THE SITUATION IN VIETNAM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00826A001400010075-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 20
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 8, 2004
• Sequence Number: 75
• Publication Date: November 28, 1966
• Content Type: MEMO

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MEMORANDUM
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
The Situation in Vietnam
Top Secret
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HIGHLIGHTS
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Poor weather continues to hamper ground and
air operations in northern portions of South Vietnam.
I. The Military Situation in South Vietnam:
Only light contact has been reported as bad weat er
continues to hamper allied air and ground operations
in the northern half of the country (Para. 1). Six
enemy soldiers were killed in scattered actions in
Operation PAUL REVERE IV in the central highlands
(Paras. 2-3). A total of 17 Viet Cong were killed
on 28 November in coastal Binh Dinh Province by US
troops of Operation THAYER II (Para. 4). Viet Cong
guerrillas ambushed an ARVN truck convoy near Da Lat
for the second time in a week (Para. 5).
II. Political Developments in South Vietnam:
The Constituent Assembly on 28 November held an in-
conclusive debate on individual rights and duties to
be included in the constitution (Para. 1).
IV. Other Communist Military Developments:
There is nothing of si_gni icance to report.
V. Communist Political Developments: A detailed
discussion of the merits of guerrilla warfare over
tactics has been publicized widely by the Vietnamese
Communists (Paras. 1-4).
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The Situation in Long An Province?
The possible deployment of US troops to the
delta area of South Vietnam has been under consid-
eration for some time. In order to test the feasi-
bility of such a move and to explore some of the
problems which might be encountered in delta opera-
tions, a US combat battalion was sent to Long An
Province in September.
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1. THE MILITARY SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM
1. Only light, sporadic contact with Communist
forces has been reported. Bad weather continues to
hamper allied air and ground operations in the north-
ern half of the country.
2. One company of the US 25th Infantry Division
taking part in the nine-battalion Operation PAUL RE-
VERE IV engaged a Communist force of unknown size early
on 29 November in southwestern Kontum Province. Six
enemy soldiers were killed in a ten-minute battle.
No friendly casualties were reported.
3. Two US brigade command posts 25 miles west
of Pleiku city in Pleiku Province were hit by Com-
munist mortar fire late on 28 November. 25X
the enemy positions, which were tired upon
by US mortars. Enemy losses are unknown.
4. Units of the US 1st Air Cavalry Division
participating in Operation THAYER II in coastal Binh
Dinh Province reported killing 17 Viet Cong in scattered
actions on 28 November. No American casualties were
reported. Since this four-battalion search-and-destroy
operation began on 24 October, 414 Communists have
been killed, eight captured, and 922 suspects appre-
hended. American casualties total 45 killed and 209
wounded.
5. Viet Cong guerrillas ambushed a South Viet-
namese Army (ARVN) convoy of 17 trucks carrying food
supplies near Da Lat in Tuyen Duc Province early on
29 November, A two-hour engagement, which ended when
allied reinforcements arrived, resulted in 26 South
Vietnamese killed and 26 wounded. Two ARVN vehicles
were destroyed and two others damaged. This is the
second ambush in a week near Da Lat--an area normally
considered secure by the South Vietnamese Government.
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II. POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN SOUTH VIETNAM
1. The Constituent Assembly held its second
deliberative session on the basic principles of the
constitution on 28 November. In accordance with the
agenda, the constitution drafting committee proposed
its concept of individual rights and duties. The
ensuing debate was inconclusive, and no vote was
taken on any of the issues. The committee's version
contained 12 basic rights, including freedom of re-
ligion and a provision outlawing political participa-
tion by religious groups, and four basic duties in-
cluding a military obligation and a duty to defend
Vietnam's republican form of government. During the
discussion ethnic minority representatives pressed for
the inclusion of special provisions which would pro-
tect the customs of the minorities.., H:oa Haodepu
ties objected to the preclusion of religious groups
from involvement in politics. A number of other
deputies were mainly concerned with defining the con-
ditions and the extent to which basic liberties could
be curtailed.
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1. There is nothing of significance to re-
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V. COMMUNIST POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS
1. An article publicized extensively by the
Vietnamese Communists and written under the pseudonym
of Cuu Long presents a detailed analysis of the im-
portance currently attached to the role of the guer-
rilla;-warfare in the south. It contrasts markedly
with the stress placed. on regular or mobile tactics
by the Vietnamese Communist leadership in South Viet-
nam as late as July 1966. The success of US spoiling
operations over the past year, particularly this sum-
mer, may have convinced the Vietnamese Communist lead-
ership that they cannot now successfully challenge
the US to large unit combat on a regular basis.
2. The article specifically warns against this
latter tactic, describing as an "erroneous concept"
the idea of "depending on concentrated troops." It
also points out that the guerrilla war is designed
as a "protracted resistance," one purpose of which
is to tie down enemy forces by making them spread
themselves thin, The author warns against those who
might favor a purely defensive tactic. He points
out that even in guerrilla warfare, the object is
continually to attack and 'harass the enemy. "To
pause at the defensive is to invite the danger of
being annihilated," the article warns. It points
out that "even if we do not attack the enemy, he
will attempt to exterminate us."
3. Cuu Long urges greater efforts to develop
guerrilla warfare, claiming that its potential is
"unlimited,". He notes, however, that a number of
difficulties face the Communists. For example, he
states that there is a need for quickly expanding
the number of guerrillas in the south. He implicitly
criticizes the move taken in early and mid-1965 by
the Viet Cong high command to weaken the guerrillas
by moving cadre and men into the ranks of the regular
forces.
4. The author concludes that if the Communists
properly develop guerrilla forces and coordinate their
political and military actions with those of the reg-
ular forces (some of which are operating as guerrillas),
the enemy could be defeated.
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ANNEX
THE SITUATION IN LONG AN PROVINCE
The US Operations
1. Two companies of the US 25th Division were
deployed to Ben Luc town in Long An Province be-
tween 21 September and 5 November. From Ben Luc,
they operated into fully Viet Cong - controlled
areas. In their forays--limited to raids into
Viet Cong combat hamlets rather than search-and-
destroy operations--the troops labored under a
number of handicaps. The terrain was new, much of
it was flooded, and supporting aircraft were re-
stricted in their use of suppressing fire to help
secure helicopter landing zones.
2. Viet Cong losses during the 45-day period
were 14 confirmed killed (plus 26 possible), 24
captured, and 64 suspects detained. The American
forces also captured 17 weapons, 326 mines and
grenades, 7,000 rounds of ammunition, and 27 tons
of rice. The Viet Cong, in turn, killed eight
Americans, and wounded 25. In addition, they de-
stroyed eight helicopters and damaged 15 others.
The high rate of helicopter losses led the units
to discontinue some of their airborne operations.
3. There was no increase in the pace of
pacification during the period--two hamlets were
~?'secured?? in September and two in October--but
the number of Chieu Hoi ralliers showed a marked
increase. Whereas the number of returnees in Long
An had averaged 42 in June, July, and August, and
had dropped to 22 in September, it rose to 87 in
October--the largest number ever to rally to the
government in the province during a one-month
period.
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Long An Geography
4. The terrain in Long An, as in much of the
rest of the delta area, works to the advantage of
the Viet Cong. The western portion of Long An,
which is located in the "Plain of Reeds," is largely
marshland, inundated for the greater part of the
year and interlaced with irrigation canals and
streams. Roads in the area are few and, for the
most part, incapable of supporting heavy traffic.
Thick vegetation often provides concealment for
small guerrilla units. Allied forces, on the other
hand, are usually forced to abandon vehicles and
rely solely on foot soldiers, boats, and aircraft
for military operations in this section of the
province.
5. The remainder of Long An is made up pri-
marily of rice fields, which preclude vehicular
movement between May and December--the growing sea-
son. During the rest of the year, when rice fields
are relatively firm, vehicular movement is feasible,
but is hampered by earthen dikes between the fields
and the large number of canals and streams in the
area, many too deep to be forded.
Pacification in Long An
6. Viet Cong documents from Long An admit to
certain political and military weaknesses, but the
Communists apparently do not feel that these short-
comings are of major significance. A document
written in February 1966 on plans for the first half
of the year for,the: local Communist Military Region
(variously called MR II and MR VIII), claimed that
the allies' pacification plans in both Long An and
Dinh Tuong provinces were successfully countered in
1965.
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7. Government records of the results of
pacification programs in Long An indicate that
the enemy optimism was'justIfied. As. of mid-
1964 an estimated 17 percent of the province's
population was under government control; by
May 1966 this figure had increased to only
21.9 percent, and the most recent figures
show only 23 percent under government control.
The figure for those under Viet Cong control
has remained constant since May l966 at 42.8
percent. The government effort to regain ter-
ritory from the Communists has also been in-
effective. In mid.-1964, the government had
control over only the provincial and district
capitals and a small area surrounding the
provincial capital and along National Route 4
--the principal ground link between Saigon and
the delta. Even this strategic road was un-
safe for travel after darkness, a condition
which continues. Apparently few territorial
gains have been made over the situation exist-
ing in 1964, and a comparison of figures on
the number of hamlets secured in late 1965 and
in October 1966 shows only a negligible gain.
By November 1965, '75 of the province's hamlets,
slightly under one third of the total, had been
secured. By October 1966 the figure had in-
creased to only 81.
Government Representation in.Long An
8. A number of factors have contributed
to the government's inability to improve the
security situation in Long An, For one thing,
the government. does not have enough Popular
Force troops to hold areas which have been
cleared by the Regional Forces or by the ARVN.
Although revolutionary development teams gen-
erally perform well., provincial supervision
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of the cadres is sometimes so lax that whole
teams have, on occasion, simply not ap-
peared for their assignments. It would take
a major allied ground sweep to even tempo-
rarily clear the enemy out of the northwestern
corner of the province.
9. Administrative difficulties have
also plagued the government in Long An. One
of the most pronounced problems has resulted from
the fact that two former districts of the prov-
ince, Duc Hoa and Duc Hue, were taken in Octo-
ber 1963 to create Hau Nghia Province. The
Viet Cong still use the old provincial divi-
sions, however, and as a result, enjoy addi-
tional freedom of movement in areas near the
province border. Government forces are con-
strained somewhat in their operations by provin-
cial boundaries.
10. Regular government forces in the
province include the 46th and the 50th regi-
ments of the ARVN 25th Division and one troop
of the 10th Armored Cavalry Squadron. In
addition, figures as of January 1966 showed
a Regional Force strength of 2,900 and a
Popular Force strength of 3,300.
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The Viet Cong
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12. Guerrilla forces are fairly well armed, many
with German Mausers and bloc-made weapons, including
K-44 carbines. At least one village guerrilla rallier
reported in mid-1966 that his squad was armed with seven
Soviet CKC semiautomatic: carbines, which fire 7.62-mm.
rimless short cartridges. This is one of the first re-
ported instances of the use of one. of_the.s:o-called".new'family"
of weapons by a guerrilla unit. Militiamen are not as
well armed as the guerrillas, but the majority have at
least two grenades.
13. The Viet Cong apparently think very highly
of their irregulars in Long An. At least one captured
document, issued by an officer in a regular unit, praised
the`guerrillas, and the Third Guerrilla Warfare Conference,
held recently in a "liberated area" of South Vietnam, se-
lected Long An--along with Quang Nam Province and Cu Chi
District of Hau Nghia Province--for special recognition
as the "vanguard banners of the movement." A recent article
in North Vietnam's Quan Doi Nhan Dan on guerrilla warfare
also specifically mentioned Long An's achievements several
times, praising the province's female guerrilla units and
giving the province special mention as a "place where guid-
ance was well organized and good preparation for combat
was made." The article also praised Long An guerrillas
for frustrating "hundreds of pacification and encroachment
raids" and for laying the groundwork for local and main
force attacks.
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14. In spite of the irregulars' good performance,
the Viet Cong in Long An do have some problems, al-
though these are apparently not great enough-'to ham-
per seriously Communist military or political opera-
tions. The 506th Battalion, for example, has suf-
fered heavy casualties several times in the past year,
but has each time been able to find replacements within
a short period of time.
15. As of early 1966, Long An had had more Chieu
Hoi ralliers than any other province. However, there
is little governmental follow-up on the ralliers be-
yond a six-week reindoctrination program, and it is
not known how many go back to the Viet Cong. It should
also be noted that in 1.965, when more than 200 Viet
Cong soldiers defected, an estimated ten percent had
formerly been in government units. This would seem
to indicate that Viet Cong military proselyting oper-
ations in the province are relatively effective in
winning over, if not holding onto,, government forces.
16. There are some indications that Viet Cong
conscriptees in the province are not performing as
well as they could; however, the problem apparently
is not yet serious enough to have caused the Viet
Cong any great difficulties. E. I
rallied in January , reported that most o his
unit was made up of conscriptees who were inexper-
ienced in combat, demoralized, and afraid. When he
jointd the unit in May :L965, he heard that 40 troops
had already deserted, and between May and January,
when he left, another 30 deserted. Most of these,
however, simply returned home and did not rally to
the government.
17. A Viet Cong captive from a: local force
unit in Long An reported, in addition, that the Com-
munists had had difficulties conscripting youths.
In one village, he said, youths ran away in large
numbers after a.conscription order had been issued
and the Viet Cong had to search for them from house
to house. They were able to recover 50 but, while
being led away, approximately 20 of these escaped.
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Despite the apparently high desertion rates, Commu-
nist units in Long An seem to be able to keep up to
strength.
Enemy Reaction to the US Presence
18. Little information has been received on the
Viet Cong reaction to t:he resence of US forces in
Long An.
o a a.c s were aunc a at the en-
emy s initiative against the American unit while it
was stationed in the province, but the Viet Cong
stepped up their attacks and harassing actions out-
side the American area of operations.
20. The planned shift in 1967 of ARVN units
from combat to holding-type operations and the allies'
emphasis on Long An as a pilot center for a newly
developed pacification plan hopefully will change
the situation in the province and work to the dis-
advantage of the Viet Congo With the added impetus
of a US unit permanently deployed to conduct offen-
sive military operations and to support the pacifi-
cation effort, the Viet Cong may find that they can
no longer rest on their laurels and will have to
work harder to hold on to areas which have been
theirs for years. Even given the best of circum-
stances, however, the allies will not find the go-
ing easy in Long An.
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