THE SITUATION IN VIETNAM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00826A001500010054-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 29, 2005
• Sequence Number: 54
• Publication Date: December 29, 1966
• Content Type: MEMO

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MEMORANDUM
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
The Situation in Vietnam
NSA review completed
Top Secret
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Some 5,000 dock workers stayed off the job
for the fourth day at the Saigon port. A call for
a 12-hour general strike in Saigon has reportedly
been issued. Approximately 120 different unions
could go on strike.
I. The Military Situation in South Vietnam:
More than 00 Communist mortar shells were fl~re
at allied positions just south of the DMZ in north-
ernmost Quang Tri Province; six Americans were
killed and 60 wounded (Para. 1). US soldiers con-
ducting Operation THAYER II in Binh Dinh Province
have located an enemy force near where a US artil-
lery position was heavily attacked earlier this
week (Para. 2). The Viet Cong appear to have re-
organized several of their provincial organizations,
according to several recently captured documents
(Para. 3). A captured NVA officer provides inter-
esting information on the 18th NVA Regiment. (Paras.
4-6).
II. Political Developments in South Vietnam:
Information as 1600
29 December 196
The dock worker strike at the Saigon port continues
and a general strike in the city is imminent (Paras.
1-3). Negotiations between the GVN and FULRO are
continuing (Para. 4). The government recently au-
thorized the reorganization of village and hamlet
governments (Para. 5) .
III. North Vietnamese Military Developments:
The possibility of a return of major North Vietnamese
units in the DMZ area to North Vietnam has been fur-
ther strengthened by recent communications intercepts
(Paras. 1-3).
IV. Other Communist Military Developments: There
is nothing of significance to report.
Approv
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1. Communist troops fired more than 400 mortar
shells at US and South Vietnamese marine positions
just south of the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) in north-
ernmost Quang Tri Province late on 28 December.
These positions include US Marine batteries, a US
Marine command post, and a South Vietnamese Marine
base--all within the perimeter of Operation PRAIRIE,
the multibattalion search-and-destroy operation
which began on 3 August. Allied forces were unable
to retaliate with air strikes because of the heavy
monsoon rains, but they did use artillery to return
fire. Initial reports indicate friendly casualties
were heavy with six Americans killed and 60 wounded.
Enemy losses are unknown. This mortar attack was
the first Communist initiative in this area in
several weeks. (See Section III for the status of
NVA forces in the DMZ area.)
2. Elements of the US 1st Air Cavalry Division
participating in Operation THAYER II skirmished with
Communist troops in coastal Binh Dinh Province on
29 December. The enemy force is believed to be an
element of the 22nd North Vietnamese Army (NVA)
Regiment of the 1st NVA Division. Sporadic fight-
ing was reported near where US artillery positions
were heavily assaulted earlier this week. Air strikes
and artillery have been supporting the American
troops. Preliminary reports show four Americans
killed and three wounded in this engagement. Commu-
nist losses are unknown.
3. A captured personal letter dated 8 December
1966 and a captured circular dated 9 December 1966
have provided a second indication that the Viet Cong
have reorganized several of their provincial organi-
zations. It appears that Bien Hoa and Ba Ria prov-
inces, generally equivalent to the government of
Vietnam's Bien Hoa and Phuc Tuy provinces, have been
merged and redesignated Ba Bien Province. These
documents also provide the first indication that Nhon
Trach and Long Thanh districts of Bien Hoa Province
have been reorganized.
29 December 1966
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Captured Prisoner Reports on 18th NVA Regiment
4. A North Vietnamese captured
on 26 December by South Vietnamese forces in Binh
Dinh Province has provided interesting information
on the 0 NVA Regiment. The source stated that the
three battalions of the regiment had approximately
200 men each, figures that would place the regiment
far below its estimated strength of 1,300. The
lieutenant stated, in addition, that the regiment's
heavy weapons companies were being disbanded to
furnish personnel for the infantry companies.
5. The source stated that the entire regiment
was very short of food. The reserve rice ration
for each man, he reported, is supposed to be a
month's supply and additional rice is supposed to be
made available by local province committee chiefs
in northern Binh-Dinh and southern Quang Ngai prov-
inces. He said, however, that there were no rice
depots left in the area since they had all been
destroyed by allied forces.
6. The lieutenant also reported on a recent
political indoctrination program which had stressed
among other things that NVA and VC soldiers had to
accept the fact that the war was going to be a long
one. The program also tried to convince the troops
that NVA/VC forces would be victorious in the end.
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II. POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN SOUTH VIETNAM
1. Some 5,000 Saigon dock workers stayed off
the job for the 4th day. US military officials
offered to hire 280 of the 600 stevedores who were
laid off at the New Port, but this concession was
apparently not sufficient to satisfy the union lead-
ers who are masterminding the strike. In spite of
the labor minister's attempts to reach a compromise
with the unions, the situation continues to dete-
riorate. American troops continued to handle es-
sential military cargo.
2. The latest union move is a reported call
for a general strike by affiliates of the CVT's
Saigon Council of Trade Unions. There are approxi-
mately 120 different affiliated unions. The strike
is to last 12 hours beginning at 6:00 a.m. Vietnam
time on 30 December. It is not clear whether just
public utilities and transportation service workers
will strike or whether all unions associated with
the council will comply with the strike call. In
any event, if the utility workers do strike, South
Vietnamese troops will reportedly be used to operate
the facilities most crucial to the functioning of
the city. The general strike call should provide
a test of strength for the opposing parties within
the national Vietnamese Confederation of Labor (CVT)
and the local unions, since the dock workers' walk-
out thus far has not been sanctioned by more than
a few CVT leaders.
3. The government has taken no steps to end
the strike aside from the unsuccessful talks by the
labor minister with rebel union leaders.
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GVN - FULRO Negotiations
4. General Vinh Loc, the commander of II Corps,
and several ethnic highland officials met recently
to plan the future integration of troops still
loyal to the FULRO organization, a dissident
inont:agnard autonomy movement into the GVN force
structure. As an act of good faith, General Loc has
agreed to furnish arms to 250 FULRO troops who have
already rallied to the government and to include
them in one of the highland paramilitary units. In re-
turn, the chief FULRO negotiator will arrange for the
return of over 2,000 other FULRO troops to the gov-
ernment in late January. The GVN also plans to re-
lease about 100 FULRO prisoners from jail at that
time. This phase of the GVN/FULRO accord, if suc-
cessful., would then prepare the way for the return
of the FULRO leader; his return is also reportedly
dependent, however, on the inclusion of articles in
the constitution benefiting the highlanders.
Recent GVN Decrees on Local Government
5. On 24 December, the government issued decrees
authorizing the reorganization of village and hamlet
governments. The election of the local officials,
usually the chief and the council, are expected to
take place in mid-1967. The governmental adminis-
trative units at these levels have been traditionally
unresponsive to the central government as well as to
their own local inhabitants. The reorganization is
aimed in part at creating a popular base within which
the people can identify with their nation.
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III. NORTH VIETNAMESE MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS
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1. Additional evidence which has become avail-
able from intercepted communications further strength-
ens the probability that major North Vietnamese units
which have been active in northern South Vietnam and
the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) have returned to North
Vietnam. On 17 December, the NVA High Command at
Hanoi began communicating with terminals believed
to represent the headquarters elements of the 324th
Division, the "mid-65" Division, the 341st Division
and the DMZ front
These
same units began using
in communications with eir subordinates on about
25 November. All of this activity suggests that
these units may have established semipermanent base
areas in the southern part of North Vietnam.
2. Reports from US Marine elements in this area
suggest that the enemy is attempting to avoid US
forces while at the same time probing and harassing
South Vietnamese positions in eastern Quang Tri Prov-
ince. The ARVN has reported several engagements 25X1
with battalion-size forces in this aread
however, continue to report the infiltration o
small size units into central and western Quang Tri
Province, possibly for logistic reconnaissance or
intelligence gathering operations. In addition,
the enemy is believed to be stockpiling supplies
along known infiltration routes north of the DMZ
and in northwest Quang Tri.
3. The return of the bulk of the North Vietnam-
ese force to the DRV is similar to the VC/NVA tactic
used in the central highlands. Enemy forces in the
highlands move into Cambodia in order to regroup
and rest. In some cases, Cambodia is used as a sanc-
tuary when US sweep operations are under way. As
in the Cambodian border area, it is probable that
NVA forces will re-enter northern South Vietnam when
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the Communists feel that a favorable tactical situa-
tion exists. In the meantime, the presence of a
sizable NVA force just north of the DMZ helps the
Communists to obtain one of their goals--that of
tying down as many allied troops as possible with-
out giving them a suitable target at which to
strike,
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port,
IV. OTHER COMMUNIST MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS
1. There is nothing of significance to re-
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