THE SITUATION IN VIETNAM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00826A001100010019-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 20
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 25, 2006
• Sequence Number: 19
• Publication Date: August 8, 1966
• Content Type: MEMO

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
::Aw0rML"---1
THE SITUATION IN VIETNAM
Inforiuation as ot_ 1600
8 Auctust 1966
PREPARED FOR THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
FURTHER DISSEMINATION OF INFORMATION
CONTAINED HEREIN IS NOT AUTHORIZED
ARMY review(s) completed.
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 Apprc
8 August 1966
HIGHLIGHTS
A detailed analysis of the situation in Quang
Tri Province in the light of recently concluded Op-
eration HASTINGS is provided in an annex.
I. The Military Situation in South Vietnam:
Operation PAUL REVERE II continues in Pleiku Province
with 22 Americans killed in an engagement with Commu-
nist forces today (Para. 1). Two new search-and-de-
stroy operations initiated by the US 25th Infantry
Division in Hau Nghia Province (Para. 3). Operation
BUCKS ends in Quang Nam Province with very light cas-
ualties reported (Para. 4). F_ I 25X1
s latest in ormation on the strength of the 324th
"B" Division and the number of North Vietnamese troops
in South Vietnam is reported (Paras. 10-11).
II. Political Developments in South Vietnam: A
spokesman of the United Buddhist Association releases
another antigovernment and antielection statement
(Paras. 1-2). Thich Tri Quang is allowed to briefly
leave his place of confinement (Para. 3).
III. Military Developments in North Vietnam: The
loss of four US aircraft over North Vietnam is reported
(Paras. 1-3).
IV. Other Communist Military Developments: There
is nothing of significance to report.
Appr4
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SPECIAL ANNEX: Survey of the Situation in Quang
Tri Province.
8 August 1966
Appr
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rvORrNDong Hoi
.SihanouAville
@5&K,
49"Wil r---
SOUTH VIETNAM
CURRENT SITUATION
U 25 51, 15 loOM,,
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1. A US infantry company participating in Opera-
tion PAUL REVERE II established contact today with an
estimated battalion-size enemy force in an area about
30 miles southwest of Pleiku. Tactical air strikes
and artillery support were provided. Preliminary re-
ports indicated that 22 Americans have been killed and
36 wounded. An estimated 65 Viet Cong were reported
killed.
2. A US base-security operation near Phuoc Vinh
in Binh Duong Province reported a 90-minute engagement
with a Viet Cong force of undetermined size early today.
According to preliminary reports, one American was
killed and 16 wounded. Five Viet Cong were also re-
ported killed.
New Operations Initiated
3. Two new search-and-destroy operations were in-
itiated on 8 August by units of the 25th Infantry Di-
vision in Hau Nghia Province. One battalion began Op-
eration LAHAINA in an area about 30 miles northwest of
Saigon. Two other battalions began Operation AIEA in
an area about 25 miles northwest of the capital. There
have been no reports of significant contact with the
Viet Cong by either operation.
4. Operation BUCKS, a joint US - South Vietnamese
search-and-destroy operation conducted in Quang Nam
Province, ended on 8 August. Friendly casualties were
two killed and four wounded. There were no Viet Cong
casualties reported, but 17 suspects were detained.
8 August 1966
Ap - 019-3
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Latest MACV Infiltration Figures
11. MACV has increased its estimate of the
strength of each of the three regiments of the 324B
Division from 1,500 to 2,500 men. In addition, on
the basis of the interrogation
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and the normal TO&E structure
of an NVA division, MACV has accepted into the
"possible" category of the order of battle seven
support battalions of the 324th Division with a
total strength of 1,800 men. These support battal-
ions include antitank,, mortar, antiaircraft, en-
gineer, signal, transportation,and medical units.
The total strength of the division is now carried
at 9,410 men, instead of 5,000 as before.
12. These, and other minor changes recently
announced by MACV, raise the number of confirmed
North Vietnamese soldiers in South Vietnam to 44,900.
An additional 2,400 men are carried in the possible
category, for a total PAVN force in South Vietnam
of 47,300 men.
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1. The Unified Buddhist Association (UBA),
principal opponent of the GVN, plans to conduct a
nationwide election of delegates to convene a con-
stitutional convention in September. Today the as-
sociation repeated its call for a boycott of next
month's election. Thich Thien Hoa, acting chair-
man of the UBA's Institute, issued a communique
pointing out the Buddhist distrust of the present
military regime and calling' for a temporary civil-
ian government immediately to supplant it and take
charge of the elections.
2. Hoa's communique may represent a kind of
last warning before more active opposition to the
Ky government is initiated by the Buddhists. Some
remnants of the "struggle" movement are still ac-
tive in the Hue and Da Nang areas, and on the basis
of the partial ultimatum that Hoa appears to be
issuing, it may be possible to generate more trou-
ble for the government in these areas as well as
other parts of the country.
3. On Sunday, Thich Tri Quang was permitted
to leave his place of confinement in Saigon to at-
tend a meeting of the Buddhist Institute council.
The GVN has apparently relaxed its posture toward
Tri Quang since only last week it had prevented him
from leaving the hospital grounds.
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US AIRCRAFT LOSSES* 8 AUGUST 1966
THAILAND
Muong Nakhon Phanor\ -Khammouane
NORTH VIETNAM
F-105 Downed
t, F-4C Downed
Muong NO ._ n VIETNAM
SOUTH
LAOS
l
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III. MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS IN NORTH VIETNAM
1. US aircraft losses over North Vietnam con-
tinued at a high level for the second straight day
as three F-105 Thunderchiefs and an F-4C Phantom
were downed on 8 August.
2. Two of the F-105s were lost through un-
known action in the vicinity of Yen Bai. The first
aircraft went down while conducting an attack about
15 miles southeast of this important military com-
plex. The second Thunderchief was lost while pro-
viding cover for his downed wingman. The para-
chutes of both pilots were sighted and rescue ef-
forts are in progress. The third F-105 was re-
ported to have been downed by ground fire 51 miles
northwest of'Dong Hoi. Radio contact has been es-
,tablished with the pilot and an SAR attempt is un-
der way.
3. The F-4C was hit by ground fire approxi-
mately 40 miles north of Haiphong and was last re-
ported flying east in an effort to eject over the
Gulf of Tonkin. Rescue efforts have so far failed
to turn up any trace of the crew. The air force
has reported that the pilot of the RF-101 Voodoo
lost on 7 August 30 miles west of Yen Bai has been
recovered in fair'condition.
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IV. OTHER COMMUNIST MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS
1. There is nothing of significance to report.
8 August 1966
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A Survey of the Situation
In Quang Tri Province
1. Current allied operations and intelligence
reports indicate that there has been a large buildup
of Communist forces in the Lao/Vietnamese border
area north and south of Route 9, and in the area
just north of the six-mile-wide Demilitarized Zone
(DMZ) separating the two Vietnams.
2. In response to reconnaissance reports of a
North Vietnamese Army (NVA) concentration just south
of the DMZ, US Marine and South Vietnamese Army
(ARVN) forces initiated Operation HASTINGS in north-
ern Quang Tri Province on 7 July. Subsequently ex-
panded to include seven US and five ARVN battalions,
Operation HASTINGS established sporadic and often
heavy contact with major elements of the PAVN 324B
Infantry Division in this area during most of July
and in early August. By 3 August, when the opera-
tion ended, the allies had killed 882 enemy soldiers
(body count), captured 15, and seized 254 weapons.
The allies lost 147 killed (126 US) and 488 wounded
(448 US). Most of the fighting in Operation HAST-
INGS took place along the thickly forested ridges
and ravines of the central part of the province,
away from the flatlands on the coast where most of
the population resides.
3. Defector, prisoner, and reconnaissance re-
ports indicate-that units of the 324B Division began
their infiltration across the DMZ in May. This is
the first known major NVA troop movement via this
direct access route to South Vietnam. All three
2,500'-mark regiments (the 812th, 803rd, and 90th)
plus a 110-man control headquarters infiltrated
within a few weeks. This was the shortest period
that a unit of this size has taken to enter South
Vietnam. The presence of most of the division in
Quang Tri Province was officially confirmed by
COMUSMACV on 22 July.
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Reasons For Use of the DMZ
4. There are several possible reasons why
Hanoi decided to use the DMZ as a major infiltra-
tion route. First, it as quicker. A defector
Tstated that his unit's
rip--over the coastal plains of North Vietnam and
through foothills in the DMZ into Quang Tri's moun-
tainous interior--took only 12 days; the trip
through the Laotian corridor takes about 40. Second,
it was safer. Until recently, the DMZ was not
bombed, while the trail complex through Laos has
been under constant air attack. Third, the short-
ness of the trip through the DMZ meant less attri-
tion. The 324B Division had fewer men stricken
with malaria at the end of its trip than units which
have traveled through Laos. Finally, the use of the
DMZ meant the North Vietnamese could utilize forward
supply dumps north of the Zone.
5. In this connection, exploitation of North
Vietnamese documents captured during Operation HAST-
INGS reveals that all food for the 324th Division is
being procured in North Vietnam. This tends to con-
firm US pilot reports of rice stores scattered along
Route 102 just north of the DMZ and captive state-
ments that their units were responsible for trans-
porting rice across the Ben Hai River in the DMZ.
The extensive supply facilities detected in this
area suggest that Hanoi has made detailed plans to
resupply Communist troops in the South via the DMZ
and may have been using this shorter route for some
time. In the past, Communist units operating in
South Vietnam are believed to have relied almost ex-
clusively on locally gathered food.
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Objectives of the Buildup
7. The short-term objectives of the North
Vietnamese apparently were to secure the major com-
munication routes reaching into Quang Tri's central
and western mountains. There are two such routes:
Route 9, which connects Laos with Route 1 on the
South Vietnamese coast, and the Ba Long Valley,
cleared a ear ago by ARVN.
Boni troops o e 324B Division were to capture
the towns of Cam Lo and Dong Ha--both astride
Route 9--and the town of Ba Long, just inside the
entrance to the Ba Long Valley. Of the alleged
objectives, Dong Ha appears to be the most ambi-
tious;it is in the center of Quang Tri's thickly
inhabited plains at the juncture of Routes 1 and 9.
8. Prisoner interrogations indicate that
other Communist forces in Quang Tri and Thua Thien
provinces were to attack allied reinforcements.
An unidentified division in Laos was scheduled to
attack along Route 9 to ensure a free flow of food
and weapons into South Vietnam from Laos. The 304th
Division was reportedly in reserve in North Vietnam
just above the DMZ.
9. Ultimately, the North Vietnamese apparently
hope to "liberate" Quang Tri. The enemy may esti-
mate that his chances for success in a large offen-
sive are now better in I Corps than in any other
area of South Vietnam. The two northern provinces
of South Vietnam--Quang Tri and Thua Thien--were
part of North Vietnam's Military Region IV during
the French war. Therefore, this is "home" terri-
tory to many NVN units, and their knowledge of the
terrain is considerable. In addition, as noted,
the area is readily accessible to North Vietnamese
supply dumps north of the DMZ. Nearby sanctuary
in both Laos and North Vietnam may also be a factor
of major importance in the Communist strategy.
These military considerations, together with the
fragile political situation in I Corps--so evident
this spring--adds to the probability that the Com-
munists hope to mount a major offensive in the
northern I Corps area.
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10. In spite of the heavy casualties sustained
by elements of the 324B Division thus far in oper-
ation HASTINGS, MACV believes that the division re-
tains the capability of initiating multiregimental
attacks and, if reinforced, of initiating a divi-
sional-size thrust into central Quang Tri Province.
An offensive could be supported on the south by two
other PAVN regiments--the 6th and 95B.
The Government Situation in Quang Tri
11. Despite the recent battles and the near-
ness of the DRV, Quang Tri and its neighbor, Thua
Thien Province, are far more secure than the other
three I Corps provinces to the south. According to
MACV figures of 31 May, the Viet Cong firmly con-
trolled only 2.5 percent of Quang Tri's 270,000
people. The government reportedly controlled 46
percent, and most of the rest were contested. Since
the bulk of the populace lives in the lowlands, it
is outside the areas of normal Communist military
strength in the province.
12. Evidently the Viet Cong have been experienc-
ing difficulties in recruiting in Quang Tri and Thua
Thien. Viet Cong guerrilla strength in the two
provinces is reportedly low, and many members of
theoretically southern Communist battalions in the
area are in fact from North Vietnam.
13. General indifference to the Viet Cong
cause in Quang Tri, however, is not accompanied by
any strong feelings of loyalty toward the overn-
men t .
Iremarked in
mi une a ideology plays a minor part in the
local people's allegiance. Most are politically
apathetic. Even the Buddhist "struggle" movement,
which flared heavily in nearby Hue and Da Nang,
failed to stir greatly the people of Quang Tri.
There were demonstrations in Quang Tri city, but
they lacked zest. Many of the participants coming
in from the countryside were reported to have done
so because they liked the bus ride.
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14. Some causes of the civic indifference
are apparent. The provincial administration, long
beset by factional disputes, is inefficient even
by South Vietnamese standards. The distribution
of USAID commodities, such as cement has been re-
ported almost nonexistent.to district villages
outside of Quang Tri city. Pacification of dis-
puted hamlets is going slowly, possibly because
many members of the local pacification teams in
the area joined simply in order to avoid the
draft.
15. Despite the weakness of the government,
the Viet Cong and the North Vietnamese may well
have a hard time expanding their influence in Quang
Tri by means other than massive introduction of
NVA regulars. Refugees, although few in compari-
son with other provinces, are reported firmly
against the Communists, and the collection of in-
telligence in the area has greatly improved over
the last year. A report in March from a US ad-
viser to the ARVN 1st Division .(which operates
in Quang Tri and Thua Thien provinces) stated
the opinion that the local population did not
identify with Viet Cong main force battalions in
the region, probably because the battalions were
composed mostly of North Vietnamese draftees.
Presumably the people would be even more prone
to inform on units clearly labeled as northern,
such as the 324B Division.
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