THE SITUATION IN VIETNAM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00826A001100010021-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 31, 2006
• Sequence Number: 21
• Publication Date: August 9, 1966
• Content Type: MEMO

Approved For-release 2P9I2/08'CIA-RD T79T0082.8A001100010021-0
103
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
THE SITUATION IN VIETNAM
Information as of 1600
9 August 1966
State Dept. review completed
PREPARED FOR THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
FURTHER DISSEMINATION OF INFORMATION
CONTAINED HEREIN IS NOT AUTHORIZED
Approved For Release 2007/02/08 : CIA-RDP79T00826AO01100010021-0
OP SECRET
 25X1 Approved For Release 2007/02/08 : CIA-RDP79T00826AO01100010021-0
Approved For Release 2007/02/08 : CIA-RDP79T00826AO01100010021-0
 App
9 August 1966
A US Marine patrol was attacked by a company-
size Communist force yesterday in northernmost
Quang Tri Province. Interrogation of recently cap-
tured enemy personnel
reveals that Communist units in sev-
eral areas are suffering manpower problems, includ-
ing a high rate of illness from malaria.
I. The Military Situation in South Vietnam:
A US Marine patrol encountered a Communist force in
northern Quang Tri Province, resulting in 37 enemy
killed (Para. 1). As many as 170 Viet Cong may
have been killed as the result of an allied air
strike in Operation COLORADO/LIEN KET 52 in Quang
Nam and Quang Tin provinces (Para. 2). Recently
captured enemy troops report large number of malaria
cases in their units (Paras. 3-4).
II. Political Developments in South Vietnam:
French-owned rubber plantations in Binh Long Prov-
ince remain open as the result of political and
military action (Paras. 1-3). A letter from the
Buddhist Institute blames US policy toward South
Vietnam for much of the trouble in the country
(Paras. 5-6). The GVN has answered an earlier
four-point letter from the Buddhist Institute which
demanded clarification of government policy toward
the "struggle" movement and "strugglers" (Paras.
6-7).
Ap
 ApIproved For Release 2007/02/08 : CIA-RDP79T00826A001100010p21-0
IV. Other Communist Military Developments:
There is nothing of significance to report.
V. Communist Political Developments: A group
of North Vietnamese Government and party officials
has been reported in the USSR (Para. 1).
VI. Other Major Aspects: Thai Foreign Minis-
ter Thanat has indicated that one major purpose of
his proposal for an Asian-sponsored conference to
settle the Vietnam war was to "force" Asian coun-
tries to adopt a clearer stand on the war (Paras.
1-3).
9 August 1966
Approved For Release 2007/02/08 : CIA-RDP79T00826A001100010021-0
 Approved For Release 2007/02/08 : CIA-RDP79T00826AO01100010021-0
'J' Saravane
UUSMCIAPYN Ok
fla
SAIG
Quang In
Vinh Long.....
U$kM RYt'
Operation
CHE{ENNE
?a Nang
Ba Me
'haot
CURRENT SITUATION
63347 Approved For Release 2007/02/08 : CIA-RDP79T00826AO01100010021-0
 App
I. THE MILITARY SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM
1. A US Marine reconnaissance patrol, partici-
pating in Operation PRAIRIE, was attacked in'the
jungle-covered mountains of northern Quang Tri
Province yesterday by an estimated company-size
enemy force. Tactical air strikes and artillery
fire supported the Marines until reinforcements
could be helilifted into the area. Thirty-seven
Communist troops were killed in the action; Amer-
ican losses were five killed and 31 wounded.
2. South Vietnamese Marines participating in
Operation COLORADO/LIEN KET 52 reported finding.170
Viet Cong bodies (30 confirmed by US body count)
yesterday in an area about 30 miles south of Da
Nang. The bodies were found in the vicinity of a
7 August allied air strike. Cumulative friendly
casualties for this multibattaliQn: allied opera-
tion, which began on 5 August in Quang Tin and
Quang Nam provinces, were 15 killed (1 US) and'68
wounded (6 US). A total of 254 Communists has thus
far been reported killed.
More VC/NVA Manpower Difficulties
3. Some 20 Viet Cong and North Vietnamese
Army (NVA) personnel, captured on 6 August, stated
that they were from the communications wire support
company of the 3rd NVA Regiment, 620th Division.
The captives estimated that up to 90 percent of
the 3rd Regiment--last located in Quang Tin Prov-
ince--was, afflicted with malaria. At least half
of the 20 prisoners also had malaria.
9 August 1966
Approved For Release 2007/02/08 : CIA-RDP79T00826A001100010021
 App
4. The 32nd and 66th NVA regiments may also
be having manpower difficulties as a result of
malaria. The interrogation of two captives taken
during Operation PAUL REVERE in the central high-
lands indicates that the 32nd Regiment may be 800
men below its accepted strength of 2,000, while
at least one battalion of the 66th Regiment was
more than 50 percent depleted and had received
only four replacements since the first of the year.
The captive from the 66th Regiment stated that as
many as 40 percent of the remaining men in his
battalion were suffering from malaria.
Approved For Release 2007/02/08 : CIA-RDP79T00826A001100010021-0
 25X1 Approved For Release 2007/02/08 : CIA-RDP79T00826AO01100010021-0
Approved For Release 2007/02/08 : CIA-RDP79T00826AO01100010021-0
 Appro~
II. POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN SOUTH VIETNAM
1. A decision by French owners to close rub-
ber plantations in Binh Long Province was deferred
as a result of intercession by Prime Minister Ky and
of subsequent military operations to clear lines of
communication into th antation area,
The plantations concerned
were due to close on 1 August, but Ky promised a rep-
resentative of the rubber companies that they would
be adequately supplied with the items that they
needed. The immediate follow-up to this promise
was an airdrop of rice on 31 July and a promise of
more help by the GVN.
2. A large combined US Army/ARVN effort, Op-
eration CHEYENNE, was initiated on 1 August to clear
Route 13, the major land line of communication to
the French-owned plantations. The ef,fort'was suc-
cessful to the extent that a convoy of more than
300 trucks was able to deliver much-needed rice and
fuel. On the return trip, the convoy carried out
about 300 tons of rubber.
3. Although the US/ARVN road clearing effort
of 1-5 August was successful, it was still only a
stopgap solution. There are no indications that
Route 13 remains free of Viet Cong interdiction,
or that there is now a free flow of traffic over
this vital communication link.
of rubber to be moved from the plantations. The
reported French decision to keep these plantations
open, even though they do not operate as economi-
cally as ones in other countries of Southeast
Asia, indicates a French desire to maintain a con-
tinued presence in a vital South Vietnamese indus-
try.
here are still some 2,500 tons
9 August 1966
Appro
 Appro'
4. The text of the Buddhist Institute's 6 Au-
gust letter, addressed principally to the Secretary
General of the United Nations and the UN Human Rights
Commisssion, lays blame for a large measure of South
Vietnam's problems on US policy toward the country.
Calling "mistaken" a policy "which always supports
individuals in office," the letter goes on to say
that "the US Government must bear responsibility for
regrettable incidents of the past." The letter, signed
by acting chairman of the Buddhist Insitute Thich
Thien Hoa, bears down heavily on a theme of religious
persecution by the GVN, and pleads for the UN Secre-
tary General and the Human Rights Commission to seek
out ways to help save the Vietnamese nation, the Bud-
dhist religion, and, in particular, the life of Thich
Tri Quang.
5. The letter, which has apparently caused no
stir in Saigon political circles, may be an end-run
effort of the Buddhist leadership to see how far they
will be permitted to go in criticizing the government.
An overly permissive posture by the government may,
in the light of past experience, invite further Bud-
dhist probes.
6. The GVN, according to press accounts, today
replied to a 30 July letter of the Buddhist Institute
demanding that the government clarify its position
toward the recent "struggle" movement and toward the
treatment of Buddhist clergy and laity now detained.
The government's reply to the four-point Buddhist
missive denies that it considers struggles for free-
dom and democracy illegal; only "illegal means" are
subject to governmental censure. Concerning prosecu-
tion of the persons now held for their part in the
"struggle" movement, the GVN answered that investi-
gations are under way and that only those who have
violated the law will be tried. As for freedom of
the press and the censoring of Buddhist communiques,
the government's reply states that its policy is to
allow all signed communications to be published and
that only anonymous items will be denied press ex-
posure.
9 August 1966
Approved For Release 2007/02/08 : CIA-RDP79T00826AO0110001g021-0
 App
7. The Buddhist Institute has largely rejected
the GVN reply. The Institute position is that the
government reply does not directly answer the ques-
tions posed by them. For the moment, at least, the
issue appears to be stalemated between the GVN and
the Institute, but further Buddhist complaints will
probably surface in the near future.
9 August 1966
Approved For Release 2007/02/08 : CIA-RDP79T00826AO01100010021-1
 Approved ForKeease 2007/02/08 :CIA-RDP79T0082-6A 01100010021-0
a
~
Ko-c iu
.l?,DongVan
C ~
I N A I" 1
Ching-fist
Bao Lac
f%
lor
?M... ? H
,
:
Gi
,,.? CHINA
~ %
\
` (
a
ang
?\
Lao Cai Cac
Bang
?1'?
\~` B
C
i
\
ac
an ?
.
i
'?~ Lai Chau?
ng
ing-m
N
Tuyen Quang
? Ph
S
l
l
J ?L' N
hi
L
Lang Son
ong
y
:
g
a
a
o? Yen.
B
Thai
Phu Tho
?
Nguyen
rv
Mong Ca
Ke
Dien Bien Phu ?
Son La
Bac Giang
Phuc Yen ?
Sac Ninh
T
0
j,
ay
Son
HAN01
\
ang Yen
'
. J.,,`?
?
Hon Gai
.
\...~ / ~
Hoa Binh ?
Hai
Duong ? Haiphong
.?
~'v l
Hung Yen Kien An
?
Phu Ly
?Thai Binh
L A 0 S Samneua? ~~?. Nam D r
~
J
'?1 Ninh Binh
1
? Luang Prabang
Th
k
H
an
oa
?
Ban Chieng ~
Xieng Khouang ? /. ? Cua Roa Phu Qui ? {
Vang Vieng
?
{
t
Winn
Linh
Cam ? ia
Tinh
VIENTT AN Nong Khai `?
t (
`
T H A I L A N D
?
M
N
kh
Ph
song Hoi
uang
a
on
anom #.Khammouane
Muang Sakon Nakhon?,... %
Vinh Linh
DEMARCATION LINE
?~?
/
1 St
r DongHa
F
J
pon . BQHoSu ? ?Quang Tri
NORTH VIETNAM
~Savannakhet
SOUTH
H -
VIETNAM
g
?--.,
Muong No
LAOS 1
:?
....
0 25 50 75 Mlles
t
?~
0 25 50 75 Kiiomete, _ -
?+~
?Saravane
Approved For Release 2007/02/08 : CIA-RDP79T00826AO01100010021-0
 25X1 Approved For Release 2007/02/08 : CIA-RDP79T00826AO01100010021-0
Approved For Release 2007/02/08 : CIA-RDP79T00826AO01100010021-0
 App oved For Release 2007/02/08 : CIA-RDP79T00826AO01100010021-0 25X1
1. There is nothing of significance to report.
9 August 1966
Appro'ed For Release 2007/02/08 : CIA-RDP79T00826AO01100010021
 App
V. COMMUNIST POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS
1. According to a TASS broadcast on 9 August,
a group of "statesmen and party officials from the
DRV" were in the Soviet Union from 6 July to 9
August at the invitation of the CPSU central com-
mittee for "a holiday and medical treatment." There
is as yet no indication as to what officials made
up the delegation although the hospitality reportedly
accorded it by Soviet officials--including a meeting
with a member of the party secretariat, Kapitonov
--would indicate that some of the members were of
at least of central committee rank.
9 August 1966
Approved For Release 2007/02/08 : CIA-RDP79T00826A001100010p21-0
 Appro
VI. OTHER MAJOR ASPECTS
1. Thai Foreign Minister Thanat told US Am-
bassador Martin yesterday that he did not expect
the Communists to respond favorably to his 3 Au-
gust proposal that the Vietnam war be settled at
an Asian-sponsored conference. North Vietnam and
Communist China have, in fact, both denounced the
proposal. Thanat indicated, however, that one
purpose of his initiative was to "force" Asian
nations to take a clearer stand on the war. He
believed that the response to a Thai-Malaysian-
Philippine note of 8 August, calling for an Asian
appeal to the countries involved to negotiate an
end to the war, would be "surprising" and would
refute allegations that the US presence in South
Vietnam is universally-unpopular in Asia.
2. Thanat said that if favorable responses
were received from half of the 16 Asian countries
to whom the note was sent, he would then try to
arrange an early September conference to which the
nations involved in the war, including Communist
China, North Vietnam, and the US, would be in-
vited. If the Communists refuse to attend, as
Thanat anticipates, then the conference would be
limited to Asian nations and would be the occa-
sion for a general airing of views on how the war
can be ended.
3. In Saigon, Foreign Minister Do has
stated that the South Vietnamese Government wel-
comes the Thai effort, and has indicated that
Premier Ky will make a favorable response in a
speech to be given on 12 August during his visit
to Manila.
9 August 1966
Approved For Release 2007/02/08 : CIA-RDP79T00826A0011000100P1-0
 TOP SECIET~
Approved For Fialease 2007/02/08: CIA- P 9T00826401100010021-0
Approved For Release 2007/02/08 : CIA-RDP79T00826A001100010021-0
TOP SECRET