CHINESE COMMUNIST FORCES IN NORTH VIETNAM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00826A001300010007-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 19
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 3, 2008
• Sequence Number: 7
• Publication Date: September 29, 1966
• Content Type: IM

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~ TOP SECRET
29 September 1966
Copy No.
23
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
CHINESE COMMUNIST FORCES IN NORTH VIETNAM
NGA Review Complete
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
NSA review completed
TOP SECRET
GROUP I
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declossification
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
29 September 1966
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
Chinese Communist Forces in North Vietnam
Summary
There has been no significant change in the
Chinese Communist military forces in North Vietnam
during the past three months. The radio net sup-
porting them has remained relatively stable, with
slightly over 100 terminals active on a regular basis.
The communications structure continues to give
evidence of at least seven major Chinese units in
North Vietnam, all of them probably of division size.
On.e is known to be an air force antiaircraft artil-
lery (AAA) division. Another is a railway engineer
division. The other five are thought to be an army
AAA division and four special engineer divisions
(see map on reverse of page).
These construction units are being supported by
service units believed to be of regimental size,
drawn from the adjacent regions of southern China.
In all, there is an estimated total of 25,000 to
45,000 Chinese support troops in North Vietnam.
Photographic analysis shows continuing construc-
tion in each of the areas where communications ac-
tivity has pointed to the presence of major Chinese
engineer units. The rail line between the border
and Kep may have been converted for use by both
standard and meter-gauge rolling stock by adding
a third rail. The new standard-gauge line to the
Thai Nguyen iron and steel complex from Kep is
nearing completion.
NOTE: This memorandum was produced by CIA. Aside from
the normal substantive exchange with other agencies at
the working level this paper has not been. coordinated
outside CIA. It was prepared by the Office of Current
Intelligence and coordinated with the Office of Research
and Reports.
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Construction is continuing at two major air-
fields in. northern North Vietnam. Photographic
analysis of the activities at one of them, the
field at Yen Bai, clearl identifies it as a Chi-
nese project. Moreover,
support a Chinese presence at YeD Bai since
August 1965.
The other airfield possibly under construction.
by the Chinese is located at Son Tay (previously
referred Son Don about 20 miles west of
Hanoi.
There is no firm evidence
of Chinese involvement, but the scope of the project,
the rapid rate of construction,_and the large amount
of construction equipment indicate an effort that
might strain the capability of the Vietnamese.
Chinese engineers are cons
coast aI defense sites on Cat Ba Island near Haiphong.
His statements have been supported by analysis of
photographs of the northeast coastal area. Chinese
units may also be participating in road construction
and improvement in the North Vietnam - South China
border area.
All the evidence continues to point to a
logistic support role for the Chinese forces in
North Vietnam. As the construction projects are
completed the Chinese engineering-type units may
return to China. There is some evidence that a
few of the smaller units already have gone.
intercepted mes-
sages indicate a high-level command in the Sino-
DRV border region, but thus far it has not exercised
any observable control over the radio net serving
Chinese logistic units in North Vietnam. This com-
munications arrangement could furnish the frame-
work for the deployment of a considerably greater
number of Chinese units into Vietnam.
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Recent Developments
1. The organization and composition of Chinese
Forces in North Vietnam (CFNVN) has remained essen-
tially unchanged during the past three months. Some
minor realignments, the appearance of new entities,
and the deactivation of some communications links
have been observed, but these changes have not signifi-
cantly affected either the strength or the mission
of the Chinese units. The number of radio terminals
serving them has fluctuated but the total remains
about the same.
2, have been several new developments,
however. 77
3. The authority believed to be the headquarters
of Chinese forces in North Vietnam
in communications
Message routing instructions sug-
authority
is located in Yunnan Province adjacent to northwest
North Vietnam.
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messages contained references to DRV Nava roup
125, located in the Hon Gai area. Intercepted North
Vietnamese communications indicate that North Viet-
namese coastal freighters that make up Group 125
have in the past been used to escort DRV gunboats
to South China for maintenance. However, the
identification of Chinese authorities in communica-
tions associated with Group 125 reflects at least
a closer Sin.o/DRV naval coordination, and may pre-
sage an expansion of joint naval activities.
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This suggests that if
an element of a Chinese inI antry division has de-
ployed into North Vietnam, it is probably only a
very small contingent, possibly a support element
such as an antiaircraft artillery or engineer unit.
9. The Chinese Army AAA division at Yen Bai
has been tenta-
tively identified as a result o a communications
compromise when the controller of a
Chinese operationa A voice broadcast in the Yen.
Bai area referred to his station both as the "67th
Air Defense Unit" and the "headquarters." Air
warning traffic was subsequently transmitted to at
It seems likely--,
therefore, that the unit at Yen Bai is, in fact,
the 67th AAA Division.
10. On 9 September tenuous references to
another AAA division were noted
with t e Chi-
nese Units located in the en ai area. This AAA
unit has been identified as the previously
unobserved Chinese Air Force 106th AAA Division.
The messages may presage either a rotation or aug-
mentation of AAA units in the Yen Bai area.
Return of Some Units to China
11. Three and possibly four units have dropped
out of communications in the Chinese radio network
in North Vietnam during the past several months,
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suggesting they have returned to China. One of
these. which have been a special construction
unit in the Lao Cai area of northwest
North Vietnam, appears to have had a construction
function and may have been engaged in road improve-
ments.
12. A possible counterpart of this unit in
northeast North Vietnam may also have withdrawn.
This organization has
recently terminated its communications wi-th several
higher authorities, but still appears as the control
of at least one subordinate radio group.
13. Another element on the northeast coast,
which may be a maritime logistics unit
was last observed in communications on May. is
radio station had been associated with a Chinese
landing craft
14. The control station of another maritime
logistics unit, has not been
heard in communications since 13 September. This au-
thority controlled 20-25 Chinese coastal craft in the
Hon Gai area. These boats may have been supporting
Chinese engineer units constructing coastal defenses
on the offshore islands near Hon Gai, including Cat
Ba. Their withdrawal may indicate that the projects
are nearing completion.
15. Communications serving other major Chinese
units in North Vietnam have shown little change during
the period. More precise RDF results have located
the special engineer division in the Tuyen
Quang area rather than at Son Tay. Fur er minor
changes in the locations of some of these units can
be expected as more and. better RDF data become
available,
16. We continue to believe that there are at
least seven divisional-level Chinese units in North
Vietnam. However, our past strength estimate of
30,000 to 47,000 troops has been revised downward to
a range of 25,000 to 45,000 troops on the basis of
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ti'K'ai-yiian
? ~??/ Ha Giang
Tuyen?
Quang
? Ching hsi
?
Cao
Bang
New rail line
under construction
Ning-ming
A
?^- CHIN
l
'
%-
-hSiang
r
Lang S; I ~??
that
'.Nguyen
fi Kep
Phu Tho
Airfield under construction
Phud
en[
ASon-T@y t`
HAN01
Hoa
Binh ?
Hkiphort,'-
....?.
Mong Ca
Tien Yen ,r
i'Johl
A e on
hlon
~,~Istand;4
New coastal defense sites
under construction
4
LAO S
1)
Converted to
dual gauge track
Ninh
Binh
25 50 75
NORTH VIETNAM
SUSPECT CHINESE ENGINEER PROJECTS
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newly obtained organizational data for Chinese
ground force units.
Chinese Construction Activity in North Vietnam (See Map)
17. The construction activity at Yen Bai was
firmly identified as airfield construction by low-
level photography The photography shows
that grading and leveling ave enlarged the air-
number is more than would be required for support of
airfield construction alone and may point to develop-
ment of a major support base.
18. There is new evidence that the airfield
project at Yen Bai is being built by the Chinese.
Two North Vietnamese soldiers, captured in South Viet-
nam at different times and different places in 1966,
reported the arrival of Chinese AAA troops at Yen Bai
in August 1965. This information agrees closely
with conclusions based on intercepted Chinese mili-
tary communications which indicate that an unidenti-
fied army AAA division moved into this
area at about this time. The uni was subsequently
replaced by the unit believed to be the 67th AAA
Division in February 1966.
19. Chinese AAA troops were apparently deployed
to Yen Bai for the specific purpose of protecting
the airfield project
photography has revealed 50 AA sites
(20 of which were occupied) and 56 automatic weapons
sites surrounding the airfield construction and sup-
port base. This is approximately the number of sites
required to emplace the guns of a Chinese army AAA
division..
20. There are no (reports
to support indications o a Chinese presence at Son
Tay, where another major airfield is under construc-
tion. Moreover, it has been determined that the
Chinese engineer unit previously thought
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to be at Son. Tay is in fact located in the Tuyen Quang
area. The general pattern of construction and the
number and types of equipment seen at Son. Tay, how-
ever, are reminiscent of Yen Bai. Moreover, the rate
of construction and engineering skill displayed would
seem to strain North Vietnamese capabilities.
22. Most of the reported construction projects
have been confirmed by photographic analysis, and the
buildings reportedly housing the Chinese engineers
do have definite military characteristics.
23. A review of photography has revealed a sharp
increase in military activity on Cat Ba Island
This includes several areas of mili-
tary activity consisting of camouflaged buildings
and tents, local defensive positions, building ma-
terials and equipment, and at least two new coastal
defense sites. These sites have four revetted posi-
tions and tunnel entrances, and approach roads.
They appear similar to coastal defense sites in South
China and are more permanent than those seen south
of Hanoi.
24. The Chinese engineer regiment reported at
Cat Ba is probably one of the several subordinates
which deployed to the Hon Gai/Tien Yen
area in June 1965. Initially, the organization
was thought to have a coastal
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NORTH VIETNAM-SOUTH CHINA BORDER AR"EA
ROAD CONSTRUCTION ACTIVITY
CHINA
\ -f _`? ,~ CHIN A
LAOS
C 25
H on
Exiting road (Jon. 1965) New road - --, I ew rand (under construction) Road improvement (includes realignment
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defense mission. However, this more recent informa-
tion indicates that it is a special engineer division
working on coastal defense construction projects.
25. The work of the 2nd Railway Engineer Divi-
sion at Kep is continuing. A third rail may have been
added to the Hanoi-Pin hsiang line between Dong Dang
and Kep. Photography showed standard-
gauge rolling stock near Kep. Segments of the line
with the third rail have been observed between Kep
and Pin.ghsiang
26. Work is also continuing on the standard-
gauge line between Kep and the Thai Nguyen Iron and
Steel complex, a major Chinese aid project. Most of
the major bridges and tunnels have been completed on
this line. This will increase the load capacity and
flexibility of North Vietnam's major rail link with
South China and speed up shipments to the Vietnamese.
If the third rail is eventually extended to Hanoi,
Vietnam-bound freight could be shipped directly to
Hanoi without transloadi.ng.
27. Chinese construction units may also have
assisted in road construction and improvement proj-
ects near the Sino/DRV border. A recent photographic
study of the status of roads in this area reveals a
total of some 500 miles of road construction and
improvement on the North Vietnam side of the border.
Most of this work has involved
improvements in existing roads and the establishment
Of connecting links. Two new roads are under con-
struction parallel to the Red River between Yen Bai
and Lao Cai. They will provide better Chinese access
to the Yen Bai area. In addition, the North Vietnam-
South China road network has been joined at several
more points along the border. (See Map)
Prospects
28. As the Chinese construction projects in
North Vietnam are completed, some changes are likely
in the role and composition of the Chinese forces
there. The number of support buildings constructed
at Yen Bai may indicate that this area is planned
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as a forward Chinese logistical base.
29. The recent evidence of increased Chinese
naval association with North Vietnam in communica-
tions may indicate a trend toward closer operational
cooperation. This could take the form of joint
coastal and offshore defense procedures in the
northern Tonkin Gulf, similar to those instituted
in the field of air defense. It may also signal an
expansion of naval support to North Vietnam, in
the form of more patrol boats or use of Chinese naval
combat units in northern DRV waters.
30. As for the future of the Chinese military
presence in North Vietnam, the first indication of
change may come if and when the Chinese engineer units
start withdrawing following the completion of their
tasks, If the experience of the past year is a re-
liable guide, any major shift in the Chinese role
in North Vietnam should then be reflected in inter-
ce ted communications.
Before the Chinese ma e
any major move in t is irection, however, they will
probably build up their ground force strength on
their side of the border. As yet, there is no indi-
cation that any such augmentation has occurred.
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I%W TOP SECRET low
TOP SECRET
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29 September 1966
Talking Paper on "Chinese Communist Forces in North Vietnam"
1. This is the fifth memorandum published on this
subject. Secretary of Defense McNamara has expressed a
desire for periodic reviews of this situation.
2. Its main conclusions:
a. The role and status of the Chinese Communist
military forces in North Vietnam have not changed
substantially during the past three months. There
are 25,000 to 45,000 Chinese support troops in
North Vietnam.
b. The communications structure continues to
give evidence of at least seven major Chinese
units in North Vietnam.
c. Photographic analysis shows continuing con-
struction activity in each of the areas where com-
munications activity has pointed to the presence of
major Chinese engineer units.
3. Recommend routine dissemination.
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