WEEKLY REPORT PREPARED EXCLUSIVELY FOR THE SENIOR INTERDEPARTMENTAL GROUP

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00826A000800010027-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 17, 2004
• Sequence Number: 27
• Publication Date: May 30, 1966
• Content Type: IM

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This Document contains information affecting the Na-
tional Defense of the Ur, ited States, within the mean-
ing of Title 18, Sections 793 and 794, of the U.S. Code, as
amended. Its transmission or revelation of its contents
to or receipt by an unauthorized person is prohibited
by law. The reproduction of this form is prohibited.
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Uganda . .
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Cyprus . .
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India-Pakistan . . . . . . . . . .
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Cuba . . .
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Nigeria .
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President Obote's tough suppression of the
Buganda rebellion has aroused bitter animosity
among many Baganda but is probably supported by a
majority of the country.
The other tribes of Uganda have long resented
Buganda's attitude of superiority, the special priv-
ileges of its wealthy chiefs, and its autonomy under
the former federal constitution.. Obote had hoped
to end Buganda's special status without bloodshed
when he rammed the new constitution through the
National Assembly in April. It effectively stripped
the Baganda elite of their prerogatives but left the
Kabaka's position intact. Many Ugandans, including
younger elements in Buganda, welcomed the reforms as
long overdue.
A militant minority of Bagandan leaders appar-
ently convinced the Kabaka that an armed showdown.
with Obote was necessary. Bagandan veterans were
given weapons training, automatic arms stolen from
the central government armory were stockpiled in the
palace, and finally the central government was given
ten. days to vacate Kampala, the national capital
within Buga.n.da's territory. The Kabaka apparently
hoped that by forcing Obote to make the first move
he could incite a Bagandan. uprising and perhaps
invite outside intervention..
Faced with a direct challenge to central author-
ity, Obote arrested the militant Bagandan leaders
and stormed the palace. Although the Kabaka escaped
arrest, most of his armed irregulars were killed and
their arms seized. The Baganda--short of arms and
lacking leadership--may not wish to continue the fight
for long in the face of severe police repression and
government intimidation. Moreover, the Kabaka's
increasingly tribalistic moves at the expense of Uganda's
unity have lost him whatever support he might have had
outside Buganda. Nevertheless, Bagandan. political
opposition. and sporadic harassment will continue to be
a festering problem for Obote. F_ I
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Greek-Turkish bilateral talks may soon resume.
Initial contacts are planned during the NATO minis-
terial conference in Brussels about 9 June. Both
countries appear sincere in. their desire to reopen the
dialogue, but have so far shown no willingness to
offer the concessions necessary to get negotiations
off dead center.
Developments on Cyprus will complicate even
this tentative effort. Already the Greek Cypriot
press has launched a campaign impugning Greek motives
for agreeing to resume the talks.
President Makarios continues to show his inde-
pen.dence of Athens and of General Grivas, the Greek
officer who commands the Cypriot armed forces.
The immediate bone of contention concerns
Makarios' efforts to win control over the Cypriot
National Guard away from Griva.s. The issue presumably
was discussed during the Cypriot foreign minister's
talks in. Athens this past weekend (28-29 May).
The Turks have also warned again that they might
intervene unless a way is soon found to improve
conditions for the Turkish Cypriot community.
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3. INDIA-PAKISTAN
Relations between India and Pakistan continue
to deteriorate, with each blaming the other for
violating "the spirit of Tashkent." Soviet dip-
lomats in South Asia have indicated that Moscow
is not presently prepared to make an effort to
reverse this trend.
A new confrontation with India might also help the
government divert public interest in Pakistan from
recent agitation over political freedom and the
rising cost of living. There also are indications
that Rawalpindi may again be examining the
possibility of taking the Kashmir issue to the UN
Security Council.
The Indian attitude toward Pakistan has also
been affected by continuing tribal insurgency in
eastern India. The press in New Delhi has charged
the Pakistanis are providing advice and weapons to
the rebels. On other issues, as well, Indian
propaganda against Pakistan has reached its highest
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Fidel Castro's overreaction to the recent inci-
dents at Guantanamo appears designed to divert atten-
tion from Cuba's economic difficulties and still
popular dissension.
Sugar production will total about 4.5 million
tons, compared with slightly more than 6.0 mil-
lion tons in 1965. Sugar provides between 85 and
90 percent of Cuba's foreign exchange earnings, so
the reduced harvest will compel a cut in the level
of imports, including foodstuffs. Increased aid
from the Soviet Union will compensate in good part
for lower foreign exchange income and the reduction
in imports probably will be moderate over the year.
For the moment, however, the lower level of im-
ports, coinciding with the absence of any increase
in domestic food production, accounts for the short-
ages in available food supplies. Rice supplies, in
particular, have been badly hurt and the monthly
ration has been cut from six pounds per person to
three. While the reduction in rice supplies probably
has been partly compensated for by increased avail-
ability of other grains, the sharp cut in consumption
of one of Cuba's basic foods has had a bad psycho-
logical effect at a time when the regime has lost
much of its mystique.
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The weekend rioting in several northern cities
was a direct result of General Ironsi's 24 May an-
nouncement replacing the federal system with a uni-
tary government and civil service. Placards carried
during the demonstrations demanded that the north
secede rather than submit to a unitary government.
A unified civil service would mean more southerners
in northern government jobs, and fear of this sparked
the rioting.
The government alerted police and army units even
before Ironsi's speech to watch for unfavorable
public reaction, but hours elapsed before order was
restored. There are indications that the rioting
in several cities was coordinated.
Ironsi sent additional police units north, but
he appeared calm and confident that his northern
governor could handle the situation. Ironsi has
kept the army in the background although troops in
the north were used.
There has been little reaction to Ironsi's speech
in the south, where the changes probably will be ac-
cepted as inevitable and necessary. There have been
no incidents in the southern provinces in reaction
to the rioting, but the killing of southerners in
the north may bring reprisals in the south.
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