NORTH VIETNAM'S FOUR POINTS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00826A001200010059-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 3, 2006
• Sequence Number: 59
• Publication Date: September 26, 1966
• Content Type: MEMO

Memo Control Form
Approved For R
4 -
^ NOTICE NO
MEMO NOUmuinbered
26A 200010059-8
k(sr")
0 DISSEM AUTHORIZATION
DATE 26 Sept 1966 Due D/OCI Review
Dates; Dissem 26 Sept 1966
SUBJECT: North Vietnam's Four Points
Approved For Release 2006/03/17 : CIA-RDP79T00826AO01200010059-8
 Approved Fo
28 deepteaber 1886
prey
Worth Vietnam's Four Points
They were first broadcast by Hanoi radio
Phan Van Doug enunciated the four points
on 12 April and were clearly Hanoi's response to 'ream-
dent Johnson's 7 April 1965 speech at Johns Hopkins in
. These four points have consistently bran re-
ferred to by the North Vietnamese as the esbodiaeat of the
basic provisions of the 1954 Geneva Agreements on Vietnam.
They have been repeatedly offered an Hanoi's official po-
sition on what it sees an the basis for a political settle-
sent in Viet.
2. There has been no Chang
four points sine* they
he word inx of the
to time that Hanoi has changed its attitude
toward one or the other of the four points has thus far
State Department review
completed.
25X1
Approved
 Approved Fos1
been borne out. The four points have become so much a
likely.
ty has been built in. An eaaminatlor
hey represent the maximum bargaining position
Hanoi would take at any negotiation conference. There
good reasons, however, for believing that some do-
North Vietnamese treatment of the four points,
element by
where the give is.
the it propaganda value it is certain
provides a good indication of just
one: "Recognition of the basic na-
tional rights of the Vietnamese people-peaco,
independence, sovereignty, unity, and territorial
integrity. According to the Geneva Agreements,
the US Government must withdraw from South Viet-
' a propaganda that no public change in them
ncel its military alliance with South Viet-
US troops, military personnel, and weapons of
kinds, dismantle all military bases there,
:tam.. It must end its policy of intervention and
aggression in mouth Vietnam. According to the
Geneva Agre nts, the US Government must stop
its acts of war against North Vietnam and com-
11 encroachments on the territory
y of the DRV. sr
. This point ww described in the 23 July 206(3
issue of i3's:rth Vietnam's party daily as the ' starrtin
Approved ForiRelease 2006/03/17 : CIA-RDP79T00826AO01200010059-8
 Approved Fo
prii
since April 196t. North
for ae. settlement of the Yietname
c ip-l*
problem. It is a basic restatseent of am e of the points
eluded in the 1954 Geneva Agreements and undoubtedly
represents Hanoi's genuinely desired goal in any political
and authoritative spokesmen have surd#
clear that Ranoi does not regard the various elements
matters for discussion. They have
On amorous occ
qtly tha
withdraval of US troops
South Vietoss is the "key.. to a settlement of the Viet-
asm, Major Cereraeel Wguyen Van Vinh, the head of
ty and government reunification co issioss
4 in September 1965 that in order to have
a political solution, "first of all," the US aunt "approve'
the withdrawal of its troops. On this point there has
been a great deal of confusion over the past year and a
solution vas being arranged.
whether the withdrawal of Ug troops was to
edition to talks or was to be discussed at the
Approved
 Approved Fo
spokesmen in 1985 helped confuse the
us by being deliberately vague when asked to cnt*
blank by the French representative in
drawal was a precondition for talks or
something
eted, Phan Van Doug replied with
a *mile, "both.?.,
+. Since that ti::e, however, Dong and other North
Vietnamese akea=eu have made it clear that they do not
a withdrawal of US forces to be a precondition
for talks. what they do insist an as a precondition is
ngtbie proof" that the US will agree to withdraw its
lemont. Just how this proof is
t.,, be given
pokeanen be.
pubi ie
rely clear, North Vietuaaaaose
US. In Septesber 1966, boweve
the French Foreign Ministry reported that both North
and liberation Front diplomats to Pheom Penh
his would not be sufficient. They claimed,
according to the French, that they need 4'firm material
guarantees" of US withdrawal, not "mere promises."
North Vietnam has also made it clear that it
will not agree to withdraw Communist forces from South
25X1
Approved for Release 2006/03/17 : CIA-RDP79T00826Ap01200010059-8
 Approve
Vietnam in exchange for the withdrawal Of US troops.
Nguyen Van Vthh stated in his September 1 article that
C. ntst troopss fighting in Sonth Vietnam "will refuse
to be regrouped to Worth Vietnam a second time, " a
reference to the regroups ent north of most of the Viet
Minh forces in South Vietnam after the signing of the
1954 Agreements.
S. Although of will, undoubtedly refuse to sign
ttiug that it has troops in nth
it would probably stage a clandestine withdrawal
North Vietnamese regulars as US
hen
out of the country. Communist doe
captured on the battlefield in South Vietnam reveal that
the Comunists believes that it US forces are withdrawn,
Viet Cong would have nothing to four Ire* the South
ineffee
my. which the communists regard as largely
9. The North Vietnamese have also Ind
,ble on the matter of the timing of
several occasions worth Vtetnaama
stated that it the us will agree to with-
copa the Communists will be willing to make
enable the US not "to lose tag*.,*
Approved For Release 2006/03/17 : CIA-RDP79T00826AO01200010059-8
 Approved
There have been hints that Hanoi In interested in exploring
unofficially
d parties what sort of timetable
might be possible if a staged withdrawal of US troops
were arranged.
Finally, although there is some
flexibility built into the first point, Hanoi has also
used it as the p?epcat for Its refusal to move toward
negotiations until the US completely and unconditionally
sex its air strikes against North Vietnam.
Point t : Fending the peaceful reuni_
ation of pieta, while Vietnam is still
twideed into two zones, the milt-
rov is inns of the 1954 "nova Agreements
on Vietnam must be strictly respected. The
from entering Into any
taxi alliance with foreign countries and
ary personnel, in their respective territory.
must be no foreign military bases, troops,
10. This point ens fashioned priesrily for its
propaganda value. Hanoi, however, undoubtedly would like
to see an agreement which would prohibit the math
having any vreeign military
sonnel in the country or from signing any sort of a d tt
assistance agreement with the US. Nevertheless, if Ha
esmeeut, this point probably
Approved For Release 2006/03/17 : CIA-RDP79T00826AO91200010059-8
 Approved Ff
not become a stumbling block. Iftnoi agreed in the
:t to allow certain carefully limited
F training personnel to be present in Laos.
ghat agree to some French or neutral
aid for the south Vietnamese goverment but
d certainly refuse to accept even a limited US alit
presence on a permanent basis.
three: The internal affairs of with
Vietaaaaa: must settled by the, South Vietnamese
people themselves in accordance with the pr ogre
of the NFLST without any foreign i.aterterenca.
*iced to give legitimacy
he I
for the Liberation of south Vietnam
and to ensure its inclusion is any negotiation conference.
Expanding on point three, Hanoi has insisted that the
n Front is the genuine representative
South Vietnaneee people and that the us suet deal
the 14-point program of the Front
Front if It wants to negotiate. Hanoi
enunciated In January 1961 10 the 6mbQdiaaeent of the
sit of the South Viotuanese people for n
independence, democracy, pace, neutrality, and the re-
country and as such should be the only
at a final conference.
Approved
 Approved Ff
1. Des
e extensive caapa.i&V by the Communists
the illusion that the front is the 1e'iti*ate
voice of the South Vietnamese people, there are good
indicatio that Hanoi will not insist on its dssa that
Ministry official Michalowski, who has
only representative from South Vietnas
ral negotiating conference on Yietasa.
been in direct touch with ]poi on the subject of nega-
t:iations told the l8 Ambassador to Warsaw in August 1966
that it was his judgeitent that if Nuiol roally believed
interested in a peace conference, it ld
block the participation of other South Vietnamese
,hat Hanoi will. not
"presentation at a multilateral neo
:xclusive
The Polish Foreign Ministry bass also assur
Approved
 Approved F?
that Hanoi will not insist that only the
Front program could be included in final discussions for
Point four: The peaceful reunification of
na n is to be settled by the Vietnamese people
oth zones, without any foreign interference..
14.
ietnaneae spokesmen have made it clear that
this point as a long-term prospe-et. They
have *van attempted to portray their willingness to ceept
a delayed reunification as a concession to the . Major
Nguyen Van vinh, for example, in Januax
stated that had the allowed the elections called for
in the 1954 Geneva Agreements to take place, the country
would now be reunited. He claimed that Hanoi's current
willingness to postpone reunification was a clear concession
to the
Preconditions
Van Doug concluded the four-point statement
the assertion that "if this basis (the four points)
is recognized, favorable conditions will be created for
the peaceful settlement of the Vietnam problem, and' it
will be possible to consider the reconvening of an inter-
oval conference along the pattern of the 2954 Geneva
conference on Vietnam.' The North Vietnamese have never
Approve
 Approv
clear as to just what the word -recognize" was
tided to sear. At one tine 'sue North Vi=:-taa se
16. More recent remarks, such as those quoted
tougher
than often had been ixatted. It now seers likely that
indicate that Hanoi's position or. this po
'tangible proofs" or Factual deeds' desanded by the
b Vietnamese as an earnest of US intention in order
to convene a final, sultilateral conference nuat include
and pe.nent cessation of air strikes against
a statement by the us that it accepted the
in South Vietnam, and probably at least a token with-
The so--called "peace to
T ? Viet Cong Peace Torus
drawl: of so
a basis for a settlesent would suffice.
cessation of the buildup of US forces
!es from that country.
f the Communist-
ietaaus were not forth
on 2 March 1965 interspersed within a rambling five.
ally, the Front's five points
Approved
 Approved F+r Release 2006/03/17 : CIA-RDP79T00826AO01200010059-8 I 25X1
l icy
CO M4.
1ou O
~r i1 to taa
1ib.rate ' oit
Acccrdi t, to the atata-
V1ot w will vei
ustii fir altos
*.traltt` bate
Tb-only way out.:
"wltbdraw l from
tat Pt d a-
rsea t . all a*-
oils,
aa. as
4098 Tu t
are pie on tit* war
"%Ix# US Imperialists
:bdraw all tr+1O ,
.* of war 1 r Viet as ,
By t 3 tb
voice.
ill _ a of ceot*raui tioa to "..d
v xx6'e toward" the ra LIti a:tioit
A d i:aratt tb*t the Front b
-lull right" to rar Sire Later
Wbile rely
ly o its owu t 'ee,
will call tt
or f or eta= vela-
ers1tiot 'root
Approved For Release 2006/03/17 : CIA-RDP79T00826AO01800010059-8
 Approved
to the fight to '" l ib-
er*ts&' the South.
Gong begari to point to the Front statement
ontaining the Viet tong peace terms. Subsequent
proposal that both Hanoi said the
oat statents have largely echoed
the 22 March manifesto, differing only in that
dewed the Front's pouitio or
the withdrawal of US forces. A statement of 14
maple, claimed that all negotia-
tions are useless" if the, US imperialists 'have
19. Although there is no explicit evidence
:tateeent of 25 lavea r 1965, however,
on all Bouth Vietnamese
1.1y touted by the Viet co>g an a manifesto
Doug's speech setting forth the RV's
drawn" fr > South Vi*tnaa. A Front
h any condition of timing to a with-
asy to a settlement.
t the conteutiori., we believe the appar-
on on US withdrawal is maiaatained
25X1',
Approved For Rele
 Appro
primarily for tactical reasons by the Viet Cong.
Hanoi's own final position on this point would
probably be the deciding word if the Vietnamese
Communists decided to move toward a political
settlement.
Approved For Release 2006/03/17 : CIA-RDP79T00826AO01200010059-8