THE SITUATION IN VIETNAM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00826A001600010004-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 3, 2006
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: January 13, 1967
• Content Type: IM

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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
MEMORANDUM
The Situation in Vietnam
State Dept. review completed
Top Secret
1 1.3
13 January 1967
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Information as 1600
13 January 1967
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A reported move by Premier Ky to unseat Defense
Minister and Deputy Premier Co appears to be causing
some quiet opposition from southerners and possibly
from Chief of State Thieu.
I. The Military Situation in South Vietnam: US
infantrymen continue to sweep the Iron Triangle area
of Binh Duong Province in search of a Viet Cong base
headquarters believed located there (Paras. 1-2).
Sixteen Viet Cong were killed near Saigon by US forces
participating in Operation FAIRFAX (Para. 3). Light
contact was reported in the Mekong Delta province of
Kien Hoa as US Marines continue to search fob the
evasive Viet Cong (Paras. 4-5). Several South Vietnam-
ese units were attacked in Quang Nam Province on 13
January (Paras. 6-7). Three US Marines were killed
when their outpost was ove;run ten miles southwest of
Da Nang (Para. 8).
II. Political Developments in South Vietnam: Pre-
mier Ky's latest bid to unseat defense minister and
deputy.premier General Co appears to be provoking quiet
opposition from southerners and possibly from Chief of
State Thieu (Paras. 1-3).
III. North Vietnamese Military Developments: There
is nothing of significance to report.-
IV. Other Communist Military Developments: There
is nothing of significance to report.
V. Communist. Political Develo ments: The former
Swiss ambassador to Peking stated that on his December
1966 trip through Hanoi neither he nor the North Vietnam-
ese made any mention of possible Swiss mediation in the
war (Paras. 1-3).
13 January 1967
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I. THE MILITARY SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM
1. Units of the 23-battalion allied search-
and-destroy Operation CEDAR FALLS sweeping the Iron
Triangle area of Binh Duong Province north of Saigon
continue to uncover Viet Cong bunkers and tunnels,.'
A large base camp was seized on 12 January, but
US forces are still searching for the main head-
quarters base from which the Communists reputedly
have mounted guerrilla and terrorist attacks against
Saigon and its surrounding area.
2. One US infantry company in the operation
was hit by a command-detonated mine on 13 January
and sustained casualties of one killed and 17
wounded. A cumulative count of casualties now
shows 28 Americans killed and 119 wounded compared
with 237 Viet Cong killed and 51 captured. There
have been 274 Communist suspects detained.
3. US infantry soldiers participating in
the coordinated US-L; South Vietnamese search-and-
destroy Operation FAIRFAX in the general area sur-
rounding Saigon reported engaging an estimated
platoon-size Communist force on 11 January. Two
Americans and 16 Viet Cong were killed. Since this
operation began on 30 November, 189 Viet Cong have
been killed in contrast to American casualties of
13 killed and 83 wounded.
4. Light contact between Communist forces and
US Marines of Operation DECKHOUSE V in southern
Kien Hoa Province was reported on 12 January. The
action began when a US Marine patrol was surrounded
by Viet Cong employing heavy small-arms fire. Five
Americans were wounded in a brief encounter; Viet
Cong casualties are unknown.
5. Light contact was again reported on 13 Janu-
ary when three companies of US Marines reported sep-
arate engagements with enemy elements, but no addi-
tional friendly casualties have been reported. Cum-
ulative casualties for this operation, which began
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on 5 January, are seven Americans killed and 28,
wounded, 15 Viet Cong killed and 13 captured.
There have been 49 Communist suspects detained.
6. Early on 13 January, in an area of Quang,
Nam Province about 15 miles southeast'of Da Nang,
a Popular Force outpost was attacked with small
arms and mortars by an unknown-size enemy force.
A company-size reaction force responded to the
attack. Friendly casualties were reported as
12 killed, six wounded, and two missing. Commu-
nist casualties are unknown.
T. An ARVN command post immediately to the
west of the location of the above incident was
later the target of an enemy mortar attack. The
approximately 20 mortar shells fired at the instal-
lation resulted in two killed and eight wounded.
Two of the mortar rounds landed outside the base
perimeter, killing four South Vietnamese civilians
and wounding many more.
8. In another area of Quang Nam Province,
about ten miles southwest of Da Nang, a US Marine
outpost was attacked and overrun by an estimated
enemy.squad. A two-platoon reaction force
searched the area with no contact with the attack-
ing force reported. Three Americans were killed
and one wounded; enemy losses are unknown.
13 January 1967
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II. POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN SOUTH VIETNAM
1. It appears that Premier Ky's bid to remove
defense minister and deputy premier General Co
is beginning to backfire. The US Embassy in an
assessment of the situation, notes indications
that Chief of. State:Thieu, who probably holds the
balance of power in the Directorate on such mili'
tary personnel matters, is supporting Co instead
of K
2. Ky may have let out a deliberate feeler
concerning Co in order to assess his opposition,
possibly in connection with his future residen-
tial prospects.
3. In any event, it appears that there are
strong signals from the Vietnamese military and
from the southern civilians that this situation
is not the same as that which pertained to Gen-
eral Quang, who was replaced as commander of IV
Corps. Although the charges of alleged corrup-
tion are similar, Co, as the deputy prime minis-
ter, occupies a much more exalted position in the
government and is the highest ranking southern
general. There have been reports also that Co.
is active behind the scenes among the southern-
ers, who hope to gain power legally through the
presidential elections. If so, he has the added
advattage of some backing from prominent southern
civilians, who are reportedly restive at present.
The embassy warns that Co's removal might also
present the militant Buddhists another opportunity
to air their grievances against the government.
13 January 1967
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III. NORTH VIETNAMESE MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS
1. There is nothing of significance to report.
1. There is nothing of significance to report.
13 January 1967
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1. The former Swiss ambassador to Peking has
provided the US Embassy in Belgrade an assessment
of his week-long visit to North Vietnam last Decem-
ber while en route to his new post in Yugoslavia.
According to the ambassador, his stopover in Hanoi
was for the sole purpose of discussing bilateral
matters pertaining to questions of trade and human-
itarian aid. Neither the ambassador nor his Vietnam-
ese hosts made any mention of possible Swiss medi-
ation_'in the war.
2. While in Hanoi, the ambassador gained the
impression that the North Vietnamese are currently
looking for additional contacts in the non-Communist
world in an effort to balance their dependence on
the Communist states. He pointed to the two visits
of the Swedish ambassador in Peking to the DRV as
evidence of this effort.
3. These efforts, and others by Hanoi over
the past year or so reflect North Vietnam's desire
to win over neutral and non-Communist nations to its
cause-, rather than an attempt to lessen its depend-
ence on the Communist states.,
13 January 1967
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