JUAN BOSCH AND THE DOMINICAN POLITICAL FUTURE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00826A000900110001-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 27, 2001
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: June 17, 1966
• Content Type: IM

STATINTL
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SUBJECT . &an Beech and The Do Willem Political Future
REQUESTED BY
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DISTRIBUTION LIST
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
CATEGORY E - ROUTINE
OCI Special Paper Notice Nb Control No. 10. 1579/64
SUBJECT 4usa Dosch and the Dominions Politics lia to 17 Juno 1968
INTERNJPOrtyAL
1-6 DDI 7-12 D/OCI 13-17 IDI STAFF 18-22 OD/OCI STAFF 23,24 MCO
DCI 25 D/ONE 39 DCI Briefers
DDCI 26-28 PILL 40,41 INDIC?
EXEC. REG. 29-37 013CEN
EXEC. DIR. 38 DD' Duty Ofcr.
42,43
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25X1A 48
49-61
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DDP
ONE
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D/ORR (CSS)
D/OSI
D/OSI (SR/OCR)
Chief, DD/OCR(COLLATERAL)-1
DIR/NPIC (LS/PID) -3
DDI/CGS -1
NMCC (OPSCEN) -1
DDI/RS -1
-2
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LATERAL) -
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EXTERNAL
THE WHITE HOUSE
Smith -5
Vice President -1
Gen. Maxwell Taylor -1
TREASURY USIA
Fowler -1 Marks -1
USIB (Distribution Points)
NSA
StallIMPRIERAL) -13
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MUXIIMIUMOtanniX BROWN (AEC)
NON-USIB (Intelligence Distribuion Points
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85 DDI
86 DDI
87-92 DDI
93 CIA
94 SA/
95,96 CA/EUR
97,98 CA/MEA
99,100 CA/WH
101,102 CA/FE
103 CD/West
104-106 CS/Pres
107 ADMIN (VM)
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109,110 Orig. Div
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Distribution Mr. Godfrey
Authorized by
17
To be released by June 1966
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17 June 1966
No. 1579/66
Copy No.
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
JUAN BOSCH AND THE DOMINICAN POLITICAL FUTURE
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
GROUP 1
Exc luded from automatic
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This Document contains information affecting the Na-
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ing of Title 18, Sections 793 and 794, of the U.S. Code, as
amended. Its transmission or revelation of its contents
to or receipt by an unauthorized person is prohibited
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No. 1579/66
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
17 June 1966
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM*
Juan Bosch and the Dominican Political Future
SUMMARY
In his 13 June address, Juan Bosch made clear
his intention to remain active in Dominican politics
by leading the opposition to president-elect Bala-
guer and the new government that is to take office
on 1 July. Balaguer does not appear to be moving
quickly enough to prevent Bosch from seizing the
initiative by pressing the new government for a
program of social and economic reform. If Bosch
succeeds in maintaining leadership of the Dominican
left, his tactics could upset what at best will be
a fragile political stability.
* Prepared by the Office of Current Intelligence;
coordinated with ONE and DDP.
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1. Juan Bosch now has made it clear he intends
to remain active in Dominican politics. Although
Bosch's crushing electoral defeat has undoubtedly
diminished his stature and eventually may leave his
leadership of the Dominican Revolutionary Party
(PRD) open to challenge, he remains a major political
figure. His active, vocal opposition to the govern-
ment-elect would significantly add to its woes. In-
deed, Bosch has indicated he will propose a concrete
program of reform designed both to seize the initiative
from Balaguer and to put Balaguer under pressures to
move ahead with some reform measures.
2. Bosch says he will take the role of "creative,
democratic and serious" opponent of the government.
One of his immediate goals will be to "ensure politi-
cal liberties," in part to create an atmosphere in
which his party will be able to operate unchecked.
has said that the PRD leader
will press Balaguer for the removal of "undemocratic
elements" from the military. Although Bosch subse-
quently has denied advancing such an objective, he
undoubtedly will oppose any step by Balaguer to in-
stall military leaders who adamantly oppose him and
the PRD. In addition, Bosch is likely to propose
sweeping economic and social changes that go far be-
yond the pragmatic approach Balaguer is expected to
take.
3. By contrast, during the 15 days since his
election, Balaguer has not moved quickly to enunciate
a government program There is no clear indication
of what type of cabinet appointments or administra-
tive program Balaguer has in mind. He evidently does
not intend to disclose either until after his inaugura-
tion. In the meantime, embassy officials have the
impression from talks with Reformist Party leaders
that even Balaguer's most intimate advisers cannot
speak with authority and have been handicapped in
formulating specific policies.
4. Bosch's talents well suit him to the role of
opposition leader--probably better than they suit him
to administering a government. His intellect, his
skills at political infighting, and his ability to
make and espouse popular causes equip him well to
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retain the support of the country's articulate and
organized elements--the PRD rank and file, students,
intellectuals, and organized labor.
5. The effectiveness of Bosch's opposition to
Balaguer also will depend on his maintaining leader-
ship of the PRD and control of its significant, albeit
minority, representation in the Congress. Bosch's
tactics of the past two weeks appear designed to do
just this. For example, one of his motives in ques-
tioning the legitimacy of Balaguer's victory has been
to placate PRD radicals. At the same time, he has
been soothing moderates by describing his intentions
to enter into a constructive opposition and to shun
militant agitation. Bosch may have asked for the
much-publicized 6 June meeting with Balaguer in part
to demonstrate to possible PRD dissidents that he
was still a leader of national significance.
6. Although there has always existed within the
PRD a current of discontent with Bosch's caudillo
style of leadership, it has not been of much signifi-
cance. Bosch, for example, has been able easily to
outmaneuver PRD organization man Angel Miolan. At
present, there is no other figure in the PRD--or in
the Dominican left--who appears capable of effectively
challenging Bosch.
7. There remains a slim chance that over the
next few months or so Bosch might give up active po-
litical life. For example, he might resume his
sinecure at the University of Puerto Rico. Various
pressures, such as his fear of assassination, now
only a little less intense than before the elections,
and the stinging personal rebuke Bosch probably felt
he received at the polls might make such a course
attractive.
8. It is unlikely that in the immediate future
Bosch will countenance the use of force against Bala-
guer. Bosch's public urging to his followers that
they keep calm has aided in restraining hotheads.
Nevertheless, by crying fraud and conceding defeat
gracelessly, Bosch--whether meaning to or not--has
created doubt in the minds of some of his followers
over the legitimacy of Balaguer's victory.
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9. The kind of oppositionist tactics Bosch has
begun to use may prove to be almost as disruptive as
violence. The Dominican political fabric is weak,
and it is not at all certain that government by inter-
party consensus can operate in such a fragile politi-
cal environment. Should Bosch's advocacy of legis-
lative objectives prove effective, it may alienate
from Balaguer conservative military and civilian ele-
ments whose tolerance of the government is essential
to its stability. Balaguer will be subject to pres-
sure from these elements to shackle Bosch and cope
with the PRD through semi-authoritarian tactics. The
adoption of such a policy would in turn play into
the hands of leftist extremists who would like to use
such slogans as "dictatorship" and "neo-Trujillismo"
to justify insurgency and recruit the vital support
of non-Communist leftists.
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