INSTABILITY IN THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE
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Publication Date:
December 9, 1966
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INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
9 December 1966
No. 1698/66
Copy No. 24
INSTABILITY IN THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
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GROUP I
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification
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This Document contains information affecting the Na-
tional Defense of the United States, within the mean-
ing of Title 18, Sections 793 and 794, of the U.S. Code, as
amended. Its transmission or revelation of its contents
to or receipt by an unauthorized person is prohibited
by law. The reproduction of this form is prohibited.
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
9 December 1966
Instability in the Western Hemisphere
Summary
Instability has long been a factor in the develop-
ing countries of the Western Hemisphere. Revolutions,
attempts at revolution, or serious disturbances are
definite possibilities in nine of the 24 countries on
the southern flank of the US. In addition there is
sufficient malaise in nearly all of the other coun-
tries to cause concern. The factors making for in-
stability vary country by country. They include se-
vere economic and financial difficulties, ineffective
governments and lack of sound leadership, a distaste
for the old order of Latin America (military-church-
wealthy oligarchical domination), a driving urge for
progress in political, economic, and international
fields, and active subversive elements which receive
encouragement and, in some cases, material support from
Cuba.
Note: This memorandum was produced solely by CIA. It
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1. The Tri-Continent Conference held in Havana
in January 1966 and subsequent events have made it
clear that Cuba continues to devote considerable ef-
fort to assisting subversive groups in the hemisphere.
Propaganda support for revolution in Latin America
emanating from Fidel Castro and other high-level Cuban
officials has again reached the crescendo of the early
1960s. Contrary to the Soviet Union's preference for
political action, Cuba boldly announced this October
the existence in Cuba of a school for guerrilla train-
ing of Latin Americans. In addition, Cuba has been
caught red-handed in giving material support to the
guerrillas in Guatemala and Venezuela in the past few
months.
2. Intelligence publications for some time have
been highlighting the malaise in the nine countries
which are believed to be the most vulnerable to rev-
olution or other major disturbances. It is, of
course, usually impossible to predict the exact tim-
ing of any crisis, and hence to single out which one
of these countries will be the next victim of a revolt
or other upheaval. The problem areas can be classified
according to the nature of the threat and the extent
of the danger to US interests should upheavals occur.
The following paragraphs describe four basic cate-
gories into which it seems useful to divide the coun-
tries.
3. In the first category are those countries in
which the tenure of the incumbent regime is precarious
and in which there are subversive forces capable of
precipitating and taking advantage of a breakdown of
public order, in one way or another. In general this
would be so because of social deprivation and unrest,
the lack of strongly established political institu-
tions and a moderating middle class, and the lack of
reliable or effective security forces. This is not to
say that the Communists are capable of seizing power
in any of these countries, but only that a situation
could readily develop which they could exploit to their
considerable advantage. There could be sufficient un-
rest in a number of these countries to create pressure
for direct United Stated involvement, even extending
to the use of troops either unilaterally or under the
auspices of the OAS. The countries which at present
appear to fit into this grouping are listed in approxi-
mate order of the estimated danger.
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a. Guatemala. President Mendez has been un-
able to cope effectively with Guatemala's insurgency
problems. He continues under pressure from both the
right and the left. Communist guerrillas still oper-
ate flagrantly in the capital and in the countryside
despite some minor successes of the military in the
hills.
b. Haiti. Despite recent arrests and mili-
tary purges, Duvalier still faces plotting and possi-
ble further outbreaks of violence. There are signs
of disaffection among some elements of the armed forces
and of continuing public unrest. Should the Du-
valier dictatorship collapse, anarchy could well en-
sue. The Communists are not capable of seizing power,
even in such circumstances, but could gain influence
by performing sorely needed organizational and adminis-
trative services for any successor regime.
c. Panama. Panama's fragile political order
is susceptible to exploitation by ultranationalists and
Communists. The demagogic Arnulfo Arias, ambitious to
be the next president, is encouraging antigovernment ac-
tivity and is said to be courting some radical leftists.
There is a constant danger that an unforeseen incident
could mushroom into a major crisis which could give
net gains to the Communists or other anti-US ultrana-
tionalist elements.
d. Dominican Republic. The potential for
chaos is still high in the Dominican Republic. The
assumption of control of ex-President Bosch's political
party--the opposition PRD--by radical elements adds
to the strains already present because of the economic
situation, labor unrest, and some Communist subversion.
e. Guyana. Now that the British troops have
left this new country, Guyana is vulnerable to public
disorder which could strain the capability of the in-
experienced Guyanese Defense Force. The largest po-
litical party is led by pro-Communist Cheddi Jagan,
who could shift to violent tactics again should it ap-
pear that he will be frustrated in the 1968 election.
f. Bolivia. President Barrientos' rivalry
with General Ovando, which bears the seed of a possible
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split in the military, labor unrest, and persistent
subversive activities add to the already unstable
situation in Bolivia. The potential for widespread
civil disorders exists.
4. The second category includes countries in
which the major threat is a coup or an attempt at one,
but in which the military establishments or other
groups which are basically willing to cooperate with
the US would be involved and would probably be capable
of maintaining control.
a. Ecuador. The turbulent political condi-
tions under w icy h the eighteenth constituent assembly
is meeting are likely to continue for some time. The
country is faced with a financial crisis. With the
country subject to a provisional president and lacking
effective government, the armed forces are poised to
intervene if there appears to be a breakdown in the
political system. The left is beginning to make an
effort to bring about a change of government.
b. Costa Rica. Coalition President Trejos
and the opposition National Liberation Party, which
controls congress, are unwilling to compromise. As a
result the country is suffering for want of effective
social, and economic programs. Trejos' lack of politi-
cal experience is compounding the difficulties. In-
fluential groups, the most powerful of which are pro-
US, could be disposed to take drastic action to fill
the political vacuum if conditions continue to de-
teriorate.
c. Honduras. The lackluster regime of Presi-
dent Lopez has created dissatisfaction in important
sectors of the population.
5. The countries discussed in the above para-
graphs are all ranked in a different listing below
according to a judgment of the degree of the criticality
of the situations in each country at this time. Of
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course any such "fever chart" will change even over
the short run as certain governments come to grips
with the factors which bring about the instability
or as other governments become weaker.
a.
Ecuador
f.
Costa Rica
b.
Guatemala
g.
Honduras
c.
Haiti
h.
Guyana
d.
e.
Panama
Dominican
Republic
i.
Bolivia
6. A third category includes countries which are
likely to undergo periods of serious stress for various
economic or political reasons. In a number of these
the problems are chronic e.g., labor unrest, severe
economic pressures, racial conflicts. However, the
governments in these countries at the moment are suf-
ficiently in control to prevent a strong threat to
stability from developing and no major danger to US
interests is now foreseen. In order of the severity
of the strains within each, the following seems an ap-
propriate ranking (with major factors for unrest noted),
although here also certain countries will move up or
down the scale as internal conditions improve or de-
teriorate.
a. Uruguay (crippling strikes, economic de-
terioration, inept leadership).
b. El Salvador (Elections in 1967 causing some
unrest and disaffection in military).
c. Colombia (Public frustration with national
front government, Communist insurgency).
d. Venezuela (Communist terrorism and guer-
rilla activity, military grumbling).
e. Brazil (Labor and student dissatisfaction,
extremely vocal opposition).
f. Argentina (Adjustment to new military gov-
ernment, Peronist opposition).
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g. Jamaica (Social unrest, outbreaks of
hooliganism, strikes, aging political leaders).
h. Nicaragua (Possibilities of disorders
surrounding upcoming 1967 elections for president).
i. Trinidad-Tobago (Negro - East Indian
rivalries, high unemployment).
j. Barbados (High employment--20-25 percent--
overpopulation).
7. The final category of countries in the Western
Hemisphere would include those in which the factors
for stability clearly far outweigh those for insta-
bility. This list includes Chile, Mexico, Paraguay,
and Peru. The Communist dictatorship of Cuba also
falls in this grouping.
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