PEKING CONTINUES EFFORTS TO WOO AFGHANISTAN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00826A000800080001-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 17, 2003
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: June 2, 1966
• Content Type: IM

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2 June 1966
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INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
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PEKING CONTINUES EFFORTS TO WOO AFGHANISTAN
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
TOP SECRET
GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgroding and
declassification
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
2 June 1966
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM*
Peking Continues Efforts to Woo Afghanistan
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1. Liu Shao-chi's visit to Afghanistan in
early April was the latest of Peking's efforts to
expand its influence in Kabul. It met with as little
success as previous Chinese initiatives since diplo-
matic relations were established in 1955, but the
Chinese are undaunted and appear determined to keep
a foot in the Afghan door.
2. Peking almost certainly views the present
government of Afghanistan as "feudalist, pre-
capitalist" in nature. As such it is a proper tar-
get for Chinese-supported Communist subversion.
Efforts at short-term cooperation with Kabul and
even the provision of economic assistance are re-
garded as justifiable to hamper efforts by the US
and the USSR to increase their influence in Afghan-
istan. In addition, by maintaining cordial relations
Peking is seeking to demonstrate its "benevolent na-
ture" and to give substance to its claim that its
dispute with India is due solely to Indian intran-
sigence.
3. Peking's effort to keep relations with
Afghanistan relatively cordial has been made easier
by the absence of historical sources of friction.
The common border is only 40 miles long and runs
through a remote, mountainous region. Although
undemarcated, it had never been in dispute. When
the Afghans proposed its formal delimitation in
*Prepared by the Office of Current Intelligence and
coordinated with the Office of Research and Reports
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January 1963, the Chinese accepted. Negotiations
were concluded in July 1963, and a border agreement
was signed in November. The Chinese publicized
this agreement as an example of China's reasonable
and peace-loving attitude toward its neighbors.
4. The first significant Chinese offer of
economic assistance to Afghanistan was made in No-
vember 1964, during the state visit of Afghan King
Muhammad Zahir Shah to China. The Chinese offered
him a $28 million long-term, interest-free develop-
ment credit, and indicated that their interest in
Afghanistan would increase. Peking's offer was
accepted "in principle," but Kabul appeared anxious
to go as slowly as possible in implementing the Chi-
nese aid program. In March 1965, Chinese Foreign
Minister Chen Yi visited Afghanistan
in
an effort to
speed up the timetable and succeeded
in
obtaining
Afghan acceptance of an'agreement on
the
utilization
of the 1964 loan, a final version of
the
border
agreement, and a Sino-Afghan cultural exchange agree-
ment.
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6. The potential aid projects investigated by
the Chinese thus far include a duck farm and a fish
hatchery at Kargha near Kabul, construction of an
irrigation project in the Panjshir Valley north of
Kabul, assistance in silk production, aid for an
existing textile plant in Kandahar, construction of
a caustic soda plant near Baghlan, aid for a ceramics
factory in Kabul, and technical advice in the manu-
facture of lapis lazuli jewelry and commodity sup-
port.
7. All of the projects are relatively small
except for the Panjshir Valley irrigation scheme--
in which Chinese advisers reportedly have shown
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the greatest interest. This is probably explained
in part by its proximity to the closely guarded
Bagram air base, a major center of Soviet military
assistance activities in Afghanistan
9. One factor curbing the expansion of Chinese
influence in Afghanistan is the already well-en-
trenched Soviet presence. To date, Kabul has re-
ceived almost 600 million dollars worth of Soviet
economic aid--far above the level of aid available
from Peking.
10. The Chinese are obviously aware of the
strong Soviet position and are doing everything
they can to undercut it. One purpose of Liu Shao-
chi's state visit was probably to counter the visit
of the Afghan premier to Moscow in February. As
was the case with similar Chinese initiatives in
the past, Liu does not appear to have had great
success in winning the confidence of the Afghans.
A joint communique issued on 8 April, the day of
Liu's departure, was conspicuously non-committal
with respect to economic relations--in contrast
with explicit statements in the Soviet-Afghan com-
munique in February in which Moscow undertook to
assist the Afghan third five-year plan.
11. The bland nature of the joint Sino-Afghan
communique apparently reflected Afghan resistance to
further economic entanglement with Peking.
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12, Despite the disappointing results of Liu's
visit, the Chinese probably believe their Afghan
policy has reasonably good prospects; they have suc-
ceeded in opening Afghanistan up to Chinese techni-
cians and in somewhat improving their capability to
exert influence in Kabul.. It seems likely that Chi-
nese policy toward Afghanistan will continue along
present lines for some time to come. It will em-
phasize a careful mixture of limited economic assist-
ance and propaganda, backed up by the implicit threat
of military force to keep the Afghans balanced be-
tween pressures from the US, the USSR, and China.
And all the while, Chinese engineers and other tech-
nicians will be laying the groundwork for more
virorous efforts to swing the Afghans into Peking's
camp.
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