THE SITUATION IN NIGERIA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00826A001300010012-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 14, 2004
• Sequence Number: 12
• Publication Date: October 1, 1966
• Content Type: IM

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1 October 1966
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INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
THE SITUATION IN NIGERIA
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
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This Document contains information affecting the Na-
tional Defense of the United States, within the mean-
ing of Title 18, Sections 793 and 794, of the U.S. Code, as
amended. Its transmission or revelation of its contents
to or receipt by an unauthorized person is prohibited
by law. The reproduction of this form is prohibited.
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
1 October 1966
The Situation in Nigeria
Summary
Africa's most populous country (population es-
timated at 48 million) is in the throes of a highly
complex internal crisis rooted in its artificial
origin as a British dependency containing over 250
diverse and often antagonistic tribal groups. The
present crisis began to take shape shortly after
Nigeria became independent in 1960, but for some
years the apparent success of a federal parliamen-
tary arrangement concealed serious internal strains.
It has been in an acute stage since last January
when a military coup d'etat destroyed the constitu-
tional regime bequeathed by the British and upset
the underlying tribal and regional power relation-
ships. At stake now are the most fundamental ques-
tions which can be raised about a country, beginning
with whether it will survive as a single viable entity.
At this time, even the immediate further evolution
of the crisis is most uncertain. In general, however,
the country has appeared in recent months, especially
since a second army coup last July, to be moving at an
accelerating rate along a downward slope with a conse-
quent diminution of its prospects for unity and sta-
bility. Unless present army leaders and contending
tribal elements soon reach agreement on a new basis
for association and take some effective measures to
halt a seriously deteriorating security situation,
there will be increasing internal turmoil, possibly in-
cluding civil war.
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Background
1. The January 1966 coup, initiated by young
southern army officers, dislodged from national power
tradition-bound Muslim aristocrats of the important
northern Hausa-Fulani tribal grouping. These feudal
overlords had developed a virtual political monopoly
within their native Northern Region--the largest and
most populous of Nigeria's present four regions--and
were tightening their grip over the federal power
structure based in Lagos. The successor military re-
gime established at that time by army commander Aguiyi-
Ironsi and other surviving senior officers had, by con-
trast, a decidedly southern cast. Primary influence in
the Ironsi regime was wielded by .1-.embers of the aggres-
sive and relatively well-educated Ibo tribe, which pre-
dominates in Nigeria's Eastern Region. Until very re-
cently the most ardent advocates of national unity, the
Ibos are also probably the most disliked and resented
tribe in the country. They have long been hated in the
backward north, where large numbers of them took up
permanent residence over the years, attracted by the
opportunities in commerce, government, and the public
services.
2. By last May, most northerners had come to view
Ironsi's regime as essentially a vehicle for Ibo domina-
tion of the government administration. The clincher for
them was Ironsi's announcement late that month of de-
crees which promised to place northerners at a still
greater disadvantage when competing for government jobs,
while opening their region to wider southern encroach-
ments. Anti-Ibo violence soon followed, initially in
the form of a wave of attacks by mobs of civilian tribes-
men in most northern urban centers on resident Ibos and
their property. On 29 July northern military elements
stationed in western Nigeria launched a bloody vendetta
against all Ibo officers and other ranks. Ironsi was
killed, and 31-year-old Lt. Colonel Yakubu Gowon, the
army chief of staff under Ironsi and the ranking north-
ern officer, reluctantly assumed power.
The Gowon Regime
3. Even more than its predecessor, Gowon's regime
has remained shaky and unsubstantial, incapable of pro-
viding effective national government. From the outset
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it has had only limited authority, and Gowon's own
freedom of maneuver has been narrowly circumscribed
by the northern military elements which thrust him
into power. Recognizing the difficulties he faced,
Gowon clearly indicated on taking over that he viewed
his rule as a short-term holding operation while re-
gional representatives negotiated to see if the coun-
try could be held together. Nonetheless, the Gowon
variant represents, in broad terms, the return of
northerners to the national leadership with their
authority resting, for now at least, solely on the
raw power of indisciplined northern soldiers.
4. It has become increasingly clear in recent
weeks, however, that the northerners now in control
are not representative of the old Hausa-Fulani Muslim
aristocracy nor are they likely to restore that aris-
tocracy to a dominant position either in Lagos or the
north. Both at the officer and enlisted levels, the
remnants of the army outside the Eastern Region--per-
haps numbering some 7,000 men--are predominantly non-
Hausa. Most line soldiers are from minor tribes--some
Christian, some Muslim, many pagan--dwelling in the
broad "middle belt" area which comprises the southern,
non-Hausa part of the Northern Region. Gowon himself
is from just such a background--he is a Christian from
the Angas tribe. These soldiers evidently share the
desire, long expressed by civilian middle belt elements,
for one or more states of their own, separate from the
oppressive former northern establishment. The dramat-
ically increased influence of the non-Hausa northerner
has already been reflected in the composition and be-
havior of the northern delegation to the constitutional
talks now under way in Lagos. Its only Hausa member is
the able leader of a former northern opposition party.
The Security Problem
5. Gowon's most pressing problem, though he may
not recognize it, stems from the continuing indiscipline
of the northern troops who put him in power. Gowon and
the small junta of northern officers who comprise what
now passes for the army's command echelon have so far
been unable to halt these soldiers' continuing anti-Ibo
depredations. With most surviving Ibo military personnel
now back in their native Eastern Region, these depreda-
tions are mainly directed against the persons and property
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of remaining civilian Ibos. Such actions by the
soldiers, abetted increasingly by aroused civilian
mobs and even some police, have encouraged a gen-
eral atmosphere of lawlessness which is being ex-
ploited by ordinary criminal elements.
6. The result has been a progressive deteriora-
tion of the general security situation in the north,
and a parallel rise in tension in all parts of the
country. Over the past few days this trend has
markedly accelerated, so much so as to suggest that
order is breaking down on a widening scale. So also
are essential servces--including railways and tele-
communications--and commercial activities in the north,
both heavily dependent on Ibo employees who are now
fleeing the area in larger numbers than ever. The
police, themselves increasingly targets of the soldiers
violence, clearly cannot be expected to salvage the
situation. Last weekend the first retaliatory attacks
against Hausas resident in the east occurred in Enugu,
the regional capital, and in two other towns. In con-
trast with their counterparts in the north, however,
the eastern authorities moved quickly and effectively
to head off widespread communal violence. Evidently
unable to control the unruly troops, Gowon apparently
has directed his efforts mainly toward trying to pre-
vent Ibos required for essential services from fleeing.
At present the difficult security situation is further
compounded by rumors forecasting dire developments on
1 October, Nigeria's national holiday. Most of these
rumors revolve around new moves against Ibos in Lagos
or against the east itself.
The Eastern Region
7. In reaction to the violent developments which
have occurred since 29 July, the Ibo-ruled Eastern Re-
gion has moved close to what is in effect de facto
separatism. The Ironsi-appointed military governor,
Colonel Ojukwu, has steadfastly refused formally to
recognize Gowon's takeover and continues to indicate
publicly that "missing" General Ironsi remains his
"Supreme Commander." Of the four regional military
governors, only Ojukwu has never gone to Lagos, basi-
cally out of fear for his personal security. He knows
that during the July putsch militant northern army
elements in western Nigeria urged northern soldiers
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then stationed in the east to kill him and he suspects
--with good reason--that they are still out to get him.
eanw i e, 7u wu has on his own es a is a an ex en-
sive array of regional governmental institutions. With
the repatriation of the northern troops and the return
of most surviving eastern military elements last month,
Ojukwu has on hand an exclusively eastern force of some
2,000 enlisted personnel and 150 officers.
8. Since early August Ojukwu has consistently
disavowed, both publicly and privately, any intention
to secede from the rest of Nigeria. Although Ibo mili-
tants have probably pushed for secession, the governor
and his close advisers are mindful that such a move
would precipitate critical problems with the east's
own minority tribes, some of whom, like their middle
belt counterparts, have long been campaigning for a
separate state. A key consideration is the fact that
these minor tribes--not the Ibos--occupy most of the
oil-rich coastal area, without which the Ibos could
hardly hope to form an economically viable state.
Ojukwu has warned, however, that he could be provoked
into a secession attempt by any invasion of the Eastern
Region by northern troops or by any effort to impose a
separation of the non-Ibo provinces.
9. He has been similarly consistent since August
in asserting that no real progress can be made toward
resolving the constitutional crisis until a basic im-
provement in the security situation justifies some
restoration of "confidence." He has argued that, be-
ginning with the army, the country must be essentially
regionalized on the basis, initially at least, of the
present four states. He wants to retain only a loose
federal association to conduct foreign policy and op-
erate common services. Under pressure from the eastern
minorities, he has even recently endorsed in principle
the idea of additional eastern states. He seemingly
still insists, however, that this is exclusively a
matter for the region to decide without outside inter-
ference.
The Constitutional Conference
10. The spreading violence has already overshad-
owed the current negotiations in Lagos among regional
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representatives and may eventually negate any agree-
ment reached there. These talks seek a new basis
for continued union. In opening the conference on
12 September, Gowon invited the delegates to seek
agreement on any basis except the extreme solutions
of a unitary system or a complete breakup. His
elimination of the latter option contrasted with the
doubts he had expressed on taking over the leadership
about whether the country could or even should be
held together.
11. Initially the conferees appeared headed
toward fairly speedy agreement on the basis of a for-
mula providing for a strengthening of the powers of
the present four regions and only a very loose federal
association. The substantially parallel positions in
support of such a formula tabled at the outset by the
key eastern and northern delegations seemed likely to
be decisive. Gowon abruptly reversed the course of
the conference, however, when at a meeting with the
delegates from his native Northern Region on 17 Sep-
tember he presented--virtually as an ultimatum--a
federal plan calling for 11 states and a strong cen-
tral government. Under his plan the north would be
divided into six states and the east into three, with
the western and midwestern regions remaining intact.
12. In thus departing from his previous neutral
stance, Gowon explained that the army had "changed
its mind" and decided it could not tolerate any loose
union. He and other army leaders had evidently con-
cluded that army influence and interests would be
adversely affected by such an arrangement. Gowon was
almost certainly also influenced by pressures from
his middle belt troops, which he could ignore only at
the risk of his life, as well as from civilian spokes-
men for the northern and eastern minorities.
13. Most of the northern delegates readily ac-
cepted Gowon's plan despite its wide variance from
the consensus which had apparently emerged from the
earlier northern consultations. Once formally pre-
sented as the new northern position, it soon gained
the open support of all but the eastern delegates.
The latter, which include minority tribal representa-
tives attracted to the multistate plan, have remained
calm, however, and have shown no hostility. Recent
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reports indicate the conferees have actually made
some modest progress toward agreement on some issues.
At this stage, however, it remains questionable to
what extent the east is willing to relent on its
basic position, especially on Ojukwu's insistence
that the creation of new states is a regional matter.
14. The northerners appear determined to split
the east into two or more regions in order to reduce
Ibo influence in any new federation. If this main
objective cannot be achieved by agreement at the con-
ference, Gowon will be under growing pressure to de-
cree it, backing up the order with military movements
into the east. In such an eventuality, civil war
would almost surely follow. At present the main hope
of averting such a debacle seems to rest on whether
Ojukwu will be willing to make some early public
gesture showing that the east is actively considering
the creation of new states in its area.
15. Only if civil war is averted, if the con-
tending tribal elements finally reach agreement on
the thorny details of a new federal system, and if
the now alarming security situation can be shored up,
would it be possible for Nigeria to establish some
kind of new equilibrium. The way would then presumably
be open for a rapid return to civilian rule, a develop-
ment strongly favored by Gowon, who is well aware that
the badly shattered army cannot run the country ef-
fectively. Over the longer run, the admission of
heretofore largely excluded forces and leaders to a
significant role in the political dynamics of the
country could conceivably give Nigeria a firmer founda-
tion for healthy stability than it has ever had.
16. The initial assumptions are large ones, how-
ever, and the odds against realization of all three now
appear great. If they are not realized, Nigeria seems
doomed for now to a further descent toward Congo-like
internal chaos. Indeed, given the continuing high
pitch of tribal hatreds, the collapse of army discipline,
the extent of political disintegration, and the probable
further collapse of public services, a long period of
internal confusion and conflict seems likely before some
new order emerges. In the process a fragmentation of
the country is a distinct possibility.
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19. Nigeria appeared destined by its size,
relative wealth, and energetic population to play a
leading role in Africa. Although the tribal and re-
gional strains on its national cohesion were recog-
nized, Nigeria was considered to be a good bet to
surmount these threats and to progress in unity and
stability. The Western powers generally looked for-
ward to its development into a strong Western-oriented
bulwark against extremism in the area and an influence
for moderation in African councils. Although Nigeria
is clearly not now fulfilling these high expectations,
it is possible that whatever state or states eventu-
ally emerge from the ashes will be based on more solid
foundations. (Map)
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