run provincial candidates
locally, either as individuals or as party slates,
or to run all the national candidates on the same
ballot. Such arrangements will be very important
as they will help determine the vote-drawing power
of candidates with either local, provincial, or
national reputations. The 1965 local elections
brought out some 3.5 million voters, or perhaps half
the estimated potential as measured by voter turnout
claimed by the Diem regime.
37. Attempts to plot the areas of probable
strength or control by the various power groups--
Buddhists, Catholics, the sects, the Dai Viets, or
VNQDD--can be done only roughly. There are data
concerning the political and religious affiliations
of individual provincial council members, and the
size of the vote won by each member, but no informa-
tion is at hand concerning the total vote or affilia-
tions of losing candidates. Moreover, the 1965 re-
sults provide almost no clue to political affilia-
tions at the district level.
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38. Finally, the suppression of genuine politi-
cal activity by the Diem regime, and to some extent
by the power of the military since that time, has
prevented the development of political parties, con-
tributed to their internal splits, and forced or en-
couraged them to operate clandestinely. Most of the
parties are reluctant to reveal their membership,and
their strength claims, when made, tend to be inflated.
Moreover, candidates in the past elections ran as in-
dependents or with government endorsement, but usually
without political party or religious labels. There
is no accurate census of the population as a whole,
or of popular religious affiliations.
39. On the accompanying map, an effort has been
made to pinpoint known strongholds or pockets of po-
litical or religious influence. It has been impossible
to estimate group strengths by cities on the map, ex-
cept for Hue where Buddhist domination is evident. No
attempt was made to estimate possible party or religious
voting strength. Attempts to pinpoint areas of major
strength by religious or political affiliation have
been necessarily limited to the populated coastal
areas in the northern part of the country, and the
major towns and cities in the delta. Most of the in-
land area of central Vietnam is sparsely populated,
and relatively little information is available on
rural political allegiances in the delta outside of
the known strongholds of the sects and the Khmers.
(Map)
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POLITICALLY SIGNIFICANT GROUPS IN SOUTH VIETNAM
?Quang Tri
QUANG TRI /
POLITICAL/RELIGIOUS GROUPS
Buddhist
Cao Dai
Catholic
VNQDD
Hoa Hao
Dai Viet
THUA THIEN
Da Nang
QUANG NAM
V1W
QUANG TIN
Quang Ngai
QUANG
NGAI
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