THE SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00826A001200010002-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 23
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 23, 2005
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: August 29, 1966
• Content Type: IR

Approved For Release 2006/03/17: CIA-RDP7QS*aIEPRQQT0010002-0
29 August 1966
No. 0388/66
Copy No.
INTELLIGENCE REPORT
USAID, ARMY, State reviews completed
I'll[, SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM
DIRECTORATE 0F INTELLIGENCE
Approved For Release 2006/03/17 : Cl 2-0
SECRET
GROUP i
1-1,,ded from automatic
downgrodmq and
deck sifi-tio,
 Approved For (ease 2006/03/17 : CIA-RDP79T0082NW01200010002-0
This document contains information affecting the
national defense of the United States, within the
meaning of Title 18, sections 793 and 794, of the US
Code, as amended. Its transmission or revelation
of its contents to or receipt by an unauthorized
person is prohibited by law.
Approved For Release 2006/03/17 : CIA-RDP79T00826AO01200010002-0
 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
THE SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM
(23 August - 29 August 1966)
POLITICAL SITUATION I
Viet Cong anti-election effort; Buddhist
Institute boycott of election; Govern-
ment attempts to assure large turnout;
Significance of size of the vote.
REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT II
Achievements during July; Rural attitudes
toward revolutionary development; Cadres'
status during July; Viet Cong defectors
(Chieu Hoi).
ECONOMIC SITUATION III
Prices; Currency and gold; Pork; Rice;
Credit; Meeting with Minister Thanh;
Textile production; Labor problems.
ANNEX: Weekly Retail Prices in Saigon (table)
South Vietnam Economic Indicators (graphs):
-Free Market Gold Prices (weekly and monthly)
-Cost of Living Index
-Foreign Exchange Reserves
SUPPLEMENT: Buddhist and Other Anti-election Activity
Approved For Release 2006/fyE(C
I T00826A001200010002-0
 Approved For Fase 2006/03/17 : CIA-RDP79T008261200010002-0
t..
SOUTH VIETNAM
CURRENT SITUATION
0 25 50 75 100Miies
25 50 75 I n Kilometers
25X1
Approved For Release 2006/03/17 : CIA-RDP79T00826AO01200010002-0
 Approve F%wRelease 002-0
. POLITICAL SITUATION
Reports from South Vietnam continue
to reflect a significant effort by the
Viet Cong to disrupt the election oZ a
constitutional assembly. The Buddhist
Institute militants, meanwhile, are im-
plementing their call for an election
boycott. Premier Ky initiated the for-
mal, two-week campaign period by appeal-
ing for a large voter turnout despite the
threat of Viet Cong intimidation. The
magnitude of the anti-election activities
and the strong government efforts to coun-
ter them thus impart increasing signifi-
cance to the size of the vote.
Viet Cong Anti-Election Effort
1. The Viet Cong are making a significant na-
tionwide effort to disrupt South Vietnam's election
of a constitutional assembly on 11 September. Nu-
merous reports reveal that Viet Cong anti-election
plans in the provinces range from the seizure of
voter identity cards, sabotage of polling places,
and interception of ballot boxes to the specific
deployment of a well-armed enemy battalion near a
populated area in central Vietnam. Communist prop-
aganda, more intensive than that preceding past
elections, reached a high point on 21 August when a
Liberation Front radiobroadcast threatened the lives
of candidates and government personnel assisting in
the election process in the Saigon area.
2. Specific Communist incidents directly as-
sociated with the election have been scattered thus
far, but more can be expected as public gatherings
for events during the formal campaign period offer
the Viet Cong opportunities for acts of terrorism
and sabotage. 25X1
_/-Further separate coverage of this subject is
anTicipated over the next several weeks.)
L 25X1
Approved 02-0
 Approved
Buddhist Institute Boycott of Election
3. The Buddhist Institute militants are also
implementing their call for an election boycott.
According to evidence received by the US Embassy,
an anti-election communique issued by the institute
has been transmitted in the form of instructions to
Buddhist representatives in the delta,: and possibly
throughout the country. The institute, in a declara-
tion made public on 16 August, directly urged the
Buddhist faithful to exercise their right not to vote
in the election. Reports from the provinces, es-
pecially those in central Vietnam, also indicate that
local Buddhist leaders responsive to the institute
are attempting to follow through on the boycott.
4. Moderate Buddhists, who presently have little
influence on institute policy, feel that the militants
may be planning some kind of action to dramatize their
boycott, although they do not believe that the mili-
tants would dare to resume street demonstrations. Pre-
mier Ky recently warned that firm action would be
taken against anyone 'interfering directly with the
elections. A leading southern Buddhist lay leader re-
cently told a US official that he would vote in the
election because it had become an issue between non-
Communists and the Viet Cong. (More detailed coverage
of the Buddhist anti-election situation is included as
a supplement to this publication.)
Government Attempts to Assure Large Turnout
5. On the positive side, Premier Ky initiated
the formal, two-week campaign period with a public ad-
dress on 25 August, appealing for a large voter turn-
out despite the threat of Viet Cong intimidation.
Normal censorship restrictions on the local press have
been eased somewhat and candidates will be given free
broadcasting time to heighten public interest in the
election. The US Embassy has commented that other gov-
ernment efforts to stimulate voter awareness are show-
ing good results, and various reports suggest that
maximum use will be made of government personnel to
increase the voter turnout on election day.
Approved
 Approved, Fe*"1eaco22006 Q'A12i'i& C~ L08 22000r.2-0
Significance of Size of the Vote
6. The decision by the Viet Cong to discredit
and disrupt the election and the government's strong
efforts to thwart such attempts are thus imparting
increasing significance to the size of the voter turn-
out. There are wide divergencies among Vietnamese--
even within government circles--as to what effect the
Viet Cong anti-election campaign, and that of the
Buddhist Institute, will have on the percentage of
the electorate voting on election day. Last month,
before indications of the magnitude of the Viet Cong
effort became apparent, the US Embassy reported that
it was reasonable to assume a turnout of between 75
and 80 percent. Recently, however, individual em-
bassy officers have been trying to convey an impres-
sion to the press that a turnout of 50 percent of the
registered voters should be considered a solid govern-
ment achievement. believes 25X1
I Iwith a Buddhist boycott, only 30 to 40 percent
o the electorate will vote in central Vietnam. He
expects the turnout in the southern provinces to
average 50 percent, with possibly 60 percent voting
in Saigon.
25X1
Approved or Release ZUUb/UJ
-
 Appr
(ease 200T9T0088001200010002-0
I I
II. REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT
The US Mission summary of revolutionary
development for the month of July cautiously
highlights an increase in the number of ham-
lets, population, and territory secured.
However, five provinces reported a net loss
of hamlet control. There continue to be prob-
lems with regard to the Vietnamese officials
who control the operation of the pacification
cadre groups and with the cadres themselves.
USAID projects registered general progress
despite continued difficulties in commodity
distribution and shortages of construction
material. The national attitude toward paci-
fication, such as it exists, still appears to
be one of a lack of understanding of the real
aims of the program, mixed with pleasure on
receiving its benefits and fear of Viet Cong
reprisals after pacification cadres leave an
area. During the week ending 19 August, 279
Vietnamese Communists defected to the GVN.
Achievements During July
1. According to the official US Mission report
for the month of July, the mainstay of the Revolution-
ary Development (RD) program--the securing of hamlets--
has forged ahead a little more. The net increase in
July of 34 secure or "pacified" hamlets brings the
number of such hamlets to 4,088, out of a total of
some 13,000 hamlets throughout the country. As of 31
July, MACV estimates 54.6 percent of the population
and 11.4 percent of the land to be "secure." MACV's
July tally of the number of provinces and autonomous
cities showing progress or regression in securing their
respective hamlets is as follows:
Progress -
27
provinces,
1 autonomous city
No change -
11
provinces,
2 autonomous cities
Regression -
5
provinces
In the five provinces that lost ground (Tuyen Due, Binh
Thuan, Tay Ninh, Bien Hoa, and Long An), 40 hamlets
were downgraded in status from the previous month.
App
 Approved Fb elease 20Q 1 -j(79T00$? A001200010002-0
2. USAID's programs progressed in general dur-
ing July. In Region I (I Corps), the most noteworthy
accomplishments were the increased flow of commodities
and the completion of 151 classrooms; 257 more are un-
der construction. In the rest of the country, provin-
cial insecurity and an inadequate transportation system
continued to be primary negative influences on the dis-
tribution of commodities. Throughout the country,
there were indications of a construction cost squeeze
and a shortage of construction materials, partially as
a result of the increasing competition for materials
from other ministries and private contractors.
Rural Attitudes Toward Revolutionary Development
3. JUSPAO (USIA) identifies three "relatively
mild" national attitudes toward pacification. First,
there still does not appear to be any real understanding
of what the Revolutionary Development (RD) program is.
Despite this lack of understanding, recipients demon-
strate some pleasure at being the beneficiaries of the
program. There is also, however, a basic fear of re-
prisals from the Viet Cong when pacification cadres
leave an area. The mild national interest in pacifica-
tion is still apparently overshadowed by the preoccupa-
tion with the high cost of living. Additionally, lack
of interest by the peasantry is related to an unfortu-
nate ignorance of the provincial and corps officials
responsible for implementing and monitoring the RD
program as to its aims. JUSPAO also points out that
the cadres themselves do not possess the capability
to exploit the psychological aspects of their work.
The weak psychological link is further compounded by
the fluctuating support and effectiveness of the Viet-
namese Information Service in the provinces.
Cadres' Status During July
4. The effects of local insecurity and ineffec-
tive leadership have had and probably will continue
to have serious consequences for the success of the
RD cadre program. There are continuing signs in some
provinces that the work of the cadres has taken a turn
for the worse. Apparently, both the cadres and the
controlling officials have been at fault, particularly
in the case of groups recently graduated from the first
Appro
 Approved Felease 209VJ7 -1k79T00>A001200010002-0
class at Vung Tau under the reorganized cadre con-
cept. Specific problems with the cadre controlling
mechanism included a wholesale change of provincial
officials in the wake of the "struggle" movement,
and a resultant atmosphere of general confusion and
inactivity. Cadre groups rendered inactive eventually
suffered a loss of motivation. Moreover, there was a
higher incidence of desertion and absenteeism among
the cadres. In the past, an unusually high level of
motivation and national identity had been characteris-
tic of teams, setting them apart from other specialized
paramilitary and technical cadres.
5. In spite of the confusion and cadre apathy
in some areas, inspection trips to the provinces by
General Thang, Minister of RD, have provided a wel-
come stimulus to provincial officials. As a result
of Thang's visits, US officials report that district
chiefs, most of whom are grossly uninformed, have been
prodded into paying more attention to pacification.
In order to provide necessary guidance and provoke
interest in the cadre program, an orientation course
for district and province chiefs has been established
at the national training center. Other orientation
classes and a longer leadership training course have
also been initiated, with stress on management, ad-
ministration, and support at all levels.
Viet Cong Defectors (Chieu Hoi)
6. The defector tally for the week of 13-19
August follows:
I Corps
5
II Corps
86
III 'Corps
86
IV Corps
92
Total
*279 (187 military)
Chieu Hoi Weekly Report Number 22 lists a total of
279 returnees. The total by corps areas, however,
adds up only to 269. The discrepancy is probably
in one of the corps tallies.
Appro 0002-0
 Approved Fo? Iease 2006S SE( R-jFD? T'9T008 001200010002-0
The week's take of returnees included one North Viet-
namese Army platoon leader and ten cadre-level Viet
Cong. In the Da Nang area, an experiment utilizing
defectors to identify Viet Cong among persons collected
during US Marine clearing operations netted 19 Com-
munists.
25X1
Approved Foci eleasc 29QQiF,!Iil . ?nn-7aT00526 n 001 20001 n 02-0
 Approved FoIease 2006 9T008 '001200010002-0
III. ECONOMIC SITUATION
South Vietnam's economy showed several
encouraging signs in the week ending 16 August.
Prices of both domestic and imported goods
fell substantially. According to the USAID
retail price index, prices now have risen
roughly.15 percent since the piaster was de-
valued by 50 percent two months ago. The
price of pork fell by one third as arrivals
of hogs in Saigon increased considerably.
Rice prices also moved down; USAID reports
that deliveries of rice to Saigon during the
first half of August were relatively good.
Free market gold and currency rates continued
to tumble, and by 19 August the price of
dollars and gold had reach?d new lows for 1966.
Moreover, with the successful domestic
production of high-quality cloth for uniforms,
a breakthrough has occurred in the program to
utilize local facilities for the production of
goods for South Vietnam's armed forces. Equally
encouraging was the fact that Minister of Economy
Thanh called a meeting with US officials and sug-
gested that commencing 1 September a joint US-GVN
meeting should be held every ten days to review
economic problems, policies and future plans.
The US quickly endorsed this proposal.
1. The recent encouraging decline in retail
prices in Saigon has resumed after being interrupted
by a moderate increase in the week ending 8 August.
The over-all USAID retail price index declined six
percent for the week ending 16 August, with food down
seven percent and nonfood items down two percent. Ac-
cording to this index, prices have risen roughly 15
percent since the piaster was devalued by 50 percent
two months ago.
2. The principal reason for the decline in the
week ending 16 August was a decrease of roughly one
third in the price of pork, which in turn led to lower
Appro
 Approve - 0002-0
prices for fish, chicken, and shrimp. The decline
in the price of pork reflected increased hog arrivals
in Saigon (see Paras 5-7). Prices of many other
food items, including two varieties of rice, also
declined. The largest drop recorded was for con-
densed milk, the price of which was 15 percent below
that of 8 August. Among nonfood items, lower prices
for charcoal and firewood were most notable. (A
table of retail prices in Saigon is included in the
annex).
3. The wholesale price of every imported com-
modity sampled declined, continuing the trend begun
about five weeks ago. This most recent decline re-
portedly results from the tight credit situation which
has forced importers to liquidate their inventories.
Significant declines were recorded by condensed milk
and iron and steel products.
Currency and Gold
4. Free market rates are tumbling as the GVN
continues its sale of gold and as credit becomes
tight. On 15 August, the price of dollars fell 23
piasters to 170 piasters per dollar and gold moved
down to 230 piasters per dollar, or 12 piasters below
the official sale price. MPC (scrip) declined 11
piasters to 112 piasters per dollar--the lowest rate
thus far in 1966. In Hong Kong, the piaster-dollar
cross rate rose slightly to 184. By 19 August the
price of dollars (158 piasters) and gold (213 piasters)
had reached new lows for 1966. (Graphics on monthly
and weekly free market gold and currency prices are
included in the annex.)
5. Arrivals of hogs at the Saigon slaughter-
house have increased notably since late July. In
the week ending 19 August, arrivals totaled 8,113
compared with only 3,940 in the week ending 29 July.
Arrivals now are approaching the normal consumption
of the Saigon area, and prices have fallen close to
the official levels.
Appr
 Approved FoIease 2006/ / T008201200010002-0
F
6. Although there is as yet no clear explana-
tion for this upturn in hog deliveries, the follow-
ing reasons have been advanced: (a) supplies of
hogs have built up in the producing provinces to
such an extent that suppliers must resort to official
channels, in addition to the black market, for an
outlet; (b) suppliers are trying to market their
hogs before prices fall as a result of the importa-
tion of frozen pork scheduled for September; and
(c) the Viet Cong are allowing more hogs to be shipped
out of VC-controlled areas in order to build up false
confidence until a few days before the 11 September
elections, when the VC will abruptly cut off supplies.
This latter explanation was put forth by a knowledge-
able official of the GVN Ministry of Agriculture. The
US Embassy regards this as unlikely, but notes that
Viet Cong attempts to disrupt elections by cutting off
shipments of hogs and other commodities from the
countryside will bear close watching.
7. Meanwhile, preparations are being made for
the importation during September of 1,500 tons of
frozen pork. GVN officials have held a meeting with
butchers and suppliers of hogs to resolve problems
related to the marketing of the imported pork. USAID
has offered assistance to the GVN Office of Supply
on the technical problems of storage and distribution
of the frozen pork.
8. Both wholesale and retail prices of rice
have moved down slightly in Saigon during the past
few weeks. Paddy prices in the delta, however, con-
tinue to increase. The US Embassy reports it is pos-
sible that prices now have peaked and that a fair
quantity of rice will be released for sale during the
remainder of 1966. Deliveries of rice to Saigon dur-
ing the first half of August were relatively good.
Minister of Economy Thanh has agreed to the formation
of a joint US-GVN rice board, the structure and exact
function of which remain to be discussed.
9. Credit became tighter in Saigon as the
National Bank of Vietnam reportedly began to refuse
Appr ved For Release 2006/03/17 : CIA-RDP79T00826AO01200 10002-0
~~R~~1
 Approved Fo Release 200f 'L'^: 'R4 79T0088 001200010002-0
to lend money to banks on the security of treasury
bonds, which the banks were forced to buy two months
ago. Some of the smaller Vietnamese banks now have
loaned all available funds. Robert Nathan, currently
in Saigon as a US economic adviser, commented on
18 August that, although credit must be restricted,
excessive tightening of credit could be counterproduc-
tive.
Meeting with Minister Thanh
10. At the initiative of Minister of Economy
Thanh, Deputy Ambassador Porter and other US officials
met with Thanh and his staff on 19 August ostensibly
to review major economic problems. The main result of
the meeting was a suggestion by Thanh that, commencing
1 September and every ten days thereafter, a joint
US-GVN meeting should be held to review economic prob-
lems, policies, and future plans. The US quickly en-
dorsed Thanh's proposal.
11. In his opening remarks, Thanh noted the
necessity of continuing to have a realistic and dynamic
economic policy which deals not only with short-term
economic problems but also with building a healthy
economy in the long run. Thanh agreed that, in addi-
tion to specific problems, the forthcoming regularly
scheduled meetings should consider broad problems
such as a total piaster budget and allocation of man-
power resources. Finally, Thanh noted that the GVN
has no planning experts and requested help on this
score. The US Embassy considers this meeting a most
salutary development, particularly since it was initi-
ated by Thanh, and intends to use future meetings
constructively.
12. A breakthrough has occurred in the program
of encouraging utilization of local facilities for
the production of commodities for South Vietnam's
armed forces. Plants affiliated with Vinatexco and
Vinatefinco, two large Vietnamese textile firms,
have successfully completed production of 50,000
meters of high quality camouflage twill cloth for
Appro ed For Release 2006/03/17 : CIA-RDP79T00826AO01200 10002-0 25X1
 Approved Fctelease 200 1 ~"9TO08 001200010002-0
uniforms. Now that it has been proven that such
fabric can be produced domestically, it is antici-
pated that additional contracts for local produc-
tion of this cloth will be forthcoming.
13. According to MACV, some 400 workers in
the Saigon area, engaged in moving goods destined
for US troops, went on strike on 19 August. The
workers are protesting a pay reduction which re-
sults from a change of working hours from two
12-hour shifts to three eight-hour shifts. Mili-
tary personnel have been moving the supplies since
the strike began.
Appro
 Approved Fcir.Release 2006XVXCZ W9T00NWA001200010002-0
TABLE
Weekly Retail Prices in Saigon J
(In Piasters)
Percent Percent
Change Change
3 Jan 18 Jul 25 Jul 1 Aug 8 Aug from from
1966 1966 1966 1966 1966 Mo. Ago Yr. Ago
Index for All Items J
160
209
217
219
228
+ 6
+ 110
Index for Food Items
169
220
230
228
237
-0.3
+ 113
Of Which:
Rice/Soc Nau (100 kg.)
800
1,500
1,500
1,500
1,450
0
+ 71
Pork Bellies (1 kgb)
70
150
150
14+0
150
- 12
+ 150
Fish/Ca Tre (1 kg.)
110
140
160
160
190
+ 6
+ 217
Nuoc Mam (jar)
50
85
85
85
85
0
+ 55
Index for Non-Food Items
124
172
172
185
194
+ 26
+ 99
Of Which:
Charcoal (60 kg.) 440
600
600
600
620
+ 13
+ 82
Cigarettes (pack) 10
12
12
12
14
+ 27
+ 40
White Calico (deter) 27
40
40
40
38
- 3
+ 73
Laundry Soap (1 kg.) 30
45
44
44
44
+ 10
+ 100
J Data are from USAID sources.
b/ For all indexes, 1 January 1965 = 100.
 Approved Fci elease 2006/03/17: CIA-RDP79TO081 A001200010002-0
SOUTH VIETNAM ECONOMIC INDICATORS
Monthly Free Market Gold and Currency Prices
JANUARY 1964 - JULY 1966
WW._0.?S.
1 0 0 111 1 1111111L 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 I 1 1 1 1 L 1 1 1 1 1 i -'
1964 DJ FMAMJ J ASONDJFMA MJ J ASOND
1965 1966
Weekly Free Market Gold and Currency Prices
3 JANUARY 1966 - 15 AUGUST 1966
4 00 --
Piasters per US Dollar at End of Week
1N FEB MAR APR MAY JUNE JUL AUG
OWN"
3 I11824 2 7 1423 28 7 14 2128 4 1118 25 3 9 1623 31 6 13.21 27 5 11 18 25 1
It
GOLD (Saigon) Piaster price per US dollar of gold calculated on
the basis of gold leaf as worth $35 per troy ounce.
US $10 GREEN (Saigon)
PIASTER-DOLLAR CROSS RATE - Piaster-dollar exchange rate in Hong
(Hong Kong) Kong calculated by reference to the
exchange rates of these two currencies
to the Hong Kong dollar.
US $10 MPC (Saigon) - Military Payment Certificates (scrip).
Approved For Release 2006/03/17 : CIA-RDP79T00826A001200010002-0
 Approved Foelease 2006/03/17 : CIA-RDP79T008W001200010002-0
SOUTH VIETNAM ECONOMIC INDICATORS
Cost of Living Index* (For Working-class Family in Saigon
JANUARY 1963 - JUNE 1966
Money Supply
JANUARY 1963 - JUNE 1966
1959 =
100
1963 9264 0 J FMAMJ J AS0NDJ fMAMJ J A SkOND
1965 1966
Approved For Release 2006/03/17 : CIA-RDP79T00826AO01200010002-0
 Approved Felease 2006/03/17 : CIA-RDP79T00$WA001200010002-0
SOUTH VIETNAM ECONOMIC INDICATORS
Foreign Exchange Reserves
JANUARY 1963 - JUNE 1966
1963 1964 D J f M A M J J AS O ND J F M A M J J A S O N D
1965 1966
Approved For Release 2006/03/17 : CIA-RDP79T00826AO01200010002-0
 Approv mse /
R(ZL - T0082W01200010002-0
SUPPLEMENT
BUDDHIST AND OTHER ANTI-ELECTION ACTIVITY
The Buddhist Institute
1. The main source of Buddhist opposition to
the Constituent Assembly election scheduled 11 Sep-
tember is the United Buddhist Association, speaking
through the Buddhist Institute. With the voice of
Thich Tri Quang muted by his virtual house arrest
while fasting since early June, his antigovernment
influence is being exercised through the acting
head of the Buddhist Institute, Thich Thien Hoa.
2. A recent series of Buddhist Institute com-
muniques and announcements has reiterated demands
that the present government immediately step aside
and allow a transitional government to supervise
the election. A declaration made public on 16 August
spelled out a position of noncooperation for the
Buddhist church and urged the laity to boycott the
election. This call for a Buddhist boycott will
probably adversely affect voter turnout--particularly
in I Corps--and may prevent the government from
attaining a percentage of participation equal to that
of 1965, when 73 percent of the registered electorate
voted.
3. At least one Vietnamese observer has esti-
mated that the Buddhist boycott may result in only
30-40 percent of the electorate voting in central
Vietnam. For the rest of the country, he predicts
a possible 60 percent turnout in Saigon and about 50
percent in the delta provinces. The US Embassy has
commented that a 50 percent national turnout would be
a significant achievement for the government.
Developments in the Provinces
4. Most of the reports of Buddhist anti-election
activity have originated from the Hue and Da Nang
areas of I Corps, where remnants of last spring's
"struggle" movement have gone underground following
government suppression.
S-1
Ap 6/03/17 : CIA-RDP79T00826A001 00010002-0
 Approved 10002-0
5. Several organizations have been detected by
Vietnamese security forces in Hue, and such groups are
known to be disseminating propaganda tracts and news-
papers. The Viet Cong are apparently attempting to
infiltrate these clandestine organizations as well as
youth and teachers organizations, and may attempt to
use them to disrupt the elections.
6. In Da Nang, low-level reports have been re-
ceived about an all-out Buddhist effort to oppose the
election. However, actual anti-election activity by
the Buddhists in Da Nang has to date consisted mainly
of spreading anti-election leaflets.
7. Reports have also been received concerning
Buddhist anti-election activities in Khanh Hoa Prov-
ince including methods which play on the superstitious
nature of the people. These activities are probably
in response to the 13 August declaration of the Bud-
dhist Institute, which has apparently been disseminated
as instructions to Buddhist pagodas throughout the
country. Responsiveness in the delta, where Buddhist
Institute influence is weak, may be quite limited.
Front of All Religions
8. In some areas, a Buddhist boycott may be
helped by similar opposition from other minority
religious factions, such as the Front of All Religions
organized by Father Hoang Quynh. The Front came into
existence in the wake of last spring's struggle
effort, attracting antigovernment elements from
various Buddhist factions and other religious groups
including the Hoa Hao, Cao Dai and Protestants. Con-
sistently following a line toward the government which
generally parallels that of the Buddhists, Father
Quynh very quickly marshaled his organization behind
the 13 August call of the Buddhist Institute for a
boycott of the election. Moreover, he directly chal-
lenged the government to contest the legality of his
organization's position. Currently, not very much
is known concerning the ability of Quynh and his group
to sway voters in the forthcoming elections, although
most sources characterize their influence as minor.
25X1
Appro IF .4 r---- Q,', 9AAA1Aq914;1 Q'A QR1D;1Q:FAAA9 10002-0
.rF
.1 IF ~ I
 Approved For Rase 2006/03T1T:qIA'-U79T008261200010002-0
Approved For Release 2006/03/17 : CIA-RDP79T00826AO01200010002-0
SECRET,