THE SITUATION IN VIETNAM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00826A001600010022-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 1, 2006
• Sequence Number: 22
• Publication Date: January 24, 1967
• Content Type: MEMO

Approved For elease 2007/03/14: CIA-R DP79T00826A00160001O 2.4-e'
0 Top Secret
MEMORANDUM
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
The Situation in Vietnam
25X1 Top Secret
112
24 January 1967
 25X1 Approved For Release 2007/03/14: CIA-RDP79T00826AO01600010022-4
Approved For Release 2007/03/14: CIA-RDP79T00826A001600010022-4
 Approve - 2-4
Information as of 1600
24 January 1967
The Communists are using
Route 23 to move large numbers of southbound trucks
through the Laotian panhandle.
I. The Military Situation in South Vietnam:
Bad weather is hampering allied ground operations
in the northern sections of South Vietnam (Para. 1).
Two Americans were killed and 19 wounded as the re-
sult of a nine-hour engagement in Bien Hoa Prov-
ince on 23 January (Para. 2). Light contact has
been reported as allied troops of Operation CEDAR
FALLS continue to sweep the Iron Triangle area of
Binh Duong Province (Paras. 4-5). A recently cap-
tured Viet Cong document indicated many weaknesses
in a Communist logistics group subordinate to COSVN
(Paras. 6-10). The Communist attack on Tan Son Nhut
Airfield on 4-5 December was apparently against,
orders (Paras. 11-12).
II. Political Developments in South Vietnam:
ethnic highlander has been appointed
as the c ie o Pleiku Province (Paras. 4-5). A
Liberation Front broadcast has denied that central
committee member Nguyen Van Hieu was recently inter-
viewed in South Vietnam by a British woman journalist
(Para. 6).
 Approved Far Release 7flfl7/Q3/14 ? rI?_RflP7QTfff27Rdlf11F',fllf11lf177_4
IV. Other Communist Military Developments:
There is nothing significance to report.
V. Communist Political Developments: There
is nothing of significance to report.
VI. Other Major Aspects: The Communists are
using Route 23 to move large numbers of trucks south
through the Laotian panhandle (Paras. 1-5).
24 January 1967
 Approved For R lease 2007/03/14: CIA-RDP79T00826AO01 00010022-4
S? , " f Kontum-
\ NORTH
VIETNAM
1
' Demilitarized Zone
r^ ?Quarg Tri
7 SEpone U 1'1 RI
`:/?~ \ Hue
0 `/? JA 7F11E
l
?'`.. a Nang
?I i Nhon
CheoReo.?T-: U
II'~. n / 9ON o .-IU
Tonle
Sap
.s:l.Uc' C 0~
_ vc~ L
PHNO1
PENH
cr:nu
Doc
IEN
IANC
JSA,ARVN
OPERPTION
CEDAR_FAU.S,r
l TAY\.
RIV:-I
'? 'ay Ninh<
.Attopeu
QUC. iv0 TIP! hu Lai
~Quang Ngai
[TUC N
R!GAI
Ban Me
Thuot
~..
nJUA
~xG pUC
?1-: UOC
LO CG
Phuo'c Vinh
\ vn
Nl II
L A14 CI OiL!G \-'
.
KI\' 'SAIGON. r
CHU NC
THI$
AN
X U YEP!
3I J:-0
I Bien
I`Hoa c 5-U;.~
tOk? c
YIL:'
p.^
fian Rang
611;:
T::UA
Vung au
- Rung Sat Special Zone
 Approved .Ear Release 9nn7/fl /14 - r1?_Rnp7QTnnR9RAnn1Rnnn1nn~2_4
I. THE MILITARY SITUATION-IN SOUTH VIETNAM
1. Flooded terrain, swollen streams and rivers,
and restricted helicopter resupply because of low
ceilings and poor visibility have continued to ham-
per ground operations in the northern parts of South
Vietnam, and no significant contact between allied
and Communist forces has been reported recently in
the two northern corps tactical zones.
2. On 23 January, a company of the US 9th In-
fantry Division about 26 miles east of Saigon in
Bien Hoa Province was attacked with small-arms fire
by an enemy force estimated to be larger than a
company. Close air support was called in, but the
enemy force did not withdraw until after nearly
nine hours of battle. American losses were two
killed and 19 wounded; Viet Cong losses are not
known.
3. In the same general area, US troops fired
on an enemy position early on 24 January. Ten Com-
munist troops were reported killed. No other con-
tact was reported and there were no American casual-
ties.
4. Scattered light contacts continue as the
multibattalion allied Operation CEDAR FALLS sweeps
the Iron Triangle area of Binh Duong Province north
of Saigon. One US company engaged a company-size
Viet Cong unit on 24 January. Eight enemy troops
were killed and three captured.
5. US casualties in this 18-day-old drive to
clear the Iron Triangle area are now 73 killed and
320 wounded compared with 679 Viet Cong killed.
Allied forces have also captured 198 enemy soldiers
and rounded up nearly 500 suspects for questioning.
Viet Cong Logistical Difficulties in Military
Region I
6. A recently captured Viet Cong document
evaluates the projected mission of a logistics
24 January 1967
 Appro 2-4
group for the last quarter of 1966 and the first
quarter of 1967 in the light of its past performance.
The document pointed up a great many internal weak-
nesses in the group and indicated that allied opera-
tions had severely hindered its activities.
7. The document originated, probably in the
latter part of 1966, with the party committee of
Group 84, whose mission is to provide logistics
support for Viet Cong units operating in the Phuoc
Tuy - Bien Hoa Long Khanh Province area and in the
Rung Sat Special Zone. Among these units is the
5th Viet Cong Light Infantry Division.
8. Although the document admitted that serious
difficulties were caused by allied military operations
in the group's area, primary emphasis was given to
internal problems. These included poor discipline
and ideological control, irresponsibility, laziness,
graft, and fear of hardship among the group's mem-
bers, as well as poor coordination with other
logistics organizations in the area. Corruption
appeared to be a major problem: estimates based,
according to the document, on incomplete information
indicated that losses through waste and corruption
alone had amounted to enough to supply 10,000 troops
for three months. Much of the blame was placed on
cadres and party members. According to the document,
73.5 percent of the unit's approximately 1,030 men
were either party or Revolutionary Youth Group mem-
bers.
9. Allied military operations during 1966 in
the group's area, the document complained, had "de-
populated and destroyed" Viet Cong villages, "devas-
tated" the Viet Cong rice crop, and obstructed the
movement of supplies to Communist units. Both man-
power and supply reserves were greatly reduced,
and transportation difficulties became critical as
a result of allied attacks on Communist base areas
and lines of communication.
10. The document claimed that because of the
group's internal problems and the difficulties caused
24 January 1967
 Appro
by allied actions, support for Communist military
units was very poor, and resultant supply shortages
caused a "significant reduction" in combat capa-
bility. Military units were forced to spend most
of their time in "administrative" tasks, presumably
in procuring their own supplies, to the neglect of
military activities. The document placed particular
emphasis on tighter discipline and better morale as
a means of overcoming the group's problems.
VC Violate Order Not to Carry Out Attack
11. A Viet Cong letter captured during Operation
CEDAR FALLS indicates that the attack on the Tan Son
Nhut Airfield on the night of 4-5 December was carried
out without specific orders and that an unsuccessful
attempt was made to stop the raid before it occurred.
According to the letter, the Current Affairs Commit-
tee of VC Military Region IV had ordered an attack
only on three bomb depots, and the Binh Tan District
(Gia Dinh Province) Current Affairs Committee ordered
that larger scale attack plans be dropped because
the raid "was deemed too daring and risky to be car-
ried out." Plans had moved along too far, however,
and the order was received too late to stop the at-
tack.
12. According to the letter, the results of the
attack--in which the Viet Cong lost 35 killed and
captured along with 29 weapons--lowered the troops'
morale. The letter further revealed that party
leadership during the attack was extremely poor, that
reconnaissance information was inaccurate, and that
the assessment of friendly capabilities was incorrect.
24 January 1967
 Approved 10022-4
POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN SOUTH VIETNAM
First Montagnard Province Chief Appointed
4, General Vinh Loco commander of II Corps,
has designated an ethnic highlander from the Jarai
Tribe as the chief of Pleiku Province, but his motive
for doing so is questionable. The new appointee,
Nay Lo, is the first montagnard to become a province
chief' this position has traditionally been one of
great influence at the local level.
24 January 1967
 Approved
5, Nay Lo is the former commander of the
Montagnard Training Center in Pleiku, Although
pleased that a montagnard has been named to head
a province, most highlanders in and out of the
government do not consider Nay Lo sufficiently
decisive or competent to handle such a strategic
roles They reportedly fear that he will follow
the guidance of his deputy--also a highlander,
but considered close to Vinh Loc--and that he
might as a result, make mistakes and bring dis-
credit to the montagnards.
Front Radio Denies Report of Interview
6, The Liberation Front's press agency, in
an "authorized" statement broadcast on 24 January,
has denied that Nguyen Van Hieu, a member of the
Front's central committee, had a recent interview
in South Vietnam with British journalist Gloria
Stewart as reported in the British press on 19
January, The Front statement referred to the al-
leged interview as a "hoax." It made no specific
comment on Miss Stewart's claim that Hieu indicated
the Front was ready for "unconditional negotiations!'
with the US,
24 January 1967
 Approved For Release 2007/03/14: CIA-RDP79T00826AO01600010022-4
Approved For Release 2007/03/14: CIA-RDP79T00826AO01600010022-4
 Approved ForBelease 2007/03/14: CIA-RDP79T0082LA001600010022-4
IV. OTHER COMMUNIST MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS
1. There is nothing of significance to re-
port.
V. COMMUNIST POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS
1. There is nothing of significance to re-
port.
24 January 1967
 Approved For Rile 2007/03/14: CIA-RDP79T00826AO01 00010022-4
LAOS PANHANDLE
3 Mu Gia 0
12 Pass Ip
Muong
4 Phalane
g Phine
920(
Muong Nong
ampassak
923
`Boaang
Islam
Approved For Release 2007/03/14: CIA-RDP79T00826A001600010022-4
 Approved - 10022-4
25X1
1. The Communists are using Route 23 to move
large numbers of southbound trucks through the
Laotian panhandle.
2. A roadwatch team located on Route 23 be-
tween Muong Phine and the Route 911 junction reports
that approximately 225 trucks moved south past its
position during a five-day period it observed the
road in mid-January. This is the largest reported
movement of trucks south of the Mu Gia Pass area
since the dry season began last October. It sug-
gests that--as in past years--the enemy is maintain-
ing much of the supply flow in the corridor through
the sporadic movement of large convoys. Such move-
ment makes it particularly difficult to estimate
traffic levels from incomplete coverage of the road
system.
3. The recent movement on Route 23 is also
the first heavy use of that road since the 1964-65
dry season. Last year, the enemy relied almost
exclusively on Route 911, which runs parallel to
Route 23. The reopening of Route 23 provides the
Communists with an alternate truck route between
the Mu Gia and Tchepone areas, making this section
of the road system less vulnerable to interruption
by US air strikes.
4. The Communists are also continuing to move
substantial numbers of trucks into Laos through the
Mu Gia Pass. Roadwatch teams have spotted some 145
trucks moving south through the pass between 12 and
17 January. These trucks are, almost certainly not
the same as those observed farther south on Route 23
during the same time period. A total of about 340
southbound trucks have been counted in the pass
between 3 and 17 January, a figure as high as any
reported during last year's dry season.
24 January 1967
 Approved
5. Additional information on the extensive
effort that the Communists are continuing to make
in order to maintain supply movements in the pan-
handle has been provided by a recent Pathet Lao de-
fector. He claims that at the time of his defec-
tion in mid-December the North Vietnamese were lay-
ing telephone lines along alternate routes south
of Route 9 in order to shorten interruptions caused
by US air strikes. The defector, who was trained
in North Vietnam and spent several years working
on the Laotian road net, reported that substantial
numbers of North Vietnamese troops are arrayed along
the entire road system to make prompt repairs of
bombed road sections and to maintain a series of
truck relay and repair stations. His remarks sug-
gest that the Communists are bending every effort
to keep the roads open in the panhandle.
24 January 1967