THE VIETNAMESE COMMUNISTS DEBATE MILITARY STRATEGY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00826A001100010046-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 30, 2006
• Sequence Number: 46
• Publication Date: August 25, 1966
• Content Type: IM

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INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
~ ` ~ ~ ~ : - 1 -~ I
'~ t
25 August 1966
No. 1596%66
Copy No .
THE VIETNAMESE COMMUNISTS DEBATE MILITARY STRATEGY
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
.~'F. C, RE T
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This Document contains information affecting the Na-
tional Defense of the United States, .within the mean-
ing of Title 18, Sections 793 and 794, of the U.S. Code, as
amended. Its transmission or revelation of its contents
to or receipt by an unauthorized person is prohibited
by law. The reproduction of this form is prohibited.
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
25 August 1966
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
The Vietnamese Communists Debate Military Strategy
Summary
Several recent articles in the North Vietnamese
press have provided a clearer insight into the di-
mensions of a debate among some of the top-level
North Vietnamese leaders over basic military strategy
in South Vietnam. The debate de-c~--n-ot appear ~e in-
volve~the question. _o_f~ .:________ __ ~_a___~?-vr---tcr~uit,
how best to defeat the US in the mili-
tary sphere. Openly on one side of the argument is
politburo member Nguyen. Chi Than.h, who probably has
been. in. the South directing the war, The chief' pro-
tagonist of the other side may be Vo Nguyen Giap,
Hanoi's long-time and respected minister of defense.
The debate apparently started in mid-1965 when.
the big buildup in US combat forces started to hurt
the Communists. It appears that some of the Hanoi
leaders, probably including Giap, questioned whether
the insurgent forces were capable of taking the of-
fensive at that time with persistent, large-scale,
anal lengthy attacks on US combat forces. They ap-
parently suggested a shift to a basically defensive
strategy that would emphasize the raiding anal ambush
tactics of the guerrilla in an effort to hold posi-
tion while shielding the regular Communist units
from heavy casualties. During the holding operation
the Communists would lay long-range plansfor counter-
ing the US buildup.
*This memorandum has been produced solely by CIA.
It was prepared by the Office of Current Intelli-
gence anal coordinated with the Office of National
Estimates.
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A decision was apparently made, nevertheless,
to proceed in basically the same operational military
style used before the US buildup began. The failure
of the Communist forces to regain the initiative dur-
ing the dry season, however, probably brought on an
extended policy review session in Hanoi in the spring
of 1966, at which time the debate was probably re-
newed.
The recent articles suggest that the question
of basic tactics for the forthcoming dry season. (No-
vember 1966 to May 1967) is still to be decided.
Meanwhile, the Communists are conducting the war in.
the South largely as they always have: drawing on
the book for basic strategy, but making the actual
defensive anal offensive moves contingent mainly on
local conditions at the time.
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1. In recent weeks, the dimensions of a debate
among some of the top-level Vietnamese Communist
leaders over how the war in South Vietnam should be
fought has come into sharper focus, New insights
into this debate have come largely from the analysis
of several authoritiative articles published in the
North Vietnamese press in July, two of which bluntly
discussed the "erroneous" attitudes toward the war
apparently held by certain unnamed party chieftains.
2. One of the articles was openly authored by
a North Vietnamese politburo member, General of the
Army Nguyen Chi Thanh. Thanh dropped out of sight
in late 1964 and has been~~d?~by severa-l---cap-
t-.used -Viet ++yyCong to be in South Vietnam. Presu;n b1 ,~1;~~~
~~ ~~
.
_
~a Yscr., t~r Id'~''~"''
. --~~ ____ _.. ---'J
~!~,~ felt called upon to defend his stewardship.
Another of the Jul
articles
itt
d
th
y
was wr
en un
er
e
pseudonym of "Truong Son" -(t~ie~tong--mountain range-~._~?`~~
~u~ng Son is reported to be Brigadier General
man Dg, who-~is deputy chief of the political office
for thPv...Gommunist ?military forces -in--South-.~,~.tnam. rk~~,
3. Both of these articles imply that the debate
over strategy began in mid-1965 when the buildup of
US combat forces in South Vietnam began to reach
significant proportions and the effect was felt on
the battlefiel.do Just before this, both argue, the
Communist forces had achieved strategic superiority
over the South Vietnamese Army (ARVN) following the
series of military defeats inflicted on it both in
the highlands and in the area around Saigon. Truong
Son pointed out that by mid-1965 the Communist forces
for the first time had managed close coordination
of their offensive actions both in the highlands and
in the delta. The result was to put such a strain
upon the ARVN's manpower that its tactical reserve
was virtually exhausted, leaving Saigon's forces at
their lowest ebb of the war in terms of offensive as
well as defensive capability.
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4. It was at this point that the US began its
rapid buildup of combat forces in South Vietnam,
which by August 1965 had blunted the Communist drive.
Thank and Truong Son. imply that9 faced with the US
buildup, some Vietnamese Communist: a.eaders questioned
whether the Communist forces were still. capable of
taking the offensive with persistent, large-scale,
and lengthy attacks on US combat forces. These
leaders apparently suggested a shift to a basically
defensive strategy that would mainly emphasize the
raiding and ambush tactics of the guerrilla in an
effort to hold position while shielding the regular
Communist units from heavy casualties. This holding
action. would give the Communists a chance to assess
the situation and lay long-range plans. It is pos-
sible that the defensive advocates were motivated
in part by a concern over the time required for the
North Vietnamese to form, train, anal send North Viet-
namese units south.
5~ These advocates of a defensive stance, it must
be emphasized, were dealing in the realm of very basic
military strategy and, while 'the dispute doubtless .had
a real military anal political. meaning to the Commu-
nist leadership, the course of the fighting in the
South might not have been drastically affected, re-
gardless of the basic decision taken., The Communists
have always been very pragmatic in their military
tactics and actions, tending to judge each battle-
field situation. by the conditions prevailing at the
time, anal it is probable that an over-all shift to
the defensive would not have .resulted in a dis-
cernible change in many individual battle actions,
at least over the short term. The Communists would
have continued to moves on a large scale or in guer-
rilla-like thrusts, as the immediate situation.
dictated,
6, Moreover., it appears from the statements
of Nguyen. Chi Thank and Truong Son that a decision.
was made in mid-1965 to proceed in basically the
same operational military style used before the US
buildup began, i.eo, large-scale and sustained of-
fensiv~ actionso Thanh's main argument in support
of such a decision. was apparently that the Communist
forces in South Vietnam, bolstered by the North Viet-
namese troops i.n the South, could hold their own in
battle during the November 1965 - May 1966 "dry
season.."
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Spring Policy Meeting
7. The failure of the Communist forces to re-
gain. the initiative during the dry season, however,
appears to have occasioned an extended policy re-
view session. in. Hanoi some time in late April or
May 1966. Most of the North Vietnamese leaders were
absent from view during this period, as has often.
been the case during past high-level meetings. Furthes'-
more, during May and June no significant articles on.
the war appeared in the Vietnamese Communist press,
in contrast to the spurt of such articles that began.
appearing in July.
8. Judging from the tenor of the remarks of
Thanh anal Truong Son, considerable opposition was
voiced at the April-May meeting to the way the war
was being fought, particularly during the dry sea-
son. Thanh anal Truong Son went to great lengths in
asserting that the Communists had, in fact, won sig-
nificant victories during that period. They made
little effort, however, to prove their assertions,
and instead took the offensive against their oppo-
nents, who are almost certainly top-level military
planners. Truong Son. accused the opponents of the
all-out offensive strategy of "tremblin.g" before the
material anal technical power of the US. He implied
that some Vietnamese Communist planners had over-
estimated the US and "would have made blunders when
making strategic decisions during the dry season."
9. Both Thanh and Truong Son. criticized their
opponents for substituting "book knowledge" for ex-
perience on the battlefield. "If we evaluate the
enemy in an automatic and bookish manner," Truong
Son. declared, "we cannot find a correct answer to
our combat plans." Further, "if we had automatically
sought a ready-made formula," or "copied the ex-
periences of foreign countries" without "selecting
and analyzing," "we would: have failed."
10. Truong Son. also declared that "had we re-
treated to the strategic defensive position, this
would have hampered the development of our position.
and strength anal created conditions for the originally
strategically weak enemy to grow strong anal to launch
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an offensive against us." The enemy "would have
been. in a far stronger position.," said Truong Son,
"if we had hesitated, showed a lack of determination
to attack, anal let the enemy attack first." Instead,
"we applied in a versatile anal creative way the policy
of avoiding places where the enemy was strong," but
of still staying on the offensive and continuing to
hit "places where he was weak."
Giap Involved
11. In. view of the basic nature of the strategy
shift advocated, and the open. debate over it, it is
likely that very high-level North Vietnamese policy
makers were involved. One individual who advocated
a defensive shift may have been North Vietnamese De-
fense Minister Vo Nguyen Giap. Giap and Nguyen Chi
Than.h have long been reported to be bitter enemies,
anal it is possible that Giap has tried to use the
failure of the Communists in the dry season to under-
mine Thanh's position. This would account for Thanh's
staunch defense of his record.
12. In his July article, Thanh insisted that i~t
was necessary for a "leader" to base his action on
the realities of the present situation anal not follow
"old-fashioned" concepts and "old customs." He ap-
peared to have in mind the reliance that some North
Vietnamese military leaders have placed on lessons
learned in the war with France. One of these pro-
ponents has been General Giap, who led the Viet Minh
armies against the French. At on.e point in the con-
flict with France, the Viet Minh pulled back, re-
trenched, anal adopted more flexible tactics designed
to avoid conventional-type battles where the ad-
vantages were not almost entirely with the Viet Minh.
This change in. strategy followed a series of dis-
astrous frontal engagements in the Red River delta
in which the French ability to bring artillery and
air power to bear from fixed positions had cost the
Communists extremely heavy casualties for little or
no gain.. It seems that Giap may have advocated a
similiar shift in tactics in this war for somewhat
the same reasons.
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Prospects
13. Whoever the main protagonists are, it ap-
pears that the issue is still under active discus-
sion. Shortly after the appearance of Truong Son?s
article, the North Vietnamese press presented a com-
mentary on it by Vuong Thua Vu, a DRV military expert
who has written a great deal on the war. Vu pointedly
endorsed the conclusions contained "in the first
part" of Truong Son's article, namely that the Commu-
nists, despite the introduction of US combat forces,
are still in the "best strategic position ever."
However, Vu attempted to look ahead to the "next
dry season." from November 1966 to May 1967, noting
that Truong Son's discussion had provided a "firm
foundation." from which to ''ponder over anal develop
more profoundly" the issues he had raised. In other
words, Vu seemed to be saying that the decision on
basic tactics for the coming dry season campaign is
still to be made and that other views, aside from
Truong Son's, should be heard.
14. The Communist military tactics now being
used in the South suggest that the defensive advo-
cates in the Vietnamese Communist hierarchy are still
very influential. During the present monsoon season.,
the expected Communist offensives have failed to de-
velop on any major scale. In large part, this ap-
pears to have been due to the success of allied
spoiling actions in preventing the concentration of
Communist forces for big attacks. However, it ap-
parently also reflects a basic caution on the part
of the Communists, for they do not appear in many
instances to have tried to concentrate their forces
for large campaigns, as had been expected.
15. It is probable that basic strategy questions
for the coming dry season are still very actively
under consideration. in Hanoi as the Communists seek
some formula that will offset the loss of momentum
by their forces during the last 12 months. For this
reason., in part, there is doubt over the truth of
rumors from varied sources that General Giap's pres-
tige and authority have been seriously shaken and
that he is in political eclipse because he has advo-
cated a defensive retrenchment in the South, He has
certainly not lost his official position, since he
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has recently appeared in public in exercise of his
office .
16. Meanwhile, the war in. the South is being
conducted largely as the Communists have always con-
ducted it: drawing on the book for basic strategy,
but making each defensive anal offensive move on the
basis of local conditions at the time. Efforts to
build up the main forces by heavy infiltration of
men and materiel continue at a steady pace, since a
large growth in Communist military strength will be
needed to counter the US regardless of the strategy
used in the fighting.
17. Fin.ally,rj:t is instructive that none of the
apparent protagon"fists in the debate over strategy has
anywhere charged or hinted that.--the other s-fide favore
~
war. Moreover, other
a negotiated settlement of ~he
articles; speeches, and private statements on t#~e
conflict all continue t~i~ take a very `hard line"`. It
seems clear, therefore, that the ,.debate within the
leadership is over-how best to -f-`fight the war, rather
than over whether to fight or to quit.
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25 August 1J66
Talking Paper for: "The Vietnamese Communists
Debate Military Strategy"
This memorandum was originated by OCI to provide
background and elaboration on the recent articles in
the North Vietnamese press which have suggested a high-
level dispute over Communist military strategy in South
Vietnam.
The memo concludes that
some
Vietnamese Communist
military leaders apparently
favor
a generally defensive
strategy for Communist main
forces
in South Vietnam in
an effort to cut casualties
while
the Communists plan
long-range strategy to cape with the buildup of US forces.
Other Communist military leaders favor continuation
of sustained, large-scale attacks on US forces in an ef-
fort to prevent the allies from gaining the strategic
initiative.
Top-level North Vietnamese, including General Giap,
may be involved in the dispute.
Subcabinet and routine internal dissemination is
suggested.
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