THE SITUATION IN VIETNAM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00826A001500010060-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 20, 2008
• Sequence Number: 60
• Publication Date: January 2, 1967
• Content Type: MEMO

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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
"op Secret
MEMORANDUM
The Situation in Vietnam
OSD review
completed
NSA review completed
i
State Department review
completed
Top Secret
2 January 1967
Z3AI
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Information as of 1600
2 January 1967
HIGHLIGHTS
The Communists lost seven or eight MIG-21s to
day in the largest air battle of the war. The
New Year's cease-fire period was marked by over 160
Communist initiated incidents, over 50 of which
resulted in casualties.
I. The Military Situation in South Vietnam:
The New Year's cease-fire was marked by over 16 in-
cidents, with over 50 resulting in casualties
(Paras. 1-2). US patrol boat intercepted apparent
Communist sea infiltration attempt off Cau Mau
Peninsula (Para. 3). No significant fighting re-
ported since end of cease-fire (Para. 4).
II. Political Developments in South Vietnam:
The Constituent Assembly is scheduled to reconvene
tomorrow to begin debate on individual chapters of
the constitution (Paras. 1-2). Political views of
Southern Renaissance bloc leader expressed to US
Embassy officers (Paras. 3-5).
police director Loan is considering
several plans to create political crisis in event
military officers are precluded from running for
office by the new constitution (Paras. 6-7). ^ 25X1
corruption
among high-ranking officials in Binh Dinh Prov-
ince is threatening the province's revolutionary
development program (Paras. 8-9).
III. Military Developments in North Vietnam:
North Vietnam lost seven and probably eight MIG-21s
today in the largest air battle of the war (Paras.
1-3). A substantial increase in ship movements
off the southern coast of North Vietnam was noted
during the cease-fire period (Para. 4).
OSD review completed
i
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IV. Other Communist Military Developments:
There is nothing of significance to report.
V. Other Communist Political Developments:
There is nothing of significance to report.
VI. Other Major Aspects: The Thai Government
appears to be reconsidering its opposition to send-
ing combat troops to South Vietnam (Paras. 1-3).
A captured Viet Cong document dealing. with activi-
ties in Cambodia has recently become available
(Paras. 4-6). Cambodian military patrol interdicts
strategic chemicals being smuggled into South
Vietnam (Paras. 7-8).
2 January 1967
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Phuoc Vinh
'Ban Me
Thuot
Jepone
l.~t Hue
a Nang
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I. THE MILITARY SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM
1. The 48-hour New Year's truce between oppos-
ing forces in South Vietnam was marked by a greater
-number of incidents and casualties to both sides
than in the two-day Christmas stand-down. A total
of 169 incidents, 67 more than in the 24-25 December
period, were reported. US troops lost 17 killed and
20 wounded against three killed and 23 wounded dur-
ing the Christmas cease-fire. Forty-one Viet Cong
were reported to have been killed in clashes during
the New Year's truce period, in contrast to 12 killed
during the Christmas period.
2. Most of the incidents reported were limited
actions involving short bursts of small-arms fire
directed at US patrols or encampments. There were
53 instances, however, in which an exchange of fire
is known to have resulted in casualties. US forces
initiated the firing on one occasion when USMC ele-
ments located about 15 miles west of Hue sighted a
large Communist force taking up positions near the
marine emplacement. After more than a thousand enemy
soldiers carrying arms including 82-mm. mortars and
machine guns had been observed, the US units received
permission from MACV to disperse the enemy force with
artillery fire and air strikes. No report on casual-
ties has been received thus far.
3. Another major incident occurred when a US
Navy patrol boat investigating water traffic ten
miles south of the Cau Mau Peninsula received heavy
machine-gun fire from a pair of trawlers off-loading
cargo onto sampans. The fire was returned by the
US ship and other sea and air units were called in,
resulting in the sinking of one trawler and heavy
damage to the other from fire and secondary explo-
sions which occurred after the vessel had run aground.
Six US personnel were wounded in the incident and
six crew members from one of the trawlers have been
detained. An investigation is under way to determine
the cargo and mission of the two trawlers.
2 January 1967
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4. As of 6 p.m. EST on 1 January, US forces
had renewed their active participation in 11 of the
24 ground operations currently under way in South
Vietnam, So far, however, no-significant ground
contact with the enemy has been reported. Three
B-52 bombing raids have been carried out in Quang Tri
and Quang Ngai provinces since the termination of the
New Year's cease-fire period.
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II. POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN SOUTH VIETNAM
1. The Constituent Assembly is scheduled to
reconvene tomorrow to begin debate on individual
chapters of the constitution. The assembly concluded
its discussion of the constitution's "basic principles"
on 30 December by approving the insertion of a "minori-
ties council" provision in the basic principles sec-
tion. The function of the minorities council is to
advise the government on affairs concerning the various
minorities.
2. The assembly voted down proposals by montagnards
and Khmer delegates that the basic principles section
provide for "customary courts" and include guarantees
that the nation will "recognize and maintain" ethnic
minority traditions, on the grounds that such propos-
als were "details" which should be treated in other
sections of the constitution.
Political Views of Southern Renaissance Bloc Leader
3. Ly Quy Chung, the floor leader of the South-
ern Renaissance bloc in the assembly told US Embassy
officials this weekend that a completed draft of the
constitution will be ready by the end of February,
and that presidential elections could take place as
early as May or June. He said that the only serious
contenders for the presidency are former prime minis-
ter Tran Van Huong and assembly chairman Phan Khac
Suu. He indicated that the southern group intends
to back Huong.
4. Chung tried to mitigate the renaissance
bloc's reputation for extremism in his talk with the
embassy officers. He claimed that the only constitu-
tional question dividing the assembly and the gov-
ernment was whether provincial officials should be
elected. He indicated that a compromise solution
of this issue is likely. He stated, however,
that the assembly was determined not to submit the
final draft of the constitution to the Directorate
for review.
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5. Chung also expressed dissatisfaction with
the present government. He claimed that the popular
support which Ky enjoyed after the defeat of the
struggle movement has now been largely dissipated.
He blamed this development on widespread misgivings
over the prime minister's entourage, particularly
police director Loan.
General Loan's Contingency Plans
6. police
director Loan is considering several plans to create
a political crisis prior to this year's elections in
the event that the constitution precludes military
officers from running for office. The bogus crisis
would be used by the government to justify dissolv-
ing the Constituent Assembly, annuling the constitu-
tion and postponing the elections.
7. Loan is
reviewing the schemes at the behest of one of his
subordinates who has been urging the general to play
a more active role in national affairs, and may not
be fully committed to supporting them.
Corruption
corruption among high-
ranking officials is threatening the provinces
revolutionary development program.
9. the morale
of honest officials, South Vietnamese soldiers, and
peasants was adversely affected by war profiteering
by some provincial officials. the
province chief, Lt. Col. Tran Dinh Vong, the assist-
ant province chief and several district chiefs were
working with local merchants in numerous black-mar-
ket and vice operations, including illegal control
of the province's lucrative rice trade.
held out little prospect for local reform
unless Prime Minister Ky, whom he characterized
as an "honest man," can be persuaded to clean house
in Binh Dinh.
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w
?Pbong Saly
f ,DongVan
Boo Lac,
He Giang
Dien Bien Phu ?!
Son La
? Luang Prabang
Xiang Khouang ?
Samneua ?
VIENTIPCD*
.
f? Nong Khai
Muang Sakon Nakhon ?_.,
NORTH VIETNAM
T H A I L A N D
~?.\
Muang Nakhon Phanord. ?Khammouane
?
Coo Bang
Lang So
Area of
MIG encou ers
~ ? Bac Giang
of/Gia Lam
Ning?ming
~` aag Yen? ?Hon?Gai
Duong ?*Haiphong Hung Yen KienAn
Phu Lyt?
Nam Din
Ninh Binh
`"?.
Bac Can ?
Tuyen Quang
Phu Tho
Phuc Yen'&
Son Tay ?
HANOI
Hoa Binh a
RHa Tinh
VIETNAM
Muong Non!--%
(LAOS l ~..
SOUTH
Increased
Coastal
Traffic
Vinh Linh
'`,?. DEMARCATION LINE
--i Dong He
Ba H0
$~pon S Quang Tri
11
El
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III. MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS IN NORTH VIETNAM
1. North Vietnamese fighter planes opposing a
force of 80 US aircraft in the Hanoi area on 2 Jan-
uary, suffered several losses as at least seven and
probably eight MIG-21s were shot down. No American
planes were lost as air-to-air missiles launched from
F4C jets achieved the highest number of kills of any day
of the air war to date.
2. The large-scale USAF mission, known as a
counter-air operation, was unique in being directed
solely against elements of the DRV air defense system
rather than ground forces or industrial and trans-
portation targets. The air operation was mounted with
the specific intent of luring the Communist fighters
into air-to-air combat--the US planes carried a full
load of heat-seeking and beam-rider missiles, but no
bombs. At least 14 DRV MIGs were launched against
the US planes from Phuc Yen and Gia Lam airfields
near Hanoi.
3. The North Vietnamese air order of battle now
includes only seven of the advanced Soviet-built MIG-21
interceptors. Prior to today's engagement, US planes
were credited with shooting down as many as 32 DRV
fighters, seven of them MIG-21s.
DRV Coastal Shipping Rises During New Year's Truce
4. US destroyers operating off the southern
coast of North Vietnam reported a considerable in-
crease in DRV ship movements during the New Year's
cease-fire period. DRV naval radars reflected an
extremely high level of activity on 31 December as
at least 33 vessels were tracked along the coast on
a southerly heading. On the same day, the US -
destroyer Maddox reported sighting approximately 25
waterborne logistics craft under sail. In several
instances it was noted that the North Vietnamese
ships operated in groups consisting of four heavily
loaded barges accompanied by one or two gun boats.
A similar-surge in the level of DRV coastal traffic
was noted during the Christmas truce period.
2 January 1967
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1. There is nothing of significance to re-
port.
V. OTHER COMMUNIST POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS
1. There is nothing of significance to re-
port.
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VI. OTHER MAJOR ASPECTS
1. The Thai Government appears to be reconsid-
ering its opposition to sending Thai combat troops
to South Vietnam. Several Bangkok newspapers re-
cently ran stories pegged to "highly placed reliable
sources" that the government is considering deploying
a 700-man combat team to South Vietnam. The news-
paper accounts said the government now recognizes
that Thai forces engaged in combat in South Vietnam
would be contributing directly to Thailand's secu-
rity.
2. In an apparently related development, Deputy
Prime Minister Praphat told the Thai press on 29 Decem-
ber that Thailand was not "presently" in a position
to assist other countries, but then went on to give
a lengthy rationale for such a move "if necessary
and if we are able."
3. Although small Thai Navy and Air Force con-
tingents.are currently serving in South Vietnam, the
Thanom-Praphat government has been reluctant to com-
mit combat troops to the war effort. It has argued
that its troops are needed at home to fight the Com-
munist insurgents in the northeast. It is probable
that the Thais, who have in the past urged a vigorous
prosecution of the war effort, believe that they can
no longer defer sending at least a token force to
South. Vietnam. The recent leaks to the press sug-
gest that the government is paving the way for such
a deployment by testing Thai public opinion,
Cambodia - Viet Cong
4. A captured Viet Cong document dealing with
activities in Cambodia has recently become available,
The document was issued by the Kien Tuong party com-
mittee and, according to a preliminary MACV report,
spells out certain precautions the Communists must
take while located on Cambodian territory,
5. The Viet Cong are cautioned to move in small
numbers, to maintain strict discipline, to hide weap-
ons and sampans, and to forego "unauthorized" actions
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against the Cambodian Government. The document claims
that the "front representative" in Phnom Penh has re-
ceived complaints from Cambodian authorities that the
Viet Cong had set up camps on Cambodian soil and car-
ried weapons with them when moving across the border.
6. The substance of the document appears to be
.similar to that of another document captured last
April in the same general area. The April document
specified that the Communists would only permit their
wounded to take refuge in Cambodia, and also stated
that the precautions were necessary to preserve good
relationships with local Cambodian officials. That
document also included a Communist assessment that
their sanctuary in Cambodia would become more important
as allied forces step up operations in Communist base
areas. Both documents illustrate the greater diffi-
culties which the Communists face operating in the more
heavily populated southern half of the Cambodia - South
Vietnam border area.
Cambodians Interdict Chemicals
a Cambodian patrol intercepte a group 25X1
of unidentified smugglers moving into Chau Doc Prov-
ince in the delta on 16 December. The Cambodians
reported seizing over 100 pounds of potassium nitrate,
8, The Viet Cong has been procuring substantial
quantities of strategic chemicals from Cambodian sources
for several years. Cambodian and South Vietnamese mili-
tary elements have. interdicted chemical shipments on
several occasions, but the traffic apparently continues
with little difficulty.
2 January 1967
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SECRET
I
OCTOBER
105
II L-1 I I I II _I I _L11111111 11 J i l l 4h? ., 4 Company and Over
Viet Cong Incidents
(Excluding Attks)
i..U.LL,LWU ..LLL".a...II I I I
36 3 1964.
1966 1967
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SECRET
Personnel Losses
(Excluding Wounded)
Viet Cong/PAVN
GVN/US/other Free World
9 b C-. 9$~ 19b
`~
1963 1
US Casualties to Date: Killed 6,431 Wounded 37,240 Captured 95 Missing 379
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Top Secret
Top Secret
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