Cuba - Vietnam

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00826A001500010039-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 20, 2004
• Sequence Number: 39
• Publication Date: December 20, 1966
• Content Type: IM

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Cuban Policy Statements on Vietnam
1. Cuba and North Korea have been the two
most vocal Communist countries in their condemna-
tion of 'US actions in Vietnam, and in expressing
willingness to render active military support--
including "volunteers"--to North Vietnam. Cuban
leaders made their position clear on this issue
as early as the spring of 1965? In March, Fidel
Castro said.- "We are in favor of giving Vietnam
all the help that may be necessary. We are in
favor of that help being in weapons and men."
Subsequent statements by Castro and other Cuban
leaders have made it clear that Cuba is anxious
to become more actively involved in the war in
Vietnam.
20 On 13 March 1966, Castro said, "We are
in favor of that aid (to North Vietnam) being in
weapons and men; we are in favor of running the
risks that may be necessary for Vietnam," Through-
out Castro's and other Cuban leaders' speeches
has run thinly-veiled criticism of the Soviet Union
and Communist China for not doing more to assist
North Vietnam
3. On 26 July 1966, Castro was more specific
in his offer sayi.ng: "If Vietnam asks for aid and
tells us what kind of technicians they want us to
send, whether tank, anti-air, artillery, or in-
fantry, we will, ,provide them, according to. .the
Vietnamese need, All we have to do is ask which
units want to go, and send complete units with
their equipment to fight there,"
4. On 18 October Foreign Minister Raul Roa said
at the 'United Nations.- "If we desire to hasten this
victory it is indispensable to widen and strengthen
the world movement of solidarity with Vietnam. In
late October, Raul Castro said in Pyongyang, North
Korea: "We (Cuba and North Korea) recognize that we
must provide all necessary military, economic,
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political, and moral assistance to Vietnam." These
views were restated during Raul Castro's and Presi-
dent Dorticos' 30 October - 1 November visit to
Hanoi,
5, In the 2 October issue of the Cuban armed
forces magazine, an officer of a Cuban cruise mis-
sile boat is quoted as saying: "I hope they (Viet-
nam) ask for Navy units to see if we have the op-
portunity to make a reality of our promise."
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The Cuban Presence in North Vietnam
1. There are indications that a small number
of Cuban military technicians probably are in the
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and North Vietnam
2. The few Cuban technicians who may be in
North Vietnam are probably associated with the Viet-
namese surface-to-air missile and other antiaircraft
defense systems. In addition, in September 1966,
the Cuban diplomatic mission in Hanoi reportedly had
23 people on its staff, nine of whom were military
attaches
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The View . rom Hanoi
1. The North Vietnamese have made it clear
since the beginning of the US air strikes against
their country that they want and expect material
aid from their Communist allies for the defense
of their country. :1 t also appears from events over
the past year and a half that, whenever possible,
the North Vietnamese prefer to operate Communist-
supplied military equipment themselves rather than
rely on foreign personnel.
2. The overwhelming proportion of military
aid to North Vietnam, of course, comes from the
Soviet Union and Communist China, Recently, how-
ever, :incr?eas:i.ng amounts of North Korean small arms
have been, captured in South. `V'ieC:nam, suggesting
that Hanoi is seeking add:itiona:l, sources of military
supplies. In short, North Vietnam almost certainly
would welcome any significant military hardware
which Cuba could supply, and would probably like to
have some coastal defense missiles, Since 24 Octo-
ber, the US navy interdiction operations against
North Vietnamese coastal shipping between the 17th
and 18th parallels h:ay e ;pro ed very effective o North
Vietnamese coastal defenses to date have been limited
to heavy artillery pieces a Hanoi, would realize,
however, that an offer from Cuba to supply coastal.
defense missiles would be a one-time affair, If
Hanoi wants th:i.s type of weapon, it is more likely
to turn. 'to Moscow than to Havana.
3. At any rate, the North Vietnamese would be
much more cautious in accepting Cuban military units
to man the coastal, defense sites, The leaders in
Hanoi continue t~_) use the "when. needed" P hrase when
raising the shibboleth of foreign %~-olunteers comin
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