IMPLICATIONS OF ALGERIAN ARMS BUILDUP

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00826A001600010042-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 1, 2006
• Sequence Number: 42
• Publication Date: February 2, 1967
• Content Type: IM

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Secret
No Foreign Dissem
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Intelligence Memorandum
IMPLICATIONS OF ALGERIAN ARMS BUILDUP
Secret
24
2 February 1967
No. 0790/67
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WARNING!
This document contains information affecting the national
defense of the United States, within the meaning of Title
18, sections 793 and 794, of the US Code, as amended.
Its transmission or revelation of its contents to or re-
ceipt by an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
2 February 1967
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
Implications of Algerian Arms Buildup
Summary
The continued 'low of Soviet arms into Algeria--
estimated to have a total value of $185 million--
has increased.,the nervousness of Algeria's neighbors
and has aroused considerable speculation in Western
capitals as to its intentions.
The Algerians describe. the arms buildup as de-
fensive in nature--and there is no evidence to re-
fute this claim--but modern equipment for the army
is also a matter of prestige for the Boumediene gov-
ernment. The USSR's motivation in providing mili-
tary assistance is to increase Soviet influence in
the Algerian Army, the most significant political
force in this major African country.
The Algerian regime has no effective domestic
opposition, and depends on the military for support.
Any change in leadership probably would not sub-
stantially change the government's present domestic
and foreign policies.
NOTE: This memorandum was produced solely by CIA.
It was prepared by the Office of Current
Intelligence and coordinated with the Office
of Research and Reports.
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Background
1. The Algerian Army is developing into a
formidable force on the African continent. In size
(62,000 men) and numbers of military aircraft (83
jets), it is surpassed only by Egypt and South
Africa. However, it presently lacks the logistics
needed to sustain its forces in the field for any
appreciable time.
2. The Algerian arms buildup began in the
fall of 1963 coincident with the Moroccan-Algerian
border clash. Most of the materiel, particularly
aircraft, armor, artillery, and naval units (see
chart), has come from the Soviet Union, which also
provided training in the USSR and sent several
hundred training specialists to Algeria. The pace
of the shipments increased steadily, reaching a
total of 28 in 1966.
3. The USSR, however, is not the sole supplier
of the Algerian Army. Egypt has furnished some
equipment and continues to provide instructors in
Algeria and specialized training in Egypt. France
is giving support to engineering and medical serv-
ices and allocates a few training slots in its mili-
tary schools. Transport and other general support
equipment have been obtained from a variety of
sources, including the UK and West Germany. Italy
is training a small group of naval officers. Al-
geria has also purchased some helicopters, communi-
cations equipment, and certain quartermaster-type
supplies from US commercial sources.
4. Soviet materiel is apparently being sup-
plied under two agreements concluded in February
1963 and May 1965 while Ben Bella was in power.
Boumediene as minister of defense, however, prob-
ably was the principal negotiator; he visited Moscow
in September 1963 and in May 1965. No information
is available as to the terms of those agreements,
but the value of the equipment received thus far is
estimated at $185 million. It is believed that
Boumediene has not concluded any new agreements
since he came to power in June 1965.
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Soviet Arms Policy
5. The Soviet Union is providing military
assistance to Algeria primarily to increase its
influence within the most significant political
force in the country--the Algerian Army.
6. At the time of Algerian independence the
army sorely needed military assistance. With France
willing to provide economic aid, the easiest and
quickest way for Moscow to gain influence in Al-
erian affairs was through military assistance.
7. There are several factors which make
Algeria worthy of Soviet attention. It is the
largest of the North African states and, inter-
nationally, the most influential. Algeria has
been active in such radical organizations as the
Afro-Asian Peoples Solidarity Organization, and
there is no "third world" country more stridently
critical of US policy in Vietnam. As a one-party
state attempting a "socialist" method of develop-
ment, Algeria also qualifies as one of the chosen
few "revolutionary democratic" states which merit
Soviet assistance.
8. While the Soviets are willing to supply the
Algerians with the hardware they desire, there is no
indication that they are anxious for them to use it.
In line with its policy elsewhere, Moscow wants to
avoid open confrontations between'Algeria and West-
ern-oriented Morocco and Tunisia.
Algeria's Intentions
9. Although the Algerian Government admits
that the humiliation its army suffered at the hands
of the Moroccan forces during border hostilities in
October 1963 is an underlying factor in the present
military buildup, it disclaims any aggressive in-
tentions, and there is no reason to doubt Algeria's
statement. Its objective, it says, is a small but
technically competent and well-armed striking force
which could deter any potential attacker. It claims
that it needs a substantial force to protect some
4,000 miles of land boundaries and a coast line of
nearly 800 miles.
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10. The Algerian Government has evinced a patho-
logical fear of external aggression. It considers
Moroccan military forces and Rabat's territorial
claims a real threat to Algerian security. Last
spring and summer, Algerian officials clearly be-
lieved recurrent rumors that the US had concluded
base agreements with both Morocco and Tunisia with
the objective of "encircling" Algeria. Repeated
denials by US, Moroccan, and Tunisian officials
somewhat allayed their fears. Yet within the past
fortnight, two Algerian officials have cited the
continued lack of response to Algeria's request of
13 August for 250,000 tons of US PL 480 wheat, the
prospect of new American arms for Morocco and Tu-
nisia, the approaching visit to the US of Morocco's
King Hassan, and the conference in Tangier of Ameri-
can diplomats from North and West Africa as factors
leading Algiers to'conclude that the US may indeed
be trying to "encircle" Algeria through Morocco and
Tunisia.
11. Although Algeria's relations with Tunisia
seem to have improved somewhat in recent months,
its relations with Morocco continue to be shaky.
The most recent irritation was King Hassan's ar-
rangement for the burial in Morocco of Mohamed
Khider, the former secretary general of Algeria's
only political party, the National Liberation
Front (FLN). Khider, who had "absconded" with the
FLN treasury amounting to some $10 to $15 million,
was assassinated in Madrid on 3 January.
The Algerian Army
12. Inheriting a fragmented and ineffectual
party, the Boumediene government has relied on the
army as its base of support. The army's participa-
tion in government is largely in policy matters.
More than half of the 24 members of the Revolu-
tionary Council--the country's policy making body--
are military officers, and virtually all were mem-
bers of the armed forces during the rebellion.
13. The army itself is divided into four fac-
tions: (a) former officers or noncommissioned of-
ficers of the French Army who, as members of the
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former rebel "Army of the Exterior" and general
staff, sat out most of the rebellion in neighboring
Tunisia and Morocco; (b) ex-guerrilla chieftains of
the "Interior Army" who have developed leadership
qualities and considerable influence in their own
regions; (c) relative newcomers from the French
Army whose military background is good but w1lo have
little prestige because of their late conversion to
the nationalist cause; and (d) the "new army"
trained abroad since independence, mostly in the
USSR and Egypt. Boumediene's objective has been
through intensive training to create a more homo-
geneous professional army and to smooth over the
inevitable frictions among these groups.
Coup Prospects
14. While the possibility cannot be ruled out,
it appears unlikely that any element of the armed
forces could successfully plan or carry out a coup.
It does not appear that any group of military com-
manders could muster sufficient support to force
through measures which Boumediene and his army sup-
porters opposed. Should key commanders, including
those who control the bulk of the army's fire power,
disagree with Boumediene on an issue of importance
to the military, he would fall in-line.
15. Should Boumediene be assassinated, the
Revolutionary Council would probably select a suc-
cessor. In such event, the council probably would
continue to formulate policy and to delegate the
day-to-day administration of the government to a
group of the most highly qualified and competent
technicians available. External and internal pol-
icies probably would not change; Algeria would be
likely to retain close ties with France, to aspire
to leadership in the "third world," to maintain an
affinity for African radicals and Communist re-
gimes, and to be extremely suspicious of foreign
advice and advisers.
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 2 February 1967
1. This maemorandu,prepared at the request of the
D/OUI, has been coordinated with ORR.
2. The paper says there is no evidence to refute
Algeria's claim that the continuing Soviet arms buildup
in Algeria--an estimated $185 million worth to date--is
for defensive purposes. The government has evinced a
pathological fear of external aggression, and considers
Moroccan military forces and Rabat's territorial claims
a real threat to Algeria's security. The USSR's motives
in furnishing military assistance is to increase its in-
fluence to the country, since the army is the most sig-
nificant political force in Algeria. The buildup is
also a matter of prestige for the Uoumediene regime,
which is without effective domestic opposition and is
dependent on the military for support. The chances of
a coup are discounted.
3. It is recommended that the memorandum be given
routine internal and external dissemination.
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