VIETNAMESE COMMUNIST VIEWS ON THE US NEGOTIATING POSITION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00826A001300010015-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 44
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 15, 2004
• Sequence Number: 15
• Publication Date: October 3, 1966
• Content Type: IM

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INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
VIETNAMESE COMMUNIST VIEWS
ON THE US NEGOTIATING POSITION
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
No. 1690/66
Copy No. 1
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This Document contains information affecting the Na-
tional Defense of the United States, within the mean-
ing of Title 18, Sections 793 and 794, of the U.S. Code, as
amended. Its transmission or revelation of its contents
to or receipt by an unauthorized person is prohibited
by law. The reproduction of this form is prohibited.
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C O N T E N T S
Page
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS . . . . . . . . . . .
1
SECTIONS
I.
US GOODWILL QUESTIONED . . . . . . . .
6
II.
SPECIFICS OF US PEACE TERMS CHALLENGED
12
III.
US GOODWILL NOT A CRITICAL ELEMENT . .
16
IV.
THE COMMUNIST ESTIMATE OF US STRENGTH
19
V.
THE EXTENT OF COMMUNIST DETERMINATION
23
VI.
POSSIBLE PRODUCTIVE PEACE APPROACHES
26
VII.
NORTH VIETNAM'S FOUR POINTS . . . . .
29
Note: This memorandum has been produced by the
Office of Current Intelligence. The con-
clusions contained in the Summary were
concurred in by the Board of National
Estimates and the Special Assistant for
Vietnamese Affairs in the Office of the
Director of Central Intelligence.
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of. Intelligence
3 October 1966
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
Vietnamese Communist Views on. the
US Negotiat'. -Position
Summary and Conclusions
1. The Vietnamese Communist rejection of US
peace offers arises out of the fundamentally opposing
goals of the two sides in the conflict. The North
Vietnamese view Vietnam as a single country, tem-
porarily and unjustly split into two parts. They
believe that without US intervention, which for the
moment frustrates their ambitions, they could com-
plete their revolution and gain full control of that
country. The end result desired by the United States,
however, is a viable non-Communist regime in South
Vietnam freed of the constant threat of aggression
from North Vietnam, That the United States is attempt-
ing to achieve this end, either on the battlefield_.
or through negotiations, the Communists do not doubt.
It is a result, however, that they are unwilling to
concede.
2. Beyond this fundamental obstacle to any
meeting of the minds, there are certain. aspects of
the US peace offers which the Communists view with
great suspicion. There is considerable evidence,
both in private statements by the Communists and in
the reports of competent Western officials who have
talked with them, that charges of US bad faith are
not solely propagandistic but reflect deeply held
beliefs. There are a number of reasons for these
suspicions. First, the Marxist-Len.in.ist training of
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the Communists axiomatically imputes a basic dis-
honesty to all capitalist powers. More important,
analysis of the Communists' statements and actions
indicates that they firmly believe that the US not
only is bent on winning a military victory in Viet-
nam but intends to maintain its presence in South
Vietnam through a puppet regime supported by US
military bases.
3. This distrust has been reinforced by their
experience with the Geneva agreement of 1954. In
their view, that agreement was a device to permit
the French to withdraw with some shred of grace in
exchange for terms that assured the Communists of
subsequently gaining control of the entire country
through a general election. The Communists feel
defrauded by the actual outcome. After this experi-
ence, they genuinely regard US proposals to negotiate
as another device to defraud them of the victory
that would otherwise be theirs. In such circum-
stances, nothing the US can do would convince the
Vietnamese Communists of its sincerity, short of
surrendering to them effective control of South
Vietnam.
4. The problem of getting US goodwill across
to the Communists is further compounded by the fact
that they have so far regarded the specific formula-
tions of US peace bids as unpalatable and unaccept-
able. There is considerable evidence indicating that
they believe the US has not yet made any real con-
cessions in its position in order to start talks.
They are convinced, moreover, that the US is not
really interested in a cessation of military action
in Vietnam. They consistently point to new American
military deployments and offensive actions as indi-
cations of a deep-seated US desire to continue the
fighting.
5. Vietnamese suspicions, however, will not be
the critical factor in getting talks on the conflict
started. If and when the Communists decide to agree
to talks, their decision will be based primarily on
their assessment of the relative power position of
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both sides. This attitude is evident from their own
private statements, from the impressions of Western
envoys, and from analysis of Western experience in
the Korean and Laotian wars.
6. The Vietnamese Communists believe that major
policy concessions can eventually be forced from the
US, since they estimate that they can outlast the US
in a protracted war. It appears that they feel deeply
that time is on their side. Their private statements,
again, are very strong and consistent on this point.
They also appear to have an optimistic estimate at
present of their relative strategic position vis-a-vis
the US forces in Vietnam. They certainly do not be-
lieve that the allies will have enough combat forces
in South Vietnam by the end of 1966 to inflict a deci-
sive defeat on them.
7. They probably estimate that they will still
retain a powerful hand in South Vietnam if they can
maintain the bulk of their regular units intact in
the face of the anticipated level of allied buildup.
In theiriview, they will then retain the option of
protracting the war. In this strategy, they are
probably encouraged by their increasing success in
coping with the aerial attacks on North Vietnam and
by their ability to move substantial forces across
the DMZ into northern South Vietnam. They are taking
a strong stance in this area where supply lines are
shorter and a positional type of war can be fought,
probably with better support from antiaircraft artil-
lery.
8. An element in the Communist strategy of
protracted war is the belief that important domes-
tic opposition may develop in the US as a result of
continuing US casualties and the economic pinch of
the conflict on the American economy. The.'Commu-
nists have consistently shown that they overestimate
the real intensity and true direction of domestic
opposition to US policy on Vietnam. Their statements
provide substantial proof of this. They appear to
believe, for example, that those who oppose nego-
tiation and urge greater military action constitute
only a tiny minority of the American public.
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9. Although direct evidence on. the point is
scanty, it seems probable that the Vietnamese Com-
munists believe the US underestimates the depth of
their determination on the war. It appears, in
fact, that they expect a moderation of US policy
may come about when Washington realizes the strength
of the Vietnamese will.
10. The available evidence indicates that the
dedication of the Communists to the unification of
Vietnam under Communist hegemony is extremely strong,
and that their will to accomplish this objective
has not been, appreciably reduced as a result of the
heavier military pressure placed on. them during the
last two years. Although it is possible that there
is a faction of Vietnamese Communist leaders who do
not share this depth of dedication, the hard evidence
on. the subject points to a surprising unanimity of
view on continuing the war. The slight differences
evident from time to time in the statements of Viet
Cong and North Vietnamese leaders on peace terms
are, we believe, mainly a tactical device to demon-
strate Viet Cong "independence." The evidence of
North Vietnamese domination and control of the National
Front and the Viet Cong is overwhelming.
11. It appears that the population under Viet-
namese Communist control will follow the policy dic-
tates of its leaders adequately for the foreseeable
future. It does not seem likely that influences for
moderation, if any, from the Soviet bloc would have
any appreciable effect on the Vietnamese will to
persist.
12. Since the Vietnamese Communists believe
the US must be forced into concessions, it follows
that one of their major concerns is to maintain. an
image of strength during the fighting and particularly
prior to the start of any talks on the war: All
good evidence on their strategy has tended to con-
firm this proposition. It is almost certain that
they will not agree to any negotiations until the
US stops bombing North Vietnam and promises not to
resume the air attacks. This has been a completely
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consistent theme in. both their public and private
statements and in the reports of Western diplomats
who have talked with them.
13. In. view of their stated position, and
their probable estimate of their strategic position.
at the present time in, the war, it appears almost
certain. that any US move for peace that is formulated
in a manner requiring a meaningful reciprocal action
by the Communists is foredoomed to rejection. It
is probable, in fact, that even if such a proposal
is advanced privately it will be rejected.
14. At this stage of the war, it appears likely
that only a US proposal accompanied by a clearcut
and significant concession in American. military policy
that did not require a quid pro quo by the Communists
would have any chance of gai in ng- Tieir agreement to
bilateral negotiations with the US. It is entirely
possible that they would refuse to agree to bilateral
talks even. in. the event of a major US concession..
They might take advantage of the partial respite
from military pressure while demanding additional
concessions before talks.
15. There follows a more detailed examination
of the above issues, including some of the specific
data and information. underlying our conclusions.
A discussion. Of the specific Vietnamese Communist
proposals for peace, as embodied in the DRV's four
points and the Front's five-point statement, is also
appended.
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US GOODWILL QUESTIONED
1. Despite American efforts to demonstrate in
a variety of ways that US peace initiatives in. Vietnam
have been made in good faith, it is clear from both
the public and private statements of the Vietnamese
Communists that they continue to doubt the sincerity
of the US' stated willingness to negotiate an equitable
settlement. The evidence strongly indicates that the
views of Hanoi and the Viet Con.g on this question. go
well beyond the propaganda objectives we would expect
them to try to gain by slandering US goodwill. It
appears that their suspicions actually reflect deeply
held beliefs.
The Communist Charges
2. Allegations concerning the fraudulent nature
of US peace moves have been consistently and prominent-
ly featured in Vietnamese Communist propaganda. Such
denunciations, for example, were a basic theme of
Hanoi's response to President Johnson's declaration on
7 April 1965 that the US stood ready to enter into
negotiations without preconditions. Hoang Quoc Viet,
one of the foremost North Vietnamese spokesmen on. the
war, charged that the President's offer was nothing but
a "trick" aimed at covering up US "crimes and acts
of war." The same term was used repeatedly by the
Vietnamese Communists in their denunciation of the
initial suspension in the bombing of North Vietnam
which took place from 12 to 18 May 1965.
3. In late December 1965, when the US coupled
a new suspension. of the aerial attacks with world-
wide diplomatic probes for peace openings, the Viet-
namese Communists again responded with charges assail-
ing the US moves as "deceptive." According to a Hanoi
commentary on 31 December, the US had not really shown
the "least sign. of desire" for a peaceful settlement
despite its actions. Similar allegations have continued
routinely during 1966. In. late August, the chairman
of the Viet Cong's Liberation Front, Nguyen Huu Tho,
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US GOODWILL QUESTIONED
1. Despite American efforts to demonstrate in
a variety of ways that US peace initiatives in. Vietnam
have been made in good faith, it is clear from both
the public and private statements of the Vietnamese
Communists that they continue to doubt the sincerity
of the US' stated willingness to negotiate an equitable
settlement. The evidence strongly indicates that the
views of Hanoi and the Viet Cong on this question go
well beyond the propaganda objectives we would expect
them to try to gain by slandering US goodwill. It
appears that their suspicions actually reflect deeply
held beliefs.
The Communist Charges
2. Allegations concerning the fraudulent nature
of US peace moves have been consistently and prominent-
ly featured in Vietnamese Communist propaganda. Such
denunciations, for example, were a basic theme of
Hanoi's response to President Johnson's declaration on
7 April 1965 that the US stood ready to enter into
negotiations without preconditions. Hoan.g Quoc Viet,
one of the foremost North Vietnamese spokesmen on. the
war, charged that the President's offer was nothing but
a "trick" aimed at covering up US "crimes and acts
of war." The same term was used repeatedly by the
Vietnamese Communists in their denunciation of the
initial suspension in the bombing of North Vietnam
which took place from 12 to 18 May 1965.
3. In late December 1965, when the US coupled
a new suspension. of the aerial attacks with world-
wide diplomatic probes for peace openings, the Viet-
namese Communists again responded with charges assail-
ing the US moves as "deceptive." According to a Hanoi
commentary on 31 December, the US had not really shown
the "least sign. of desire" for a peaceful settlement
despite its actions. Similar allegations have continued
routinely during 1966. In. late August, the chairman
of the Viet Cong's Liberation Front, Nguyen Huu Tho,
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denounced the `9honeylike'4 but "insincere" US words
about peace. At the DRV National Day celebrations in
September{ Premier Pham Van Dong labeled American
peace overtures a "shameless trick."
4. The striking persistence of these charges
in the public statements of the Vietnamese Communists
suggests, in itself, that they are more than just
propaganda slogans. That they genuinely distrust
the US has been confirmed in reports from numerous
f
ree world diplomats and officials who ha
with the Vietnamese
The Reasons for Communist Distrust
6. Analysis of statements and actions of the
Vietnamese Communists indicates that they believe the
US is, in reality, bent on winning a military victory
in Vietnam. They appear to believe that the US en-
visions, at the very least, the elimination of the
'Viet Cong as an armed threat in the South.. Given
this appraisal, it would follow for the Communists
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that all US bids for a peaceful solution are, ipso facto,
hypocritical tactical maneuvers designed to conTusee-
situation, undercut support for the Communist position, and
screen US military moves. The Communist belief that the
US is intent on imposing a settlement by force in Vietnam
is suggested in part by public statements denouncing US
peace initiatives. Almost uniformly, denunciations of US
peace moves are.,; accompanied by references to US military
actions which have taken place despite.the US peace bids.
7. Hoang Quoc Viet, for example, in castigating the
President's 7 April 1965 offer, attempted to prove'his
allegations by noting that "right after" the President's
speech the US deployed additional combat aircraft and marine
battalions to South Vietnam in clear preparation for con-
tinued military action. In denouncing the bombing suspen-
sion in May 1965, the North Vietnamese claimed that "provoca-
tive" US overflights continued during the suspension and
signaled an American intent to renew military action against
the North unless the DRV agreed to US terms for talks.
8. Vietnamese Communist allegations concerning the
suspension of air attacks on the North which began in De-
cember 1965 were also closely coupled with charges assail-
ing US actions in deploying new troops to Vietnam during
the aerial standdown, allegedly in preparation for later
armed action against the Communists. According to the
Vietnamese propaganda, "reality has proven that each time
the US prattles about peaceful negotiation," it takes
another step in "intensifying and expanding" the war. Such
charges have continued steadily through 1966. In September
Pham Van Dongclaimed, for example, thatUS talk concerning
peaceful negotiations is issued prior to every new US'miiiitary
escalation of the war.
9. Reports from many free world visitors to
North Vietnam indicate that the propensity of the Viet-
namese Communists to couple their statements denouncing
US peace moves with claims of simultaneous US military
action is more than just a tactical propaganda device.
These reports also suggest that Vietnamese statements
reflect a belief that the US is intent on pursuing mil-
itary action in Vietnam despite any openings for peace.
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12. The Vietnamese Communists' distrust of US
intentions stems to some extent from Marxist-Leninist
philosophy, which imputes a basic dishonesty to the
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capitalist powers--a dishonesty that must be guarded
against by the Communists. Their own experience in
dealing with the Western powers has tended to reinforce
their ideological predispositions. They believe, for
example, that the French moved against Ho Chi Min.h's
self-proclaimed Democratic Republic of Vietnam in 1945
despite an agreement signed with representatives of
his government recognizing its autonomy. The Viet-
namese also view the aftermath of the Fountainebleau
conference in. 1946, at which a cease-fire agreement was
reached, as a period during which the French moved to
escalate the war. The final proof of Western perfidy,
in the Vietnamese Communist view, was the failure of
the Western. powers to implement the 1954 Geneva agreement
on Indochina, an agreement which the Hanoi leaders
believed, if carried out, would have assured their
peaceful takeover of all Vietnam.
13. It was this experience which led Pham Van
Dong to say in a September 1965 speech that each time
an agreement was signed with the French, it merely
"gave them time to prepare their military force and
draft new plans for attacks on us." In. the entire course
of the conflict, stated Dong, "at the time when they
first started the war, as well as when they were faced
with a collapse and prepared to withdraw, the French
always tried to carry out their schemes to divide" and
conquer us.
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14. The Vietnamese Communists have long lumped
the Americans with the French as dishonest Westerners.
They often. voiced their suspicions of the US during
the sessions of the 1954 Geneva Conference. On. 29 May
1954, for example, Pham Van. Dong charged that while
the US talked about "national unity" and peace in
Vietnam, the US actions at Geneva were "merely a
ruse" designed to slow progress and prevent a peaceful
settlement. 25X1
e Viet-
namese ommunis s e ey had been
"taken in" at the time o e Geneva Accords and that
the "bourgeois side" would not keep its promises. The
next time, they planned to be "on their guard" and
would not be so trusting. More recently, according to
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15. In. the face of this view of US peace in-
itiatives and the current and historical factors act-
ing to in.fluen.ce it, there is apparently little the
US can. do to convince the Vietnamese Communists of
its desire for a just and honorable solution in Viet-
nam. This is especially true when it is considered
that the Vietnamese Communists also regard the
specific formulation of US peace terms as 'unpalatable
and completely unacceptable.
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Section II
SPECIFICS OF US PEACE TERMS CHALLENGED
1. The public and private statements of the
Vietnamese Communists also indicate that they feel
the specific terms of US proposals for a settlement
or for negotiations on Vietnam are formulated in a
fashion which the Communists cannot accept at the
present time. To a great extent, their statements
on this score are only propagandistic attempts to
discredit American policy. It does appear, however,
that the Vietnamese Communists sincerely believe
the US has not made any real concessions in its po-
sition in order to start talks. It appears also that
this has reinforced their belief that the US is not
really interested in a cessation of military action.
They seem to feel, moreover, that US peace proposals
are so formulated that acceptance would show the
Communists to be dealing from a position of weakness
(see also Section VI).
The Terms and Phraseology of US Peace Bids
2. Perhaps the best illustration of the latter
problem arose in connection with President Johnson's
offer on 5 September 1966 to make public a schedule for
the withdrawal of US forces from South Vietnam if in-
filtration from the North were halted and DRV forces
now in the South withdrawn. Hanoi speedily denounced
this proposal as designed to "trick" the Vietnamese
into an admission that DRV forces were actually in
South Vietnam. They also claimed it constituted an-
other attempt to "force" on the Vietnamese conditions
for the withdrawal of US troops.
3. It is highly doubtful that the Vietnamese
Communists, in view of their apparently optimistic
estimate of the current balance of forces in Vietnam
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(see Section IV),would have accepted the US with-
drawal offer without at least partial implementation,
even if it were not hedged with conditions to be
filled by Hanoi. It does appear from their response,
however, that in the present power balance, the Viet-
namese Communists will not accept any US proposal
which sets conditions for them to fulfill. Such
proposals are viewed as requiring an unacceptable
show of weakness on their part.
4. US efforts to get negotiations under way
through a suspension of the bombing of North Vietnam
have so far drawn the same type of response for the
same reasons. According to Hanoi, "it is starkly
clear that the hoax about the conditional cessation
of the bombing of North Vietnam, like the one about
the conditional withdrawal of US troops, is but a
trick which is part of the unconditional discussions
scheme of the US."
5. The Vietnamese Communists have often pri-
vatelynstressed their concern with avoiding any appear-
6- nneprni no, the slismansi n of the bombing of
the DRV old b Soviet Embassy
represen a Ives that no US
offer to stop the bombing of the DRV had any chance of
success if it were tied to some reciprocal action by
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the Vietnamese, such as a cessation of assistance to
the Viet Cong, since to accept such an offer would
constitute an admission of aggression.
Views on the US 14-Point Proposal
7. The Vietnamese Communist belief that the US
has not yet made any concessions in its position on the
war was clearly evident in Hanoi's treatment of the
American 14-point proposal publicized in December 1965.
According to Mai Van Bo, this US peace bid attempted
to "create the illusion of concessions but in fact
showed no change of position." Each principle set
forth in the 14 points, according to Bo, "is followed
by a condition" set out for the Communists which "makes
the principle unworkable." This was also the position
taken by the Vietnamese propagandists in their public
commentary on the 14 points. Their propaganda focused
on such things as the expression of US willingness to
stop bombing the DRV if the Communists would "tell what
would happen as a result." According to Hanoi, the
bombings must be ended "unconditionally" as a unilateral
act of the US.
The Effect of Communist Suspicions
8. On balance, it seems almost certain that
the distrust and suspicion of the Vietnamese Communists
concerning US intentions in the Vietnam war have served
as a significant impediment to a termination of the
conflict. They have clearly tended to reinforce Hanoi's
already strong determination to fight on until the US
is forced to make concessions. The Vietnamese have
said so flatly on a number of occasions. A Foreign
Ministry statement of 14 July 1966 protesting the US
raids on petroleum storage facilities in North Vietnam,
for example, asserted that the US hopes it "can bring
about negotiations from a strong position and compel
the Vietnamese people to lay down their arms." Such
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actions are useless, the statement asserted, and only
increase the Vietnamese determination to defeat the US.
9. In its response to the suspension of bombing
in May 1965, the North Vietnamese party daily Nhan Dan
declared that the Vietnamese people are "not used to
kneeling down before any aggressor.."' Thus, the more the
US proffers its "deceptive" peace offers, the "deeper
our hatred and the firmer our resolve to annihilate
them." In an April 1966 radiobroadcast denouncing
Senator Mansfield's call for direct peace talks between
the US, China, and the DRV, Hanoi declared that "we
must deal the US more painful blows, so painful that it
tan no'longer bear.-.them".and must "abandon its aggres-
sive will and recognize our stand."
10. This line is doubtless intended in part to
spark popular sentiment against the US among the people
of North Vietnam. It would also appear, however, to
reflect the actual feelings of the Hanoi leaders. 25X1
the Vietnamese Communists has quoted Ho Chi Minh as
stating that "when they bomb us, it looks as if someone
with a whip in his hand were inviting us to sit down
and start talking. We say: throw away your daggers 25X1
and throw down your whip and we shall talk. If we sit
down with you at one table under the present conditions,
it will mean giving up, and we never give up."
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US GOODWILL NOT A CRITICAL ELEMENT
1. Vietnamese Communist suspicions concerning
US goodwill will not be a critical factor in getting
talks on the conflict started. If and when the Viet-
namese decide to agree to talks, their decision will
be based primarily on their assessment of the relative
strategic position of the US and Communist sides. This
is apparent in many of their more candid private state-
ments and also in the impressions gathered by seasoned
Western observers who have talked with them. In the
middle of 1964, for example, before direct American
military pressure was applied to North Vietnam, Pham
Van Dong that the
Vietname Communists y un oo a strategic
stakes in the conflict and recognized that a "US defeat
in South Vietnam would in all probability start a
chain reaction that would extend much farther." The
US should understand, however, said the premier, "that
the principles and stakes involved are just as high"
for the Communists and that this helps to "explain
our determination to continue the fighting."
2. In January 1965, the Vietnamese Communist
intention to wait until the strategic situation was
right was underscored by a DRV official during a visit
to Cambodia. According to him, the Communists were
not prepared to make any concession to hasten the
American departure from Vietnam. The Vietnamese Com-
munists were not "looking for short cuts" and would
not act prematurely, but would wait until "everything
had been built up correctly" before making a move to
end the fighting.
3. DRV officials have continued during 1966 to
maintain that the primary factor governing their policy
on negotiations is their assessment of the Communist
power position vis-a-vis the allies.
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stronger than it was in the war against the French when
it was "forced to negotiate an unsatisfactory settlement."
Now its military situation has become so strong that it
"need not again enter into negotiations from weakness."
The Korean and Laotian Experiences
4. The experiences of the free world allies with
the Communists in the Korean and Laotian conflicts bear
out the proposition that Communist views on the goodwill
of the enemy are distinctly secondary in importance to
estimates of the relative balance of forces. In the
Korean conflict, initial Chinese military successes
convinced the Communists that UN forces could be driven
from Korea if military pressure was sustained. During
this period, the Chinese remained uninterested in any
kind of talks and routinely justified their position
partly by describing allied offers for a negotiated set-
tlement as insincere.
5. A series of allied advances in early 1951,
followed by the blunting of the Communists' own offen-
sives, however, left the ranks of the best Communist
armies decimated. The disastrous defeats impelled the
Communists to begin negotiations. There was no prior
indication, however, that they planned to move in this
direction. Moreover, their vituperation concerning the
inadequacy, illegality, and fraud of the allied peace
terms had not abated. It remained, in fact, a steady
theme in Communist propaganda during the protracted
discussions which ensued.
6. In Laos, the course of political negotiations
was considerably more complicated than in Korea, but the
Communist decisions both to engage in talks and to reach
an agreement clearly resulted primarily from assessments
of the strategic situation and depended only incidentally
on estimates of the good intentions of the non-Communist
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participants. The agreement of the North Vietnamese
to the Geneva Treaty on Laos in June 1962 resulted from
concern over the possibility of direct US military in-
tervention in the Laotian fighting, which had been
suggested by the deployment of US combat forces to
Thailand in May. The North Vietnamese were also anxious
by this time to concentrate more extensively on support
of the insurgency in South Vietnam.
7. The Communists had originally agreed to the
Geneva Conference in May 1961 in the belief that their
gains up to that point could best be extended by con-
tinuing military pressure combined with greater politi-
cal and diplomatic action. Both during and after the
Geneva sessions, however, the Vietnamese continued to
harp on the lack of a sincere will for peace on the
non-Communist side and on its unacceptable terms for
a settlement.
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THE COMMUNIST ESTIMATE OF US STRENGTH
1. The Communists' belief that major policy
concessions can eventually be forced from the US, and
that negotiations are not feasible until that time, is
based on faith in their ability to fight a protracted
war, a conflict in. which their will to persist can
outlast that of the US.
w nuut nerhans most succinctly
all in agreement on how the war would end.
"it could take a man's age," and that "we have time."
eans (including the US) have less time.
"Euro
Th
p
e
There, governments shift, and leaders come and go. In
the end, there will come a man in. Washington who will
say there is no sense in staying and they will leave.
We are sure of this." La' -- Ur% phi Minh himself
roi+ora+arl the same theme
that "t heir special mitive warfare, physical
endurance, and inner fortitude, which in the past
showed them equal to the Mongols and the Chinese, will
permit them to gradually wear the Americans down. and
achieve ultimate success."
The Probable Communist Estimate
3. The available intelligence indicates that
this faith in the protracted war strategy is not based
solely on emotional beliefs in Vietnamese powers of
endurance, but also springs from an estimate of the
relative strategic position of the US and Communist
forces. Hanoi appears to believe that the US will
continue to employ its forces in the future along
basically the same lines as at present. The Americans,
in Hanoi's view, will, be aiming to keep the Communist
forces off balance by disrupting and destroying their
bases and by attempting to trap and destroy their
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main. force units. The North Vietnamese have frequently
expressed the belief that the US buildup in South Vietnam
may surpass 400,000 men by the end of this year. It
would appear, however, that they do not believe this
force will be enough to inflict a decisive defeat on
the Communists.
4. They probably estimate that they will still
retain a powerful hand in South Vietnam if they can
maintain the bulk of the regular units intact in the
face of the anticipated level of allied buildup. They
will then. retain the option of protracting the war into--
and, if necessary, beyond--1967. This may be the main
strategy behind the intensive movement of PAVN troops
across the DMZ and into mountainous parts of Quan.g Tri
Province. Fighting here from interior supply lines,
connected to the DRV,with speedy refuge and probably
better antiaircraft artillery available, the Communists
seem bent on. getting into a position. from which they
can indefinitely protract the conflict regardless of
the military situation farther South.
5. The Vietnamese Communists apparently believe
that the US will continue to be extremely reluctant to
seek a basic alteration in. the strategy of the war:
for example, a ground invasion of the DRV.
that even if the US
were to invade or ie n m, protracted conflict
could still be fought since the US could not conquer
and occupy the North. They could take Hanoi, admitted
the Vietnamese, but they "could not control the land
areas any more than they can control South Vietnamese
rural areas at present."
6. The Vietnamese Communists may hope that
Washington will be forced to make a basic re-examination
of its policy if the allies, with an American. ground
force of around 400,000, fail to force a decisive out-
come of the war. Hanoi may hope that, at this point,
the US will be willing to make concessions which would
offer a realization. of at least some Communist objectives
in South Vietnam.
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The Importance of Domestic Opposition in the US
7. An element in the Vietnamese Communist strategy
of protracted war is the extent and effect of opposition
to US policy on Vietnam from within the United States.
The Vietnamese Communists do not view this opposition
as simply a manifestation of moral reservations among
American intellectuals and leftists over Washington's
war policy, but believe that important opposition may
develop as a result of the economic pinch of the war on
the American public and business, and that such oppo-
sition may also be fanned by the continuing American
casualties in Vietnam.
8. It is clear that the Vietnamese believe the
US will be forced to go on an extensive wartime foot-
ing eventually. They think this will greatly increase
domestic opposition, and will tend to check any heavy
US escalation of the war through the commitment of
conside
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as sure the could not maintain the kind
o war effort needed in Vietnam without being forced
eventually by domestic public opinion to re-examine
and modify its policy. We know that Vietnamese Commu-
nist cadres have been told by their leaders that "in-
creased public opposition to US activities in Vietnam"
could be "among the more important factors," in ad-
dition to casualties and economic costs," which would
cause the "American government to desist and decide
to give up and get out."
9. Despite their expectations, there is strong
evidence that the Vietnamese Communists are not able
to correctly gauge the real intensity or direction of
US domestic opposition at any given time. In viewing
the American situation, the Vietnamese are doubtless
influenced by their over-all lack of sophistication
on American politics and by their earlier, but not quite
parallel, success in bringing pressure to bear from
French public opinion on France's war policy in 1953-54.
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10. The lack of sophistication of the Vietnamese
Communists can be seen in their reaction to the American
student protests over Vietnam policy in the fall of 1965.
There was an. increasing air of optimism over the strength
of the student agitation. in Vietnamese Communist propa-
ganda at that time, capped by an announcement from. Hanoi
on. 24 October that a "united front of the Vietnamese
and American. people has de facto taken shape." The
tone of the propaganda strongly suggested that the
Vietnamese were overreading the extent and depth of the
protests.
11. Another indication of the Vietnamese Com-
munist misjudgment on this score is apparent iE
propaganda charges that the statements of "war hawks"
in the US act as a deterrent to negotiations. While
such statements are designed as a tactical measure to
bolster the Communist position against talks, they
appear to indicate a belief in. Hanoi that only a tiny
minority in the US outside the administration is
urging a more vigorous policy of military action and
involvement in. Vietnam.
12. In view of their propensity to misread the
depth and direction of American domestic opposition
to US policy on Vietnam, it is probable that the
eventual failure of such opposition to work in. the
Communists' favor would exert a significant impact
on their protracted war strategy. It would probably
not be critical, however, unless accompanied by a
serious decline in. their military position.
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THE EXTENT OF COMMUNIST DETERMINATION
1. All of the available evidence indicates that
the dedication of the Vietnamese Communists to the unifi-
cation of Vietnam under Communist hegemony is extremely
strong, that this has'been a consistent goal since 1954,
and that the will to accomplish this objective has not
been appreciably reduced by the heavier military pres-
sure imposed on the Communists during the last two years.
Many of the statements quoted in the preceding sections
testify implicitly to the depth of this determination;
others are offered below.
2. The ink on the Geneva agreements of 1954 was
hardly dry, for example, before the Vietnamese Commu-
nists publicly asserted their determination to extend
their control over South Vietnam. At the closing ses-
sion of the Geneva Conference, Pham Van Dong declared
that "we shall achieve the unity of Vietnam just as we
have won the war." Ho Chi Minh said the next day that
a "long and arduous struggle" still lay ahead and that
the division of Vietnam was only a "temporary and transi-
tional arrangement: Central, South and North Vietnam
are all our land, and our country undoubtedly will be
unified, the compatriots throughout our country liberated."
them the Vietnamese leaders o
"we have a very consistent, clear i ,
and we will never abandon it. There is nothing to dis-
cuss. The only honorable peace is that we are masters
of our own country. The only question to discuss is
when will the Americans go." The visitor came away with
the impression. that "this fantastic self -confidence and
belief in themselves" is what essentially motivates and
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POSSIBLE'; PRODUCTIVE PEACE APPROACHES
1. Since the Vietnamese Communists believe the
US must be forced into a position. from which it will
make concessions in. order to start talks, it follows
that a paramount concern of the Communists is to main-
tain an. image of strength during the fighting and
particularly prior to the initiation of any talks on
the war. All good; evidence on Vietnamese Communist
strategy has tended to confirm this proposition. (see
also Section-; 11)
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Termination of the Bombing Necessary
3. In view of their concern for the maintenance
of an. image of strength, it is almost certain that the
Vietnamese Communists will not agree to any discussions
until the US stops bombing North Vietnam and promises
not to resume the air attacks. This has been a com-
pletely consistent theme in the private and public state-
ments of the Vietnamese and in the reports of Western and
bloc diplomats who have talked with them. Among the
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5. As indicated in prior sections of this study,
the Vietnamese have rejected every proposal by the US
or other mediators which either stated or implied that
the Communists must take reciprocal action in exchange
for a US move of de-escalation. It is clear that Communist
action on this score also stems from concern for pre-
serving an image of strength and/or for avoiding even
an implicit admission of aggressive action against
South Vietnam. As long as they judge the balance of
power in Vietnam along the lines outlined in Section
IV of this study, it appears almost certain that any
US proposal which is formulated in a manner requiring
a meaningful reciprocal action by the Communists is
foredoomed to rejection. It is probable, in fact, that
even, if such a proposal were advanced privately it
would be rejected.
Possibly Acceptable Proposals
6. Given the evidence set forth in this study on
the Vietnamese Communist suspicion concerning US inten-
tions, on the unpalatability to the Communists of past
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US peace formulas, on the evident determination of the
Vietnamese to achieve their objectives, and on their
estimate of their present strategic position in the
conflict, it appears likely at this stage of the war
that only a US proposal which was accompanied by a
clearcut and significant concession in American mili-
tary policy which did not require a quid pro quo by
the Communists would have any chance of gaining their
agreement to bilateral negotiations with the US. It
is possible that by means of such a concession (for ex-
ample: the unconditional termination of the bombing of
the DRV, or an. announced end to the US troop and weapon
buildup in South Vietnam), the Vietnamese Communists
could be brought to agree to bilateral talks. It was
the firm view that the
North Vietnamese were prepared to resume at least
bilateral "contacts" with the US if Washington gave
an unconditional undertaking to stop the bombing for
good. Such a move by the US would test rather ef-
fectively whether there is currently a weakness which
does not appear on the surface in the Vietnamese Com-
munist position and determination on the war.
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Hanoi would see its princi-
pal objective in any bilateral contacts with the US
as securing US acceptance of the DRV's four-point
war. Formal, multilateral negotiations,
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ing had been achieved on the four points. It is pos-
sible, however, that the course of preliminary bila-
teral contacts would point the way to wider negotia-
tions and possibly to an agreement on the termination
of military action that would be acceptable to the
United States.
8. We believe it at least equally possible that,
despite a major US concession, the Vietnamese Com-
munists would refuse to agree to bilateral talks or
even to renewed contacts. They might take advantage
of the partial respite from military pressure while de-
manding additional concessions before talks. They
might, for example, call for the cessation of
offensive air operations in Laos and the termi-
nation of strategic bombing in South Vietnam.
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1. Premier Pham Van Dong enunciated the four
points in April 1965. They were first broadcast by
Hanoi radio on 12 April and were clearly Hanoi's re-
sponse to President Johnson's 7 April 1965 speech at
Johns Hopkins in Baltimore. These four points have
consistently been referred to by the North Vietnamese
as the embodiment of the basic provisions of the 1954
Geneva agreements on Vietnam. They have been repeatedly
offered as Hanoi's official position on what it sees
as the basis for a political settlement in Vietnam.
2. There has been no change in the wordin of
the four points since they were first broadcast.
he four points have
become so much a part o Hanoi's propaganda that no
public change in them is likely.
3. Aside from their propaganda value, it is cer-
tain that they represent the maximum bargaining posi-
tion Hanoi would take at any negotiation conference.
There are good reasons, however, for believing that
some degree of flexibility has been built in. An ex-
amination of the North Vietnamese treatment of the four
points, element by element, provides a good indication
of just where the give is.
Point one: "Recognition of the basic na-
tional rights of the Vietnamese people--peace,
independence, sovereignty, unity, and territorial
integrity. According to the Geneva agreements,
the US Government must withdraw from South Viet-
nam US troops, military personnel, and weapons
of all kinds, dismantle all US military bases
there, and cancel its military alliance with South
Vietnam. It must end its policy of intervention
and aggression in South Vietnam. According to the
Geneva agreements, the US Government must stop its
acts of war against North Vietnam and completely
cease all encroachments on the territory and sov-
ereignty of the DRV."
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4. This point was described in. the 23 July 1966
issue of North Vietnam's party daily as the "starting
point and the basis" of the four points and as the
"principle of principles" for a settlement of the Viet-
namese problem. It is a basic restatement of some of
the points included in the 1954 Geneva .agreements and
undoubtedly represents Hanoi's genuinely desired goal
in any political settlement.
.5. On. numerous occasion.s since April 1965, North
Vietnamese leaders and authoritative spokesmen have
made it clear that Hanoi does not regard the various
elements of this point as proper matters for discussion.
They have stated flatly that the withdrawal of US troops
from South Vietnam is the "key" to a settlement of the
Vietnam problem. Major General Nguyen. Van Vin.h, the
head of both the party and government reunification
commissions in. Hanoi, stated in. September 1965 that in
order to have a political solution, "first of all," the
US must "approve" the withdrawal of its troops.
On. this point there has been. a great deal of con-
fusion over the past year and a half, that is, whether
the withdrawal of US troops was to be a precondition
to talks or was to be discussed at the negotiations
table when. a final solution. was being arranged. North
Vietnamese spokesmen in. 1965 helped confuse the issue
by being deliberately vague when, asked to comment.
When asked point blanki 25X1
Ihether withdrawal was a precondition o
or something to be negotiated, Pham Van. Dong replied
with a smile, "both."
6. Since that time, however, Don.g and other North
Vietnamese spokesmen have made it clear that they do
not intend the withdrawal of US forces to be a precondi-
tion for talks. What they do insist on. as a precondi-
tion is "tangible proof" that the US will agree to with-
draw its troops as part of a settlement. Just how this
proof is to be given. is not entirely clear. North Viet-
namese spokesmen. have hinted that it could take the form
of a public pledge by the US .
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4. This point was described in the 23 July 1966
issue of North Vietnam's party daily as the "starting
point and the basis" of the four points and as the
"principle of principles" for a settlement of the Viet-
namese problem. It is a basic restatement of some of
the points included in. the 1954 Geneva agreements and
undoubtedly represents Hanoi's genuinely desired goal
in any political settlement.
.5. On numerous occasions since April 1965, North
Vietnamese leaders and authoritative spokesmen have
made it clear that Hanoi does not regard the various
elements of this point as proper matters for discussion.
They have stated flatly that the withdrawal of US troops
from South Vietnam is the "key" to a settlement of the
Vietnam problem. Major General Nguyen. Van Vin.h, the
head of both the party and government reunification
commissions in. Hanoi, stated in. September 1965 that in
order to have a political solution, "first of all," the
US must "approve" the withdrawal of its troops.
On. this point there has been a great deal of con-
fusion over the past year an.d a half, that is, whether
the withdrawal of US troops was to be a precondition.
to talks or was to be discussed at the n.egotiation.s
table when. a final solution. was being arranged. North
Vietnamese spokesmen in. 1965 helped confuse the issue
by being deliberately 7acrlldn whon asked to comment,
When asked point blank 25X1
Ewhether withdrawal was
lied
D
ong rep
or something to be negotiated, Pham Van.
with a smile, "both."
6. Since that time, however, Dong and other North
Vietnamese spokesmen. have made it clear that they do
not intend the withdrawal of US forces to be a precondi-
tion for talks. What they do insist on as a precondi-
tion. is "tangible proof" that the US will agree to with-
draw its troops as part of a settlement. Just how this
proof is to be given. is not entirely clear. North Viet-
namese spokesmen. have hinted t t it could take the form
n-f n n>hl i c nl edp^e by the US. T I
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7. North Vietnam has also made it clear that it
will not agree to withdraw Communist forces from South
Vietnam in exchange for the withdrawal of US troops.
Nguyen Van Vinh stated in his September 1965 article
that Communist troops fighting in South Vietnam "will
refuse to be regrouped to North Vietnam a second time,"
a reference to the regroupment north of most of the
Viet Minh forces in South Vietnam after the signing of
the 1954 agreements.
8. Although Hanoi will undoubtedly refuse to sign
any agreement admitting that it has troops in South
Vietnam, it would probably stage a clandestine with-
drawal of at least North Vietnamese regulars as US for-
ces were being taken out of the country. Communist
documents captured on the battlefield in South Viet-
nam reveal that the Communists believe that if US
forces are withdrawn, the Viet Cong would have nothing
to fear from the South Vietnamese Army, which the Com-
munists regard as largely ineffectual.
9. The North Vietnamese have also indicated that
they are flexible on the matter of the timing of a US
troop pullout. On several occasions North Vietnamese
spokesmen have stated that if the US will agree to with-
draw its troops the Communists will be willing to make
arrangements which will enable the US not "to lose face."
There have been hints that Hanoi is interested in ex-
ploring unofficially with third parties what sort of
timetable might be possible if a staged withdrawal
of US troops were arranged. 11
Finally, al-
though there is some flexibility built into the first
point, Hanoi has also used it as the peg point for
its refusal to move toward negotiations until the US
completely and unconditionally ceases its air strikes
against North Vietnam.
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1.2.. Despite the extensive campaign by the Com-
munists to create the illusion that the Front is the
legitimate voice of the South Vietnamese people, there
are good indications that Hanoi will not insist on. its
demand that the Front be the only representative from
South Vietnam at any multilateral negotiating conference
Point four: The peaceful reunification. of
Vietnam is to be settled by the Vietnamese people
in. both zones, without any foreign interference.
North Vietnamese spokesmen. have made it clear that
they consider this point as a long-term prospect. They
have even. attempted to portray their willingness to
accept a delayed reunification. as a concession. to the
US. Major General Nguyen. Van Vinh, for example, in
January 1966 stated that had the US allowed the elections
called for in. the 1954 Geneva agreements to take place,
the country would now be reunited. He claimed that
Han.oi's current willingness to postpone reunification.
was a clear concession to the US.
Four Points As Preconditions
'14. Pham Van. Don.g con.cluded the four-point state-
ment with the assertion that "if this basis (the four
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 Approve
points) is recognized, favorable conditions will be
created for the peaceful settlement of the Vietnam
problem, and it will be possible to consider the
reconvening of an international conference along the
pattern of the 1954 Geneva conference on Vietn.am."
The North Vietnamese have never been clear as to just
what the word "recogn.ize" was intended to mean. At
one time some North Vietnamese hinted that a statement
by the US that it accepted the four points as a basis
for a settlement would suffice.
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a Hanoi's Position. on is poin.t~
is tougher than often had been indicated. It now seems
likely that the "tangible proofs" or "actual deeds"
demanded by the North Vietnamese as an earnest of US
intentions in. order to convene a final, multilateral
con.feren.ce must include a total an.d permanent cessation
of air strikes against North Vietnam, a cessation of
the buildup of US forces in. South Vietnam, and probably
at least a token. withdrawal of some forces from that
country.
16. The so-called "peace terms" of the Communist-
con.trolled Front group in South Vietnam were set forth
on 22 March 1965 interspersed within a rambling five-
point statement. Essentially, the Front's five points
were as follows:
a. A condemnation of US policy in Vietnam along
with a catalogue of US war "crimes" there since
1954.
b. An expression of the determination of the Viet-
namese "people" to "kick out" the US "imperialists"
from Vietnam and to "liberate" South Vietnam.
According to the statement, the Vietnamese will
never stop fighting until their ultimate ob-
jectives of "independence, democracy, peace,
and neutrality" have been. obtained. The "on.ly
way out" for the US is to "withdraw" from South
Vietnam. The statement declared that "at present,
all negotiations are useless" on the war as
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long as "the US imperialists do not withdraw
all troops, weapons, and means of war from
Vietnam, and as long as the Liberation Front
does not have the decisive voice." By this
the Front apparently meant that it should have
a dominant voice in any political settlement
of the conflict.
c. A pledge of determination to "advance toward"
the reunification of Vietnam.
d. A declaration that the Front has the "full right"
to receive international assistance. While re-
lying primarily on its own force, the Front
"will buy war materiel from any county," and
will call "if necessary" for foreign volunteers.
e. A call on all South Vietnamese people to join
in, the fight to "liberate" the South.
17. At its publication, the Front statement was
primarily touted by the Viet Cong as a manifesto of their
intent in the war. It was not until after Pham Van
Dong's speech setting forth the DRV's four-point peace
proposal that both Hanoi and the Viet Cong began to point
to the Front statement as containing the Viet Cong peace
terms. Subsequent Front statements have largely echoed
the 22 March manifesto, differing only in that several
of them hardened the Front's position on the withdrawal
of US forces. A statement of 14 June 1965, for example,
claimed that "all negotiations are useless" if the US
imperialists "have not yet withdrawn" from South Vietnam.
A Front central committee statement of 25 November 1965,
however, did not attach any condition of timing to a
withdrawal as a preliminary to a settlement. Occasionally,
other statements by Front leaders have also implied that
withdrawal is not a precondition to talks. This, for
example, was the position taken. by Nguyen Huu Tho, chair-
man of the Front, in an interview on 25 August 1966.
18. Although there is no explicit evidence to sup-
port?the contention, we believe the apparent hard Front
position on US withdrawal has been maintained primarily
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for tactical reasons by the Viet Cong. Hanoi's own
final position. on this point would, we feel confident,
be the deciding word if the Vietnamese Communists
decided to move toward a political settlement.
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505
This memorandum considers in some
detail the North Vietnamese attitudes
toward the US negotiating positions
and depicts the North Vietnamese im-
peratives in the matter.
On the whole the Communist po-
sition emerges as unyielding, dis-
trustful of the US, and confident.
This is not to say that there are
no crevices in the front, but they
are few.
Some discussion of possibly
productive approaches is contained
in Section VI, starting on Page 26.
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5. It is possible that there is a faction among
the Vietnamese Communist leaders which does not share
this depth of feeling concerning the protraction of the
war. The hard evidence on the subject, however, points
to a surprising unanimity of view on continuing the
struggle. The only recent evidence of debate over
policy among the Communists suggests a difference of
opinion mainly over how best to conduct the military
side of the war, not over whether to fight or to quit.
There is no evidence, either, tha.t the morale of the
DRV population is such that it will not follow the
policy dictates of the leaders for the foreseeable
future.
6. It does not seem likely that influences for
moderation, if any, from East European Communists and/or
from the Soviet Union would have any appreciable ef-
fect on the Vietnamese will to persist. A DRV diplo-
mat said in June: "Our friends tell us we suffer too
many losses and make too many sacrifices." They urge
us to "compromise with the Americans as we did with
the French." There are, however, "other losses and
sacrifices the world does not know about" in the
event of such a compromise; "this is why we are deter-
mined to continue to fight until we achieve total
victory."
7. Although the direct evidence on the point is
scanty, it seems probable that the Vietnamese Commu-
nists believe the US underestimates the depth of their
determination in the war. They have often made such
charges in their propaganda. An editorial in the
party daily paper on the occasion of the DRV National
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Day in September, for example, stated that "as a rule,
the imperialists always meet with defeats because of
their miscalculation." Because of "a misappreciation
of the strength of our people," declared the edi-
torial, US war policy has already "gone bankrupt."
The paper denounced alleged US plans to throw 100,000
more troops into the fight, asserting that the "strength
of our people lies in their firm determination." Ac-
cording to the paper "we have enough strength and deter-
mination to continue this fight until final victory."
8. It appears that the Vietnamese Communists ex-
pect a modification of US policy will come about when.
Washington realizes the strength of the Vietnamese will.
They consistently stress their determination to key
visitors who they know or suspect will report their im-
pressions to Washington. It is impossible to judge how
much of this effort is bluster to convey at least an
image of strength and how much represents a candid ef-
fort to get the point of their real determination
across more forcefully in. the US.
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