DEVELOPMENTS IN SARAWAK

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00826A001300010004-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 14, 2004
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: September 28, 1966
• Content Type: IM

Approved For Release 2004/07/28 : CIA-RDP79T00826A001
00010004-7
28 September 1966
No 1604/66
Copy No. 2 3
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
25X1
SE CRE T
Approved For Release 2004/07/28 : CIA-RDP79T00826A00130001000 1-7
 Approved For Release 2004/07/28 : CIA-RDP79T00826AO01300010004-7
This Document contains information affecting the Na-
i ionai Defense of the United States, within the mean-
ing of Title 18, Sections 793 and 794, of the U.S. Code, as
arnended Its transmission or revelation of its contents
to or receipt by an unauthorized person is prohibited
by law The reproduction of this form is prohibited.
Approved For Release 2004/07/28 : CIA-RDP79T00826AO01300010004-7
 Approved For Release 2q
N"W
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
28 September 1966
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
Developments in Sarawak
Summary
Recent political and security developments in
the Borneo state of Sarawak are weakening its gov-
ernment and pointing up the tenuous relationship be-
tween the several parts of the three-year-old Malay-
sian federation. Politically, growing tension has
resulted from the central government's efforts to
subordinate local elements who want greater autonomy
and oppose submission to Kuala Lumpur's rule.
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Approved For Release X2004/07/28 : CIA-RDP79T00826AOg1300010004-7
 Approved For Release 2004/07/28 : CIA-RDP79T00826AO01300010004-7
28 September 1966
Intelligence Memorandum on Developments in Sarawak
1. This memorandum was requested by Mr. Donald
Rope of the White House Staff.
2. After detailing the many difficulties facing
the federal government in Sarawak, the memorandum con-
cludes that although Kuala Lumpur may maintain its
ascendancy in the short run, its long-term prospects
for keeping Sarawak in the federation are not bright.
4. We believe the DCI would find the memorandum
worth reading for background purposes.
Approved For Release 2004/07/28 : CIA-RDP79T00826AO01300010004-7
 25X1 Approved For Release 2004/07/28 : CIA-RDP79T00826AO01300010004-7
Approved For Release 2004/07/28 : CIA-RDP79T00826AO01300010004-7
 25X1
Approved For Relea~00 /07/28 : CIA-RDP79T00826A0013 10004-7
1. Current political tensions in Sarawak stem
from longstanding differences between Kuala Lumpur
and the recently deposed Sarawak Chief Minister,
Stephen Ningkan. Ningkan, who became Chief Minis-
ter in July 1963, has often refused to accept the
dictates of the ruling Alliance Party leaders in
Kuala Lumpur.
2. Underlying these political differences is the
problem of ethnic antagonism between local tribal
elements (of which the Than is the largest) and the
Malays, who make up only 18 percent of Sarawak's
population but dominate the regime in Kuala Lumpur.
Ni,igkan is an Than and his party, the Sarawak Na-
tional Party (SNAP)', is almost exclusively Iban.
Although SNAP was until recently a member of the
Sarawak Alliance (the local adjunct of the ruling
party), it has opposed the Alliance on some issues.
One such issue is Kuala Lumpur's attempts to sponsor
Malay as the national language, which SNAP sees as
restricting the rights of the tribal groups who
make up more than half of:.'Sarawak's__ population .
3. In mid-June 1966 these differences flared
into an open break, with Malaysia's Prime Minister
Rahman publicly demanding that Ningkan resign be-
cause he was not doing his job "properly." Ningkan
refused, contending he could be constitutionally
dismissed only after a vote of no confidence in the
Council Negri, Sarawak's legislative body. Anti-
Ningkan elements in the Sarawak Alliance thereupon
nominated two possible replacements for him, and the
federally appointed governor of Sarawak named one
of these, Tawi Sli, as Ningkan's successor. Tawi
Sli, although also an Ibaq, is relatively unknown
in Sarawak and is manifestly lacking in ability.
He has been a responsive tool of Kuala Lumpur.
4. Ningkan, who was thus forced to step down
but not to resign. countered by demanding an in-
junction by the Sarawak high court to force Tawi
Sli's removal from office on constitutional grounds.
On 7 September the court ruled in Ningkan's favor.
During this period of political and legal confusion,
however, Ningkan's legislature support was reduced
25X1
Approved For Release 204/07/28 : CIA-RDP79T00826A00130p010004-7
 Approved For Relea O
0130OP10004-7
and he now lacks majority support in the Council
Negri.
8. Ningkan, meanwhile, withdrew SNAP from the
Alliance, thus openly placing himself and his sup-
porters in opposition. Aligned with SNAP in the
opposition is the almost exclusively Chinese Sarawak
United People's Party (SUPP), many branches of which
are Communist infiltrated. In the current political
battle SUPP has supported Ningkan.
6. Stung by the high court's action, Kuala Lumpur
declared a state of emergency on 15 September, claim-
ing this was necessary because Sarawak was seriously
endangered by Communist subversion and political in-
stability. Actually, this action stemmed from the
fact that Ningkan's reinstatement presented the Alli-
ance with an unacceptable political situation in
which it would be deprived of control of the Sarawak
Government.
7. As a follow-up to the state-of-emergency de-
cree, the federal Parliament on 19 September passed
a bill empowering the Sarawak governor to convene
the Council Negri for the purpose of removing Ningkan
through a no-confidence vote. This pro forma vote
was taken on 22 September and Ningkan was subse-
quently dismissed by the governor. Ningkan appears
to have taken his ouster philosophically, stating
that he and his supporters are confident of victory
in general elections next year, after which he would
fight for greater autonomy for Sarawak. Constitu-
tionally, elections can be delayed as late as mid-
1968, but it is generally expected that the govern-
ment will be forced by political and popular pressures
to hold them within a year.
8. Despite Ningkan's apparent acceptance of his
ouster, the situation will not necessarily remain
quiet until elections are held. Kuala Lumpur's in-
terference in Sarawak's internal affairs has aroused
unprecedented resentment, has greatly strengthened
popular sympathy for Ningkan, and has stimulated
some discussion of secession. Although Kuala Lumpur
is expected to assert its authority over the short
term, the long-run prospects are for increased
instability.
25X1
25X1
Approved For Release 1004/07/28 : CIA-RDP79T00826AO01300010004-7
 25X1 Approved For Release 2004/07/28 : CIA-RDP79T00826AO01300010004-7
Next 3 Page(s) In Document Exempt
Approved For Release 2004/07/28 : CIA-RDP79T00826AO01300010004-7
 Approved For Releas '2004/07/28 : CIA-RDP79TOO826AO01WO10004-7
Lutong,
Mi,i n
iVt6f#315t~
5A! A,(A7l__
fdFl~GY '~
6G 'I
SULU ISLAND
Approved For Release 2004/07/28 : CIA-RDP79T00826AO01300010004-7
 Approved For Relea'2004/07/28SA(p26A001,010004-7
Approved For Release 2004$~C~1~1 9T00826AO01300010004-7
 25X1 Approved For Release 2004/07/28 : CIA-RDP79T00826AO01300010004-7
Approved For Release 2004/07/28 : CIA-RDP79T00826AO01300010004-7