WEEKLY REPORT PREPARED EXCLUSIVELY FOR THE SENIOR INTERDEPARTMENTAL GROUP

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00826A001500010074-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 20, 2004
• Sequence Number: 74
• Publication Date: January 9, 1967
• Content Type: IR

Approved For Release 2004/07/28 : CIA-RDP79T00826A001500010074-8
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Intelligence Report
Weekly Report
Prepared Exclusively for the
Senior Interdepartmental Group
Secret
44
9 January 1967
No. 0392/67
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4. Congo-Belgium . . , o . , . e . . , . ,
9 January 1967
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3. GUATEMALA
Since the imposition of a state of siege on 2
November, the army's counterinsurgency efforts
have been much more successful.
Guerrilla forces have suffered blows, both
from increased casualties and from the denial of
peasant support. The security forces have gained
confidence from these successes, and the govern-
ment's antiguerrilla propaganda and its attention
to the political grass roots have brought notable
popular approval. It recently announced a plan
for socioeconomic development of the long-ter-
rorized Izabal-Zacapa region.
Despite the progress made by the army, how-
ever, insurgency remains a serious problem through-
out the country. Violent incidents have increased
steadily, partly in response to military pressure.
The army's effectiveness has not been matched by
police success in the cities, where terrorists
continue to act almost at will. Lawlessness and
violence are mounting in widespread parts of the
country and are no longer specifically typical of
the northeast.
Exiled rightist conspirators, persisting in
attempts to provoke trouble for President Mendez,
continue their coup plotting
A more significant danger is t e rise o vigilante
groups in the countryside who take the law into
their own hands to eliminate Communist suspects.
The rapidity with which violence--whatever
the motivation--has spread through the country
suggests that it may become an important factor
in the country's political future.
_'A_ Q January 1967
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4. CONGO-BELGIUM
The dispute between President Mobutu and the Union
Miniere could be damaging to all parties, especially
to the Congo. If their conflict is not resolved, world
copper markets may be disrupted and pressure on the US
to rescue the Congo from a serious financial crisis will
increase. Each side holds powerful weapons over the
other.
Union Miniere, through litigation, could probably
prevent the Congo from marketing its copper, at least
for a few weeks, and might be able to stop the transit
of copper across Angola as well. By continuing to in-
terrupt the flow of foreign exchange--as it has done
since late December--it can force a reduction of the
Congo's imports, thereby disturbing the cash economy
and causing discontent among the country's urban Afri-
cans and its whites. By ordering a halt in its pur-
chases abroad for the Congo, it could also disrupt the
supply pipeline for the mining industry and for Katanga
as a whole. Moreover, the company to a limited extent
can influence the actions of its personnel in Katanga.
Union Miniere's assets outside the country, chiefly the
copper already in the marketing pipeline, would make
it very difficult for Mobutu to retaliate.
The Congo's principal weapon is its hold over the
40,000 Belgians in the country, a fact of perhaps even
greater concern to the Belgian Government than to Union
Miniere. In addition, copper is an eminently salable
commodity, and despite Union Miniere's harassment the
Congo's marketing problems are likely to be relatively
short lived. If alternative marketing arrangements were
made, Union Miniere would be frozen out of a relatively
risk-free part in the copper-producing process.
Thus each side has a stake in fending off a show-
down. Mobutu is now at least generally aware of the
risks he is running and is searching for a way out.
For instance, he apparently has pulled back from his
threat to seize the extensive Congolese assets of
Societe Generale, the Belgian holding company closely
related to Union Miniere, on 15 January. Union
Miniere, although so far obdurate, will come under
great pressure in the near future from corporations
and governments interested either in keeping the copper
market stable or in maintaining the Congo's viability.
Thus there is still some chance that an arrangement will
be worked out.
Approved
9 January 1967
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